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Abstract 
 
This thesis acts as an exploration of the notion of an a priori aporia of the always 
already diminished subject as opposed to an ideal self-present individual, and explores 
the efforts of a selection of twentieth  century continental philosophy to address the 
crises  of  scepticism  and  metaphysics  that  beset  this  tradition  and  its  search  for  the 
‘truth’ of being. I will argue that my atemporal philosophical teleology proves in fact 
that any attempt to determine the finitude of subjectivity represents an ineluctable desire 
for metaphysical comfort that can, at times, verge on totalitarianism. Furthermore, the 
divergent temporal loci of these theorists — and their particular attempts to address 
these  recurrent  crises  —  necessarily  calls  into  question  the  popular  perception  of  a 
temporally specific ‘postmodern condition’ afflicting the contemporary subject. 
 
  Given the repeated failure of philosophical discourse to provide the subject with 
its raison d’être, a focus on the usefulness of literature in this regard becomes apparent 
within  my  theoretical  schema,  leading  to  a  discussion  of  several  controversial 
contemporary novels that parallel my proposition of the diminished subject, and refute 
negative perceptions of them as postmodern and valueless due to an apparent nihilistic 
‘anything goes’ attitude. However, rather than resorting to naïve utopianism regarding 
the  positive  uses  of  literature,  I  argue  that  these  texts  reiterate  the  key  theoretical 
propositions in this thesis with an awareness of the discursive nature of the subject and 
the  a  priori  condition  of  the  possibility  of  change  which  inevitably  undermine 
transcendence.  It  is  my  proposition  that  these  texts  can  be  read  as  fictionalised 
expressions of the cathartic possibilities of literature, and an innate desire in all subjects 
for  the  metaphysics  of  comfort  when  faced  with  the  meaninglessness  of  existence, 
something exacerbated by the recurrent failure of philosophical and religious discourses 
to counter the aporia of an always already absent self-presence of subjectivity.     
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   1 
Introduction 
 
By  way  of  a  brief  ‘introduction’  to  this  thesis  on  the  ‘diminished  subject’  and 
contemporary literature, I will begin with a discussion regarding structure. Yet despite 
the  philosophical  nature  of this  text, I  am  not  referring  to  the  obvious  Structuralist 
concerns  of  Claude  Lévi-Strauss  —  the  proto-post-structuralist  musings  of  Roland 
Barthes  —  the  Heideggerian  discourse  of  ‘destruction’  —  a  widely  disseminated 
misunderstanding of Derridean deconstruction — nor the plethora of anti-structuralist, 
anarchic, ‘free-play’ theories — both positive and negative — of ‘postmodernism.’ By 
contrast,  and  despite  repeated  attempts  to  achieve  a  concrete  understanding  or 
transcendence of subjectivity through the study of the minutiae of existence, or certain 
rabid anti-metaphysical responses to these deterministic investigations into the intimate 
aspects of our subjectivity, I am referring to the more mundane, but no less important, 
structures of the everyday that help us formulate our daily lives, our narratives of self, 
and which determine certain more formal discourses, such as thesis writing. 
  Due to what I shall refer to as the ‘metaphysics of submission’ it is necessary 
that I structure this thesis in a certain predetermined manner, bearing in mind font sizes, 
margin  widths,  minimum  and  maximum  lengths,  and  various  other  dictates  of 
formatting. What escapes such determinism, to one’s great fortune and potential peril, 
are  the  ideas  and  postulations  therein  and  —  if  you  have  one  —  the  conclusion. 
However, what is determined is that one structure one’s thesis in a certain way, with an 
introduction, or preface— outlining the content of the thesis but not ‘giving the game 
away’ too soon — with several lengthy chapters that elucidate one’s argument and build 
towards a climax — and a conclusion or denouement that reiterates, summarises, and 
gives clarity to one’s argument, while tantalisingly hinting at further areas of research. 
What is advisable though — despite the possibility that the theoretical content of any   2 
given  thesis  may  explore  the  potential  limits  of  the  defamiliarisation  of  discursive 
structures,  through  the  appropriation  of  the  anti-metaphysical  theories  of  post-
structuralism or deconstruction — is that these structures be adhered to. 
  Bearing in mind this problematic, it is indeed ironic that given the focus of this 
thesis into the possibility of a diminished contemporary subject — as opposed to the 
metaphysically  self-present  individual  of  traditional  religious  and  philosophical 
discourses — that these determining structures should play such an overt role. However, 
rather than viewing the imposition of these structural dictates as a hindrance, I have 
appropriated this necessary, and unavoidable, metaphysical need for order to emphasise 
and amplify my proposition that the diminished subject is an a priori aspect of being, 
and not the retrograde diminishing of a previously obtainable metaphysical ideal self. 
Therefore, I use a deliberate structure of repetition and recurrence, whereby various 
crises of philosophy and subjectivity are reiterated in each chapter and  sub-section, 
building a rhythm that reaches a theoretical coda of sorts in the final chapter. Apart 
from the obvious aim of emphasising my theoretical propositions, this structure not only 
allows for any individual section to be read as a micro-level exemplar of the entire text, 
it  also  develops  a  certain  familiarity  with  my  arguments  and  neologisms,  which  I 
extrapolate and consolidate in my final chapter. 
  As a consolation to myself, and given my patent mistrust of deterministic and 
totalitarian discourses, I have taken a certain liberty with this particular structure. While 
the first three chapters make up the bulk of my theoretical propositions, there exists a 
problem  for  those  in  need  of  the  metaphysical  comfort  of  a  chronological  ‘correct’ 
teleology of my subjective reading of twentieth century continental thought. Rather than 
exploring the possible theoretical precedents of the diminished subject in temporal order 
—  and  given  the  historical  concurrence  of  certain  theorists  and  unavoidable  cross-
fertilisation of ideas — I instead chose to follow the subtext of the other major premise   3 
of this thesis — the possibility of positive alternative explorations of subjectivity in 
literature — and create a diachronous teleology that investigates an increased focus on 
the  literary,  rather  than  reinforcing  any  philosophical  timeline.  Thus,  it  becomes 
apparent why my theoretical ‘genealogy’ begins with Sigmund Freud and ends with 
Albert  Camus  rather  than  commencing,  as  one  might  expect,  with  the  writing  of 
Friedrich Nietzsche and ending with the recently deceased Jacques Derrida. 
  Despite my attempt to structure this thesis in an anti-metaphysical manner, there 
remain certain necessary groupings of theoretical thematics in each of the first three 
chapters. This begins with Chapter 1: The Unconscious, the Symbolic & the Semiotic 
— Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva, wherein I focus on the increased 
conflation of the discussion of subjectivity and the literary which, despite proposing a 
teleology  of  psychoanalytic  theory,  progressively  becomes  less  deterministic.  In 
Chapter 2: Phenomenology, Deconstruction and the Diminished Subject — Edmund 
Husserl, Martin Heidegger and  Jacques Derrida, I explore the manner in which the 
development  of  Husserlian  phenomenology  mutated  firstly  into  the  ‘proto-
deconstruction’ of Heideggerian ‘destruction,’ and then the widely appropriated and 
much  maligned  theories  of  Derridean  deconstruction,  all  of  which  undermine  the 
primacy of the self-present individual by acknowledging the ineluctable relationship 
between subject and language. While finally in Chapter 3: Nihilism, Existentialism, 
Absurdism and the Diminished Subject — Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Albert Camus, I perform a ‘literary turn’ of sorts, whereby my theoretical focus on 
literature and subjectivity reaches its peak with the somewhat vitriolic aphorisms of 
Nietzsche’s  proto-existentialism,  the  rigorous  existential  theories  and  inconsistent 
fiction of Sartre, and the widely revered fiction of the theoretical ‘outsider’ Camus. 
  Having reached a zenith of sorts with the philosophical possibilities of literature 
with Camus, I then shift my attention to a contemporary discussion of the diminished   4 
subject in relation to so-called ‘postmodernism’ and arguments pertaining to a supposed 
lack  of  content  and  value  in  the  literature  of  this  anti-theoretical  movement  — 
something  that  roughly  divides  this  thesis  into  two  halves.  In  Chapter  4:  The 
Diminished Subject, Contemporary Theory and Literature —The Postmodern Condition 
and Generation X, I discuss a plethora of discourses — both positive and negative — 
with a view to the subject of the ‘postmodern condition’ as a diminished shadow of the 
former self-present ‘modern’ individual, and of the apparent nihilism and apathy of an 
entire generation and its cultural output, before carrying out a close reading of Bret 
Easton Ellis’ Less Than Zero — a text widely regarded as exemplifying these criticisms. 
Then in Chapter 5: The Prescient Text — Subjectivity, Literature and Philosophy in 
Trainspotting, Empire of the Senseless, Cocaine Nights and American Psycho, I discuss 
the philosophical implications of fictionalised expressions of the diminished subject, 
while referring to, and reiterating, the key themes and concepts discussed in previous 
chapters. While finally, in Chapter 6: The Diminished Subject, The Metaphysics of 
Comfort, The Narrative of Self and Michel Foucault, I discuss the philosophical life and 
works  of  Michel  Foucault  as  a  form  of  summary  par  excellence  of  my  repeated 
theoretical proposition of the diminished subject and the impact of the condition of the 
possibility of change. 
   5 
Chapter 1 
 
The Unconscious, the Symbolic & the Semiotic — 
Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan and Julia Kristeva 
 
 
1.1.a. Sigmund Freud — From Individual to Subject 
 
To  begin  this  theoretical  investigation  into  the  a  priori  diminished  subject  the 
psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud makes an ideal starting point, for not only 
did  Freud  question  the  metaphysical  tradition  of  philosophy,  his  innovative 
investigations into the human mind provided the catalyst for a shift away from the 
dominant  perspective  of  self-present  consciousness,  to  one  that  undermined  the 
traditional primacy of the Cartesian cogito. In The Subject of Semiotics, Kaja Silverman 
discusses the implications of the transition from a traditional notion of the self-present 
individual to a predominant postmodern view of the fragmented subject, indicating that 
within  Freudian  psychoanalysis  there  occurred  a  movement  away  from  the  stable 
concept of metaphysical consciousness toward a view of a divided unconscious, arguing 
that: “[t]ogether the terms ‘individual’ and ‘man’ posit an entity that is autonomous and 
stable. ‘Man’ presupposes  a human essence that remains untouched by historical or 
cultural circumstances — what the Renaissance was fond of calling ‘reason,’ but which 
in  the  twentieth  century  generally  goes  by  the  name  ‘consciousness’”  (1983:126). 
Traditionally then, consciousness was seen as the irrefutable locus of individuality and 
self-presence that existed independent of external influences, yet Freud’s theoretical 
shift from consciousness to the unconscious proposed that the individual was subject to 
cultural  and  discursive  influences,  a  position  radically  removed  from  traditional 
religious  philosophy.  The  primacy  of  consciousness  in  traditional  metaphysical 
philosophy  is  made  clear  by  French  philosopher  René  Descartes,  and  his  famous 
proclamation ‘cogito ergo sum’  — or ‘I think therefore I am.’ In his ‘Introduction’ to   6 
Descartes’  Discourse  on  Method,  F.E.  Sutcliffe  explains  that  with  the  primacy  of 
consciousness there occurs: 
[A] clear and distinct conception of the fact that he exists; he can therefore believe 
that whatever else he perceives with the same clarity and distinction is equally true. 
Moreover, he knows himself only as a thinking being, he is therefore assured that the 
soul and the body are entirely distinct. Since he has been able to understand his own 
being and essence without yet knowing anything about the world outside him, it 
follows that his self — or soul — is completely independent of the outside world, 
mind is distinct and superior to matter (1972:19). 
 
In  other  words,  for  Descartes  consciousness  exists  independent  of  external  cultural 
discourses  making  it  purely  self-present,  something  Silverman  expands  upon  when 
indicating that: “Descartes’s ‘I’ assumes itself to be fully conscious […] and hence fully 
self-knowable. It is not only autonomous but coherent; the concept of another psychic 
territory, in contradiction to consciousness, is unimaginable” (1983:128). For Descartes 
therefore,  nothing  can  impinge  on  the  primacy  of  the  cogito  for  the  presence  of 
consciousness in the newly born precludes the possibility of any prior interference from 
culture.  Although  Descartes  was  predominantly  interested  in  consciousness  as  a 
manifestation of perfection that proved the existence of God, his position was widely 
popular given its inherent humanism. However, with Freud’s focus on the unconscious 
there  occurred  a  shift  from  this  unquestioned  self-present  individual  to  that  of  the 
divided subject. Furthermore, he broke with the tradition of the cogito further still by 
implicating the body in the development of consciousness and the discursive influences 
of  language  and  culture  on  subjectivity,  a  position  far  removed  from  that  of 
metaphysical philosophy. As such, what follows is an outline of Freud’s key theories 
that illustrate this change, and which posit the influence of external registers such as 
culture, language and corporeality in this process. Therefore, I shall begin by discussing 
Freud’s theory of the advent of infantile sexuality which not only divided the subject in 
its own right, but created rifts within his theory of the preconscious unconscious, and 
his later concepts of the id, ego and super-ego.   7 
 
1.1.b. The Sexually Divided Subject 
 
The first of Freud’s theoretical propositions that supports the notion of a diminished 
subjectivity is the Oedipus complex, something that takes its lead from Sophocles’ King 
Oedipus,
1 and sets about explaining the development of infantile sexuality whereby the 
incest taboo directs the individual towards acceptable sexual behaviour. Freud argued 
that following its successful progression through the oral and anal stages, a child arrives 
at the genital stage giving rise to the Oedipus complex, which manifests itself as the 
first love-object and a longing in the child for the opposite gender parent, and results in 
the equivalent parent becoming a threat to the fulfilment of this taboo, and for it to wish 
for the death of this apparent rival. Freud highlights this process in The Interpretation of 
Dreams stating that: 
It is the fate of all of us, perhaps, to direct our first sexual impulse towards our 
mother and our first hatred and our first murderous wish against our father. Our 
dreams convince us that this is so. King Oedipus […] merely shows us the fulfilment 
of  our  own  childhood  wishes.  But,  more  fortunate  than  he,  we  have  meanwhile 
succeeded, in so far as we have not become psychoneurotics, in detaching our sexual 
impulses from our mothers and in forgetting our jealousy of our fathers (1983:364). 
 
Despite the obvious cultural implications for the development of sexuality here, Freud 
suggests that the individual must repress this taboo desire for the love of one parent and 
the death of the other, in order to become a stable and socially acceptable sexual being. 
He believes that this was achieved through the twin processes of a fear of castration and 
the repression of the Oedipus complex, both of which begin the division of the subject 
and  facilitate  the  interpellation  of  culturally  determined  gender  roles.  Following 
rebuttals for playing with his genitals, the boy’s fear of castration, and the resigned 
acceptance of castration by the girl, are instrumental in the suppression of the Oedipus 
complex and the division of the subject into gender roles. For Freud the boy is faced 
with two choices as a result of his inappropriate desire for his mother — although Freud 
suggests that there is a third that leads to homosexuality
2 — he can attempt to have   8 
intercourse with her, or resign himself to the displacement of his wish for the love of his 
mother  and  to  sublimate  another  love-object,  such  as  the  father.  However,  as  he 
discusses in ‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex,’ these choices are extremely 
problematic given that they both involve the loss of the penis with: “the masculine one 
as a resulting punishment and the feminine one as a precondition. If the satisfaction of 
love in the field of the Oedipus complex is to cost the child his penis, a conflict is bound 
to  arise  between  the  narcissistic  interest  in  that  part  of  his  body  and  the  libidinal 
cathexis of his parental objects” (176). Thus, the child’s narcissistic desire for his penis 
leads to the sublimation of the Oedipus complex and is instrumental in the development 
of the ego as an alternative love-object to both mother and father in the form of self-
love, leading to the latency period and the successful development of male sexuality. 
However,  the  realisation  of  this  threat,  and  the repression  of  the  Oedipus  complex, 
become  manifest  only  when  the  young  boy  first  views  female  genitalia,  with  the 
missing penis the assumed result of castration.  
  Freud believes that the boy’s desire to retain his genitals, and the recognition of 
the girl as castrated, allows the male child to repress his prohibited desires, explaining 
this process thus: “The observation which finally breaks down his unbelief is the sight 
of the female genitals. Sooner or later the child, who is so proud of his possession of a 
penis, has a view of the genital region of a little girl, and cannot help being convinced of 
the absence of a penis in a creature that is so like himself. With this, the loss of his own 
penis becomes imaginable, and the threat of castration takes its desired effect” (175-76). 
He suggests that this fear of castration, and the switching of love-objects, has a doubly 
dividing effect, as an originary and inherent bisexuality then needs to be overcome
3 and 
is only achieved with the repression of the Oedipus complex and the onset of the ego as 
love-object. In addition, the development of the child’s behaviour through the fulfilment 
of pleasurable desire is controlled by the unpleasure principle — later redeveloped by   9 
Freud as the pleasure principle — that prevents the individual acting on wishes and 
desires  that  are  deemed  taboo.  Thus,  the  Oedipal  desire  for  the  taboo,  and  the 
unpleasurable  fear  of  castration  is  repressed,  and  the  possibility  of  a  metaphorical 
division of the subject is removed.  
  The recognition in the boy of the girl’s absent penis, and vice versa, begins the 
differentiation between the sexes and establishes culturally specific gender roles. The 
possibility of castration finds the boy gladly accepting his gender role and results in the 
repression of his desire for his mother and the death of the father, thus allowing him to 
achieve  his  masculine  status.  The  girl’s  story  is  quite  different  and  has  resulted  in 
feminist criticism of Freud’s perspective of the female as lacking and inferior, given 
that it creates an oppressive division between the sexes and diminishes female influence 
in society, as can be seen when Freud states that: 
The little girl’s clitoris behaves just like a penis to begin with; but, when she makes a 
comparison with a playfellow of the other sex she perceives that she has ‘come off 
badly’ and she feels this as a wrong done to her and as grounds for inferiority. For a 
while she consoles herself with the expectation that later on, when she grows older, 
she will acquire just as big an appendage as the boy’s. Here the masculinity complex 
of women branches off. A female child, however, does not understand her lack of a 
penis as being a sex character; she explains it by assuming that at some earlier date 
she had possessed an equally large organ and lost it in castration […] the essential 
difference thus comes about that the girl accepts castration as an accomplished fact 
(178). 
 
For Freud then, the threat of castration is paramount in the repression of the Oedipus 
complex in the boy, while the girl is under the impression that she has suffered an actual 
castration and views herself as inferior to the male — and a priori lacking — leading 
her to desire the father, and to sublimate the loss of her own penis onto his and to bear 
him a child. He points out that: “Her Oedipus complex culminates in a desire, which is 
long retained, to receive a baby from her father as a gift — to bear him a child […] The 
two  wishes  —  to  posses  a  penis  and  child  —  remain  strongly  cathected  in  the 
unconscious and help prepare the female creature for her later sexual role” (179). Thus, 
the repression of the Oedipus complex can be seen to create a clear stratification of   10 
gender  roles  whereby  the  position  of  female  subject  —  or  ‘creature’  —  is  greatly 
diminished in comparison to the male.  
 
1.1.c. The Diminished Subject and the Early Topography 
 
Although I have merely touched on the manner in which the Oedipus complex divides 
the male and female subject through the imposition of discursive gender roles, it also 
acts  as  the  main  source  for  Freud’s  investigations  into  the  unconscious  of  those 
suffering  from  what  he  termed  ‘psychoneuroses.’  He  began  investigating  the 
psychological  and  pathological  problems  of  individuals  under  hypnosis,  but  soon 
developed a process whereby dreams became his focus of attention, believing that the 
symptoms of those suffering from neuroses were caused by the incomplete repression of 
unfulfilled desires that were usually sexually taboo in nature, and arose in early infancy. 
He suggested that this process of repression was carried out by the preconscious
4 at the 
behest  of  the  pleasure  principle  in  order  to  prevent  the  individual  suffering  any 
unpleasure resulting from inappropriate wish fulfilment — such as castration with the 
Oedipus complex. In Freud’s first theoretical topography he proposed a need for the 
conscious to be shielded from unpleasurable experiences, something achieved by an 
interaction between what he termed the preconscious and the unconscious.
5 He believed 
that the clearest manifestation of the unconscious was in dreams, and that in dream-
work there was affected a process of condensation and displacement. It was here that 
the  unpleasurable  aspects  of  wish-fulfilment  were  redirected  onto  alternative  and 
innocent moments — generally based on the previous day’s experiences — and thereby 
displaced and disguised as dream-thoughts to protect the individual, and provide them 
with a sound sleep. Here we see a departure from Descartes’ self-present individual, as 
the preconscious represses prohibited wishes of the unconscious thus preventing them 
from becoming conscious and present, and those which do so are censored and filtered 
by the preconscious, thus metaphysically dividing the subject.    11 
  For Freud then, it was in the dreams of those suffering from neuroses that this 
process could best be disclosed allowing the analyst an insight into the workings of the 
unconscious mind of the analysand. However, as Freud points out in The Interpretation 
of  Dreams:  “what  is  suppressed,  continues  to  exist  in  normal  people  as  well  as 
abnormal, and remains capable of psychical functioning. Dreams themselves are among 
the  manifestations  of  this  suppressed  material”  (1983:768).  Here  Freud  draws  a 
distinction between those who have repressed their prohibited desires and those who 
have not, and for whom the taboo manifests itself in dream-thoughts and — in some 
cases — physical symptoms. It was his belief that these psychoneurotic disorders could 
be revealed in therapy thus enabling the individual to function in normal society, yet 
this  process  legitimates  certain  socially  acceptable  expressions  of  subjectivity,  and 
effectively diminishes those who fall outside its deterministic parameters. 
  Although Freud was primarily interested in the well being of those suffering from 
neuroses — for he was essentially a humanist — he still believed that with the analysis 
of dreams the complete workings of the human mind could be uncovered, famously 
explaining that: “The interpretation of dreams is the royal road to a knowledge of the 
unconscious  activities  of  the  mind”  (769).  He  goes  on  to  state  that:  “By  analysing 
dreams we can take a step forward in our understanding of the composition of that most 
marvellous of all instruments. Only a small step, no doubt; but a beginning” (769). 
Freud  believed  that  dreams  and  pathologies  were  entrances  into  the  unconscious 
workings of the mind, and that a greater understanding of these processes, achieved 
through  psychoanalysis,  would  gradually  reveal  its  secrets  resulting  in  clearer 
perspectives of neuroses and subjectivity in general.  
  While Freud can be seen to diminish the metaphysical individual with his division 
of  the  human  mind  into  the  conscious,  preconscious  and  unconscious,  he  was  also 
‘guilty’  of  establishing  his  own  metaphysical  propositions.  When  discussing  sexual   12 
neuroses,  Freud  explains  that:  “The  theory  of  the  psychoneuroses  asserts  as  an 
indisputable and invariable fact that only sexual wishful impulses from infancy, which 
have  undergone  repression  […]  during  the  developmental  period  of  childhood,  are 
capable of being revived during later developmental periods […] and are thus able to 
furnish the motive force for the formation of psychoneurotic symptoms of every kind” 
(766). That is, for Freud the inadequate repression of the early oral, anal, genital phases 
and the Oedipus complex, invariably leads to neuroses, hysterical behaviour and sexual 
aberrations. However, despite believing that he could unlock the workings of the mind 
through the analysis of neuroses, he expressed reservations about this process arguing 
that:  “It  is  not  now  a  question  of  whether  I  have  formed  an  approximately  correct 
opinion of the psychological factors with which we are concerned, or whether, which is 
quite possible in such difficult matter, my picture of them is distorted and incomplete” 
(767). Thus, Freud himself appears divided, for although he redefines the subject in 
terms of the unconscious and the effects of the Oedipus complex, he also diminishes the 
primacy  of  the  metaphysical  subject,  and  while  he  attempts  to  pinpoint  neurotic 
behaviour in a deterministic manner on one hand, he fuels doubts about the validity of 
his  research  on  the  other.
6  Therefore,  Freud  constantly  redeveloped  his  theoretical 
premises according to new insights, pointing out that: “we must always be prepared to 
drop our conceptual scaffolding if we feel that we are in a position to replace it by 
something that approximates more closely to the unknown reality” (770). This not only 
brings into question the possibility of a complete understanding of the unconscious, but 
also acts as a theoretical manifestation of the inherently diminished subject. 
 
1.1.d. The Divided Subject of the Mature Topography 
 
Having undermined the traditional notion of the primacy of the self-present cogito in 
The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud continued his division of the unconscious in his 
later work, and it is to ‘The Id and the Ego’ and the manner in which his ‘mature   13 
topography’ continues to diminished the subject that I shall now turn to.
7 Reworking his 
earlier  propositions  Freud  posited  that  gaps  existed  in  the  relationship  between  the 
preconscious and the unconscious and set about redefining these mental processes. To 
account for the passage of acceptable thoughts and memories from the conscious to the 
unconscious — when the unconscious was seen solely as a repressing agent — Freud 
renamed the unconscious the id, and divided the preconscious between the ego and 
super-ego. The ego being primarily a bodily process involved with the external world 
and the id the purely internal, while the super-ego acts as a facilitator between the two, 
thus dividing Freud’s conceptual apparatus even further. 
  Following  the  repression  of  the  Oedipus  complex  and  the  sublimation  of  the 
parent as love-object, Freud believed there was a void in the wish fulfilment of the 
unconscious that needed to be supplanted by the ego. Silverman explains the difference 
between  the  id  and  the  unconscious  stating  that:  “it  lacks  the  latter’s  signifying 
capacities, seeing to be little more than an area of instinctual anarchy. Freud associates 
it with the passions, and he attributes to it qualities like unruliness and lack of control. 
The  id  always  obeys  the  dictates  of  the  pleasure  principle,  no  matter  what  the 
consequences” (1983:133). That is, the ego develops with the repression of the Oedipus 
complex, keeping the primordial desires of the id in check by setting itself up as the 
love-object thus replacing the original parental object-choice — that which is deemed 
taboo — without recourse to unpleasure. Freud explains this process in ‘The Id and the 
Ego’ stating that: “it may be said that this transformation of an erotic object-choice into 
an alteration of the ego is also a method by which the ego can obtain control over the id 
and deepen its relation with it […] When the ego assumes the feature of the object, it is 
forcing itself, so to speak, upon the id as a love-object and is trying to make good the 
id’s loss by saying: ‘Look, you can love me too — I am so like the object’” (1978:30). 
We can see that there occurs a process of introjection whereby the ego facilitates the   14 
transformation of the desire for inaccessible love-objects through reason and common 
sense — referred to as the ‘reality principle’ — setting itself up as an alternative love-
object  keeping  the  pleasure  principle  in  check.  This  process  creates  a  view  of 
subjectivity as divided between the primordial desires of the pleasure principle that acts 
on the id, and the reason and control of the reality principle, as executed by the ego. 
  However, there exists another division and arena of conflict in Freud’s mature 
topography in the relationship between the ego  and the super-ego, or ego-ideal. He 
states that the super-ego develops following the repression of the Oedipus complex and 
acts as a link between the external concerns of the ego and the internal processes of the 
id, suggesting that it does so primarily to keep the Oedipus complex repressed and to 
establish an ideal ego, which must at once reinforce its masculine role, and suppress the 
desire for the mother. He argues that: “The super-ego is […] not simply a residue of the 
earliest  object-choices  of  the  id;  it  also  represents  an  energetic  reaction-formation 
against these choices. Its relation to the ego is not exhausted by the precept: ‘You ought 
to be like this (like your father).’ It also compromises the prohibition: ‘You may not be 
like this (like your father) — that is, you may not do all he does; some things are his 
prerogative.’ This double aspect of the ego ideal derives from the fact that the ego ideal 
had the task of repressing the Oedipus complex” (34). Not only does the super-ego 
repress the ego by dictating the manner in which it may, or may not, act on the desires 
of the id, Freud suggests it also acts as the heir to the Oedipus complex. That is, it 
allows  identification  with,  but  not  the  displacement  of  the  father  by  the  ego,  and 
assumes that disciplinary role for itself, indicating that the super-ego not only represses 
the Oedipus complex, it also acts as a surrogate to the paternal discipline of the father 
and  a  distinction  between  it  and  the  ego.  Thus,  the  imposition  of  the  ego-ideal 
establishes a distinction between the self of the ego, and the other that is the father.
8 
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1.1.e. The Culturally and Literally Divided Subject 
 
Freud’s fascination with the inner workings of the mind stemmed from his interest in 
psychoneurotic behaviour and, in most cases, he viewed these neuroses as the result of 
the incomplete repression of the Oedipus complex by the unconscious in his early work, 
and by the super-ego in his later formulations. For Freud, these neurotic manifestations 
were expressions of prohibited wish fulfilment and generally taboo in nature, believing 
that  those  suffering  from  these  symptoms  needed  to  undergo  dream  therapy  and 
psychoanalysis in order to successfully achieve acceptable sexual and social behaviour. 
Thus,  Freud’s  attitude  towards  the  development  of  the  sexual  subject  is  inherently 
deterministic, given that those exhibiting counter-discursive behaviour are automatically 
‘othered’ for their own good, and for that of the wider community.  
  We find him expressing this view in ‘The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex,’ 
wherein  he  argues  that:  “[a]lthough  the  majority  of  human  beings  go  through  the 
Oedipus complex as an individual experience, it is nevertheless a phenomenon which is 
determined and laid down by hereditary and which is bound to pass away according to 
programme when the next preordained phase of development sets in” (1978:174). In 
other words, the phases of sexual development and the outcome of the repression of the 
Oedipus complex — whereby subjects interpellate their gender roles — are viewed as 
metaphysical. Those individuals who fail to achieve this accepted standard — such as 
neurotics,  hysterics,  schizophrenics,  homosexuals,  bisexuals  and  even  epileptics  — 
form a problematic minority that must be cured by psychoanalysis. This metaphysical 
perspective of sexual development and general behaviour not only prioritises dominant 
cultural  gender  roles,  it  highlights  the  personal  moralistic  position  of  the  theorist 
himself. Silverman comments on the cultural determination of sexuality explaining that: 
“[I]n Three Essays on Sexuality oral and anal sexuality are designated as ‘pre-genital,’ 
as if to suggest that they are preliminary stages in a larger narrative. Even the adult   16 
sexual  encounter  resembles  a  road  whose  destination  is  all-important  —  since  the 
logical  culmination  of  such  an  act  is  procreation,  excessive  lingering  (i.e.  foreplay) 
along  the  way  is  to  be  discouraged”  (1983:136).  Thus,  Freud’s  perspective  of 
psychoneurotic  sexual  behaviour  is  not  only  discursive  in  nature  —  reflecting  the 
dominant cultural and moralistic dictates of his time — it further diminishes and divides 
the self-present subject. Therefore, acceptable gender roles are socially derived rather 
than  ‘preordained,’  while  counter-discursive  sexuality  is  dismissed  as  infantile,  and 
those subjects exhibiting these ‘neuroses’ find themselves drastically othered. 
  Having  highlighted  the  problems  associated  with  Freud’s  metaphysical 
perspective of the Oedipus complex as essentially discursive, it must be noted that he 
was quite aware of the influence of culture on his theories, explaining in ‘The Ego and 
the Id,’ that: “[t]he differentiation between ego and id must be attributed not only to 
primitive man but even to much smaller organisms, for it is the inevitable expression of 
the influence of the external world. The super-ego, according to our hypothesis, actually 
originated from the experiences that led to totemism” (1978:38). As such, there exists 
herein a contradiction, whereby Freud views the sexual development of the subject as 
preordained, while acknowledging the cultural and discursive origins of the Oedipus 
complex — the very cornerstone of his theories. If, as he suggests, the super-ego is 
developed from the Oedipus complex and is based on the taboo and totemism, then it 
follows  that  his  perspective  of  the  human  mind  is  itself  culturally  determined  and 
necessarily reliant on discursive practices and linguistic dictates, and therefore always 
already exposed to the condition of the possibility of change. This view also explains 
critical  feminist  readings  of  Freud’s  perspective  of  pre-given  and  socially  defined 
genders roles that isolate the sexually counter-discursive as an aberration on the basis of 
subjectively determined and temporally specific metaphysical concepts.    17 
  Despite these contradictions he took great interest in historical, mythological and 
literary texts in order to build his perspective of the Oedipus complex. Having based his 
theory  on  Sophocles’  story  of  King  Oedipus,  Freud  carried  out  his  own  reading  of 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet as an Oedipal text, positing that Hamlet was suffering from a 
psychoneurotic disorder brought about by the murder of his father by Claudius, who 
subsequently married his mother Gertrude. Freud explains Hamlet’s initial inability to 
act on his findings, and his bellicose soliloquies thus: “Hamlet is able to do anything — 
except take vengeance on the man who did away with his father and took that father’s 
place  with  his  mother,  the  man  who  shows  him  the  repressed  wishes  of  his  own 
childhood realized. Thus the loathing which should drive him on to revenge is replaced 
in  him  as  self-reproaches,  by  scruples  of  conscience,  which  remind  him  that  he  is 
literally no better than the sinner whom he is to punish” (1983:367). Therefore, the 
murder  of  his  father  allowed  Hamlet  to  access  his  repressed  Oedipal  desire,  and 
explains his treatment of the doomed Ophelia, as his mother regained her initial position 
of love-object as the result of his infantile regression. 
  This  psychoanalytic  reading  of  Hamlet,  and  the  theorisation  of  the  Oedipal 
narrative,  indicates  the  influence  literature  played  in  Freud’s  work  and  explains  his 
repeated use of literary texts — including those of Goethe and Dostoyevsky and — to 
support his propositions. He explains his interest in mythology and literature in The 
Interpretation of Dreams stating that: “The obscure information which is brought to us 
by  mythology  and  legend  from  the  primaeval  ages  of  human  society  gives  an 
unpleasing picture of the father’s despotic power and of the ruthlessness with which he 
made use of it. Kronos devoured his children, just as the wild boar devours the sow’s 
litter; while Zeus emasculated his father” (1983:357). Despite the obvious biological 
imperative of the incest taboo, his theory of sexual development is based on discursive 
practices and cannot be viewed as a priori due to the arbitrary nature of language.   18 
  An example in which the Oedipus complex can be seen as discursive and non-
deterministic — and one where the social and cultural milieu of the times enabled the 
perpetrator to justify his actions — can be seen with the Roman Emperor Caligula. In 
his seminal ficto-historical novel I, Claudius, Robert Graves gives another perspective 
of the Oedipus complex in action —  and another Claudius! — as illustrated in the 
following excerpt wherein Caligula confesses his actions to his Uncle: 
‘And what’s more, by the age of eight I had killed my father. Jove himself never did 
that. He merely banished the old fellow.’  
I took this as raving on the same level, but asked in a matter-of-fact voice, ‘Why did 
you do that?’  
‘He stood in my way. He tried to discipline me — me, a young God, imagine it! So I 
frightened him to death. I smuggled the dead things into his house at Antioch and hid 
them under loose tiles […] And I robbed him of his Hecate. Look, here she is! I 
always keep her under my pillow.’ He held up the green jasper charm.  
My heart went as cold as ice when I recognized it. I said in a horrified voice: ‘You 
were the one then? …’  
He nodded proudly and went rattling on: ‘Not only did I kill my natural father but I 
killed my father by adoption too — Tiberius, you know. And whereas Jupiter only 
lay with one sister of his, Juno, I have lain with all three of mine. Martina told me it 
was the right thing to do if I wanted to be like Jove’ (1987:334). 
 
This literary expression of an historic event undermines the metaphysical certitude of 
the sexual development of the infant as put forth by Freud, and is made manifest as 
Caligula justifies killing his father and step-father, and eats his unborn child beget to his 
sister, with a literal belief that in so doing he will become a deity. That is, Caligula’s 
cultural background — and obvious position of power — enabled him to carry out these 
taboo acts, and having done so he pronounced himself a god becoming invulnerable to 
criticism due to the a priori acceptance of the Roman people of the validity of this 
explanation.  This  example  clearly  indicates  that  cultural  taboos  are  discursive  and 
subject  to  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  change,  and  thus  remain  open  to 
interpretation, for despite his assured beliefs Caligula’s extreme actions did bring about 
his down-fall and the rise to power of the more moderate Claudius.  
  Graves’ interpretation of Caligula’s actions suggests that the Oedipus complex is 
not simply a metaphysical process, but rather a manifestation of the dominant cultural   19 
discourse prohibiting incest. Furthermore, Freud’s extrapolation of other psychoneurotic 
disorders — such as homosexuality — and his view of preordained gender roles can 
also  be  seen  as  discursive  and  therefore  inherently  questionable.  Although  Freud’s 
theoretical propositions were instrumental in marking a shift from the perspective of the 
primacy of the metaphysical individual of traditional philosophy, he can be accused of 
attempting  to  determine  his  own  metaphysics  of  psychoanalysis.  This  at  once 
diminishes and oppresses the subject with its deterministic view of gender roles and 
acceptable sexual behaviour, which despite being necessarily biological in nature, can at 
times be seen to limit and oppress alternative expressions of sexual subjectivity. 
 
1.2.a. Jacques Lacan and the Subject of Language   
 
Having explained the manner in which Freud’s theoretical focus on the unconscious 
constituted  a  shift  from  the  traditional  metaphysical  self-present  individual  of 
Descartes’  cogito,  I  will  now  turn  to  the  work  of  French  theorist  Jacques  Lacan, 
focussing on his reworking of Freud’s ego-based psychoanalysis, and how this relates to 
the diminished subject. Before I begin my discussion of his oeuvre and how desire, lack 
and language constitute the Lacanian subject, I shall address the difficulties in defining 
a  neat  schematic  of  his  ideas  and  how  this  relates  to  both  his,  and  my,  theoretical 
propositions. Lacan’s work can be divided into several key periods, the first of which 
was focussed on the concept of the ‘Imaginary,’ and the influence of the image on the 
development of the subject. In the second — following the influence of Ferdinand de 
Saussure — he became interested in the way the subject is constituted by language and 
the  ‘Symbolic  order.’  While  in  the  third  he  attempted  a  formalised  science  of 
psychoanalysis using logic and mathematics, although for the purpose of this section I 
shall limit my discussion to the first and second of these periods. Yet, despite these 
metaphysical and teleological delineations, Lacan also referred to, and reworked, certain 
key theoretical concepts pertaining to an a priori diminished subject.    20 
  The great difficulty in mapping a temporally coherent teleology of Lacan’s few 
published works is that rather than standing individually they represent the collation of 
over 30 years of seminars — the bulk of which make up the seminal Ecrits — resulting 
in  little  comparison  between  his  texts  the  expansive  collected  works  of  Freud.  As 
Madan Sarup points out in his book Jacques Lacan, by acting as Lacan’s primary text 
Ecrits poses a problem because at the same time it deliberately avoids being:  
[T]heoretically or epistemologically homogeneous [and is] extraordinarily difficult to 
read for many reasons. It is said that these ‘writings’ are a rebus. A rebus, like a 
dream, is a sort of picture puzzle, which looks like nonsense but, when separated into 
elements and interprets, makes sense. Lacan’s writings are a rebus because his style 
mimics the subject matter. He not only explicates the unconscious but  strives to 
imitate it […] Lacan believes that language speaks the subject, that the speaker is 
subjected to language rather than master of it (1992:80).  
 
As  such,  with  its  non-linear  and  linguistic  approach,  Ecrits  exemplifies  Lacan’s 
fragmented writing style and imitates the primacy of language in the development of 
subjectivity. Sarup adds that Ecrits can be compared to Roland Barthes’ scriptable or 
‘writerly’ text and that: “[t]he architecture of Ecrits is such that it is almost impossible 
to trace the development or the history of the concepts deployed: chronology is in effect 
abolished” (1992:81). Therefore Lacan, with his interest in Saussurian semiotics and the 
post-structuralist works of Barthes — and their respective interest in language — makes 
a notable departure from Freud, yet still diminishes the subject. This is not only evident 
with his theoretical approach but also in his writing style, for as Sarup points out in 
Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, Lacan’s interest in the subject, language, and 
his playful ficto-critical writing, indicates a more overt interest in the literary, arguing 
that his: “theory of language is such that he could not return to Freud: texts cannot have 
an unambiguous pristine meaning. In his view, analysts must relate directly with the 
unconscious  and  this  means  that  they  must  be  practitioners  of  the  language  of  the 
unconscious — that of poetry, puns, internal rhymes” (1988:9). That is, Lacan not only 
shifted the focus of psychoanalysis from the ego to the unconscious, he posited the   21 
importance of language in the development of the subject thus echoing the dominant 
structuralist  theories  of  his  day.  It  was  his  belief  that  the  unconscious  was  like  a 
language that needed to be viewed in linguistic terms, to such an extent that he wrote in 
a style that replicated his own theoretical practices. 
  Despite the absence of a neat teleology of Lacan’s work it is necessary that I 
construct  an  account  of  certain  concepts  in  order  to  support  my  proposition  of  the 
diminished subject, and with this in mind I will turn to Kaja Silverman’s The Subject of 
Semiotics which usefully attempts such a chronology: “Lacan’s theory of the subject 
reads like a classic narrative — it begins with birth, and then moves in turn through the 
territorialization of the body, the mirror stage, access to language, and the Oedipus 
complex […] each of the stages of this narrative is conceived in terms of some kind of 
self-loss  or  lack”  (1983:150).  Interestingly, Silverman’s  description  of  the  Lacanian 
subject as a classic narrative clearly runs counter to Sarup’s description of Ecrits as 
neither ‘theoretically or epistemologically homogeneous,’ thus highlighting again the 
difficulties faced with any discussion his work. Despite this, it is his interest in ‘lack,’ 
‘loss’ and language in the development of the subject that I will use to continue this 
teleology into the a priori diminished subject and the importance of the literary.  
 
1.2.b. Pre-Oedipal Territorialization & The Mirror Stage — The Pre-symbolic Subject 
 
The dominant thematic throughout Lacan’s work is that of an inherent lack originating 
with the birth of the subject and, true to Lacan’s playful writing style, one could refer to 
this theory as Lac(k)anian. The jocose nature of his writing is made clear when he 
evokes the ‘myth of the lamella’ from Aristophanes’ story of the birth of desire in 
Plato’s  Symposium,  which  refers  to  how  an  enraged  Zeus  divided  the  original 
androgynous human form in two: “just like a fruit which is to be dried and preserved, or 
like eggs which are cut with a hair” (1986:60). With this act Zeus supposedly initiated a 
desire in either sex for the other, thus instigating a lack, leading Lacan to evoke his   22 
(in)famous egg joke. In The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis he refers to 
this divided subject as “l’hommelette,”
9 or human omelette (1986:197) — indicating 
either a scrambling of the subject, or perhaps the initial division of the fertilised human 
ovum — and yet again we find a myth acting as the originary premise of the diminished 
subject  that  undermines  the  notion  of  a  temporally  specific  fragmented  postmodern 
subject. With the child’s loss of its initial androgynous self and desire to return to that 
wholeness,  the  subject  becomes  irreconcilable  divided  and  diminished,  for  when 
discussing  Aristophanes’  story  further  Lacan  states  that:  “To  this  mythical 
representation of the mystery of love, analytic experience substitutes the search by the 
subject, not of the sexual complement, but of the part of himself, lost forever” (205). As 
such, his view of a child’s birth is one based on an irrevocable loss that undermines the 
possibility of it attaining self-presence, thus instigating a desire for an unobtainable 
ideal, and initiating the child’s progress into the symbolic order. Furthermore, this split 
between the original whole and the divided subject results in a sexual desire for the 
Other, and acts as the catalyst for the child’s unquestioning acceptance of a socially 
discursive sexual identity.  
  Taking his lead from this myth, Lacan proposes that the lack associated with the 
birth of the male child is the origin of the desire for the ‘Other’ sex, as it seeks to regain 
its initial completeness through the sexual desire for the (m)Other, thus beginning its 
representation in the symbolic order. He expands on this point stating that: “The subject 
is born in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other. But, by this very fact, 
this subject — which, was previously nothing if not a subject coming into being — 
solidifies into a signifier” (199). The separation of mother and child, coupled with its 
entrance  into  the  sexual  world,  gives  rise  to  the  Oedipus  complex,  and  begins  its 
entrance  into  the  ‘Imaginary’  and  the  ‘Symbolic’  orders  as  it  becomes  socially   23 
determined. However, as Lacan locates this separation in the biologically ‘Real,’ or pre-
symbolic order, it also predates the child’s entrance into language. 
  The next pre-symbolic division occurs after birth and is referred to as pre-Oedipal 
territorialization, a process whereby the child learns to differentiate its corporeal zones 
due to the attention paid to them by the mother, and thus begins its preparation for the 
sexual role it acquires upon entering the symbolic order. This partitioning of the body 
has the effect of curtailing the unbounded libidinal flows, and the search for pleasure 
from  the  various  erotogenic  areas  of  the  body, such  as  the  mouth,  anus,  penis  and 
vagina. As Lacan explains in Ecrits these areas of the body become sites of contestation 
between pleasure and control:  
For these objects, part- or not, but certainly signifying — the breast, excrement, the 
phallus — are no doubt won or lost by the subject. He is destroyed by them or he 
preserves them, but above all he is these objects, according to the place where they 
function  in  his  fundamental  phantasy.  This  mode  of  identification  simply 
demonstrates the pathology of the slope down which the subject is pushed in a world 
where his needs are reduced to exchange values — this slope itself finding its radical 
possibility  only  in  the  mortification  that  the  signifier  imposes  on  his  life  in 
enumerating it (1999:251-2). 
 
Despite the fact that the child is still in the pre-symbolic stage there begins a process of 
cultural interference whereby the mother checks the unbridled libidinal desires of the 
child,  and  its  body  is  differentiated  according  to  its  ‘appropriate’  gender  role. This 
immediately diminishes the subject in part due to the control exacted on the child’s 
unmediated  search  for  pleasure,  and  the  pre-ordained  gender  role  instigated  by  the 
mother. Because the child has not yet begun to differentiate itself from its other — as 
seen in the Mirror Stage — the ‘erotogenic zones’ of pleasure are culturally designated 
and denied resulting in a lack that manifests itself as a desire for the Other or, what 
Lacan refers to as, “‘objet petit autre’ or ‘object petit a’” (1986:103-4) — that missing 
aspect of their previously undifferentiated body.  
  The next division of the subject occurs when the child enters the Imaginary order, 
and is best expressed in his concept of the Mirror stage, when the infant begins to   24 
differentiate between itself and the Other, while the Oedipus complex comes into play 
with the advent of the symbolic order. For Lacan, the Mirror stage also initiates the 
development  of  the  ego,  yet  unlike  Freud,  he  believes  that  the  ego  is  created  by 
misrecognition, or “méconnaissance” (1986:74), which stems from the recognition of a 
perfectly reflected image of the self. This reflection becomes a mirror image for the ego, 
but is at once ideal and always already unobtainable, thus undermining the primacy of 
the ego and further diminishing the subject. 
  Taking his lead from French psychologist Henri Wallon, Lacan argues that the 
Mirror stage occurs between the of ages six to eighteen months, when the child first 
observes its own reflection in a mirror and begins the identification process whereby it 
differentiates  itself  from  the  other
10  —  predominantly  the  mother  or  father.  This 
recognition is based on the metaphysical image of a stable body, where previously the 
sites of corporal erotogenic pleasure were indefinable from those of the other. In Ecrits 
he explains the way that the child becomes fixated with this ideal image or ‘imago:’ 
We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense 
that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the 
subject when he assumes an image — whose predestination to this phase-effect is 
sufficiently indicated by the use, in analytical theory, of the ancient term imago. This 
jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child at the infans stage, still sunk in 
his  motor  incapacity  and  nursling  dependence,  would  seem  to  exhibit  in  an 
exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial 
form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and 
before language restores to it, in the universal, its function as a subject. This form 
would have to be called the Ideal-I, if we wished to incorporate it into our usual 
register, in the same sense that it will also be the source of secondary identifications, 
under which term I would place the functions of libidinal normalization (1999:2).  
 
For Lacan, the totalised representation of a stable image allows the child to overcome its 
dependent and incapacitated state by  appropriating the reflection as an Ideal-I, thus 
aiding  in  the  development  of  the  ego.  The  imago  provides  the  child  with  an  ideal 
perspective of wholeness over a previous fragmentation, and acts as a crutch, giving it 
the hope of a completeness it can strive to attain. However, this belief in the Ideal-I is   25 
one based on a metaphysical Imaginary that is unattainable, and thereby precipitates yet 
another lack in the subject. 
  Lacan indicates that because this Ideal-I is based on an inverse reflection — and 
acts as an Imaginary representation — the initial development of the ego is based on an 
artifice that bears only a cursory visual resemblance to the child. He goes on to explain 
that the imago is not based on actuality but is in fact a fictional misrecognition by the 
ego, arguing that: “the important point is that this form situates the agency of the ego, 
before its social determination, in a fictional direction” (1999:2). As such, we can see 
that the comfort afforded the child through the appropriation of the imago, and the 
development of the ego, have no factual basis. Silverman adds weight to this argument 
explaining how the imago fragments the subject further: “[I]t must be stressed that the 
mirror stage is one of those crises of alienation around which the Lacanian subject is 
organized, since to know oneself through an external image is to be defined through 
self-alienation” (1983:157-8). That is, by basing itself on the ‘fictional’ metaphysical 
representation of the reflected imago, the ego sets out on a path of division whereby a 
fundamental and irrevocable lack is established between the ego and the Ideal-I. This 
creates self-alienation with the false promise of the imago resulting in a narcissistic 
desire in the subject for the wholeness of the Ideal-I, and a vacillation between the love 
and hate of an image that it can never attain, thus creating a further division that is 
apparently resolved with the child’s entrance into the symbolic order. 
 
1.2c. The Symbolic and the Oedipus Complex 
 
The next stage in the child’s entrance into the symbolic order becomes apparent — once 
again — with the advent of the Oedipus complex, yet Lacan’s view differs greatly from 
that  of  Freud  for  although  various  concepts  are  carried  over,  he  moves  away  from 
Freud’s  perspective  of  the  primacy  of  the  unconscious  to  a  focus  on  the  lack  that 
language  effects  in  the  subject.  As  already  seen,  the  entrance  of  the  subject  in  the   26 
symbolic order begins with the recognition of the falsity of the Ideal-I, and the loss of 
the sense of wholeness it believed it once had. Reworking Freud’s ‘fort-da’ formulation, 
Lacan  posits  that  this  lack  —  or  fort  —  is  not  of  the  mother,  but  stems  from  this 
essential  loss  of  wholeness,  a  ‘fading’  or  ‘disappearance’  of  the  subject,  which, 
borrowing the term from Ernest Jones, he refers to as ‘aphanisis’ (1986:207). Lacan 
elucidates this process in Ecrits wherein he indicates that:  
We can now grasp in this the fact that in this moment the subject is not simply 
mastering his privation by assuming it, but that here he is raising his desire to a 
second  power.  For  his  action  destroys  the  object  that  it  causes  to  appear  and 
disappear in the anticipating provocation of its absence and presence. His action thus 
negatives the field of forces of desire in order to become its own object to itself […] 
Fort! Da! It is precisely in his solitude that the desire of the little child has already 
become the desire for another, of an alter ego who dominates him and whose object 
of desire is henceforth his own affliction (1999:103-4). 
 
Therefore, as the child recognises that the absence of the Ideal-I is an ineluctable lack, 
the fort/da game begins to linguistically represent its entry into the symbolic order, 
given that its desire for completeness cannot be obtained within the Imaginary order. 
Having failed to find solace in the Other of the Imaginary reflection, the child turns this 
lack into a desire for the symbolic Other, which it hopes will succeed in filling this a 
priori void, and thus sate its desire for self-presence. 
  In  order  to  explain  this,  Lacan  posits  the  child’s  relationship  to  the  Oedipus 
complex  as  one  not  based  simply  on  the  fear  of  castration  due  to  its  desire  for its 
mother, but rather that this passage is a linguistic process. Taking his lead from Lévi-
Strauss and his view of incest taboos in ‘primitive societies,’
11 Lacan posits that the 
Oedipus complex is based on the cultural and linguistic recognition of the roles of the 
mother  and  father,  indicating  yet  another  lack  as  the  child  realises  its  desire  of  its 
mother — like the imago — can never be fulfilled. He highlights this process in relation 
to language explaining that: “The primordial Law is therefore that which in regulating 
marriage ties superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a nature abandoned to the 
law of mating. The prohibition of incest is merely its subjective pivot, revealed by the   27 
modern  tendency  to  reduce  to  the  mother  and  the  sister  objects  forbidden  to  the 
subject’s choice […] This law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an 
order of language” (66). With his recognition of the linguistic and cultural nature of the 
Oedipus complex, Lacan, like Freud, then falls into his own theoretical determinism by 
applying  Lévi-Strauss’  structuralist  anthropological  view  of  the  incest  taboo  to  the 
development  of  the  subject.  Despite  this  tendency,  I  shall  now  turn  to  Lacan’s 
reworking of the Oedipus complex as ‘identical’ with language, and the repercussions 
this had for the development of the Lacanian subject.  
  Although the role of the Oedipus complex remains more or less the same for both 
Freud and Lacan, it is a shift from the penis to the phallus that is important to this 
discussion. With this in mind it is the entrance of the subject into the symbolic order as 
a result of the ‘Name-of-the-Father,’ the function of the phallus in the differentiation of 
sexual roles, and the manner in which the subject is further diminished, that I shall now 
discuss. Sarup succinctly condenses Lacan’s complicated and convoluted take on the 
Oedipus complex and highlights the linguistic and cultural elements therein: 
Lacan contends that at first the child does not merely desire contact with the mother 
and her care; it wishes, perhaps unconsciously, to be the complement of what is 
lacking in her: the phallus. At this stage the child is not a subject but a ‘lack,’ a 
nothing. In the second stage the father intervenes; he deprives the child of the object 
of its desire and he deprives the mother from the phallic object. The child encounters 
the Law of the father. The third stage is that of identification with the father. The 
father reinstates the phallus as the object of the mother’s desire and no longer as the 
child-complement to what is lacking in her. There is, then, a symbolic castration: the 
father castrates the child by separating it from its mother. This is the debt which must 
be paid if one is to become completely one’s self (1988:10).  
 
While for Freud the child attain its preordained gender role by suppressing the Oedipus 
complex due to fear of the loss of the penis, and appropriate the role of the father, for 
Lacan this process takes on a far more symbolic role, whereby the phallus — as distinct 
from the biological penis — represents the Law of the ‘Name-of-the-Father.’
12 The 
recognition of the supremacy of the father for Lacan represents the acknowledgement of 
a variety of discursive cultural practices that among other characteristics will determine   28 
sexual differentiation. This not only represents a further division between child and 
mother — as the Oedipus complex is repressed by the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ — it also 
initiates the child’s entry into the symbolic order as it becomes subject to the discursive 
practices of the ‘Law.’  
  Lacan’s  appropriation  of  Saussure’s  semiotic  theory  of  signs
13  indicates  the 
manner in which the symbolic order initiates the ultimate division of the subject and 
undermines  the  metaphysical  self-present  individual.  He  explains  the  relationship 
between the subject and the signifier stating that: “it is in the chain of the signifier that 
the  meaning  ‘insists’  but that  none  of  its  elements  ‘consists’  in  the  signification  of 
which it is at the moment capable […] We are forced, then, to accept this notion of an 
incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (1999:153-4). By inverting the 
Saussurian  algorithm  Lacan  replaces  the  cogito  with  the  symbolic  signifier
14  —  by 
locating the subject within the symbolic order, as seen with the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ — 
and  with  final  signification  proven  problematic,  he  posits  an  irrevocably  divided 
subject. He argues that upon entering the Symbolic order, the child begins a relationship 
with a chain of cultural signifiers that have no fixed meaning and simply refer to other 
signifiers, thus undermining the possibility of self-presence. However, he does qualify 
this, stating that: “All of our experience runs counter to this linearity, which made me 
speak once […] of something more like anchoring points (‘points de caption’) as a 
schema  for  taking  into  account  the  dominance  of  the  letter  in  the  dramatic 
transformation  that  dialogue  can  effect  in  the  subject”  (154).  Importantly,  Lacan 
recognises  that  without  the  illusion  of  fixed  signifiers  there  would  be  no  meaning, 
indicating the impact that an arbitrary system of signs alone has on the subject, and the 
inherent need for the metaphysics of comfort.  
  This  child’s  entrance  into  the  symbolic  order  manifests  itself  when,  after  its 
mythic castration, it accepts its culturally defined gender role, and quells its desire for   29 
the Ideal ego by endeavouring to attain the ultimate representation of that role. That is, 
for Lacan, subjectivity is always already located in the symbolic and this, he argues, 
makes it irreducible from language and culture. Silverman supports this position stating 
that:  “Language  is  consequently  not  the  only  source  of  signifiers;  dietary  rituals, 
marriage  ceremonies,  hysteria,  conventions  of  dress,  and  neuroses  all  generate 
signifiers. Indeed, since signification constitutes the matrix within which the subject 
resided  after  its  entry  into  the  symbolic  order,  nothing  escapes  cultural  value” 
(1983:164-5). Therefore, the subject’s entry into the symbolic order is represented by 
the  interpellation  of  culturally  designated  discursive  roles.  This  undermines  the 
possibility  of  the  subject  attaining  any  originary  sense  of  individuality,  leaving  it 
irrevocably diminished given that  all acceptable modes of expression  are inherently 
linguistic, arbitrary in nature, and thereby culturally determined. 
  With this in mind, criticisms of Lacan that level the spectre of phallocentricism 
overlook the fact that the phallus represents a privileged signifier in a symbolic order, 
and exemplifies the dominant cultural discourses of patriarchy, which he views as a 
linguistic system. As such, his attitude towards  sexual differentiation differs greatly 
from Freud’s, for when arguing that ‘Woman does not exist,’ Lacan was indicating that 
the  role  of  the  woman  in  society  is  symbolic.  That  is,  the  predominant  cultural 
relationship between man and woman is one based on a system of differences located in 
language,  presupposing  that  the  dominant  cultural  discourses  that  perpetuate  biased 
gender roles are not a priori, but necessarily open to the condition of the possibility of 
change due to their linguistic and inherently arbitrary nature. 
  While Lacan’s conception of the subject is based on both a lack and desire for the 
other, his appropriation Saussure’s theory of signs and Lévi-Strauss’ incest taboo led 
him to posit his own theory of subjectivity as determined and divided by language. That 
is, once the child enters the symbolic order and becomes subject to the Law of the   30 
‘Name-of-the-Father,’  it  engages  in  a  linguistic  process  whereby  it  is  culturally 
determined and sexually differentiated by language. This view of the subject defined by 
its other led Lacan to carry out his own reworking of Descartes’ cogito in Ecrits that 
focussed on the linguistic elements as: “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I 
do not think” (1999:166). This continuing development of the cogito from Descartes 
through to Lacan has had important repercussions for the study of subjectivity, for as 
Malcolm Bowie explains:  
The subject is irremediably split in and by language, but ‘modern man’ still has not 
learned his lesson. He thinks himself wonderfully astute for parading his doubts and 
uncertainties — where Descartes had striven merely to rescue himself from his — 
but he does not understand that the trust he places in language, even as he prates 
about his doubts, is in a direct line of descent for the cogito. After Freud, there is no 
one ‘thought’ on which to base the existential proposition ‘I think therefore I am’ or 
such modern derivatives […] And after Lacan, there is no simple, signifying level 
that would allow an appropriate psychoanalytic counter-proposal to be made. Hence 
the  cogito  is  not  flatly  repudiated;  its  terms  and  propositional  structure  are 
refashioned in a sequence of parodic alternatives (1991:77). 
 
Therefore,  Lacan’s  interest  in  language  represents  a  break  from  the  philosophical 
tradition of the cogito that prioritises the primacy of self-present consciousness, and 
from Freud’s continuation of this tradition, despite his shift in focus from the conscious 
to the unconscious. It was this that led Lacan to make his famous proclamation: “the 
unconscious is structured like a language” (1986:20), and in doing so irredeemably 
fragmented the subject and set Lacan apart from Freud and other psychoanalysts. 
  Lacan expresses the importance of the linguistic process — and his own break 
with Freud — when he states that the recognition of language in the constitution of the 
subject: “is to deny oneself access to what might be called the Freudian universe — in 
the  way  that  we  speak  of  the  Copernican  universe.  It  was  in  fact  the  so-called 
Copernican revolution to which Freud himself compared his discovery, emphasizing 
that it was once again a question of the place man assigns to himself at the centre of the 
universe” (1999:165). Lacan argues that despite Freud’s shift from the cogito to his 
propositions regarding the unconscious, he still located conscious meaning within the   31 
individual ego, and not culture and language, resulting in a metaphysical and ego-based 
psychoanalysis. Whereas Freud can be seen to be carrying on the humanist tradition, 
Lacan’s appropriation of theories of language decentres the subject in a manner often 
viewed  as  anti-humanist.  While  Freud  believed  psychoanalysis  could  uncover  the 
workings of the human mind and cure its neuroses, the early Lacan — at least — argued 
that subjectivity existed as part of an endless chain of signifiers and was necessarily 
Other to itself. Although language offered a way into the unconscious for Lacan, its 
arbitrary and metaphysical nature always already denied a complete understanding of 
the unconscious, thus evoking the condition of the possibility of change, and thereby 
justifying the possibility of the a priori diminished subject,   
 
1.3.a. Julia Kristeva and the Subject of Revolutionary Language 
 
The  semiological  approach  identifies  itself  […]  as  an  anti-humanism  which 
outmodes those debates — still going on even now — between philosophers, where 
one side argues for a transcendence with an immanent ‘human’ causality while the 
other argues for an ‘ideology’ whose cause is external and therefore transcendent; 
but where neither shows any awareness of the linguistic and, at a more general level, 
semiotic logic of the sociality in which the […] subject is embedded.  
— Julia Kristeva, in ‘The System and the Speaking Subject’ (1992:25-6). 
 
Having outlined the manner in which Lacan’s increased focus on both the linguistic and 
symbolic  diminishes  the  subject,  I  shall  now  turn  to  Julia  Kristeva  and  her 
redevelopment of his work, focussing specifically on the relationship between semiotics 
and the subject, which at once divides and explores positive alternative expressions of 
subjectivity. Kristeva’s oeuvre can be divided into three main periods beginning firstly 
with  her  investigation  into  Saussurian  linguistics  and  the  possibility  of  formalising 
poetic language: secondly came her focus on the relationship between poetic language 
and the subject, and the manner in which the semiotic works alongside the symbolic in 
the constitution of gender roles: while thirdly, she explored the notion of abjection, 
feminist theory, and the transgressive capabilities of poetic writing. However, for the 
purpose of this section, I shall focus on those aspects that support my discussion of   32 
psychoanalysis in relation to the diminished subject, and her view of the literary as a 
site of contestation opposed to dominant cultural representations of subjectivity.  
 
1.3.b. Kristeva and Semanalysis 
 
Kristeva’s initial theoretical position, as outlined in ‘Word, Dialogue and Novel’ and Le 
texte  du  roman,  was  based  on  a  conviction  of  the  impossibility  of  a  linguistic 
formalisation  of  poetic  language.  She  was  interested  in  the  inherent  materiality  of 
language  as  represented  by  the  speaking  subject,  something  that  had  been  largely 
ignored by theorists such as Saussure who focussed mainly on the systematic structure 
of langue. This positions Kristeva among the likes of Bakhtin — whom she translated 
— and his notion of the ‘carnival’ and ‘dialogic novel,’ and with Barthes with his 
interest in the ‘writerly text.’ Rather than viewing language as the simple conveyor of 
meaning Kristeva was interested in the heterogeneous nature of poetic language that 
escaped the oppression of strict scientific understanding and symbolic representation. 
For Kristeva the locus of poetic language could be found within the semiotic, and she 
developed her notion of ‘semanalysis’ as a way focusing on the ‘outside’ of language — 
that which remained unanalysable to the determinism of structuralist linguistics.  
  The importance of Kristeva’s semanalysis can be located in her view of semiotics 
in  relation  to  the  speaking  subject,  whereby  she  highlights  the  manner  that 
heterogeneous  language  undermine  the  primacy  of  the  individual  and  further 
problematise the tradition of self-present consciousness as seen with the cogito, and 
Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego.’
15 This decentring of the subject is clearly manifest in 
Kristeva’s ‘The System and the Speaking Subject,’ wherein she explains that: 
The theory of meaning now stands at a crossroad: either it will remain an attempt at 
formalizing meaning-systems by increasing sophistication of the logico-mathematics 
tools  which  enable  it  to  formulate  models  on  the  basis  of  a  conception  […]  of 
meaning as the act of a transcendental ego, cut off from its body, its unconscious 
and its history; or else it will attune itself to the theory of the speaking subject as a 
divided subject (conscious/unconscious) and go on to attempt to specify the types of 
operation characteristic of the two sides of this split, thereby exposing them to those   33 
forces extraneous to the logic of the systematic; exposing them, that is to say, on the 
one hand, to bio-physiological processes ([…] what Freud has labelled ‘drives’); 
and, on the other hand, to social constraints (family structures, modes of production, 
etc.). In  following this  latter  path,  semiology,  or,  as  I  have  suggested  calling  it, 
semanalysis, conceives of meaning not as a sign system but as a signifying process. 
Within this process one might  see the release and subsequent articulation of the 
drives as constrained by the social code yet not reducible to language (1992:28).  
 
That is, by focussing on the heterogeneous nature of language, as represented by the 
semiotic Kristeva not only highlights the importance of the materiality of language, but 
also questions the predominance of the Symbolic. Her focus on the development of the 
subject and the primacy of the conscious I, problematised dominant cultural formations 
by virtue of their inherently discursive nature. By not being ‘reducible to language’ the 
semiotic  —  as  a  signifying  practice  —  highlights  the  non-symbolic  aspects  of 
subjectivity — those elements that escape the representation of language and create a 
division between the semiotic and symbolic, or unconscious and conscious — which 
remain after the subject enters the symbolic order. Therefore, Kristeva proposed that 
within the semiotic there remained access to the unconscious pre-symbolic individual 
that is not completely separated from the subject of the symbolic order. 
  For Kristeva the importance of both semiotics and poetic language is that they 
remain  unanalysable  and  beyond  the  symbolic  and  its  oppressive  re-presentations. 
Therefore,  the  semiotic  represents  the  possibility  of  transgressive  expressions  of 
subjectivity that exist extraneous to the symbolic order, and thereby undermine it. In his 
text Julia Kristeva, John Lechte explains the possible counter-discursive nature of the 
semiotic and the materiality of language for the speaking subject, arguing that: 
The ‘outside’ of language became its non-systematizable, dynamic, and even non-
formalizable aspect — the aspect of ‘play, pleasure or desire.’ This is the aspect of 
the body’s imprint in language, a body bound up with a potentially transgressive 
(because un-scientific) practice. Kristeva was thus beginning to argue that the place 
of the body (the ‘outside’ of language according to conventional linguistics), should 
not  only  become  the  legitimate  concern  of  semiotics  as  such,  but  perhaps  even 
become its raison d’être. In a fundamental way, the nature of meaning is distorted if 
it  is  reduced  to  what  is  possible  within  the  conventional  framework  of 
communication. The body, moreover, is the place where we ‘are’ as speaking beings; 
it is the place of the material support of the language of communication (1990:99).   34 
 
In other words, it is Kristeva’s view that through the analysis of the semiotic materiality 
of language, as expressed by the speaking subject, dominant cultural discourses such as 
the  ‘Name-of-the-Father’  —  which  oppress  the  subject  by  prescribing  socially 
acceptable modes of expression — can be defamiliarised. As such, Kristeva’s work 
represents a radical shift from that of Lacan, for rather than viewing subjectivity as the 
result of the repression of the Oedipus complex — an effect of the primacy of the 
phallus that makes the subject symbolically determined by language — she proposed 
that the initial development of the subject is located in the pre-symbolic or semiotic 
stage. The result being that certain aspects of subjectivity always already escape the 
determination of the symbolic order, thus undermining the deterministic oppression of 
the individual by the ‘Law’ and all it represents. 
 
1.2.c. Kristeva and the Semiotic Subject 
 
The  relevance  of  Kristeva’s  work  to  this  investigation  into  the  diminished  subject 
becomes manifest with her reworking of Lacan’s view of the subject of language, cut 
off from the drives of the pre-Oedipal stages, following its entrance into the symbolic 
realm. In her seminal work, The Revolution in Poetic Language, Kristeva sets about 
investigating the unanalysable and pre-symbolic through the distinction of the semiotic 
and the symbolic. Her view is distinct from traditional semiotics due to its interest in the 
‘genotext’ rather than the ‘phenotext,’ or language as communication. The genotext, she 
argues, is that which is non-linguistic and predates the symbolic, yet the two necessarily 
work together in order to provide a signifying process. Interestingly, Kristeva moves 
still further away from Lacan’s position, stating that the genotext — or semiotic — is a 
representation of the subject prior to its division and entrance into the symbolic: 
What we shall call a genotext will include the semiotic processes but also the advent 
of the symbolic. The former includes drives, their disposition, and their division of 
the body, plus ecological and social systems surrounding the body, such as objects 
and pre-Oedipal relations with their parents. The latter encompasses the emergence   35 
of object and subject, and the constitution of nuclei of meaning involving categories: 
semantic and categorical fields […] The genotext is thus the only transfer of drive 
energies that organize a space in which the subject is not yet a split unity that will 
become blurred, giving rise to the symbolic. Instead, the space it organizes is one in 
which the subject will be generated as such by a process of facilitation and marks 
within the constraints of the biological and social structure. In other words, even 
though it can be seen in language, the genotext is not linguistic (1984:86). 
 
Despite obvious comparisons with Lacan’s pre-Oedipal territorialization of the infant 
and  the  mirror  stage  as  mere  precursors  for  the  entry  of  the  child  into  the  phallic 
symbolic order, Kristeva believed that infantile subjectivity begins in the pre-symbolic 
order. Not only is this semiotic phase instrumental for the satisfactory entrance of the 
child into the symbolic order, it also remains part of the signifying process. As such, the 
pre-Oedipal division of the subject manifests itself with the structuring of the libidinal 
drives of the oral and anal stages, and the social and biological differentiation of the 
sexes that, for Kristeva, despite being pre-linguistic, manifest themselves as semiotic 
language. Furthermore, that she predates the entrance of the child into the social realm 
as semiotic and prior to the symbolic, questions the distinct break proposed by Lacan 
and further divides the subject, for although the semiotic represents the pre-Oedipal 
separation of the child from both the mother and libidinal drives, it also exists as part of 
the  signifying  process.  For  Kristeva,  this  means  that  the  semiotic  gives  access  to  a 
previously  unrepresented  pre-symbolic  unconscious,  thus  proposing  that  the 
unconscious exists both within the semiotic and alongside the symbolic subject.  
  Despite Kristeva dividing the subject further by suggesting that the semiotic and 
symbolic processes represent two co-existing, yet disparate aspects of subjectivity — 
that  which  is  already  diminished  due  to  its  discursive  and  linguistic  nature  —  her 
proposal that the locus of the semiotic — that which is unanalysable and unnameable — 
is the mother, has had important ramifications for feminist theory, and seen by many as 
questioning  the  seemingly  hopeless  position  of  the  linguistically  and  culturally   36 
determined symbolic subject. For Kristeva, the site of the semiotic and the instigator of 
the initial constraints of libidinal drives, is the mother or chora, and explains that: 
Drives involve pre-Oedipal semiotic functions and energy discharges that connect 
and orientate the body to the mother. We must emphasize that ‘drives’ are always 
already ambiguous, simultaneously assimilating and destructive; this dualism […] 
makes the semiotized body the place of permanent scission. The oral and anal drives, 
both of which are orientated and structured around the mother’s body, dominate this 
sensorimotor  organization.  The  mother’s  body  is  therefore  what  mediates  the 
ordering principle of the semiotic chora  (27). 
 
According to Kristeva the chora organises and dictates the pre-Oedipal territorialization 
of the child’s body according to its biological function before it enters the symbolic 
order. While this begins with the attention paid to the corporeal zones of the body by the 
mother, unlike Lacan she believes that this semiotic process of repetition and constraint 
ultimately manifests itself as a  site of negativity. She points out that: “the semiotic 
chora is no more than the place where the subject is both generated and negated, the 
place where his unity succumbs before the process of charges and stases that produce 
him  […]  We  shall  call  this  process  […]  a  negativity”  (28).  As  such,  the  semiotic 
represents the locus of the initial division of the subject and site of an originary sense of 
loss. Rather, than seeing these drives as repressed by the symbolic order following the 
child’s entry into language, Kristeva suggests that with its involvement in the signifying 
process  that  this  negative  repression  of  libidinal  drives  becomes  a  possible  site  of 
contestation against the dominant phallocentric symbolic order. 
  It is important to note here that despite the semiotic being located in the chora — 
by virtue of its pre-symbolic phase — the fact that it is located with the mother does not 
presuppose that the semiotic itself is represented by the feminine. As Madan Sarup 
explains: “We should remember that the fluid motility of the semiotic is associated with 
the pre-Oedipal phase and therefore with the pre-Oedipal mother, but Kristeva makes it 
quite clear that […] she sees the pre-Oedipal mother as a figure that encompasses both 
masculinity and femininity. This fantasmatic figure, which looms as large for baby boys   37 
as for baby girls, cannot be reduced to an example of femininity, for the simple reason 
that the opposition between feminine and masculine does not exist in pre-Oedipality. 
The  semiotic,  in  short,  is  not  to  be  associated  with  the  feminine”  (1992:142).  For 
Kristeva, the unnameable chora must remain just that, for to be represented requires it 
entering the discursively symbolic order and face being subject to the limits inherent 
therein.  Thus,  the  semiotic  must  not  be  associated  with  the  feminine  due  to  the 
limitations this symbolic function serves and its relation to the ‘Name-of-the-father’ 
and, in turn, phallocentric society. For the same reason Kristeva, unlike Luce Irigaray, 
does not call for a type of ‘écriture feminine,’ as this would reiterate and legitimate the 
symbolic order by simply inverting it. Therefore, by virtue of its non-symbolic nature, 
she sees the semiotic as a locus outside of language for the symbolic order and a site 
free of the oppression of dominant cultural discourses. It is this that makes the semiotic 
a possible site of contestation, but in order for it to be so it must be represented in a 
form that escapes signification, and for Kristeva poetic language succeeds in doing this. 
  Adopting  certain  aspects  of  Lacan’s  ‘Mirror  stage,’  Kristeva  highlights  the 
importance of the Other in the process of signification, viewing it as essential to the 
development of the subject. As already seen, when the child enters the mirror stage it is 
first faced with the imago of the Ideal-I, and then with the possibility of castration it is 
torn from the mother and enters the symbolic order with an acceptance of the primacy 
of the phallus. This at once separates the child from its first love object, and creates a 
division between the pre-Oedipal and the symbolic subject, introducing the concept of 
the Other in its formation. Kristeva, on the other hand, suggests that this is not a clean 
break but rather gives rise to the ‘thetic,’ or division, between the semiotic and symbolic 
which she views as: “the place of the other, as the precondition for signification, i.e., the 
precondition for the positing of language. The thetic marks a threshold between two 
heterogeneous realms: the semiotic and the symbolic” (1984:48). However, the thetic,   38 
as  the  boundary  between  the  semiotic  and  symbolic,  enables  signification  by 
presupposing  the  Other  —  as  in  the  signified/signifier  division  —  thus  making  the 
semiotic  a  precondition  of  the  symbolic.  By  virtue  of  this  fact  Kristeva  posits  the 
importance  of  the  semiotic  in  the  process  of  signification,  and  highlights  the 
functionality  of  the  Other  as  an  ineluctable  aspect  of  communication,  and  thereby 
diminishes the subject further.  
 
1.3.d. Poetic Language and Transgression  
 
Having explained the relationship between Kristeva’s view of the semiotic and my own 
notion  of  the  diminished  subject,  I  shall  now  turn  my  focus  to  the  transgressive 
capabilities  of  poetic  language  and  the  possible  implications  for  the  subject.  For 
Kristeva,  the  thetic  divide  between  the  semiotic  and  symbolic  —  that  separation 
between the pre- and post-Oedipal stages — is of paramount importance in the practice 
of  signification.  However,  she  sees  this  boundary  as  permeable,  viewing  poetic 
language as that which transgresses the thetic, something Lechte explains thus: 
[T]he thetic is also the precondition of the difference between signifier and signified, 
denotation and connotation, language and referent; in effect it is the basis of all 
theses and antitheses, of all oppositions. As Kristeva notes […] there is no language 
without the thetic; it is a necessary boundary originating in the mirror stage and is 
the  basis  of  all  structural  relations.  Mention  of  the  mirror  stage  links  the  thetic 
clearly with the  symbolic paternal function — the condition of  signification and 
representation.  When,  in  a  poetic  work,  the  semiotic  violates  the  order  of  the 
symbolic, the thetic itself is challenged (1990:135). 
 
For Kristeva then, poetic language transgresses the demarcation between the semiotic 
and  symbolic  as  it  escapes  final  signification.  This  not  only  calls  into  question  the 
primacy of the symbolic order — including the Law of the Name-of-the-Father — but 
also the notion of language as a transparent conveyor of meaning and, in turn, the self-
presence of the symbolic and discursive subject of contemporary culture. That is, unlike 
Lacan, Kristeva optimistically posits this permeability of the semiotic/symbolic orders 
as  both  transgressive  and  empowering  for  the  subject,  suggesting  that  although  the   39 
subject is further diminished, possible alternative expressions of subjectivity can exist 
outside of and counter to the dominant symbolic order. 
  As we have already seen, the repression of the libidinal drives of the infant and 
the separation from the mother results in a negativity that is suppressed as the child 
enters the symbolic order. However, unlike the neurotic suffering from the incomplete 
repression of the Oedipus complex in Freud, or the narcissist incapable of identifying 
with the Other in Lacan, Kristeva believes that pre-symbolic drives can transgress the 
thetic and have a structuring effect on the symbolic. She explains this when arguing 
that: “Though absolutely necessary, the thetic is not exclusive: the semiotic which also 
precedes it, constantly tears it open, and this transgression brings about all the various 
transformations  of  the  signifying  practice  that  are  called  ‘creation.’  Whether  in  the 
realm of metalanguage […] or literature, what remodels the symbolic order is always 
the influx of the semiotic” (1984:62). For Kristeva, the permeability of the thetic and 
the transgression of the semiotic into the symbolic differ from the views of Freud and 
Lacan,  who  both  arrived  at  their  own  metaphysical  conclusions  regarding  the 
development of the subject. Whereas Freud considered the Oedipus complex, and Lacan 
language, as the primary processes which dictate subjectivity, Kristeva — while still 
guilty  of  her  own  form  of  metaphysics  —  attempted  to  undermine  the  seemingly 
monolithic and oppressive ‘Law’ of the ‘Name-of-the-Father,’ by positing the influence 
of the pre-symbolic, and thus pre-gendered, individual in the function of the symbolic 
order, and by locating the site of this contestation in poetic language. 
  According to Freud and Lacan, there always already exists the possibility of the 
symbolic subject falling victim to pre-Oedipal drives, which can manifest themselves as 
neuroses or psychotic behaviour. However, where they posit the use of psychoanalysis 
to deal with such disorders and to reinstate the subject in the symbolic order, Kristeva 
— who much later became a psychologist — was interested in the transgressive nature   40 
of  the  eruptions  of  the  semiotic  into  the  symbolic.  Yet  despite  her  view  of  the 
oppression of the subject in phallocentric society, she resisted calls to abandon both the 
Other and difference as a way of creating sexual equality, as it was her belief that the 
relationship between the semiotic and symbolic, and resultant process of signification, 
was  indispensable.  She  explains  this  by  pointing  out  that  extreme  eruptions  of 
negativity from the libidinal drives can have disastrous results for the subject: 
In the extreme, negativity aims to foreclose the thetic phase, which, after a period of 
explosive semiotic motility, may result in the loss of symbolic function, as seen in 
schizophrenia. ‘Art’ on the other hand, by definition, does not relinquish the thetic 
even while pulverizing it through the negativity of transgression. Indeed, this is the 
only means of transgressing the thetic, and the difficulty of maintaining the symbolic 
function  under  the  assault  of  negativity  indicates  the  risk  that  textual  practice 
represents for the subject. What had seemed to be a process of fetishizing inherent in 
the way the text functions now seems a structurally necessary protection, one that 
serves to check negativity, confine it within stases, and prevent it from sweeping 
away the symbolic order (68-9). 
 
Kristeva indicates that the abandonment of the Other in the process of signification 
would result in the end of communication, as the loss of the thetic would preclude the 
end of meaning, or in the schizophrenic’s case would result in non-sense. Instead, she 
proposes the investigation of poetic language — with its links to the semiotic and pre-
symbolic  individual  —  due  to  its  ability  to  transgress  the  thetic  division  without 
rupturing it completely. This has the potential of influencing the constitution of the 
subject by soothing the symbolic through a process of catharsis, which sees the work of 
literature control the negativity of the libidinal drives. Therefore, for Kristeva a locus 
for the subject attempting to free itself of the restrictions of the dominant symbolic 
order  could  not  be  extraneous  to  language,  because  this  would  result  in  it  being 
inevitably othered by the ‘Law.’ Thus, the subject is always already diminished due to 
the arbitrary nature of language, the limitations placed on the individual forced to use 
this medium, and with the interpellation of discursively derived cultural practices.
16 As 
a  compromise,  she  posits  that  poetic  language  could  act  as  a  site  of  contestation,   41 
proving to be a fertile expression of alternative and counter-discursive subjectivity that 
must necessarily use the available discourses of that which it seeks to undermine. 
  The importance of poetic and literary works in relation to subjectivity is of the 
utmost interest to Kristeva, and continues my focus on the importance of literature with 
relation to subjectivity, as seen with Freud and the myth of Oedipus, and of language in 
the constitution of the subject in Lacan. Kristeva highlights this when arguing that: “If 
there exists a ‘discourse’ which is not a mere depository of thin linguistic layers, an 
archive  of  structures,  or  the  testimony  of  the  withdrawn  body,  and  is,  instead  the 
essential element of a practice involving the sum of unconscious, subjective, and social 
relations in gestures of confrontation and appropriation, destruction and construction — 
productive violence, in short — it is ‘literature,’ or, more specifically, the text” (16). For 
Kristeva, the work of literature mimics the relationship between the semiotic and the 
symbolic, and the ‘productive violence’ within the text represents a manifestation of the 
production of the subject and, in many cases, uses metaphor as a catharsis to redirect the 
negative libidinal drives which could disrupt meaningful and productive signification. 
As Lechte points out: “to be challenged by art is to be confronted by the void of non-
meaning  and  the  prospect  of  our  own  hell,  our  own  suffering  caused  by  a  loss  of 
identity inducing our melancholies and the truly tragic aspect of being. Kristeva shows, 
too  —  in  her  writing  of  love  and  art  —  that  this  suffering  is  also  the  way  to  a 
‘resurrection’ as a renewal of the self in language. Once, to ‘travel to hell’ was possible: 
for  God  was  love  (agape);  now,  God  is  dead  and  we  are  alone  and  afraid  of  the 
challenge of the void” (1990:219). For Kristeva, the work of literature enables us to 
reflect on our position as the subject of the symbolic order, and fictional representations 
of subjectivity that escape (re)presentation due to their semiotic nature  can propose 
alternative  expressions  of  subjectivity  to  those  which  are  culturally  determined  and 
limiting. Thus,  she  indicates  the  possibility  of  a  literature  that is  both  political  and   42 
philosophical,  which  includes  counter-discursive  explorations  of  fictional  forms  of 
subjectivity that attempt to escape the constraints of dominant cultural practices. 
  That Kristeva’s later work focussed on the relationship between subjectivity and 
artistic representation is apparent in her books, The Power of Horror and Tales of Love. 
Alluding to her notion of the artistic ‘subject in process,’ Lechte states that: “Kristeva’s 
work over the last decade can be seen as a series of specific elaborations of a theory of 
the subject. There can be no final elaboration. For Kristeva presents a subject which is 
never  entirely  analysable,  but  rather  one  always  incomplete:  the  subject  in  which 
dynamics of subjectivity are seen by Kristeva to be played out in this artistic space […] 
Thus while an artistic work must exhibit indications of human control and order for it to 
be identified as such, there is no complete subject prior to the work. Rather, artistic 
endeavour constitutes the subject as much as the subject constitutes the work of art” 
(1994:143). In other words, Kristeva views artistic representations of subjectivity as a 
site of contestation and transgression, while her texts play out the heterogeneous nature 
of signification and posit hypothetical alternative modes of expression, suggesting that 
as  the  subject  is  always  in  progress  and  never  self-present,  it  can  be  justifiably 
constituted by the work of art as much as by the symbolic order. She explains that: 
“This  heterogeneous  process,  neither  anarchic,  fragmented  foundation  nor 
schizophrenic blockage, is a structuring and de-structuring practice, a passage to the 
outer  boundaries  of  the  subject  and  society.  Then  —  and  only  then—  can  it  be 
jouissance  and  revolution”  (1984:17).  And  it  is  through  the  ‘structuring  and  ‘de-
structuring’ of being carried out in literature that we can explore the outer limits of 
subjectivity and society and, in her view, effect some form of ‘re-structuring.’ 
  Kristeva’s perspective at once defamiliarises the seemingly monolithic cultural 
and  economic  discourses  of  phallocentric  society,  yet  proposes  possible  positive 
alternatives to them. This has major implications for the subject diminished by these   43 
discursive practices as it illuminates their arbitrary nature and provides a locus for the 
transgression  of  dominant  expressions  of  subjectivity  and  sexuality.  This,  in  turn, 
undermines the symbolic representation of gender roles, which predominate, dictate and 
ultimately  oppress  those  who  choose  counter-discursive  alternatives.  Therefore, 
although Kristeva proposes that the subject is always already ‘in progress’ and never 
fully self-present, she optimistically indicates that by virtue of their symbolic nature 
these expressions of subjectivity are always already susceptible to the condition of the 
possibility of change, and that a valid locus for the potential discontinuity of oppressive 
discourses can be located in the poetic. 
 
1.4.a. In Summation — Chapter 1 
By way of summation then, we can view Freudian psychoanalysis as a discourse in 
progress that was determined to uncover the inner working of the human mind in order 
to gain greater access to its function, and to cure any potential crises within. However, 
quite the obverse was achieved as Freud’s initial focus on the unconscious not only 
diminished  the  subject  by  undermining  the  primacy  of  the  cogito,  his  ego-based 
propositions  complicated  and  multiplied  this  division  further,  leading  him  into  an 
aporia that relied on the metaphysical discourses of mythology and language to support 
his theses. In turn, this increased focus on the impact of language and subjectivity led 
Lacan to develop his ficto-critical perspective of the discursively determined subject, 
and  his  impression  of  a  fundamentally  diminished  individual  suffering  from  an 
irrevocable lack, and eternally searching for an always already absent metaphysical and 
self-present  Ideal-I.  While  finally,  Kristeva’s  work  focussed  on  defamiliarising  the 
manner  in  which  metaphysical  phallocentric  discourses  —  such  as  Freudian 
psychoanalysis  —  oppress  and  determine  the  sexual  subject.  In  opposition  to  this 
limiting  perspective  she  optimistically  posited  the  poetic  as  a  site  for  transgressive   44 
explorations of alternative forms of subjectivity that are always already in progress, 
permanently diminished, and subject to the condition of the possibility of change.  
                                                 
Notes: 
 
1 Written by Sophocles c. 445 King Oedipus tells of how it was prophesied that Oedipus would kill his 
father and marry his mother. Abandoned by his parents in the mountains, but saved by a shepherd to grow 
up in distant lands, he learns of this fate as an adult, but not realising his adopted status Oedipus flees and 
arrives in Thebes, his birthplace, and unwittingly kills King Laius, his father. After being declared King, 
following his defeat of the Sphinx that was besieging the city, he married Jocasta, his mother, who begets 
him several children. In an interesting twist to the tale as Oedipus searches for the truth of his birth and 
becomes aware of what he has committed, whereby Jocasta berates him stating: “Doomed man! O never 
live to learn the truth!” (1985:55). As a cautionary tale this could be read as a critique of those who spend 
their lives searching for a truth which may cause them to forsake their own happiness, for upon realising 
his responsibility for the death of his father and Jocasta’s suicide, Oedipus stabs out his eyes in disgust 
and echoing the dominant cultural perspective regarding the incest taboo states: 
“That silent crossroads in the forest clearing —That copse besides the place where three roads met, 
Whose soil I watered with my father’s blood, My blood — Will they remember what they saw,  
And what I came to Thebes to do? Incestuous sin! Breeding where I was bred! 
Father, brother, and son; bride, wife, and mother; Confounded in one monstrous matrimony! 
All human filthiness is one crime compounded! Unspeakable acts — I speak no more of them. 
Hide me at once, for God’s love, hide me away, Away! Kill me! Drown me in the depths of the sea!” 
(1985:64). 
2  Homosexuality  is  viewed  as  a  psychoneurosis  that  results  in  the  identification  with  the  sexually 
reciprocal parent from the failure of the repression of the Oedipus complex. In the Ego and the Id Freud 
states that: “[T]he more complete Oedipus complex, which is twofold, positive and negative, and is due to 
the bisexuality originally present in children: that is to say, a boy has not merely an ambivalent attitude 
towards his father and an affectionate object-choice towards his mother, but at the same time he also 
behaves like a girl and displays an affectionate feminine attitude towards his father and a corresponding 
hostility towards his mother […] The relative intensity of the two identifications in any individual will 
reflect the preponderance in him of one or another of the two sexual dispositions” (1978:33-34). 
3 This footnote to ‘The Ego and the Id’ indicates Freud’s view that it is the development of the infant up 
to the repression of the Oedipus complex that creates a sexually divided subject: “[W]e find in a letter to 
Fleiss (Freud, 1950a, Letter 113, of August 1, 1899): ‘Bisexuality! I am sure you are right about it. I am 
accustoming myself to regards every sexual act as an event between four individuals’” (1978:33). For 
Freud then, any later eruption of bisexuality is due to the failure to repress the Oedipus complex, viewing 
it as a neurosis and neither a biological imperative, nor a personal choice. 
4 In The Subject of Semiotics Silverman explains Freud’s concept of the preconscious in depth stating 
that: “the preconscious acquires the status of a censor, blocking the entrance of those wishes it deems 
unacceptable, as well as the memories associated with those wishes. The preconscious comes to exercise 
a  repressive  authority,  determining  not  only  which  unconscious  materials  may  gain  access  to  the 
conscious, but the shape those materials must take. The pleasure principle operates unchecked in the 
unconscious, exerting a particularly strong pressure through the first wishes which were refused access to 
the  conscious  —  infantile  impulses,  generally  of  an  Oedipal  nature.  These  impulses,  Freud  argues, 
constitute the motivating force of dreams (as well as parapraxes, jokes, day-dreams, and neuroses), which 
are by nature wish fulfilling. However, both wish and fulfilment must be thoroughly disguised or they 
will be rejected by the preconscious” (1983:60-1). 
5 Freud further elucidates the complicated relationship between the unconscious and the preconscious in 
The Interpretation of Dreams, indicating  that: “the unconscious (that  is,  the psychical)  is found as a 
function of two separate systems and that this is the case in normal as well as in pathological life. Thus 
there are two kinds of unconscious, which have not yet been distinguished by psychologists. Both of them 
are unconscious in the sense used by psychology; but in our sense one of them, which we term the Ucs., 
is also inadmissible to consciousness, while we term the other the Pcs. because its excitations — after 
observing certain rules, it is true, and perhaps only after passing a fresh censorship, though nonetheless 
without regard to the Ucs. — are able to reach conscious […] We have described the relations of the two 
systems to each other and to consciousness by saying that the system Pcs. stands like a screen between 
the system Ucs. and consciousness”  (1983:775-6). 
6  That  the  subject  is  diminished  in  Freud’s  work  is  supported  by  Silverman,  who  argues  that:  “The 
Freudian subject is above all a partitioned subject, incapable of exhaustive self-knowledge. Its parts do 
not  exist  harmoniously;  they  speak  different  languages  and  operate  on  the  basis  of  conflicting   45 
                                                                                                                                              
imperatives.  The  analyst  functions  as  a  kind  of  interpreter,  establishing  communication  between  the 
various sectors” (1983:132). 
7 For a full explanation of the relationship between the id, ego and super-ego refer to ‘The Id and the 
Ego,’ while the following quote acts a good summary of Freud’s perspective: “[T]he ego is formed to a 
great extent out of identifications which the take place of abandoned cathexes by the id; that the first of 
these identifications always behave as a special agency in the ego and stand apart from the ego in the 
form of the super-ego, while later on, as it grows stronger, the ego may become more resistant to the 
influences of such identifications. The super-ego owes its special position in the ego, or in relation to the 
ego, to a factor which must be considered from two sides: on the one hand it was the first identification 
and one which took place while the ego was still feeble, and on the other hand it is the heir to the Oedipus 
complex and has thus introduced the most momentous objects into the ego […] Although it is accessible 
to all later influences, it nevertheless preserves throughout life the character given to it by its derivation 
from the father-complex — namely, the capacity to stand apart from the ego and to master it. It is a 
memorial  of  the  former  weakness  and  dependence  of  the  ego,  and  the  ego  remains  subject  to  its 
domination. As the child was once under the compulsion to obey its parents, so the ego submits to the 
categorical imperatives of its super-ego” (1978:48) 
8 I must point out that Freud primarily discusses this and most other processes in terms of the boy. There 
are clearly serious problems with his development of the female subject, as I have already discussed, but 
rather than dealing with this complicated issue at length I have decided, in order to aid simplicity, to 
follow his discussion of the male. 
9 For a full account see Lacan’s The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1986:196-7 & 205), 
Plato’s Symposium (1985:59-61), and Silverman’s Subject of Semiotics (1983:154-5). 
10  Lacan  is  indebted  here  to  the  pioneering  work  of  Melanie  Klein,  and  her  notions  of  the  lack  of 
differentiation between infants, whereby if one begins crying so too will the other, and of her interest in 
aggressiveness in the pre-symbolic child. 
11 See Claude Lévi-Strauss’ Structural Anthropology and Elementary Structures of Kinship. For Lacan’s 
usage see Ecrits and also Silverman’s The Subject of Semiotics (1983:178-80). 
12 For the various accounts of the ‘Name-of-the-Father’ see Ecrits, Section C: Note b (1999:328). 
13 See Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics. 
14 Sarup expands on Lacan’s position pointing out that: “While Saussure formulated the signified on top, 
Lacan puts the signifier on top — to give it pre-eminence. He argued that signifiers are combined in a 
signifying  chain.  Meaning  does  not  arise  in  the  individual  signifier  but  in  the  connection  between 
signifiers. Saussure had admitted that there can occur a shift or sliding (glissement) in the relationship 
between the signifier and signified. In contrast, Lacan argues not only that the two realms of signifier and 
signified are never united, but that there is an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier. This 
does not mean that there are no moments of stability at all. Lacan suggests that there are ‘anchoring 
points’ […] which stop the sliding signifiers and fix their meaning” (1992:90). 
15 Edmund Husserl’s work and the ‘transcendental ego’ are explained at length in the next chapter. 
16 A discussion pertaining to language and subjectivity will be expanded in the following chapter, and in 
particular in the section on Jacques Derrida. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Phenomenology, Deconstruction and the Diminished Subject —  
Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida 
 
 
2.1.a. Edmund Husserl — Phenomenology the Divided Theorist 
 
With a mind to investigating the theoretical football that is, or perhaps is not, the crisis 
of postmodernism, its apparent condition, and its effect on contemporary subjectivity in 
relation to the aporia of the diminished subject, the work of Edmund Husserl makes for 
a  pertinent  starting  point.  It  was  Husserl’s  belief  that  a  strict  phenomenological 
approach  could  bring  about  a  complete  understanding  of  consciousness  and  being, 
arguing repeatedly that ‘European man’ was suffering from certain crises that prevented 
traditional philosophy from reaching this ‘Archimedean point.’ He viewed these crises 
as the result of the failure of philosophy and psychoanalysis to provide a theoretical 
certitude  of  subjectivity,  and  urged  for  a  return  of  reason  in  the  face  of  growing 
scepticism toward these once respected metaphysical disciplines. In ‘Philosophy and the 
Crisis of European Man,’ he argues that: “it is important for our problem of the crisis to 
show  how  it  is  that  the  ‘modern  age,’  that  has  for  centuries  been  so  proud  of  its 
successes in theory and practice, has itself finally fallen into a growing dissatisfaction 
and must even look upon its own situation as distressful” (1965:185). Thus, Husserl 
believed that the subject of his day was suffering from a lack of faith in the ability of 
philosophy to escape an apparent aporia by which the very foundations of society, 
rationality and reason, had been proven vulnerable, due to a reliance on certain less 
theoretically rigorous metaphysical postulations. With this in mind, this discussion of 
Husserl will investigate his attempts to reinstate philosophical reason through the study 
of knowable phenomena and cure the ills of ‘European man,’ the problems associated 
with  this  approach,  his  own  doubts  regarding  his  undertaking,  and  his  mostly 
unacknowledged influence on contemporary theory.   47 
  It was Husserl’s contention that the ‘crises’ that beset European culture were the 
result of the inherently questionable postulations of traditional philosophy and — more 
recently  —  those  of  psychoanalysis,  believing  that  the  metaphysical  nature  of  their 
formulations left them open to the vagaries of scepticism, resulting in a loss of reason 
and rationalism — the very things that separated ‘man’ from ‘beast.’
1
 Consequently he 
proposed a phenomenological approach to study the conscious subject,
2
 as opposed to 
the  traditional  focus  on  the  dualism  of  the  Cartesian  cogito  and  contemporary 
psychoanalytic  interest  in  the  unconscious,  claiming  that  both  had  failed  to  make 
inroads into the understanding of the subject in toto, and had lost credibility with their 
unproven metaphysical propositions. Thus, phenomenology became the ‘great-white-
hope’ of not only philosophy, but also of culture and subjectivity in general. Rudiger 
Safranski explains this view of the phenomenological panacea in Martin Heidegger: 
Between Good and Evil, wherein he states that:  
[D]uring the first postwar years, this specialized subject turned into what was almost 
an ideological hope. Hans-Georg Gadamer [a student of Husserl’s] reports that, at the 
beginning  of  the  1920s,  when  ‘slogans  about  the  decline  of  the  West  [were] 
omnipresent,’ the subject of phenomenology was included, alongside the teachings 
of Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Kierkegaard, among the countless suggestions put 
forwards at a ‘Discussion among World Improvers’ (1999:71). 
 
That  is,  rather  than  phenomenology  being  yet  another  speculative  metaphysical 
philosophy, Husserl believed, among others, that this new science of subjectivity would 
uncover,  and  guarantee  with  certitude,  the  truth  of  consciousness,  and  address  a 
perceived decline in European culture. 
  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  raison  d’être  for  Husserl’s  phenomenological 
approach  was  to  reinstate  the  purely  centred  subject  as  the  object  of  philosophical 
investigation, and although this determinism seems to run counter to the aim of this text, 
he  was  also  guilty  of  diminishing  the  subject  in  his  own  manner  and  with  major 
implications for succeeding theorists. His main objection to psychology, apart from its   48 
scientific  approach  to  the  study  of  intangible  unconscious  subjectivity,  was  its 
apparently ‘objectivist’ approach, explaining in ‘The Crisis’ that: 
[W]ith  its  claims  to  scientific  exactitude  [psychology]  wants  to  be  the  universal 
fundamental science of the spirit. Still, our hope for real rationality, i.e., for real 
insight, is disappointed here as elsewhere. The psychologists simply fail to see that 
they too study neither themselves nor the scientists who are doing the investigating 
nor their own vital environing world. They do not see that from the very beginning 
they necessarily presuppose themselves as a group of men belonging to their own 
environing world and historical period. By the same token, they do not see that in 
pursuing their aims they are seeking a truth in itself, universally valid for everyone. 
By its objectivism psychology simply cannot make a study of the soul in its properly 
essential sense (1965:186-87). 
 
Not  only  does  Husserl  criticise  psychology  for  its  supposedly  objective  ego-based 
approach to the study of the unconscious, he also hints at a more conventional approach 
that further decentres the individual. By indicating the importance of the ‘environing 
world’  —  that  which  impacts  on  both  the  analyst  and  analysand  —  Husserl 
inadvertently  proposes  that  this  outside  influence  will  vary  from  subject  to  subject, 
making a ‘universal truth’ an impossibility, yet this view was one born out of an innate 
humanism rather than any belief in an inherently diminished subject. Furthermore, his 
belief that psychology was failing in its pursuit, due to a confusion between the physical 
and ‘psychical,’ led him to propose that the study of consciousness was best afforded 
through the investigation of phenomena rather than experience.  
  Husserl’s motivation for his phenomenological approach was not based solely on 
the failure of psychology but also of the Hegelian legacy, and although influenced by 
Hegel’s work he believed that philosophy had suffered greatly as a result of his search 
for  a  deterministic  understanding  of  the  human  subject,  which  included  the 
unquestioned adoption of a variety of metaphysical concepts. As Quentin Lauer states in 
his ‘Introduction’ to Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy: “Though Hegel’s 
goal was unquestionably absolute knowledge, it is in his wake that scientific exigency 
in philosophy tends to weaken or to be given a false orientation. As a reaction to Hegel 
there arose a dissatisfaction with every known philosophy, which turned into a distrust   49 
of philosophy as such and terminated in historical relativism” (1965:8-9). Thus, Husserl 
saw philosophy as suffering from a crisis of faith resulting from the lack of scientific 
certitude of metaphysical approaches, such as Hegel’s historicism, leaving them open to 
ridicule and scepticism, pointing out in ‘The Crisis’ that the: “course of philosophy goes 
through a period of naïveté. This, then, is the place for a critique of the so renowned 
irrationalism, or it is the place to uncover the naïveté of that rationalism that passes as 
genuine  philosophical  rationality  […]  the  most  general  title  for  this  naïveté  is 
objectivism, which is given a structure in the various types of naturalism, wherein the 
spirit is naturalized” (1965:181). As such, Husserl viewed philosophy and psychology 
as  having  failed  to  deliver  a  promised  scientific  certitude  of  subjectivity,  while 
naturalising consciousness through a flawed objectivist approach that — coupled with a 
loss of rationality and reason — had resulted in scepticism toward both.  
  It was Husserl’s belief that a rigorous scientific approach to the study of human 
consciousness  would  avert  any  further  decline  of  theory  and  culture,  viewing  the 
complete  understanding  of  conscious  subjectivity  as  his  ‘Archimedean  point.’  He 
believed  this  could  be  achieved  by  moving  from  the  intangible  metaphysical 
postulations  of  philosophy,  religion  and  psychoanalysis  to  the  unquestionable 
phenomena of existence, explaining in ‘Philosophy as a Rigorous Science’ that the fight 
against scepticism was necessary for the future of European culture and subjectivity:  
From its earliest beginnings philosophy has claimed to be a rigorous science. What is 
more, it has claimed to be the science that satisfies the loftiest theoretical needs and 
renders  possible  from  an  ethico-religious  point  of  view  a  life  regulated  by  pure 
rational norms. This claim has been pressed with sometimes more, sometimes less 
energy, but it has never been completely abandoned, not even during those times 
when interest in and capacity for pure theory were in danger of atrophying, or when 
religious forces restricted freedom of theoretical investigation (1965:71).  
 
Thus, Husserl believed he was returning to the proper teleology of a rigorous scientific 
philosophy  that  had  ‘atrophied’  as  the  result  of  the  acceptance  of  a  priori 
preconceptions,  resulting  in  the  loss  of  metaphysical  certitude  for  the  subject.  He   50 
posited  that  his  phenomenological  approach  would  address  what  he  considered  the 
subject’s  inalienable  right  to  metaphysical  self-presence  because:  “philosophy, 
according  to  its  historical  purpose  the  loftiest  and  most  rigorous  of  all  sciences, 
representing  as  it  does  humanity’s  imperishable  demand  for  pure  and  absolute 
knowledge  […]  is  incapable  of  assuming  the  form  of  a  rigorous  science”  (72). 
Therefore,  the  only  hope  for  the  subject  was  with  a  scientifically  rigorous 
phenomenology free of the sceptical metaphysical preconceptions plaguing his day.  
  With the failure of philosophy to achieve this certitude of subjectivity, Husserl 
proceeded  to  defamiliarise  what  he  referred  to  as  ‘degenerate  metaphysics,’  with  a 
process he referred to as ‘bracketing,’ thus bringing about an phenomenological epoché 
—  or  cessation  —  of  the  unquestioned  appropriation  of  the  preconceptions  of  a 
supposedly objective psychology and philosophy. He explains this process in ‘Section 
8’ of the Cartesian Meditations wherein he argues that:  
The universal depriving of acceptance, this ‘inhibiting’ or ‘putting out of play’ of all 
positions  taken  toward  the  already  given  Objective  and,  in  the  first  place,  all 
existential positions (those concerning being, illusion, possible being, being likely, 
probable etc.) — or, as the it is also called, this ‘phenomenological epoché’ and 
‘parenthesizing’ of the Objective world — therefore does not leave us confronting 
nothing. On the contrary we gain possession of something by it; and what we […] 
acquire by it is my pure living, with all the pure subjective processes making this up, 
and everything meant in them, purely as meant in them: the universe of ‘phenomena’ 
in the (particular and also the wider) phenomenological sense. The epoché can also 
be said to be the radical and universal method by which I apprehend myself purely: 
as Ego, and with my own pure conscious life, in and by which the entire Objective 
world exists for me and is precisely as it is for me (1973:20-21). 
 
That  is,  despite  his  fundamentally  metaphysical  aim,  Husserl  was  instrumental  in 
diminishing  the  subject  of  traditional  philosophy  by  defamiliarising  it  in  a  form  of 
proto-deconstruction that would prove to be greatly influential. Yet despite criticising 
psychoanalysis  and  contemporary  philosophy  for  their  objectivist  approaches, 
Husserlian  phenomenology  was  at  once  grounded  in  science  and  claimed  complete 
knowledge of the phenomena of the ‘environing world’ of the conscious subject. As 
such,  Husserl  sacrificed  the  individual  in  favour  of  a  metaphysical  ‘ideal  being’  of   51 
consciousness  —  thus  continuing  the  primacy  of  the  cogito  —  that  was  at  once 
universal and scientifically provable, while at the same time diminishing the subject 
through his belief in a generic method for understanding all subjects. Therefore, he 
found himself consciously guilty of metaphysics due to a determined belief that the 
truth of the consciousness could be uncovered through a scientific study of phenomena, 
and that the rampant scepticism in the European subject would be cured.
3  
 
2.1.b. Husserl’s Doubts 
 
Having outlined Husserl’s modus operandi for developing his phenomenological study 
of subjectivity, and the problems inherent therein, it is interesting to note that despite his 
scientific rigour he expressed constant doubts regarding the validity of his enterprise. In 
his ‘Introduction,’ Lauer points out that there are three distinct phases of Husserl’s 
phenomenology, those being the:  
Husserl  of  the  Logische  Untersuchungen,  where  he  so  masterfully  employed  a 
phenomenological description of experience […] the Husserl of Ideen I, as he turned 
the searchlight of his investigations more and more inward to the subject of this 
experience  [while]  in  Formale  und  transzendentale  Logik  and  the  Cartesian 
Meditations, he made his idealism so thoroughly transcendental that not only the 
form but also the content of experience was constituted in subjectivity (1965:24).  
 
That is, despite his best intentions Husserl was filled with doubts in much the same 
manner as Wittgenstein was with his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, causing him to 
continually develop and refine his approach, eventually leading him into an aporia — a 
theoretical impasse — that he could only escape with the proposal of the ‘transcendental 
ego.’ However, this move led him inexorably into the trap of metaphysics, the very 
locus of the crisis he wished to escape.  
  Husserl  believed  that  the  ‘bracketing’  brought  about  by  the  phenomenological 
epoché would not only overcome degenerate metaphysics, but also provide a purity of 
self-present subjectivity through a process of phenomenological reduction — explained 
in ‘Section 8’ of The Cartesian Mediations — and argued that: “this phenomenon itself,   52 
as mine, is not nothing but is precisely what makes such critical decisions at all possible 
and accordingly makes possible what ever has for me sense and validity as ‘true’ being 
— definitely decided or definitely decidable being” (1973:19). It was his belief that the 
seat  of  this  ‘true’  being  —  the  ‘Archimedean  point’  of  subjectivity  —  would  be 
uncovered by this reduction, and was located in the ‘transcendental ego,’ explaining in 
‘Section 11’ of The Meditations that: 
By phenomenological epoché I reduce my natural human Ego and my psychic life — 
the  realm  of  my  psychological  self-experience  —  to  my  transcendental-
phenomenological  Ego,  the  realm  of  transcendental-phenomenological  self-
experience. The Objective world, the world that exists for me, that always has and 
always will exist for me, the only world that can ever exist for me — this world, with 
all its Objects, I said, derives its whole sense, and its existential status, which it has 
for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to 
the fore only with the transcendental-phenomenological epoché (1973:26). 
 
Ironically, while Husserl began by refuting the metaphysical approaches of philosophy 
and psychology, he too became guilty of metaphysical determinism when creating his 
own neologism of the ‘transcendental ego.’
4 However, despite the inherent problems of 
this  intangible  concept,  his  process  of  bracketing  seemingly  a  priori  philosophical 
concepts proved to be greatly influential, and despite his failings, the manner in which 
he dealt with this impasse was to provide a useful theoretical springboard for the likes 
of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. Safranski indicates the extent that Husserl’s 
approach to the study of subjectivity eventually ran counter to his initial propositions: 
“With his own thoughts […] he would forever start afresh; he found it difficult to accept 
as valid what he had written earlier. Consciousness, especially his own, was to him a 
river into which, as is known, one cannot ever step twice at the same point” (1999:73-
4).
5 In other words, despite his best intentions, Husserl saw himself as a ‘perpetual 
beginner’ in the study of consciousness, and raised doubts that led him to constantly 
undermine his scientific propositions and literally destroy his own work. Thus, even 
though he attempted to reinstate self-present certitude and complete understanding of   53 
consciousness with the transcendental ego, we can view his aporia as supporting an a 
priori perspective of subjectivity as ineluctably diminished and not transcendental.  
 
2.1.c. Husserl and language 
 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that  although  Husserl  attempted  to  address  the  problematic 
division of language originating with Plato’s ‘wrong turn’ — that schism between the 
reason of rhetoric an the speciousness of the poetic — in order to establish the logical 
base  of  his  phenomenological  approach,  in  doing  so  he  further  diminished  the 
traditional view of the self-present subject. He explains the need for a logical definition 
of language in ‘Section 5’ of the ‘First Investigation’ of The Logical Investigations 
stating that: “From indicative signs we distinguish meaningful signs, i.e., expressions. 
We thereby employ the term ‘expression’ restrictively: we exclude much that ordinary 
speech would call an ‘expression’ from its range of application. There are other cases in 
which we have thus to do violence to usage, where concepts for which only ambiguous 
terms can exist call for a fixed terminology” (1999:28). That is, in order to establish a 
logical approach to the study of the phenomena of consciousness, vague arbitrary terms 
such as ‘expression’ needed to be ‘bracketed’ and set in concrete terms. The ‘violence’ 
Husserl  extends  toward  the  definition  of  ‘expression’  indicates  a  deterministic 
perspective of what he believed could be classified communication, and emphasises 
once again his fundamental metaphysical aim:  
We shall lay down, for provisional intelligibility, that each instance or part of speech, 
as  also  each  sign  that  is  essentially  the  same  sort,  shall  count  as  an  expression, 
whether or not such speech is actually uttered, or addressed with communicative 
intent to any persons or not. Such a definition excludes facial expressions and the 
various  gestures  which  involuntarily  accompany  speech  without  communicative 
intent, or those in which a man’s mental states achieve understandable ‘expression’ 
for his environment, without the added help of speech. Such ‘utterances’ are not 
expressions in the sense in which a case of speech is an expression, they are not 
phenomenally one with the experiences made manifest in them in the consciousness 
of man who manifests them, as in the case of speech. In such manifestations one man 
communicates nothing to another: their utterance involves no intent to put certain 
‘thoughts’ on record expressively, whether for the man himself, in his solitary state, 
or for others. Such ‘expressions’ in short, have properly speaking, no meaning. It is   54 
not to the point that another person may interpret our involuntary manifestations, 
e.g., our ‘expressive moments,’ and that he may thereby become deeply acquainted 
with our inner thoughts and emotions. They ‘mean’ something to him in so far as he 
interprets them, but even for him they are without meaning in the special sense in 
which  verbal  signs  have  meaning:  they  only  mean  in  the  sense  of  indicating 
(1999:28). 
 
Therefore, we see Husserl continuing, and complicating, the divisive dualism of the 
‘wrong turn’ while indicating his own determinism, when suggesting that these non-
verbal  and  unconscious  forms  of  involuntary  communication  have  no  value  in  his 
logical investigation. However, by recognising and dismissing the existence of these 
non-conscious  expressions  of  subjectivity,  Husserl  inadvertently  acknowledges  the 
danger that communicative articulation has for the self-present subject, by implicating 
the Other in the reception of these unintentional ‘utterances.’ Faced with a form of 
expression  which  stems  from  the  unconscious,  and  having  turned  his  back  on 
psychological preconceptions, Husserl determined that such phenomena have no value 
for the investigation into pure consciousness and, much like Plato, banishes them, and 
their receiver — the dangerous Other — from his phenomenological investigation into 
the pure ‘expression’ of self-presence.  
  Husserl’s deliberate omission of non-verbal and unconscious expression from his 
definition of ‘indication’ is explained by Jacques Derrida in ‘Meaning as Soliloquy,’ 
wherein he states that: “The move which justifies this exclusion should teach us a great 
deal about the metaphysical tenor of this phenomenology” (1996:37), and goes on to 
intimate the dangers these forms of expression hold for Husserl’s metaphysics of self-
presence, explaining that:  
The themes which will arise therein will never be re-examined by Husserl; on the 
contrary, they will repeatedly be confirmed. This will lead us to think that in the final 
analysis what separates expression from indication could be called the immediate 
nonself-presence of the living present. The elements of worldly experience, of what 
is  natural  or  empirical,  of  sensibility,  of  association,  etc.,  which  determined  the 
concept of indication will perhaps […] find their ultimate unity in this non-presence. 
And this non-presence to itself of the living present will simultaneously qualify the 
relation  to  others  in  general  as  well  as  the  relation  to  the  self  involved  in 
temporalization (37).   55 
 
Perhaps this tendency is a prime example of someone protesting too much against a 
perceived  aporia  in  their  work,  and  is  Husserl’s  response  to  a  threat  to  his 
‘Archimedean  Point.’  This  possibility  is  not  lost  on  Derrida  who  explains  that  the 
division between verbal and non-verbal communication is also a continuation of the 
dualism of the Cartesian cogito arguing that: “The opposition between body and soul is 
not only at the centre of this doctrine of signification, it is confirmed by it; and, as has 
always been at bottom the case in philosophy, it depends upon the interpretation of 
language. Visibility and spatiality as such could only destroy the self-presence of will 
and spiritual animation which opens up discourse. They are literally the death of that 
self-presence”  (35).  That  Husserl’s  investigations  into  language  should  raise  more 
questions than answers — due mainly to this inadequate engagement with language — 
could be in part due to the recognition that all  forms of self-expression necessarily 
undermine the possibility of pure presence.  
  While Husserl’s logically deterministic approach to language attempted to cure 
the  crisis  of  scepticism  by  ‘bracketing’  non-verbal  and  unconscious  expressions,  he 
failed to recognise the metaphysically linguistic nature of all philosophical concepts. 
Derrida explains this problem when he asks: “What gives a theory of knowledge the 
authority to determine the essence and origin of language? We do not impute such a 
decision  to  Husserl;  he  explicitly  assumes  it  —  or  rather  he  explicitly  assumes  its 
tradition and its validity […] Husserl had to postpone, from one end of his itinerary to 
the other, all explicit meditation on the essence of language in general […] and the 
language of phenomenology is never broken in spite of the precautions, the ‘brackets,’ 
the renovations or innovations” (7-8). As we shall see, not only did this unquestioning 
use  of  the  philosophical  tradition  and  the  a  priori  nature  of  indicative  expressions 
underline the fundamental metaphysical  aim of Husserl’s phenomenology, it was to 
have a marked impact on the work of Martin Heidegger.   56 
 
2.1.d. The Husserlian Now — Presence and Changeability 
 
Although  having  focussed  primarily  on  Husserl  as  divided  between  a  faith  in  the 
certitude of science and doubts over his phenomenological enterprise, the changeability 
of his theoretical position is also important to this discussion of the diminished subject, 
while his investigation of consciousness in relation to both language and time, have had 
implications for the continued study of subjectivity. In The Phenomenology of Internal 
Time-Consciousness, Husserl explains that in order for consciousness to progress with 
the passage of time there must be a transition between a past consciousness and a new 
‘now-consciousness’ while maintaining self-presence:  
It is a universal and basically essential fact that every now as it sinks in the past 
maintains its  strict identity. Phenomenologically speaking, the now-consciousness 
that  is  constituted  on  the  basis  of  a  content  A  changes  continuously  to  a 
consciousness of the past, while at the same time an ever new now-consciousness is 
built up. With this transformation […] the self-modifying consciousness preserves its 
object intention (1966:86).  
 
However,  while  trying  to  provide  a  perspective  of  the  transition  of  consciousness 
through time, Husserl inadvertently undermines his phenomenological approach, and 
the possibility of self-present subjectivity. This becomes clear when he explains the 
manner in which consciousness transcends the present moment: “The now, just sinking 
away, is no longer the new, but that which is shoved aside by the new. In this being-
shoved aside lies an alteration. But while the now which has been shoved aside has lost 
its now-character, it maintains itself in its object intention absolutely unaltered” (86-7). 
Thus, for Husserl, the new ‘now-consciousness’ must at once undergo an alteration and 
maintain its intention. Furthermore, the fact that every new ‘now-consciousness’ must 
be  open  to  new  phenomena  presupposes  that  consciousness,  rather  than  being  self-
present to the subject and fixed in time, it is constantly changing. 
  This dichotomy has been picked up on by many including Christopher Norris
6 and 
Horst Ruthrof,
7 and has had major implications for the work of Heidegger and Derrida.   57 
However, most pertinently it was Husserl who best undermined his own attempts at a 
scientific understanding of consciousness and, in turn, the belief in the possibility of 
pure self-presence, something that becomes clear when he explains that:  
In  any  ideal  sense,  then,  perception  (impression)  would  be  the  phase  of 
consciousness, which constitutes the pure now, and memory of every other phase of 
the  continuity.  But  this  is  just  an  ideal  limit,  something  abstract,  which  can  be 
nothing for itself. Moreover, it is also true that even the ideal now is not something 
toto caelo different for the not-now but continually accommodates itself thereto. The 
continual  transition  from  perception  to  primary  remembrance  conforms  to  the 
accommodation (63).  
 
Thus it follows that if every possible new now-consciousness is both an ‘ideal limit’ and 
‘abstract’ then there can be no way of knowing what that new now-consciousness will 
be,  especially  given  that  any  new  phenomena  denies  pre-given  perception.  That  is, 
while trying to apply a purely phenomenological explanation to consciousness, Husserl 
undermines  his  own  proposition  in  relation  to  language  and  time  arguing  that  any 
moment  of  self-presence  is  fleeting  and  problematic.  Derrida  argues  this  point  in 
‘Meaning and Representation,’ stating that: “The self-presence of experience must be 
produced in the present taken as a now. And this is just what Husserl says: if ‘mental 
acts’ are not announced to themselves through the intermediary of a ‘Kundgabe,’ if they 
do not have to be informed about themselves through the intermediary of indications, it 
is because they are ‘lived by us in the same instant.’ The present of self-presence would 
be  as  indivisible  as  the  blink  of  an  eye”  (1973:59).  Thus,  with  his  dismissal  of 
inappropriate forms of expression, the relation between the subject and the other, and 
the effect that the passage of time has on any new now-consciousness, we see Husserl’s 
‘Archimedean Point’ of self-present subjectivity literally thrown out with the bathwater!  
  Finally then, we can see that Husserl’s work in relation to self-present subjectivity 
makes  for  an  interesting  dichotomy.  On  the  one  hand  he  attempted  to  carry  out  a 
complete understanding of consciousness in scientific terms to overcome the scepticism 
of speculative metaphysics, while on the other he exhibited self-doubt as to the validity   58 
of this approach, which led him to consistently rewrite and undermine his work. The 
extent  of  Husserl’s  theoretical  aporia  and  the  success  he  had  in  defamiliarising 
metaphysical  preconceptions  by  ‘bracketing’  them  is  best  expressed  by  Martin 
Heidegger who states that: “I remained so fascinated by Husserl’s work that I read it 
time and time again in the years to follow without gaining sufficient insight into what 
fascinated me. The spell emanating from the work extended to the outer appearance of 
the sentence structure and the title page” (Quoted in Biemel:1977:10). That is, despite 
his failings, it was Husserl’s shortcomings that had a remarkable impact on successive 
theorists,  while  his  apparent  aporia  clearly  gives  a  perspective  of  an  a  priori 
diminishing of subjectivity. Although Husserl called for a phenomenological approach 
to the study of subjectivity free from degenerate metaphysics and purely self-present, he 
ultimately failed to cure the crises of European Man, yet despite this he never lost faith 
in the future of subjectivity. However, when writing in 1936 — a mere two years prior 
to  his  death  and  three  years  before  WWII  —  he  presciently  indicated  the  possible 
outcome of a culture based on rampant scepticism, something that he was to experience 
first-hand in neo-Nietzschean Nazi Germany, explaining in ‘The Crisis’ that:  
The crisis of European existence can end in only one of two ways: in the ruin of a 
Europe alienated from its rational sense of life, fallen into a barbarian hatred of 
spirit; or in the rebirth of Europe from the spirit of philosophy, through a heroism of 
reason that will definitively overcome naturalism. Europe’s greatest danger is its 
weariness. Let us as ‘good Europeans’ do battle with this danger of dangers with the 
sort of courage that does not shirk with even the endless battle. If we do, then from 
the annihilating conflagration of disbelief, from the fiery torrent of despair regarding 
the West’s mission to humanity, from the ashes of the great weariness, the phoenix 
of a new inner life of the spirit will arise as the underpinning of a great and distant 
human future, for the spirit alone is immortal (1965:192). 
 
Therefore, with this discussion of Husserl we see a theorist split between a pessimism 
that is predicative of the new crisis about to engulf Europe and the ‘endless’ desire for 
the metaphysical comfort of self-presence, while remaining mystically optimistic that 
phenomenology could determine the certitude of subjectivity and culture he craved for. 
Finally  then,  Husserl  can  be  read  as  a  divided  theorist  whose  work  parallels  the   59 
fundamental theoretical premise of the aporia of the diminished subject, and whose 
influence, as we shall see, has had a significant impact on contemporary perspectives of 
philosophy, language and subjectivity. 
 
2.2.a. Martin Heidegger — Phenomenology, Language and ‘Deconstruction’ 
 
Having discussed the importance of Edmund Husserl to this thesis I will now turn my 
attention to the work of Martin Heidegger, which despite having had a great influence 
on contemporary theory is mostly ignored or simply glossed over. It is my contestation, 
that  this  apparent  lack  of  interest  stems  from  the  difficult  nature  of  his  writing  — 
infamous for its neologisms and word play, most of which are lost in translation — and 
due his involvement with the Nazi party. It is with this in mind that I shall begin this 
section, yet rather than summarising Heidegger’s extensive body of work, I shall focus 
on three aspects, those being his close personal and theoretical ties with Husserl, the 
manner in which Being and Time — his magnum opus — continues the teleology of the 
diminished  subject,  and  the  increased  focus  on  the  literary  in  his  ‘mature’  work. 
However, as any discussion of Heidegger must necessarily engage with his involvement 
with Nazism, rather than simply adding to this weighty topic, I shall keep my discussion 
of this issue as pertinent to the topic of this thesis as possible. 
 
2.2.b. Heidegger and Husserl — The link and the break 
 
Is it the fault of being that it is so involved? Is it the fault of the word that it remains 
so empty? Or are we to blame that with all our effort, with all our chasing after the 
essent, we have fallen out of being? And should we not say that the fault did not 
begin with us, or with our immediate or more remote ancestors, but lies in something 
that runs through Western History from the very beginning, a happening which the 
eyes of all the historians in the world will never perceive, but which nevertheless 
happens, which happened in the past and will happen in the future? What if it were 
possible that man, that nations in their greatest movements and traditions, are linked 
to being, and yet had long fallen out of being, without knowing it, and that this was 
the most powerful and most central cause of their decline?  
— Martin Heidegger, in An Introduction to Metaphysics (1987:37). 
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It is interesting to note that despite the commonly held belief that the contemporary 
subject is suffering from a ‘postmodern condition,’ the issue of a crisis in culture and 
subjectivity recurs once again in the work of Martin Heidegger — although its nature 
was to alter between the First and the Second World Wars — giving the perception that 
this  state  of  crisis  is  continual  rather  than  something  temporally  specific.  That 
Heidegger’s theoretical impetus was as a response to certain cultural and philosophical 
crises is explained by Thomas Sheehan, in his article ‘Reading a life: Heidegger and 
hard times,’ wherein he states that:  
Even Heidegger, when he was 20 years old and still a seminary student, had thrown 
in his lot with the Vatican [and] publicly condemned Modernism and defended the 
church’s teaching authority […] Four years later, however […] Heidegger began to 
feel the pinch of the church’s anti-Modernist crusade and changed his mind. In a 
letter to his friend Father Krebs […] he remarked ironically how the Vatican might 
guarantee conformity among Catholic intellectuals: ‘Philosophical demand could be 
met by setting up vending machines in the train station (free of charge for the poor)’ 
and ‘all who succumb to having independent thoughts could have their brains taken 
out and replaced with spaghetti’ (1993:74). 
 
Having decided to enter the seminary, it follows that the young Heidegger would abide 
by the Church’s doctrines and reject the liberal philosophical and artistic endeavours of 
Modernism. However, in a case of crisis begetting crisis, Heidegger soon turned his 
back on the church, and in an abrupt volte-face embraced the apparent philosophical 
freedom of Modernism. This temporally specific fear of Modernism cannot be ignored, 
especially given that recent perspectives of the crisis of postmodernism, such as Fredric 
Jameson’s — those which argue for a return to the cultural originality of the Modernist 
era  —  can  now  be  perceived  as  a  neo-‘shock  of  the  neo,’  and  comparable  to  this 
response by the Catholic Church to decadent Modernism. 
  For  Heidegger,  this  crisis  of  religious  faith  eventually  led  him  to  convert  to 
Protestantism, yet this was little when compared with the impending horrors of WWI. 
Unable  to  enlist  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  he  continued  his  studies  at  Freiburg 
University under Edmund Husserl before being called up for home defence duties in   61 
early 1918. Following the armistice and the reparations of the Treaty of Versailles, 
Germany’s economy and culture were suffering from unprecedented crises
8 that would 
have a major influence on his work. This is especially true of Being and Time, given 
that many of its key themes — such as the innate anxiety of Being — are the direct 
response to the crises of culture and philosophy. Rudiger Safranski points out the extent 
of the chaos in post-war Germany in Martin Heidegger, Between Good and Evil: 
Heidegger’s philosophy of anxiety also stems from the general crisis mood of the 
1920s. The malaise of culture […] was widespread. The worldview essays of the 
period were marked by an uneasy sense of a declining, perverted, or alienated world. 
The  diagnoses  were  gloomy  and  the  therapies  offered  numerous.  A  boom  was 
enjoyed by attempts to  cure the  ailing whole from one point […] fanatical anti-
Semitism  and  racial  ideas  were  rampant,  the  Bolshevization  of  the  German 
Communist  Party  was  beginning,  Hitler  was  writing  Mein  Kampf  in  Landsberg 
prison,  millions  were  seeking  salvation  in  sectarian  movements  —  occultism, 
vegetarianism,  nudism,  theosophy  and  anthroposophy  —  there  were  countless 
promises of salvation and offers of a new road  (1999:152-3).  
 
With this view, it appears that Heidegger’s early work was a response to a perceived 
crisis  of  culture  and  philosophy,  and  an  attempt  to  reinstate  analytical  rigour  and 
overcome the failure of religious metaphysics, Modernism, and the myriad of dubious 
cure-alls, to provide any solutions to an inherent anxiety and insecurity of subjectivity. 
Much of this cultural chaos had been exacerbated by the war, and what was to follow in 
Nazi Germany had its roots here leading to crises beyond imagination, while Heidegger 
was himself dealing with the failure of Husserl to theoretically deal with these issues.  
  Although Husserl was Heidegger’s academic mentor at Freiburg University, by 
1919 he had begun to question his phenomenological approach, and began to distance 
himself from both the man and his theories. He took especial exception to Husserl’s 
reliance  on  the  metaphysical  ‘transcendental  ego’  to  escape  his  phenomenological 
aporia, and as Sheehan explains, began to openly express these feelings: “[I]n one of 
the Saturday morning discussions that Husserl used to hold at his Freiburg home with 
his close associates, Heidegger told Husserl publicly that the much vaunted pure ego of 
Husserlian phenomenology was ‘derived’ from the historical ego by the ‘repression’ of   62 
historicity and concretion, and that the pure ego was limited to the role of being the 
‘subject’  only  of  ‘theoretical  acts’”  (1993:80).  It  is  clear  that  several  years  before 
beginning  Being  and  Time  Heidegger  was  already  drifting  away  from  Husserl’s 
metaphysical phenomenology, and returning to the analysis of knowable phenomena, 
which gave rise to his notion of Dasein.
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  By the time Heidegger had completed Being and Time, he had distanced himself 
even further, to the point that when discussing ‘Being-in-the-world’ he felt confident 
enough to indirectly criticise Husserl when explaining that Being’s philosophical lack 
of clarity: “is not rooted primarily and solely in ‘egocentric’ self deceptions; it is rooted 
just as much in a lack of acquaintance with the world” (1967:187). That is, rather than 
relying  on  the  ‘transcendental  ego’  to  get  to  the  heart  of  Being  as  Husserl  ego-
centrically did, Heidegger made Dasein his focus, believing that the understanding of 
the  interaction  between  Being  and  such  worldly  phenomena  as  language  and  time, 
would bring clarity to this opaqueness. Heidegger explained this further in The Basic 
Problem of Phenomenology, wherein he argued that: 
For Husserl the phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time 
expressly  in  the  Ideas  Towards  A  Pure  Phenomenology  and  Phenomenological 
Philosophy  (1913),  is  the  method  of  leading  phenomenological  vision  from  the 
natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and 
persons  back  to  the  transcendental  life  of  consciousness  and  its  noetic-noematic 
experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us 
phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from the 
apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the 
understanding of the being of this being (1982:21). 
 
For Heidegger then, Husserl’s transcendental ego would be his starting point, believing 
that his own anti-metaphysical approach to Dasein would address these philosophical 
problems. Apart from rejecting Husserl’s metaphysical phenomenology, Heidegger also 
questioned his a priori adoption of the ontological tradition of philosophical thought, 
defamiliarised being by locating Dasein ‘in-the-world’ — rather than as present-at-hand 
— and coined his own neologisms rather than appropriating those of metaphysics.
10   63 
However, Heidegger did not stop there, and in Being and Time turned on Descartes’ 
cogito, stating that: “In the course of history certain distinctive domains of Being have 
come into view and have served as the primary guides for the subsequent problematics; 
the ego cogito of Descartes, the subject, the ‘I,’ reason, spirit, person. But these all 
remain  uninterrogated  as  to  their  Being  and  its  structure,  in  accordance  with  the 
thoroughgoing way in which the question of Being has been neglected” (1967:44).
11 
And it is this desire to question the a priori nature of the metaphysical Being that makes 
Heidegger  important  to  this  thesis,  influential  to  contemporary  subjectivity,  and 
problematic to many.  
  Although  Heidegger  was  keen  to  question  the  ontology  of  metaphysics,  and 
despite efforts to distance himself with such concepts as Dasein, he was also aware of 
the impossibility of making a complete break with this tradition. In The Basic Problem 
of Phenomenology, he explains this while continuing to question several key figures 
that were influential in establishing this ontology:  
Even the ontological investigation which we are now conducting is determined by its 
historical situation and, therewith, by certain possibilities of approaching beings and 
by the preceding philosophical tradition. The store of basic philosophical concepts 
derived from the philosophical tradition is still so influential today that this effect of 
tradition can hardly be overestimated (1982:22).  
 
That  is,  rather  than  being  unwittingly  caught  in  the  aporia  of  metaphysics,  for 
Heidegger  a  complete  break  with  the  ontological  tradition  would  in  itself  be  a 
metaphysical  act,  and  he  began  questioning  these  a  priori  concepts  in  order  to 
defamiliarise them. As Stephen Mulhall points out in his study Heidegger and Being 
and Time: “Our questioning of the meaning of Being must begin within the horizon of a 
vague, average understanding of Being; for we cannot ask ‘What is ‘Being’?’ without 
making use of the very term at issue. There is, accordingly, no neutral perspective from 
which we might begin our questioning; the idea of a presuppositionless starting point, 
even  for  an  exercise  in  fundamental  ontology,  must  be  rejected  as  an  illusion”   64 
(1996:13).  By  questioning  the  ontology  of  the  metaphysical  tradition,  Heidegger 
diminishes the primacy of Being and the self-present subject, a move that would have a 
marked impact on contemporary theory and the metaphysics of presence.
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  In order to pursue his anti-metaphysical aims Heidegger coined three neologisms 
— reduction, construction and destruction — that would make up the component parts 
of his phenomenological approach, explaining in The Basic Problem of Phenomenology 
that:  “Construction  in  philosophy  is  necessarily  destruction,  that  is  to  say,  a  de-
constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. 
And this is not a negation of the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the 
reverse, it signifies precisely a positive appropriation of tradition” (1982:23). As such, 
for  Heidegger,  the  ‘de-construction’  of  the  philosophical  tradition  is  necessarily 
empowering as it defamiliarises the seemingly a priori concepts pertaining to Being. 
However, as we shall see, his ‘deconstruction’ of the ontology of Western philosophy 
was  not  viewed  positively,  especially  when  it  meant  the  end  of  the  unquestioned 
primacy of the self-presence of Being.  
  Before I begin my discussion of the diminished subject in Being and Time, I will 
finish this section by discussing Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party, and the 
impact  this  would  have  on  his  relationship  with  Husserl.  Apart  from  Heidegger’s 
theoretical  rejection  of  Husserl’s  metaphysical  phenomenology,  by  joining  the  Nazi 
party in 1933
13 he exacted the ultimate personal betrayal of his Jewish born friend. 
Safranski  indicates  the  growing  personal  divide  between  the  two  when  Husserl’s 
position as Rector of Freiburg University was endangered with the implementation of a 
decree that prohibited any Jew employed since 1918 from working in the Civil Service: 
Reich Commissioner Robert Wagner [issued a decree] providing for the provisional 
suspension, with the aim of eventual dismissal, of all Jewish officials [and] Husserl 
was given an enforced leave of absence on April 14, 1933. At that time Heidegger 
was not yet in office. When Wagner’s decree was rescinded in favor of the Law on 
the Reestablishment […] Husserl’s mandatory leave had to be revoked. This was the 
task of the newly elected rector […] Husserl had felt his leave to be the ‘supreme   65 
affront’ of his life […] In a letter of May 4, 1933, to his pupil Dietrich Mahnke, he 
calls Heidegger’s ‘very theatrical’ entry into the Nazi Party ‘the perfect ending to 
this supposed bosom friendship between philosophers.’ This had been accompanied 
over  the  few  preceding  years  by  Heidegger’s  increasingly  patent  anti-Semitism, 
including  toward  his  group  of  enthusiastic  Jewish  pupils  and  faculty  colleagues 
(1999:253-54). 
 
Husserl’s  anger  was  understandable  given  that  by  the  time  he  returned  from  his 
enforced leave, Heidegger had not only become member of the Nazi party, but had also 
replaced him as Rector. At a time of increased crisis — with war looming and the 
persecution of the Jews commencing — it seems ironic that Heidegger, who so strongly 
railed  against  the  crises  of  philosophy  and  culture,  should  embrace  a  political 
dictatorship  that  ostracised  his  friend  and  mentor,  especially  given  that  both  had 
converted to Protestantism. That a seemingly progressive individual should embrace a 
political doctrine that would drastically affected the Dasein of such a large section of 
the European community indicates the lure this nationalist fervour had in depression-
ridden  Germany,  although  it  is  also  possible  that  this  move  was  simply  a  flawed 
manifestation of Heidegger’s own philosophical position. 
  A further irony in the souring of the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, 
and the impact of the Nazi party on German culture can be seen with the removal of 
Heidegger’s dedication to Husserl from Being and Time. In 1962 he retrospectively 
made reference to this event as a note to ‘A Dialogue on Language’ wherein he stated: 
In 1941, when my publisher felt that the fifth edition might be endangered and that, 
indeed the book might be suppressed, it was finally agreed […] that this dedication 
be omitted from the edition, on the condition imposed by me that the note to page 38 
be retained — a note which in fact states the reason for that dedication, and which 
runs: ‘If the following investigation has taken any steps forward in disclosing the 
‘things themselves,’ the author must first of all thank E. Husserl, who, by providing 
his  own  incisive  personal  guidance  and  by  freely  turning  over  his  unpublished 
investigations,  familiarized  the  author  with  the  most  diverse  areas  of 
phenomenological research during his student years in Freiburg’ (1982:200). 
 
Perhaps  this  is  a  case  of  historical  revisionism  whereby  Heidegger’s  retrospective 
awareness  of  the  difficulties  inherent  in  dealing  with  the  dictates  of  a  totalitarian 
political  doctrine,  caused  him  to  justify  his  treatment  of  Husserl.  Nevertheless  by   66 
joining  the  Nazi  party  he  betrayed  not  only  Husserl  but  also  millions  of  others, 
including such contemporary figures as Walter Benjamin. However, Heidegger’s initial 
dedication of Being and Time to Husserl cannot be trivialised, yet to treat him so poorly 
and to remove this mark of respect for fear of the Nazi party seems unlikely. Perhaps 
that  this  friendship  between  like-minded  thinkers  ended  as  it  did,  may  yet  have 
something important to say about Being-in-the-world? 
 
2.2.c. Being and Time — The Early Heidegger and the Kehre 
 
If  the  question  of  Being  is  to  have  its  own  history  made  transparent,  then  this 
hardened tradition must be loosened up, and the concealments which it has brought 
about must be dissolved. We understand this task as one in which by taking the 
question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient 
ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our 
first ways of determining the nature of Being — the ways which have guided us ever 
since. 
— Martin Heidegger, in Being and Time (1967:44). 
 
Heidegger’s  break  with  both  the  metaphysics  of  the  Catholic  Church  and  Husserl’s 
‘transcendental ego’ have had major implications for the self-present individual, for 
although attempting to overcome the perceived crises of philosophy, subjectivity and 
culture, he was also guilty of further diminishing the subject. As Safranski explains: 
“The easiest way of escaping from the malaise of the physics of life was just this ‘meta’ 
of  a  speculative  overall  interpretation.  Martin  Heidegger  shudders  with  disgust;  he 
begins virtually every lecture in those early years with a diatribe against the cultural 
scene, and he keeps emphasizing that philosophy must, at long last, give up its covetous 
glances towards heaven” (1999:98-99). While attempting to find the truth of Dasein, 
Heidegger  not  only  undermined  the  supposedly  a  priori  nature  of  metaphysics,  by 
locating  Being-in-the-world  he  diminished  it  further  by  ‘unconcealing’  Dasein’s 
interaction with the phenomena of the ‘environing world.’  
  Despite  its  complex  nature  Being  and  Time  is  a  rewarding  text  that  clearly 
articulates Heidegger’s awareness of his inability to make a complete break with the   67 
inherited conceptual ontology of metaphysics, and the problems associated with Being-
in-the-world.  He  believed  that  the  unconcealment  of  Being  could  be  achieved  only 
through the analysis of knowable phenomena, and by defamiliarising its apparent a 
priori nature and the concepts used to describe it. Aware of Plato’s ‘wrong-turn’ and his 
own  complicity  in  the  hermeneutic  circle,  Heidegger  set  about  the  ‘destruktion’  of 
Being in a new and exciting manner, and armed with neologisms such as Dasein he 
hoped to reveal the truth of Being. However, so sure was he of his approach that he 
immediately entered into metaphysics and then, just as quickly, exited it again.  
  Early  in  Being  and  Time,  Heidegger,  states  that:  “whenever  Dasein  tacitly 
understands and interprets something like Being, it does so with time as its standpoint. 
Time must be brought to light — and genuinely conceived — as the horizon of all 
understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it. In order to discern this, time 
needs to be explicated primordially as the horizon for the understanding of Being, and 
in terms of temporality as the Being of Dasein, which understands Being” (1967:39). 
However, on the very next page he contradicts this deterministic statement indicating 
that: “our treatment of the question of the meaning Being must enable us to show that 
the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly 
seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case” (40).
14 That is, 
Heidegger begins by positing an answer to the fundamental nature of Being and then 
immediately deconstructs that metaphysical certainty. He begins with a proposition, and 
extrapolates this idea working backwards until he arrives at his question, making Being 
and  Time  something  akin  to  a  stream  of  consciousness  in  reverse  that  explores  the 
ultimate question of Being rather than providing the ultimate answer.
15 However, I shall 
leave Heidegger’s apparent aporia for now and turn to the manner in which Being and 
Time diminishes the subject through its focus on time, death and language.   68 
  Rather than going into a lengthy analysis of Heidegger’s discussion of time, I 
shall instead uncover the contradictions within his argument, for although he appears to 
believe ‘concretely’ that an understanding of time would provide the truth of Dasein, he 
expresses doubts over this metaphysical determinism. Toward the end of Being and 
Time this contradiction reappears as a seemingly self-analytical aporia that was to have 
massive implications for the theoretical study of contemporary subjectivity, with his 
proposal of the momentary nature of presence being the key. The traditional ontology of 
philosophical thought had regarded Being as present-at-hand and existing outside of 
time,  yet  by  locating  Being-in-the-world  it  becomes  susceptible  to  temporality  thus 
undermining  the  metaphysics  of  presence.  If,  as  Heidegger  suggests,  Dasein  is 
constituted through its relationship with time, and that phenomenology will unconceal 
this  truth,  then  it  follows  that  self-presence  must  be  able  to  maintain  itself  despite 
shifting temporally. Heidegger attempts to explain how, despite the unavoidable passing 
of time, self-presence can be maintained stating that: 
Understanding  is  grounded  primarily  in  the  future  (whether  in  anticipation  or  in 
awaiting). States-of-mind temporalize themselves primarily in having been (whether 
in repetition or in having forgotten). Falling has its temporal roots primarily in the 
Present  (whether  in  making-present  or  in  the  moment  of  vision).  All  the  same, 
understanding is in every case a Present which ‘is in the process of having been.’ All 
the  same,  one’s  state-of-mind  temporalizes  itself  as  a  future  which  is  ‘making 
present.’ And all the same, the Present ‘leaps away’ from a future that is in the 
process of having been, or else it is held on to by such a future (401).  
 
Despite his clever use of repetition and metre to mimic the passing of time, therein lies a 
contradiction, for although the ‘Present’ ‘leaps away,’ the past is held on to and self-
presence is maintained into the future. By located Being-in-the-world with time as its 
locus, Heidegger struggles to come to terms with a patent yet intangible phenomenon, 
for  time,  coupled  with  various  ‘Other’  aspects  of  the  environing  world,  necessarily 
undermines the possibility of self-presence and the ‘concrete’ truth of Being.   
  Richard Polt expands on the difficulties of discussing Being in relation to time 
explaining that: “It runs out, then, that the meaning of Being is unclear, […] that in   69 
order to think about Being, we have to think about temporality — for beings make a 
difference to us not only when they are present in the present, but also when they are in 
the past and future dimensions of the mysterious phenomenon called time” (1999:3). 
Undaunted, Heidegger continues to explain how time can be overcome stating that:  
The sequence of ‘nows’ is taken as something that is somehow present-at-hand, for it 
even moves ‘into time.’ We say: ‘In every ‘now’ is now; in every ‘now’ it is already 
vanishing.’ In every ‘now’ the ‘now’ is now and therefore it constantly has presence 
as something selfsame, even though in every ‘now’ another may be vanishing as it 
comes  along.  Yet  as  this  thing  which  changes,  it  simultaneously  shows  its  own 
constant presence (1967:475).  
 
What Heidegger appears to omit when theorising the possible ‘constant presence’ of 
Being is that by locating  Being-in-the-world he opens it up to the condition of the 
possibility of change, and although I shall discuss his concept of ‘potentiality-of-Being’ 
later, it is the possible impact of the environing world on the subject which places self-
presence in danger. Not only is it impossible for Being to exist outside of time, it cannot 
be denied its corporeal relationship with the world around it. Thus, Heidegger reached a 
similar aporia to Husserl, as this constant flow of ‘nows’ make any potential presence 
simply fleeting, merely momentary and fundamentally unstable. 
  Within  Heidegger’s  discussion  of  Being  and  Time,  there  exist  insurmountable 
contradictions  that  continue  to  diminish  the  self-present  subject,  for  rather  than 
implicating time in the unconcealing of the truth of Being, Heidegger uses it to muddy 
the  waters  further.  In  the final  paragraph  of Being  and  Time,  he  acknowledges  the 
aporia  he  has  reached  pointing  out  in  no  uncertain  terms  that:  “The  existential-
ontological  constitution  of  Dasein’s  totality  is  grounded  in  temporality.  Hence  the 
ecstatical projection of being must be made possible by some primordial way in which 
ecstatical temporality temporalizes” (488). However, with his tendency to repeatedly 
question his position, he immediately undermines this certitude when in the very next 
line he asks: “How is the mode of temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted? Is 
there a way which leads from the primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time   70 
itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being?” (488). Having set out with ‘concrete’ 
assertions regarding Being’s relationship to time, like Husserl before him he finishes by 
‘de-constructing’ his own position by rhetorically questioning his aims. Interestingly 
enough, Heidegger did intend to complete a second volume wherein, we assume, he 
intended to answer the questions that end Being and Time. However, he soon became 
embroiled in the controversy surrounding his membership of the Nazi party, and when 
he did recommence writing, he began working instead on the expansion of §34 of Being 
and Time, entitled ‘Being-there and Discourse, Language.’ 
  Apart from the importance of time in relation to Being and the impact on the 
previously unquestioned metaphysics of self-presence, Heidegger further undermines 
the  primacy  of  the  individual  through  his  discussion  of  death,  authentic  Being  and 
potentiality.  These  particular  aspects  of  Being  are  intertwined  and  provide  the  best 
example of the inherent contradictions in the approach and structure of Being and Time. 
In many ways Heidegger’s constant questioning and inability to ascertain the truth of 
Being in time, imitate the perplexities of subjectivity, and it is with his discussion of 
death and potentiality that the inability of Being-in-the-world to attain and maintain 
self-presence becomes apparent.  
  For Heidegger, death brings about the end of Dasein, and with this awareness of 
the permanence of not-Being there comes a “freedom towards death” (311), and an 
anxiety that leads Being to live inauthentically. Furthermore, like the aporia of time, 
death is not only an inevitable aspect of existence, it is also ontical for although it exits 
as a phenomenon, it always remains metaphysical, for as he explains:  
If ‘death’ is defined as the ‘end’ of Dasein — that is to say, of Being-in-the-world — 
this does not imply any ontical decision whether ‘after death’ still another Being is 
possible, either higher or lower, or whether Dasein ‘lives on’ or even ‘outlasts’ itself 
and is ‘immortal.’ Nor is anything decided ontically about the ‘other-worldly’ and its 
possibility, any more than about the ‘this-worldly’ (292).  
   71 
Although  the  anxiety  of  Being-towards-death  is  palpable  it  remains  “a  fantastical 
exaction” (311) which, like time is shrouded in mystery. Ironically, death at once brings 
about the ultimate diminishing of the self-present subject by bringing to a close the flow 
of present ‘nows,’ and becomes the true example of the individual act of subjective 
‘mineness.’  Heidegger  explains  this  position  stating  that:  “Dying  is  something  that 
every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in 
every  case  mine,  in  so  far  as  it  ‘is’  at  all.  And  indeed  death  signifies  a  peculiar 
possibility-of-Being in which the very Being of one’s own Dasein is an issue. In dying, 
it is shown that mineness and existence are ontologically constitutive for death” (284). 
That is, death is the ultimate possibility-of-Being, a truly individual act, but one that 
cannot be experienced consciously or necessarily repeated in order to be understood.
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  The realisation of the inevitability of Dasein’s end brings with it an anxiety that, 
according to Heidegger, and depending on how it is dealt with, results in authentic or 
inauthentic Being. For Heidegger, inauthentic Being is the result of anxiety and a desire 
to avoid death, and the possibility that any given moment of presence might be its last. 
He explains that: “Dasein’s fleeing in the face of that authentic existence which has 
been characterized as ‘anticipatory resoluteness,’ has made itself known; and it is this 
fleeing which is covered up. In this concernful fleeing lies a fleeing in the face of death 
—  that  is,  a  looking  away  from  the  end  of  Being-in-the-world”  (476-7).  Stephen 
Mulhall expands Heidegger’s position further stating that: “an authentic confrontation 
with  death  reveals  death  as  an  essentially  thrown  projection,  its  relation  to  its  own 
Being at once holding open the possibility, and imposing the responsibility, of living a 
life that is both genuinely individual and genuinely whole — a life of integrity, of 
authenticity”  (1996:120).  That  is,  although  death  brings  about  the  end  of  Dasein, 
Heidegger believed that the awareness of the finality of death could actually release 
Being from the torpor of denial, and result in a more authentic existence. Although this   72 
concept  seems  to  valorise  certain  ways  of  living,  and  is  both  metaphysical  and 
deterministic — ignoring the condition of the possibility of change inherent in Being-in-
the-world  and  its  interaction  with  language  and  ‘the  they’  —  I  would  argue  that 
Heidegger was in fact referring to a renewed vigour for life born out of an awareness of 
one’s own mortality, and can instead be viewed as empowering.
17  
  Heidegger goes on to explain that although an acceptance of the inevitability of 
Dasein’s death causes anxiety, it  can also encourage the individual to explore their 
potentiality-for-Being. It is through this exploration of potentiality that authentic Being 
can be attained, although as we can see in the following passage from Being and Time, 
the very nature of Being-possible further diminishes the subject: 
The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in 
understanding.  Dasein  is  not  something  present-at-hand  which  possesses  its 
competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible. Dasein 
is in every case what it can be, and in the way in which it is possibility. The Being-
possible which is essential for Dasein, pertains to the ways of its solicitude for others 
and for its concern for the ‘world,’ as we have characterized them; and in all these, 
and always, it pertains to Dasein’s potentially-for-Being towards itself, for the sake 
of itself. The Being-possible which Dasein is existentially in every case, is to be 
sharply distinguished both from the contingency of something present-at-hand, so far 
as with the present-at-hand this or that can come to pass. As a modal category of 
present-at-hand, possibility signifies what is not yet actual and what is not at any 
time necessary. It characterizes the merely possible (1967:183).  
 
As such, the potentiality-for-Being and the Being-possible of Dasein, coupled with the 
awareness of the lack of presence inherent with the possibility of change as represented 
by death, and the momentary nature of any given self-present ‘now,’ leaves us with a 
perspective of Being as perpetually in progress and never present-at-hand. That is, for 
Heidegger, the potentiality-for-Being, may lead us to live more authentic lives, but it 
will never be fully realised in a metaphysical  sense, and thus the possibility of the 
subject attaining and maintaining pure self-presence is fundamentally diminished. 
  As already indicated the importance of Being and Time comes with the constant 
contradictions  and  uncertainties  within,  something  that  in  many  ways  imitates  the 
changeable nature of subjectivity. That Heidegger ends his text where one would expect   73 
it to begin indicates that rather than his ‘destruction’ uncovering the truth of Being, it 
ends with an aporia, something that appears to have prevented him completing Part 
Two, and represents a demarcation between the works of the ‘early’ and the ‘mature’ 
Heidegger — commonly referred to as the ‘turn’ or the Kehre.
18 The importance of 
Being and Time, his theoretical aporia, and the neologism ‘destruction,’ can therefore 
be viewed positively, for as Richard Polt explains:  
After hundreds of pages, Heidegger sounds more tentative than he did at the start! 
The fact is that Being and Time is a fragment, a dead end, a ‘wood path’ that never 
makes it out of the woods. Heidegger will never show to his satisfaction that time is 
the horizon of Being. But some of us appreciate a good question at least as much as a 
good answer, and along the way to the dead end, there is so much to discover in the 
woods (1999:25).  
 
With this in mind Heidegger’s work can be viewed as both empowering and nihilistic, 
for the final outcome of Being and Time is the denial of the metaphysics of presence 
through  a  process  of  defamiliarisation  which  deconstructs  this  seemingly  a  priori 
perspective of Being, leaving it naked and alone ‘in-the-world’ without the comfort 
blanket of self-presence.  
  Although Heidegger’s theoretical conception of ‘destruktion’ was (in)famously 
reformulated  by  Derrida  as  deconstruction,  it  is  important  to  acknowledge  this 
precedent.
19  Furthermore,  it  is  equally  important  to  note  that  despite  his  failure, 
Heidegger had every intention of, and succeeded in, defamiliarising Being in a dramatic 
fashion, as we can see when he states that:  
Dasein’s kind of Being thus demands that any ontological interpretation which sets 
itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in their primordiality, should capture the 
Being  of  this  entity,  in  spite  of  this  entity’s  own  tendency  to  cover  things  up. 
Existential analysis, therefore, constantly has the character of doing violence  […] 
whether to the claims of the everyday interpretation, or to its complacency and its 
tranquilized obviousness (1967:359).  
 
That  is,  without  arriving  at  the  true  horizon  of  Being,  the  ‘violence’  Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ‘destruction’ performed raised Dasein from this ‘tranquilized’ torpor, 
with ramifications not only for philosophy but also popular culture and religion that   74 
clearly diminishes the self-present subject. Therefore, having concluded my discussion 
of Being and Time I shall now turn to Heidegger’s mature work, and how he continued 
to ‘deconstruct’ his magnum opus by investigating its failure. For as he presciently 
explains at the conclusion of Being and Time — and herein lies a message for us all — 
“This thesis, of course, is to be regarded not as a dogma, but rather as a formulation of a 
problem of principle which still remains ‘veiled’” (487). And it is to his continued 
attempts at this ‘unveiling,’ and increased focus on the literary, that I shall now turn. 
 
2.2.d. Heidegger and the Literary — The Mature Heidegger 
 
Before I begin my discussion of Heidegger’s mature work I shall firstly turn to §34 of 
Being and Time, wherein he questions the naïve use of language, the hermeneutic circle 
and Plato’s ‘wrong turn,’ all of which would provide impetus for his later works. When 
he  located  Being-in-the-world  he  undermined  the  metaphysics  of  the  self-present 
subject,  opening  it  up  to  the  vagaries  of  the  world  of  analysable  phenomena. 
Furthermore, his focus on language had a lasting influence on subsequent philosophy 
and  influenced,  rightly  or  wrongly,  the  nihilism  of  certain  postmodern  theories  of 
subjectivity. The way in which a mere seven pages of this weighty tome achieved this 
was to locate Dasein within language and discourse,
20 and this mostly unacknowledged 
insight achieved Heidegger’s aim of deconstructing the metaphysics of Being far more 
successfully than any other aspect of Being and Time. While his extensive efforts to 
deconstruct and avoid using unquestioned metaphysical concepts saw him coining his 
own  neologisms,  we  see  in  §34  the  inherent  problems  of  this  approach,  for  when 
discussing  the  importance  of  discourse  when  attempting  to  understand  Dasein, 
Heidegger explains that: “If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the 
‘there,’ is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily 
constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of 
Being which is specifically worldly — an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind   75 
— expresses itself as discourse” (204). That is, although Heidegger describes discourse 
and language as the ‘there’ of the ‘disclosedness’ of Being, and implies that the truth of 
Being can be uncovered through the analysis of its relationship to language, he did so 
without acknowledging the implicit problem of language’s inherently metaphysical and 
arbitrary nature. 
  Despite  Heidegger’s  metaphysical  desire  to  ‘disclose’  the  discursive  nature  of 
Dasein, his brief discussion of language in §34, not only acts as a turning point in his 
own work, it also supports a perspective of the philosophical validity of poetic and 
literary  explorations  of  subjectivity.  Although  still  caught  up  in  metaphysics,  he 
indicates  that:  “Being-in  and  its  state-of-mind  are  made  known  in  discourse  and 
indicated  in  language  by  intonation,  modulation,  the  tempo  of  talk,  ‘the  way  of 
speaking.’ In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of 
one’s state-of-mind can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of 
existence” (205). That is, although he indicates that discourse can be used to ‘disclose’ 
Dasein, he also states that ‘poetical’ discourse can be used to uncover the possibilities 
of Dasein. This somewhat empowering and positive view of Dasein in relation to poetic 
language is of great importance to this thesis, becoming the foundation of Heidegger’s 
later work and eventually led him to state that ‘language is the house of Being.’  
  Before I begin my discussion of Heidegger and the literary, I shall investigate his 
acceptance of, and continued interest in, the inherent problems associated with his early 
discussion of language and Being. That the ‘mature’ Heidegger became aware of the 
importance  of  language  in  all  discussions  of  Being  —  and  his  own  complicity  in 
metaphysics  —  can  be  seen  no  clearer  than  in  his  pseudo-literary  stream  of 
consciousness between J and I, entitled ‘A Dialogue on Language:’ 
J: Later, too, in Being and Time, your discussion of language remains quite sparse. 
I: Even so, after our dialogue you may want to read Section 34 in Being and Time 
more closely.   76 
J: I have read it many times, and each time regretted that you kept it so short. But I 
believe that now I see more clearly the full import of the fact that hermeneutics and 
language belong together. 
I: The full import in what direction? 
J: Toward a transformation of thinking — a transformation which, however, cannot 
be  established  as  readily  as  a  ship  can  alter  its  course,  and  even  less  can  be 
established as the consequence of an accumulation of the results of philosophical 
research (1982:41-42). 
 
We can see from this passage written in 1959, that Heidegger had not only become 
more playful in his writing style, he at once began acknowledging the importance of 
language, and his failure to make a break with metaphysics due to a priori trap of the 
hermeneutic circle. Even though the ‘early’ Heidegger set out to distance himself from 
the phenomenology of Husserl, and the metaphysical ontology of philosophical thought, 
here we see him admit the impossibility of avoiding the hermeneutics of language, and 
of making a complete break with the transcendental tradition of philosophy.
21 
  The importance of the ontology of the philosophical tradition does not escape 
Heidegger who, later in the ‘Dialogue…’ explains that his approach in Being and Time 
was an attempt to defamiliarise rather than act as a complete break, stating that:  
Nobody can in just one single leap take distance from the predominant circle of 
ideas, especially not if he is dealing with the well-worn tracks of traditional thinking 
— tracks that fade into realms where they can hardly be seen. Besides, taking such 
distance from all tradition is tempered by the very fact that the seemingly subversive 
will tries above all to recover the things of the past in a more originary form. It is this 
purpose that the first page of Being and Time speaks of ‘raising again’ a question. 
What is meant is not the monotonous trotting out of something that is always the 
same: to fetch, to gather in, to bring together what is concealed within the old (36). 
 
That is, in a case of historical revisionism whereby the metaphysical aims of Being and 
Time  are  conveniently  ignored,  Heidegger  argues  that  despite  his  awareness  of  the 
hermeneutic circle, the work undertaken therein does achieve his aim of ‘raising again’ 
the  question  of  Being.  Furthermore,  in  An  Introduction  to  Metaphysics,  he 
acknowledges the arbitrary and metaphysical nature of language and Being stating that: 
“To attach the crucial question of metaphysics to this empty word ‘being’ is to bring 
everything into confusion. Here then is only one possibility, to recognize the emptiness   77 
of  the  word  and  to  let  it  go  at  that. This  we  may  now  apparently  do  with  a  clear 
conscience; and all the more since the fact is explained historically by the history of 
language” (1987:76). Therefore, we see that by deconstructing Being, Heidegger draws 
attention to the metaphysical nature of language and undermines his own concept of 
Dasein, for if it was his aim to uncover the truth of Being by locating it in-the-world, 
then language, like time, further diminishes the self-present subject. 
  The impact of the literary turn on Heidegger’s ‘mature’ work was far reaching and 
the influence poetic language would have on the ‘unconcealment’ of Being — and his 
own writing style — was enormous. In ‘The Way to Language,’ he indicates the change 
his view of Being had undergone since Being and Time stating that:  
The ability to speak is what marks man as man. This mark contains the design of his 
being. Man would not be man if it were denied him to speak unceasingly, from 
everywhere and every which way, in many variations, and to speak in terms of an ‘it 
is’ that most often remains unspoken. Language, in granting all this to man, is the 
foundation of the human being. We are, then, within language and with language 
before all else (1982:112). 
 
If time was once the true ‘horizon’ of Being, then Heidegger — true to the changeable 
condition of both — shifted his theoretical focus to the relationship between Being and 
language. He goes on to expand on this interaction recycling his by now famous phrase 
when explaining that: “Language is the house of Being because language, as Saying, is 
the mode of Appropriation” (135). That is, we are forced to rely on an appropriated and 
arbitrary  system  of  utterances  to  articulate  Being,  thus  indicating  its  inherently 
metaphysical nature, while in ‘The Nature of Language’ he explains the importance of 
this  relationship:  “If  it  is  true  that  man  finds  the  proper  abode  of  his  existence  in 
language — whether he is aware of it or not — then an experience we undergo with 
language will touch the innermost nexus of our existence” (1982:57). In other words, 
for Heidegger the analysis of language provides us with an understanding of Being as 
always already trapped within metaphysics and the hermeneutic circle.   78 
  The fundamental problems associated with the relationship between Being and 
language  did  not  escape  Heidegger,  and  led  him  to  continually  ‘de-construct’  his 
approach. In his ‘Dialogue on Language’ he reiterates the constraints of the hermeneutic 
circle — and the continued desire for the certitude of metaphysical concepts — when 
stating that: “those conceptualizations are not what I have in mind. Even the phrase 
‘house of Being’ does not provide a concept of the nature of language, to the great 
sorrow of those philosophers who in their disgruntlement see in such phrases no more 
than a decay of thinking” (1982:22). With this view the chagrin that Heidegger felt 
toward certain negative responses of his discussion of the discursive nature of Being, 
and the limitations when appropriating the legitimate language of academic discourses, 
become apparent. This frustration manifests itself in Heidegger’s shift in focus to poetic 
language for the study of Being, something which had been ‘othered’ since Plato’s 
‘wrong  turn,’  explaining  in  The  Basic  Problem  of  Phenomenology  that:  “Poetry, 
creative literature, is nothing but the elementary emergence into words, the becoming-
uncovered, of existence as being-in-the-world. For the others who before it were blind, 
the world first becomes visible by what is thus spoken” (1982:171-172). As such, for 
the ‘mature’ Heidegger, if the ‘unconcealment’ of Being carried out with the analysis of 
the  interaction  of  language  and  Being  has  been  thwarted  by  the  ontology  of  the 
philosophical tradition, then he would turn to its traditional other. 
  Heidegger’s linguistic turn was not only reflected in his lengthy discussion of the 
poetry of Hølderlin and the writing of Golding, but also in the style and form of his own 
texts.  This  is  explained  by  Anderson  and  Freund  in  their  ‘Translator’s  Preface’  to 
Heidegger’s  Discourse  on  Thinking,  for  when  discussing  the  ‘Conversation…’  they 
indicate the extent that poetic language had infiltrated his work describing it as: “a 
refreshingly  concrete  presentation  of  one  of  the  many  fundamental  points  in  his 
philosophy. The interplay of thought and argument, the free use of word and metaphor,   79 
the poetic summaries, all offer a new perspective on an abstract argument, which should 
be of help in rounding out an awareness of the vision Heidegger has of the place of man 
in Being” (1966:8). That is, while he appears fixated on working outside of privileged 
parameters, he creates a ficto-critical work that succeeds on more levels than Being and 
Time, not simply because of its readability, but due to the ultimate defamiliarisation of 
Being carried out by the literary.
22 Richard Polt expands on Heidegger’s increased focus 
on language and Being in relation to the poetic, explaining that: 
Perhaps  when  Heidegger  says  that  language  is  the  house  of  Being,  he  means  it 
‘literally:’ Being abides in language as its abode. There may be no prosaic way of 
saying this well, because ordinary prose is just poetry that has lost its disclosive 
force. What makes poetry poetry is not that it uses special poetic techniques, but that 
it  recaptures  the  illuminating  power  that  secretly  resides  in  our  ordinary  words, 
letting us see the world as if for the first time (1999:177). 
 
And it is this illuminating power which is of the greatest importance to this thesis, for 
not only does Heidegger diminish the subject in a variety of ways, having done this — 
and  incurring  the  wrath  of  a  raft  of  theorist  —  he  re-empowers  the  individual  by 
positing that not only is language ‘the house of being,’ but that this being need not be 
deterministically constrained. He locates the seat of the possible ‘releasement’ of being 
in the literary and the poetic, explaining in the ‘Memorial Address’ that: “If releasement 
towards things and openness to the mystery awaken within us, then we should arrive at 
a path that will lead creatively to a new ground and foundation. In that ground the 
creativity which produces lasting works could strike new roots” (1966:56-7). That is, 
through both literary and poetic works a process of ‘releasement’ defamiliarises the 
supposed  a  priori  nature  of  Being  and  the  role  of  the  individual  in  society,  and 
interestingly, this positive view of Being patently runs counter to the many, and varied, 
negative perspectives levelled at both Heidegger’s oeuvre and his life.  
  Finally then, it appears that the tendency to overlook Heidegger’s work because of 
its complicated nature, and due to moral objections regarding his involvement with the 
Nazi party, are mostly inappropriate, while his influence on the contemporary subject,   80 
and  the  theories  of  deconstruction  and  postmodernism  —  although  mostly 
unacknowledged — cannot be underestimated. In many ways it is possible to read this 
narrative of Heidegger’s life as a manifestation of many of the fundamental elements of 
his theoretical propositions. If Dasein was to become transparent with an analysis of 
Being-in-the-world, then although his membership of the Nazi party can be seen as a 
reaction to the crises afflicting Germany, it can equally be read as a manifestation of his 
own  deterministic  desire  for  ‘authentic  Being’  and  a  resurgent  national  identity.
23 
Furthermore, that Heidegger revisited his earlier work and deconstructed many of his 
metaphysical concepts can be seen as an inevitable response to the condition of the 
possibility of change that only hindsight can bring. Finally, it becomes apparent that 
Being always already resists being determined in concrete terms due to the impact of 
the environing world, and that Heidegger’s personal failings ultimately elucidate the 
unavoidable highs and lows of ‘Being’ human, and of the constant temptation of the 
worst kind of metaphysical determinism — fascism. 
 
2.3.a. Jacques Derrida — Deconstruction and the Diminished Subject 
 
Given  that  so  much  has  been  written  by  Jacques  Derrida  any  discussion  of  his 
deconstructive  work  is  necessarily  fraught  with  the  very  hazards  that  his  approach 
repeatedly illustrates are not merely possible, but inevitable. Given that so much has 
been  written  by  Derrida,  yet  negative  accusations  surrounding  its  apparent  content 
abound due to the somewhat obtuse nature of his work, I shall let others speak about 
him rather than presume to speak for him. Given that so much has been written about 
Derrida in an act of contrition I shall attempt — with my re-reading of re-readings and 
while  recognising  the  myriad  ‘play’  of  differences  in  his  works  —  to  use  these 
controversies to expand this teleology of the diminished subject. As such, given the 
broad  scope  of  Derrida’s  work
24  I  shall  focus  initially  on  his  early  texts  and  the 
proposition that an inherently fragmented subject is an ineluctable aspect of being and   81 
not  specifically  postmodern.  Then  in  the  latter  sections  I  will  discuss  the  critical 
backlash against Derrida given the manner in which certain aspects of his work have 
been  appropriated  by,  and  closely  associated  with,  nihilistic  postmodernism.  And 
finally, I shall investigate the manner in which his ‘performative’ work reiterates the 
proposition of an a priori diminished subject, and the validity of literature as a locus for 
the exploration of alternative expressions of subjectivity.  
 
2.3.b. Derrida, Deconstruction and the Diminished Subject 
 
What deconstruction is not? everything of course!  
What is deconstruction? nothing of course!  
— Jacques Derrida, in ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’ (1988:5). 
 
Derrida insists it is naïve to speak of ‘the Subject’ as if it were a mythical entity that 
has  only  been  recently  abandoned.  The ‘subjects’  of  Descartes,  Kant,  Hegel  and 
Husserl are not themselves simple but involve paradoxes and aporias that deserve 
renewed consideration. Derrida would like to ‘de-homogenize’ the subject. Nobody, 
he maintains, ever seriously believed in the classical humanist subject, autonomous 
self-sufficient, spontaneous. ‘The subject never existed for anyone […], the subject is 
a fable’  
— Christina Howells, in Derrida: Deconstruction from Phenomenology to Ethics 
(1999:142). 
 
It is with a view to the failure of Husserlian phenomenology to escape the aporia of 
metaphysics,  and  of  Heidegger  to  make  a  break  with  the  ontology  of  Western 
philosophy that I shall begin my discussion of Jacques Derrida. While it is apparent that 
the desires of both Husserl and Heidegger to implement non-metaphysical approaches 
to the study of knowable phenomena failed, their slippages and difficulties provide a 
view of Derrida’s work as an expansion of several of their key ideas, rather than a 
complete  conceptual  break.  Furthermore,  it  is  with  his  reworking  of  Heidegger’s 
concept of ‘Destruktion,’ his discussion of their investigations of presence and time, and 
their failed attempts to break with the onto-theological tradition of Western philosophy, 
that initiate this discussion of Derrida, deconstruction and contemporary subjectivity.  
  Given the atemporal teleology of the crises of philosophy and subjectivity carried 
out thus far in this thesis, it is interesting to note a shift in focus in the work of Derrida,   82 
for  up  to  this  point these  crises  have  been  temporal  in  nature  —  fixed  by  specific 
cultural  and  social  upheavals  —  with  a  resultant  loss  of  faith  in  the  dominant 
philosophical tradition of the day. While both Husserl and Heidegger were concerned 
with the ontological tradition of Western metaphysics, their impetus was a response to 
certain  crises  of  the  early  twentieth  century,  and  a  desire  to  arrive  at  a  complete 
understanding of Being. However, with deconstruction Derrida makes a break with this 
cycle diminishing the self-present subject in a far more dramatic manner, indicating that 
this crisis of the metaphysics of presence is an ineluctable aspect of subjectivity, and not 
a particular failure of philosophy, but due to its failure in toto.  
  So what is deconstruction, and what does Derrida hope to achieve by it? One of 
the difficulties when discussing his work is that it is inherently ‘performative,’ although 
it would suffice to say that if one was to deterministically posit his aim, one could 
argue, as many have, that he is, among many other things, attempting to defamiliarise 
the seemingly a priori tradition of the ‘metaphysics of presence’ that predominates not 
only Western philosophy, but everyday language. As Derrida explains in ‘Semiology 
and  Grammatology:  Interview  with  Julia  Kristeva:’  “‘everyday  language’  is  not 
innocent or neutral. It is the language of Western metaphysics, and it carries with it not 
only a considerable number of presuppositions of all types, but also presuppositions 
inseparable  from  metaphysics,  which,  although  little  attended  to,  are  knotted  into  a 
system”  (1981:19).  It  is  important  to  note  that  far  from  calling  for  an  end  to  this 
tradition, Derrida exposes both his and our complicity with it by deconstructing key 
philosophical  arguments  and  conceptual  orders,  and  thereby  upsetting  many  by 
undermining the traditional, yet problematic, view of the self-present subject.  
  When discussing deconstruction it is important to point out what it is not,
25 and 
accusations that it amounts to the destruction the previous certitude of the ontological 
tradition  of  Western  metaphysical  philosophy,  are  misplaced.  In  his  ‘Letter  to  a   83 
Japanese  Friend,’  Derrida  explains  the  etymological  and  theoretical  origins  of 
deconstruction, stating that: 
When I chose this word, or when it imposed itself upon me — I think it was in Of 
Grammatology — I little thought it would be credited with such a central role in the 
discourse that interested me at the time. Among other things I wished to translate and 
adapt to my own ends the Heideggerian word Destruktion or Abbau. Each signified 
in this context an operation bearing on the structure or traditional architecture of the 
fundamental  concepts  of  ontology  or  of  Western  metaphysics.  But  in  French 
‘destruction’ too obviously implied an annihilation or a negative reduction much 
closer perhaps to Nietzschean ‘demolition’ than to the Heideggerian interpretation or 
to the type of reading that I proposed. So I ruled that out (1998:1). 
 
Derrida indicates that there is no actual destruction in de(con)struction, arguing that 
claims as such are in fact, a ‘con,’ and that the coining of this non-concept was due to 
the inadequate nature of the closest French translation of Heidegger’s neologism. That 
is,  rather  than  calling  for,  and  attempting  to  make  a  destructive  break  with  this 
metaphysical  tradition,  deconstruction  defamiliarises  those  seemingly  a  priori 
conceptual discourses by indicating that the inherent contradictions within any given 
philosophical premise necessarily undermine their arguments. As Nicholas Royle points 
out in his text, Jacques Derrida: “deconstruction is not a method, a tool or technique for 
reading texts, especially not literary texts […] Deconstruction is not something brought 
in from the outside, like a band of ‘special forces:’ it is a foreign body, already inside. It 
is a kind of founding excess, exorbitance or supplementarity” (2003:85). That is, if we 
can  agree  on  a  conceptual  understanding  of  this  non-concept,  deconstruction  is  not 
brought to bear on a theory but is an ineluctable aspect of all texts — something that 
exists at the margins
26 — and it is in the periphery that Derrida finds his passage into 
the metaphysics of philosophy and subjectivity. 
  Having discussed what deconstruction may or may not be, I shall now question 
Derrida’s interest in deconstructing the metaphysics of presence, and how this relates to 
the  diminished  subject.  For  Derrida,  the  tradition  of  Western  metaphysics  has  been 
caught up in an onto-theological approach whereby Being equals presence, and with   84 
attempts to understand existence through the search for the truth of Being. In ‘Structure, 
Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,’ he argues that:  
The  history  of  metaphysics,  like  the  history  of  the  West,  is  the  history  of  these 
metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix […] is the determination of Being as presence 
in  all  senses  of  this  word.  It  could  be  shown  that  all  the  names  related  to 
fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always designated an invariable 
presence  —  eidoes,  arché,  telos,  energeia,  ousia    (essence,  existence,  substance, 
subject)  alétheia,  transcendentality,  consciousness,  God,  man,  and  so  forth 
(1997:279-80).  
 
For Derrida, therefore, the history of Western philosophy has focussed on determining 
the  existence  of  God  with  a  comforting  perspective  of  the  subject  as  purely  self-
present,
27 leading philosophy into a metaphysical aporia. If the conceptual framework 
of contemporary philosophy is corrupted by metaphysics, then ipso facto, the object of 
its study is necessarily absent, while any solution without phenomenological grounding 
is invariably metaphysical, as seen with Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego.’ However, in 
order to deconstruct this tradition, we necessarily use, and unwittingly legitimate, the 
very concepts and discourses we hope to undermine, thus leading us into yet another 
aporia,
28 for any attempt to discuss Western metaphysical philosophy without recourse 
to its ontology would be nonsense. 
  One  of  the  more  controversial  outcomes  of  Derrida’s  investigation  into  the 
inherently  metaphysical  nature  of  Western  philosophy  has  been  the  claim  that  this 
theoretical  impasse  —  this  conceptual  aporia  —  has  resulted  in  the  death  of  both 
history and philosophy. In ‘The Supplement of Origin,’ Derrida explains the apparent 
demise of history stating that: 
[W]ithin  the  metaphysics  of  presence,  within  philosophy  as  knowledge  of  the 
presence of the object, as the being-before-oneself of knowledge in consciousness, 
we believe, quite simply and literally, in absolute knowledge as the closure if not the 
end of history. And we believe that such a closure has taken place. The history of 
being as presence, as self-presence in absolute knowledge, as consciousness of self in 
the infinity of parousia — this history is closed. The history of presence is closed, 
for  ‘history’  has  never  meant  anything  but  the  presentation  […]  of  Being,  the 
production  and  recollection  of  beings  in  presence,  as  knowledge  and  mastery 
(1996:102). 
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For Derrida, if the tradition of Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle is one 
based on an initial  conceptual problematic, then its very foundation is based on an 
unknowable  transcendental  premise.  He  explains  this  aporia  in  ‘Violence  and 
Metaphysics’ arguing that despite its death: “philosophy should still wander toward the 
meaning of its death — or that it has always lived knowing itself to be dying […]; that 
philosophy died one day, within history, or that it has always fed on its own agony, on 
the violent way it opens history by opposing itself to nonphilosophy, which is its past 
and its concern, its death and wellspring; that beyond the death, or dying nature, of 
philosophy, perhaps even because of it, thought still has a future […] all these are 
unanswerable questions. By right of birth, and for one time at least, these are problems 
put to philosophy as problems philosophy cannot resolve” (1997:79). If this is the case 
then traditional philosophy has been ineluctably travelling toward its demise, with no 
way  of  escaping  the  metaphysical  concepts  carried  within  it,  nor  any  possibility  of 
describing the object of its study in a purely present manner due to the arbitrary nature 
of language. Furthermore, the supposed ‘death’ of philosophy further undermines the 
possibility  of  the  self-present  subject,  and  although  Derrida  argues  that  Western 
philosophy  began  with  an  originary  aporia,  as  Howells  explains:  “‘Violence  et 
métaphysique’ starts with the large issue of the ‘death of philosophy,’ envisaged not as 
the end of serious reflection but rather as, potentially, the beginning of another, less 
limited kind of (philosophical) questioning” (1999:123). That is, despite this ‘death’ 
being blamed on Derrida’s anti-metaphysical deconstruction, this statement has been 
taken to mean much more, with far-reaching implications for contemporary theory.   
  Given that the deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence appears to be the 
locus of Derrida’s efforts to defamiliarise seemingly a priori conceptual orders, I shall 
now discuss several key aspects of his approach that have specific relevance to this 
thesis. The first of these being his deconstruction of the prioritisation of rhetoric over   86 
writing  —  inaugurated  with  Plato’s  logocentric  ‘wrong  turn’  —  and  the  resulting 
judgements that valorise the philosophical over the literary. Secondly, his investigation 
into  Saussurian  linguistics,  and  the  inherent  contradiction  whereby  the  play  of 
differences between arbitrary signs undermines the divisions of the ‘wrong turn.’ While 
finally, the impact that his deconstruction of logocentrism and the resultant absence of a 
self-present ‘transcendental signifier,’ have had on the contemporary subject.  
  Plato articulated the need for a division between speech and writing in both the 
Phaedrus  and  the  Republic,  and  his  attempt  to  address  a  perceived  crisis  in  Greek 
society not only marks the historical ascendancy of logocentrism, it at once formed the 
basis of Western philosophy and, according to Derrida, its inevitable demise. Plato’s 
distrust of writing and metaphor stemmed from a belief that speech was the ultimate 
expression  of  self-present  consciousness  truth,  while  metaphorical  writing  was 
repeatable, open to mis-interpretation,
29 and therefore dangerous to the stable republic 
he envisioned would end decades of civil unrest and war. Christopher Norris explains 
Plato’s position is one that believes: “writing is the readiest means to acquire all those 
forms  of  unearned  or  gratuitous  wisdom  which  the  sophists  and  mythologists  then 
passed off as the genuine goods […] It is through writing that the logos is deflected 
from its proper, truth-seeking aim and abandoned to a state of hazardous dependence on 
the vagaries of unauthorized transmission” (1988:32). However, Plato’s treatment of 
writing is not originary, but rather an ineluctable aspect of an arbitrary system of signs 
that  undermine  any  possibility  of  self-present  truth  by  being  necessarily  repeatable. 
Furthermore, in Of Grammatology Derrida points out that, despite his protestations, 
Plato was still reliant on metaphorical writing, — as seen in the Phaedrus, the Republic 
and in Socrates’ Dialogues — and neither was he alone in this
30 for as he points out: 
“As was the case with the Platonic writing of the truth in the soul, in the Middle Ages 
too it is a writing understood in the metaphoric sense, that is to say a natural, eternal,   87 
and universal writing, the system of signified truth, which is recognized in its dignity. 
As in the Phaedrus, a certain fallen writing continues to be opposed to it” (1997:15). 
That is, according to Derrida, despite the predominance of logocentrism in Western 
philosophy, the division of pure speech and fallen writing, and any value judgements of 
philosophy over literature can be seen to be problematic. Another way in which Derrida 
defamiliarised the seemingly a priori division of speech and writing — along with the 
claims  of  self-present  truth  of  the  latter  —  can  be  seen  with  his  deconstruction  of 
Saussure’s theory of signs in Of Grammatology. Without unnecessarily repeating this 
well-known  proposition  of  the  deterministic  relationship  between  sign,  signifier  and 
signified,
31 it will suffice to say that the seeds of its demise came from within, as we 
find when Derrida carries out his deconstruction when quoting Saussure in the Course: 
“it can be said that entirely arbitrary signs realize better than any others the ideal of the 
semiological process,” and that “it is not spoken language that is natural to man, but the 
faculty  of  constituting  a  language,  that  is,  a  system  of  distinct  signs”  (Quoted  in 
Derrida:1981:21). That is, Derrida uses Saussure’s own text to deconstruct the a priori 
presupposition that speech is the self-present expression of consciousness — despite its 
arbitrary nature — and goes on to explain the implications for the traditional priority of 
philosophy over the literary in Of Grammatology: 
The written signifier is always technical and representative. It has no constitutive 
meaning. This derivation is the very origin of the notion of the ‘signifier.’ The notion 
of  the  sign  always  implies  within  itself  the  distinction  between  signifier  and 
signified, even if, as Saussure argues, they are distinguished simply as the two faces 
of one and the same leaf. This notion remains therefore within the heritage of that 
logocentrism which is also a phonocentrism: absolute proximity of the voice and 
being,  of  voice  and  the  meaning  of  being,  of  voice  and  the  ideality  of  meaning 
(1997:11-12). 
 
Thus, for Derrida the recognition of the arbitrary nature of both spoken and written 
language  terminally  undermines  the  truth  claims  inherent  in  the  history  of  Western 
metaphysical philosophy, and the valorisation of the philosophical over the poetic and 
the rhetorical over the literary. Furthermore, along with doubts regarding the possibility   88 
of self-present speech we see the impossibility of the speaking subject ever expressing 
pure consciousness. As Howells explains: “Writing implies inscription, the possibility 
of repetition, and a range of conventional differentiating features. All these elements run 
counter to the myth of pure presence, and all are to be found in speech. It is not possible 
to  maintain  that  speech  is  free  of  them  if  the  signifier/signified  relationship  is 
recognized  to  be  arbitrary”  (1999:49).  By  virtue  of  their  arbitrary  nature,  the  truth-
values  of  writing  and  speech  are  undermined  by  the  inherent  possibility  of 
misinterpretation through repetition, and by the metaphysical nature of the system of 
signs we necessarily adopt in order that we articulate ourselves to others. 
  Another outcome of Derrida’s deconstruction of the Saussurian algorithm arose 
from what he would refer to as the ‘play’ of differences — or ‘différance’ — explaining 
in his seminal text of that name, that: “Saussure had only to remind us that the play of 
difference was the functional condition, the condition of possibility, for every sign; and 
it  is  itself  silent”  (1996:133).  Having  already  defamiliarised  and  undermined  the  a 
priori truth claims of the logos, he indicates that rather than speech and writing being 
purely self-present, meaning is always already absent due to an unavoidable process of 
deferral  —  the  fundamental  expression  of  this  process  being  his  neologism  —  and 
although much has been written about différance, the importance of this non-concept
32 
is that it continues the defamiliarisation of the metaphysics of presence, and indicates 
the a priori nature of diminished subjectivity. 
  Aside from cleverly highlighting the entwined nature of speech and writing by 
replacing the ‘e’ of différence with the ‘a’ of différance — thus indicating the difficulty 
in delimiting these phonetically similar words without recourse to writing — Derrida 
argues that these slippages are the result of the inevitable ‘play’ of differences between 
signs,
33 explaining that: “The verb ‘to differ’ [différer] seems to differ from itself. On 
the one hand, it indicates difference as distinction, inequality, or discernibility; on the   89 
other  hand,  it  expresses  the  interposition  of  delay,  the  interval  of  a  spacing  and 
temporalizing that puts off until ‘later’ what is presently denied, the possible that is 
presently impossible” (129). That is, for Derrida this ‘play’ not only defers meaning 
throughout the system of signs, it undermines the traditional view of spoken language as 
purely self-present to consciousness, and argues in ‘The Supplement of Origin’ that 
différance is: “the operation of differing which at one and the same time both fissures 
and retards presence, submitting it simultaneously to primordial division and delay” 
(88). Thus, the self-present subject is always already in absentia due to a ‘play’ of 
differences, which not only proposes a view of subjectivity as diminished, it also casts 
doubts as to the temporal specificity of the crises of the postmodern condition.  
  While it is clear that Derrida’s deconstruction of the conceptual order and the 
metaphysics of presence has caused controversy among certain contemporary theorists, 
the loudest cries of horror were saved for his proclamation in Of Grammatology that: 
“There  is  nothing  outside  of  the  text  […];  il  n’y  a  pas  de  hors  texte”  (1997:158), 
following  his  formulations  on  Saussure  and  language  in  “…That  Dangerous 
Supplement…”  Having  expressed  the  impossibility  of  speech  and  writing  ever 
articulating  pure  self-presence  due  to  the  arbitrary  nature  of  language  and  the  non-
presence  of  a  ‘transcendental  signified,’
34  with  this  statement  Derrida  indicates  the 
unavoidable  yet  compromised  relationship  between  the  two.  In  his  ‘Translator’s 
Introduction’ to Speech and Phenomena, David B. Allison explains this proposition:  
Derrida concludes that the whole problem and history of language must be entirely 
rethought. Instead of trying to capture and retain a pure presence, we must conceive 
signification from the start as a movement away from self-presence, a movement 
away  from  the  pure  presence  of  a  discrete  origin  and  the  ideal  presence  of  an 
identical meaning-content. As a movement of difference, signification precedes and 
gives rise to the very concepts of self, presence and meaning (1996:xxxvii). 
 
For Derrida, rather than language expressing pure consciousness, through the process of 
‘play’  and  différance  there  occurs  an  absence  whereby  self-presence,  already  once 
removed, is re-read, re-inscribed, and as we shall see later, transformed. Furthermore,   90 
his  perspective  of  language  is  one  whereby  self-presence  is  undermined  due  to  its 
linguistic nature, and recognised as the fiction of an arbitrary metaphysical system of 
signs.  Allison  explains  that  for  Derrida:  “What  is  signified  in  the  present,  then, 
necessarily includes the differentiating and nonpresent system of signifiers in its very 
meaning. We can only assemble and recall the traces of what went before; we stand 
within language, not outside it” (xxxviii). Thus, for Derrida the subject of language does 
not exist outside of the text as all representations are expressed by an arbitrary ‘play’ of 
signs, explaining in ‘Freud and the Scene of Writing’ that: “pure perception does not 
exist: we are written only as we write, by the agency within us which always already 
keeps watch over perception, be it internal or external. The ‘subject’ of writing does not 
exist if we mean by that some sovereign solitude of the author. The subject of writing is 
a system of relations between strata: […] the psyche, society, the world. Within that 
scene, on that stage, the punctual simplicity of the classical subject is not to be found” 
(1997:226-27). Finally then, as a result of this discussion of deconstruction it is not only 
possible to view traditional metaphysical discourses as inherently problematic, but that 
Derrida’s view of language also calls into question self-present subjectivity, and it is to 
the implications of this proposition that I shall now turn my attention. 
 
2.3.c. Derrida and Postmodernism? — Deconstruction in Translation 
 
No one gets angry with a mathematician or with a doctor he doesn’t understand at 
all, or with someone who speaks a foreign language, but when somebody touches 
your own language, […] I assure you that I never give in to the temptation of being 
difficult for its own sake. It would be too easy. I believe only in the necessity of 
taking the time — or, rather, of leaving it, of not ironing out the wrinkles, the folds. 
For  philosophical  or  political  reasons,  the  problem  of  communication  and 
admissibility, with its new techno-economic givens, is more serious than ever before, 
for everyone. We can only come to terms with it uneasily, through contradiction and 
compromise. 
—  Jacques  Derrida,  in  ‘Semiology  and  Grammatology:  Interview  with  Julia 
Kristeva’ (1981:71).   
 
Having examined the manner in which Derrida’s work undermines the primacy of the 
metaphysics of presence with his view of the subject of language, I shall now turn to   91 
various  responses  to  this  proposition,  focussing  specifically  on  the  appropriation  of 
deconstruction, and the resultant controversy surrounding certain (mis)-readings of his 
work, leading to an unfortunate association with post-structuralism and postmodernism. 
A catalyst for negative readings of Derrida’s work can be traced back to his (in)famous 
statement  that  ‘nothing  exists  outside  the  text.’  In  Debating  Derrida  Niall  Lucy 
indicates  the  critical  reception  of  this  statement  explaining  that:  “Somehow  the 
statement ‘there is no outside the text’ has been taken to mean that there is no truth, no 
reality, no history, no actual flesh-and-blood people in the world, no rocks and trees, 
disease, sex, poverty, or physical violence. All there is instead is a form of fiction in 
extremis: nothing can  said to be in so far as it  has been made up, constructed, put 
together from language, discourse, signs” (1995:1). While such negative reactions have 
seen Derrida labelled an anti-humanist, the focus of deconstruction on the textual nature 
of  subjectivity  has  seen  many  of  his  neologisms  being  adeptly,  if  not  wholly 
appropriately, adopted by English speaking literary departments.
35 This tendency has 
not  escaped  Derrida’s  attention  wherein  he  argues  that  ‘deconstruction’  is:  “a  word 
whose  fortunes  have  disagreeably  surprised  me”  (Quoted  in  Norris:1987:44),  while 
Christopher Norris argues that the fortunes of deconstruction: “have certainly been more 
bound  up  with  literary  criticism  than  with  philosophy,  at  least  in  the  current 
(institutional)  sense  of  those  terms.  One  result  has  been  the  refusal  by  many 
philosophers in the mainstream Anglo-American tradition to take Derrida seriously, or 
to  read  his  texts  with  anything  like  the  requisite  care  and  attention”  (113).  This 
unfortunate  tendency  to  conflate  deconstruction  with  literary  criticism  and 
postmodernism, has led Jürgen Habermas, among many, to base their arguments against 
Derrida’s  primary  texts  on  secondary  sources,  leading  to  a  variety  of  ill-informed 
critiques of his work.
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  A further difficulty in any reception of Derrida’s writing formulates itself in the 
ultimate  example  of  the  ‘play’  of  differences  —  that  of  translation.  Although,  the 
inherent possibility of mistranslation is an example par excellence of the impossibility 
of self-presence — and given that Derrida would never argue for closed readings of any 
of his texts — it cannot be denied that various translations of his work have led to 
certain unwarranted responses. The difficulties faced by the translator of any text, let 
alone those of Derrida, is expressed by Gayatri Spivak in the ‘Translator’s Preface’ to 
Of Grammatology, wherein she explains that: “Derrida’s text certainly offers its share of 
‘untranslatable’ words […] To an extent, this problem informs the entire text. Denying 
the uniqueness of words, their substantiality, their transferability, their repeatability, Of 
Grammatology denies the possibility of translation […] That playfulness I fear I have 
not  been  able  remotely  to  capture”  (1997:lxxxv-vi).
37  Ironically,  it  is  in  fact  this 
performative (play)fulness that adds to the difficulty of translating Derrida’s neologisms 
and of the many, and varied, responses to them. 
  In his text, System and Writing in the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Christopher 
Johnson clearly indicates the problems caused by the random uninformed appropriation 
of Derrida’s neologisms — mainly by Anglo-American literary critics — the resultant 
devaluing  of  his  patently  philosophical  work,  and  the  impact  that  his  notoriously 
difficult texts have had on contemporary theory, arguing that: 
Too often the emphasis has rested on what might be termed Derrida’s special theory 
of writing, the preliminary critique or deconstruction of the phono- and logocentric 
subordination of writing, found in the ‘classic’ texts of the period 1967-72. This has 
most often been the case in literary critical interpretations and appropriations of the 
theory of writing. Such readings have involved, on the one hand, a privileging of the 
notions of ‘texte’ and ‘écriture’ […] and on the other, the treatment of literature as 
‘jeu,’ with its notorious English (mis) translation of ‘free play’ (1993:8). 
 
It is this mistranslation of ‘jeu’ as ‘free play’ that has resulted in some of the more 
extreme and nihilistic aspects of post-structuralism and postmodernism, leading several 
well-known academics to turn against Derrida and deconstruction by conflating all three   93 
disciplines without necessarily reading his work.
38 In a prime example of the incorrect 
association of Derrida with postmodernism we find Frederic Jameson explaining that: 
“no matter how desirable this postmodern philosophical free play may be, it cannot now 
be  practiced;  however  conceivable  and  imaginable  it  may  have  become  as  a 
philosophical  aesthetic  […]  anti-systematic  writing  today  is  condemned  to  remain 
within the system” (1990:27). Although Jameson refers to this postmodern ‘free play,’ 
at no time does Derrida view deconstruction as ‘free’ of the metaphysical ontology of 
Western philosophy, and although Jameson supports this perspective, his own critique 
of postmodernism is replete with Derridean tropes and mistranslated neologisms.     
  The apparent inherent difficulty in Derrida’s work has not only resulted in these 
mistranslations and cursory readings criticising his work for a lack of critical finality 
and content,
39 but has also seen deconstruction viciously attacked as a result of the 
personal  history  of  its  antecedents  and  purveyors.  Christina  Howells  explores  the 
manner in which the backlash against Derrida entered the public arena: 
Accused by the right of iconoclasm and dangerous irresponsibility, and by the left of 
fostering  inactivity  by  rendering  political  action  unjustifiable,  Derrida’s  work  is 
certainly  far  too  difficult  of  access  to  find  favour  with  the  common-sense  anti-
obscurantism of centrist liberal thinkers. The links between deconstruction and the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger, who for a period was a member and supporter of 
the Nazi party, and the case of the (Belgian) Yale deconstructionist, Paul de Man, 
whose youthful writings were discovered after his death to be arguably sympathetic 
to fascist anti-Semitism, have clouded the issue further (1999:122). 
 
That Heidegger’s personal history, and Derrida’s friendship with Paul de Man became 
the basis for a critical backlash against deconstruction indicates the extent of the vitriol 
levelled against his gravely misunderstood insights into the defamiliarisation of a priori 
metaphysical  conceptual  orders.  As  Howell’s  indicates:  “Deconstruction  was,  in  the 
popular press and imagination, gleefully tarred with the same brush of Nazi sympathy” 
(137-38). Rather than carrying out independent readings of Derrida’s work, the majority 
of  these  negative  responses  are  based  on  twice  removed  re-readings  of  secondary 
sources based on mistranslations of his non-originary texts, thus becoming examples of   94 
the ‘play’ of difference par excellence. If Derrida’s work is performative, then this 
critical response — which led him to write De l’espirit and Memoires de le Paul De 
Man — not only support his view of deconstruction, but must have amused him greatly. 
  Finally then, it is clear that Derrida’s seemingly taken-for-granted position as the 
progenitor  of  post-structuralism,  and  close  association  with  negative  theories  of 
postmodernism,  are  misplaced.
40  In  an  attempt  to  distance  himself  from  these 
unwarranted associations we find him explaining in his ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend,’ 
that although deconstruction was necessarily a structuralist enterprise, given its reliance 
on  the  metaphysical  ontology  of  philosophy  to  remain  meaningful:  “it  was  also  an 
antistructuralist gesture, and its fortune rests in part on this ambiguity. Structures were 
to be undone, decomposed, desedimented […] This is why, especially in the United 
States, the motif of deconstruction has been associated with ‘poststructuralism’ (a word 
unknown in France until its ‘return’ from the United States)” (1988:2-3). Therefore the 
repeated association of Derrida with postmodernism is in need of serious revision, for as 
Lucy explains: 
Today’s ‘post,’ nevertheless, contains a widespread belief that ‘today’ is radically 
and  fundamentally  different  from  the  past.  Especially  in  the  name  of 
‘postmodernism’ (or in what is often attributed to it), extreme versions of this belief 
have resulted in the ridiculous assertions of how ‘we’ can escape from binarity and 
therefore  be  no  longer  in  the  thrall  of  such  oppositions  as  creative/critical, 
imagination/history,  philosophy/politics,  man/woman,  and  so  on.  There  are  good 
reasons for regarding what may be called oxymoronically, the ‘postmodern project’ 
as  idealist,  romanticist,  and  rhetorical  —  in  a  word  logocentric  —  rather  than 
radically  pragmatic.  But  there  are  no  good  reasons  for  regarding  Derrida  as  a 
postmodernist (1995:88). 
 
As  already  explained,  the  actions  of  deconstruction  are  simply  to  defamiliarise 
seemingly  a  priori  metaphysical  discourses  by  highlighting  the  problematics  buried 
within  the  margins  of  those  very  texts.  Derrida,  therefore,  is  not  diminishing  a 
previously attainable self-presence consciousness, nor calling for the end of history or 
philosophy,  but  rather  acknowledges  that  the  metaphysics  of  presence  is  always 
involved in the process of deconstruction. Norris goes on to state that: “Deconstruction   95 
is  not,  [Derrida]  insists,  either  a  ‘method,’  a  ‘technique’  or  a  species  of  ‘critique.’ 
Sometimes Derrida disclaims all responsibility for such misreadings, regarding them as 
a  kind  of  déformation  professionelle,  the  result  of  grafting  deconstruction  on  to  an 
activity (that of literary criticism) with its very own needs and requirements” (1987:18). 
Gasché indicates the predominant view of a lack of critical content in Derrida’s work 
pointing  out  that:  “one  aspect,  more  than  obvious  to  the  philosopher,  is  that 
deconstruction in the first place represents a critique of reflexivity, and specularity. It is 
the unawareness of this essential feature of deconstruction that has caused the easy 
accommodation  of  deconstruction  by  contemporary  American  criticism”  (1979:183). 
Therefore, it becomes clear that much of what has been negatively attributed to Derrida 
is in fact speculation — predominantly carried out by Anglo-American literary critics 
— resulting in appropriated philosophical neologisms being applied deterministically 
and unquestioningly to literature. However, despite this distance between Derrida and 
literary criticism, there is cause to question his own position regarding the literary, due 
to the performative nature of his writing style and obvious interest in literature.  
 
2.3.e. The Margins of Philosophy — Derrida and the literary 
 
Despite the manifest relevance to literary studies of the relation between reading and 
misreading, the implications of deconstruction for the study of literature are far from 
clear. Derrida frequently writes about literary works but has not dealt with topics 
such as the task of literary criticism, the methods for analyzing literary language, or 
the nature of meaning in literature. 
 — Jonathan Culler, in On Deconstruction (1993:180). 
 
There are thus two interpretations of interpretation, of structure, of sign, of play. The 
one seeks to decipher, dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play 
and the order of the sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile. 
The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, affirms play and tries to pass 
beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name of that being who, 
throughout  his  entire  history  —  has  dreamed  of  full  presence,  the  reassuring 
foundation, the origin and the end of play.  
— Jacques Derrida, in ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ (1997:292).  
 
Having outlined the manner in which deconstruction elucidates the a priori aporia of 
the diminished self-present subject, and the spurious association of Derrida with post-  96 
structuralism and postmodernism, I shall now investigate his view of the subject and 
literature. Having explained the misguided accusations aimed at Derrida regarding his 
supposed  call  for  the  end  of  the  delimitation  of  philosophy  and  literature,  and  a 
‘levelling’ of genre distinctions in the name of literary criticism,
41 it is important to note 
that this controversy again highlights the inherently performative nature of his writing. 
Jonathan Culler explains Derrida’s deconstruction of definite discursive boundaries, and 
his view of the arbitrary system of signs, in On Deconstruction, stating that:  
Reading  philosophy  as  a  literary  genre,  Derrida  has  taught  us  to  consider 
philosophical writings as texts with a performative as well as cognitive dimension, as 
heterogeneous constructs, organizing and organized by a variety of discursive forces, 
never simply present to themselves or in control of their implications, and related in 
complex ways to a variety of other texts, written and lived (1993:182).  
 
While this appears as a well-executed summary of Derrida’s deconstructive aims, it also 
expresses a certain metaphysics, whereby Derrida is accused of ‘reading philosophy as a 
literary genre.’ Rather than calling for a ‘levelling,’ a blurring, or even a reversal of 
genre distinctions, Derrida argues firstly that all genres are metaphysical, and secondly 
that all texts carry the tropes of a variety of genres. In ‘The Law of Genre’ he states that 
any ‘law’ regarding genre: “is precisely a principle of contamination, a law of impurity, 
a  parasitical  economy”  (1992:227),  and  goes  on  to  argue  that:  “I  submit  for  your 
consideration the following hypothesis: a text would not belong to any genre. Every text 
participates in one or several genres, that there is no genreless text, there is always a 
genre  and  genres,  yet  such  a  participation  never  amounts  to  a  belonging”  (230). 
Therefore, as we have seen with the deconstruction of the self-present subject, Derrida 
is not arguing for the destruction of genres or encouraging discursive chaos, but rather, 
he is indicating the arbitrary nature of these constructs and questions the prioritisation of 
certain genres over others — as already seen with the arbitrary distinction between 
philosophy and literature.
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  Despite Derrida’s concerted efforts to distance himself from literary criticism, and 
the post-structuralist and postmodernist theories attributed to him, there is no denying 
the impact of the literary on both the content and style of his work.
43 Working in the 
margins of philosophy, exploring anecdotes, footnotes and the metaphorical in both 
mainstream  and  little  known  philosophical  texts,  Derrida  not  only  made  constant 
reference to works of literature, his writing style was also experimental in nature. In 
‘Signature Event Context,’ he explains the nature of performative writing seeing it as: 
“a ‘communication’ which does not essentially limit itself to transporting an already 
constituted semantic content guarded by it own aiming at truth (truth as an unveiling of 
that which is in its Being, or as an adequation between a judicative statement and the 
thing itself)” (1972:322). That is, given the nature of his philosophical approach in 
defamiliarising  the  metaphysics  of  presence,  and  an  awareness  of  the  inherent 
metaphysical  culpability  involved  in  deconstruction,  his  writing  style  does  offer  an 
alternative and creative mode of expression.  
  Christina  Howells  supports  the  view  that  Derrida  was  not  only  interested  in 
deconstructing the artificial truth claims prioritising philosophy over literature, but that 
he was also interested in doing this stylistically, arguing that:  
Derrida’s writing is in itself ‘performative,’ that is, it enacts what it describes; it is 
not  merely  constantive  and  argumentative,  but  it  exemplifies  the  features  it  is 
discussing. This kind of language use is alien to most philosophical traditions, and is 
more readily thought of as a feature of literary texts; but […] another feature of the 
Derridean  strategy  is  to  undo  the  conventional  distinction  between  literature  and 
philosophy and the hierarchy which subordinates the former to the latter (1999:71).  
 
And  this  can  be  seen  no  clearer  than  in  ‘The  Supplement  of  Origin,’  wherein  the 
following metaphoric passage we find Derrida referring to his own undertaking: “It 
remains, then, for us to speak, to make our voices resonate throughout the corridors in 
order to make up for […] the breakup of presence. The phoneme, the akoumenon, is the 
phenomenon of the labyrinth. This is the case with the phone. Rising toward the sun of 
presence, it is the way of Icarus” (1996:104).
44 Yet despite this tendency we see in   98 
Newton Garver’s ‘Preface’ to Speech and Phenomena that this approach does not sit 
comfortably with many: “We cannot complain just because Derrida is often obscure, for 
the problems are exceedingly difficult, and a demand for pedestrian prose would be 
misplaced. But clarity is more than just pedestrian. Faced with Derrida’s unrestrained 
literary extravagance, one cannot help wondering if the heavy reliance upon metaphor 
and paradox is not also misplaced” (xxvi). However, unlike Garver, I believe these 
difficulties not only reflect the problematic nature of Derrida’s task, they deliberately 
elucidate the inherently problematic nature of all language usage.   
  Although negative criticisms of a lack of content in Derrida’s texts abound, it 
becomes apparent that this literary focus, and indeed his own performative writing style, 
can lead us to view his work differently. In fact, he makes this apparent himself in 
‘Violence and Metaphysics’ wherein he explains that: 
Henceforward, the heliological metaphor only turns away our glance, providing an 
alibi  for  the  historical  violence  of  light:  a  displacement  of  technico-political 
oppression  in  the  direction  of  philosophical  discourse.  For  it  has  always  been 
believed that metaphors exculpate, lift the weight of things and of acts. If there is no 
history, except through language, and if language (except when it names Being itself 
or nothing: almost never) is elementally metaphorical, Borges is correct: ‘Perhaps 
universal history is but the history of several metaphors’ (1997:92). 
 
Finally then, it is possible to read, or rather re-read, in Derrida that certain cathartic 
expressions  of  subjectivity,  and  alternatives  to  dominant  conceptual  orders,  can  be 
found  in  the  metaphoricity  of  the  literary.  Nicholas  Royle  supports  this  view  when 
explaining  that  for  Derrida:  “The  interest  of  literature  goes  far  beyond  aesthetic  or 
formalist  concerns:  his  focus  is  on  the  importance  of  the  literary  work  having 
transformed and in continuing to transform the ways in which we think, for example not 
only about ‘writing’ in its narrow sense, but about history, politics, democracy and law, 
the world itself” (2003:86). And I determine that this view of Derrida’s work highlights 
the  fundamental  importance  that  both  deconstruction  and  literature  can  have  in 
defamiliarising  the  arbitrary  nature  of  any  expression  of  subjectivity,  which  despite   99 
fundamentally  diminishing  the  metaphysics  of  self-presence  also  empowers  the 
individual with the inherent recognition that the condition of the possibility of change is 
an ineluctable aspect of all discursive formations. 
 
2.4.a. In Summation — Chapter 2 
Despite the divergent theoretical and temporal loci of these three theorists, it is my 
contention that the theme of a fragmented and divided subject can be clearly traced 
from the anti-metaphysical phenomenological approaches of Husserl and Heidegger, 
through to Derridean deconstruction. Firstly we see that, despite his determination to 
avoid the trap of metaphysics, Husserl attempted to address a perceived temporally 
specific crisis in subjectivity and philosophy, yet fell victim to the trap of metaphysics 
of  comfort  when  he  determined  a  way  out  of  his  theoretical  aporia  with  the 
‘transcendental ego,’ despite being plagued with personal doubts that diminished his 
belief  in  the  validity  of  his  pursuit.  Secondly,  we  find  Heidegger  attempting  to 
overcome  the  ontological  crisis  of  philosophy  by  coining  his  own  metaphysical 
neologisms in Being and Time. Yet despite having an acute appreciation of the a priori 
trap of determinism, he still embraced the brutal totalitarian metaphysics of comfort in 
the  form  of  National  Socialism,  with  a  misguided  belief  that  it  would  assuage  the 
various  crises  afflicting  depression  ridden  post-war  Germany.  Although  Heidegger 
would eventually appreciate the inherently discursive nature of the subject in progress, 
his philosophical influence was greatly diminished as a result of his fascistic treatment 
of Husserl and involvement with the Nazi Party. Finally then we find Jacques Derrida 
scouring the margins of various discourses in order to deconstruct the a priori play of 
differences within the ontology of metaphysical philosophy, happily aware of his own 
complicity in the hermeneutic circle, while undoubtedly disturbing a great many. Thus, 
with these three theoreticians we witness repeated examples of the a priori aporia of the 
diminished subject, view the importance of literary expressions of alternative counter-  100 
discursive  subjectivity,  observe  the  refutation  of  the  validity  of  a  supposedly 
contemporary postmodern crisis, and recognise the inherent dangers of the discourses of 
determinism and fascism which, thankfully, are always already under threat due to their 
inherently arbitrary nature, and the condition of possibility of change.   
                                                 
Notes: 
 
1 This attitude can clearly be seen in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy wherein Husserl states: 
“Still, just as man (and even the Papuan) represents a new level of animality — in comparison with the 
beast — so with regard to humanity and its reason does philosophical reason represent a new level. The 
level  of  human  existence  with  its  ideal  norms  for  infinite  tasks,  the  level  of  existence  sub  specie 
aeternitatis, is, however, possible only in the form of absolute universality, precisely that which is a 
priori included in the ideas of philosophy” (1965:179). That is, for Husserl, philosophy and reason not 
only raise man above the ‘beast,’ they indicate a stratum among ‘men’ whereby philosophical certitude 
becomes the benchmark of societal excellence. 
2  However,  as  Quentin  Lauer  points  out  in  his  ‘Introduction’  to  Phenomenology  and  the  Crisis  of 
Philosophy,  Husserl’s  perspective  of  consciousness  differed  greatly  from  that  of  the  cogito:  “It  was 
Descartes  who,  in  his  Meditations,  revealed  to  Husserl  the  possibility  […]  of  seeking  a  universally 
rational  science  of  being  by  turning  from  a  consideration  of  the  objective  world  to  a  reflective 
consideration  of  the  thinking  subject.  Unlike  Descartes,  however,  Husserl  will  not  look  upon  this 
knowledge of the subject as a first indubitable principle from which all other knowledge can be derived. 
Instead, taking the cogitatum as the objective correlate of the cogito, he will see in subjectivity the one 
and only (transcendental) source of all absolute, objectively valid knowledge, because the subjectivity of 
consciousness  and  only  here  is  the  being  of  objectivity  absolute”  (1965:20).  Christopher  Norris  also 
examines the relation between Husserl and Descartes explaining that: “Husserl’s main aim was to break 
this charmed circle of consciousness by showing how the mind took possession of experience, relating 
thought to the object-of-thought through an act of structured perception. Thinking no longer takes place in 
the  solipsistic  realm  of  reflection  cut  off  from  the  reality  it  vainly  strives  to  grasp.  Philosophy  is 
reconstructed on the pared-down but firm foundations of a knowledge in and of the world” (1982:44). 
3 Lauer explains Husserl’s approach to the scientific study of spirituality thus: “[I]t is Western man’s 
failure to live up to his philosophical destiny which has brought him to the crisis before which he now 
stands. He is sick, and there is no available cure for his illness. There is a science of medicine to cure his 
sick body, but there is no science of the spirit to cure his sick soul. If there is to be such a science — and 
there must be — it cannot simply satisfy itself with empirical observation; only a strict science will do. 
Nor can such a science of the spiritual subject who is man be merely psycho-physical science — though it 
cannot spurn the help of this latter. It is important to realize that it cannot be a science of nature at all; it 
cannot be ‘objective’ the way a science of nature must be. The world it is to study is not the objective 
world  of  nature  but  the  ‘environing  world’  (Umwelt)  of  the  spiritual  subject”  (1965:16).  Therefore, 
despite his criticism of Hegel’s use of metaphysical concepts, Husserl also experiences this problem by 
promoting the health of the spirit and soul of the subject. However, given his temporally specific locus it 
is unlikely that he could escape these predominant logocentric paradigms. 
4 Safranski goes on to explain Husserl’s metaphysical aporia: “Husserl having performed the trick of 
describing the consciousness process ‘before’ its splitting into ego and world, and hence as an ‘egoless’ 
one, now, on the transcendental plane, falls back on the idea he had hoped to overcome, the idea of the 
ego as the owner of its consciousness contents. The ego, only just deconstructed, once more, as in the 
Cartesian tradition, becomes the highest authority on certainty. It is this turn toward a transcendental ego, 
the outlines of which had been noticeable since 1913, that will provoke Heidegger’s criticisms in future. 
Husserl understands the transcendental ego as a kind of substance in which the contents may change 
without itself changing. The transcendental ego has a suspicious resemblance to the divine spirit, which 
tradition has always thought of as the unchanging foundation of all world contents. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Husserl said about the discovery of the transcendental ego: ‘If I do so by myself, then I am 
not the human ego’” (1999:80). Thus, being the subject of his environment Husserl replaces the idea of a 
pseudo religious spirit with a deterministic concept that is unavoidably metaphysical, as Safranski further 
explains: “there are also moments of temptation when he questions the sense of the whole enterprise. 
Does  one  not  always  inevitably  remain  a  beginner  when  one  attempts  to  traverse  the  vast  field  of 
consciousness? Is it not like trying to reach an ever-receding horizon? If, therefore, consciousness cannot 
be exhaustively described and analyzed, then — Husserl’s way out of the impasse — the sack has to be   101 
                                                                                                                                              
closed at the other end, at the beginning. The name for this mental short circuit is ‘transcendental ego.’ It 
is the quintessence of all performances and operations of consciousness, the headwaters region of the 
stream  of  consciousness.  If  […]  ego  consciousness  develops  only  secondarily  in  the  perception  of 
perception, how then does one bring a transcendental ego to the beginning of the entire consciousness 
process?  Quite  simply  by  declaring  the  phenomenological  attitude,  with  which  one  observes  the 
consciousness process, as the locus of the transcendental ego” (1999:79). 
5  Interestingly  Lauer  takes  a  contrary  position  to  Safranski  arguing  that:  “Only  a  careful  reading  of 
Husserl’s principle works will reveal how this completely justified cognition is to be achieved, but there 
are three factors at least indicated in the present selections that point the direction in which Husserl’s 
thought on the scientific ideal moves. They are: the notion of a cognition whose objective validity can be 
determined by an examination of the act of knowing itself, the constant necessity of beginning over again 
in the acquisition of scientific knowledge, and science as an accumulation of established truths achievable 
only by the cooperative efforts of a community of investigators” (1965:28). That is, whereas Safranski 
sees Husserl’s rewriting as a sign of doubt, Lauer suggests that this is a necessary aspect of scientific 
study and that Husserl was a great believer in abandoning ideas and beginning again. However, having 
said that, given Husserl’s phenomenological reasoning, this rewriting did little to guarantee his desired 
‘Archimedean point’ of the certitude of subjectivity. 
6 Norris explains Derrida’s critique of Husserl thus: “The idea of temporal deferring is also made explicit 
in relation to Husserl’s phenomenology. His quest for a grounding philosophy of conscious experience 
required that Husserl gave some account of time and its various modalities. This was the topic of his book 
The  Phenomenology  of  Internal  Time-Consciousness  (1929)  in  which  Husserl  set  out  to  analyse  the 
different relations and levels of intelligible order which ‘made sense’ of time for the experiencing mind 
[…] From the phenomenological standpoint, this involved showing how the ‘living present’ of awareness 
is the privileged point from which memories, both long-and short-term, are organized and given their due 
sequential  meaning.  Among  Husserl’s  most  important  distinctions  is  that  between  retention  and 
representation,  the  former  having  to  do  with  immediate  (sensory)  traces,  the  latter  with  experiences 
recalled  over  a  greater  distance  of  time.  It  is  here  that  Derrida  inserts  the  deconstructive  lever  of 
différance. He points out that Husserl is constantly obliged, by the logic of his own argument, to treat the 
present as a moment compounded of manifold retentions and anticipations, never existing in the isolated 
instant of awareness. Time  is  an  endless deferring of presence which drives yet another paradoxical 
wedge into the project of phenomenology” (1982:46-7). 
7 In The Body In Language, Ruthrof explains the manner that Husserl undermines the concept of a stable 
self-present subject in relation to time, when discussing the implications of Derridean ‘différance’ and the 
fleeting nature of self-presence: “The ‘now’ of conceptual realization is no more than an idealization. 
Husserl speaks of a ‘continuum which is continually modified’ so that ‘the pure now’ of perception ‘is 
just an ideal limit, something abstract which can be nothing for itself’” (Husserl,1966:62f) [actually p:63] 
(2000:26). Thus, Husserl undermines his own transcendental argument and metaphysical pursuits, and 
despite viewing language as a science of the meaning of existence, begins a division of subjectivity that 
continues with Heidegger and Derrida. 
8 Sheehan indicates the extent of these crises explaining that: “These were hard times for Germany, both 
economically and politically.  Right-wing death squads had just murdered  Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht, and the bodies of other leftist victims were turning up by the scores. The Reichsmark was 
falling in value and by November 1923 would exchange 4.4 trillion to the dollar. The Versailles Peace 
Conference  was  busily  paring  away  10  percent  of  Germany’s  population,  13  percent  of  its  national 
territory, and 100 percent of its colonies, as well as imposing […] a war reparations bill that was worth, in 
today’s exchange rates, $220 billion” (1993:77). 
9 Sheehan goes on to explain not only the extent of Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s transcendental ego 
but how this brought about his own notion of Dasein: “virtually everything the young lecturer had to say 
in his first course, ‘The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview,’ seemed to undercut, or at 
least to reinterpret radically, Husserl’s own positions on phenomenology. Heidegger’s main attack was on 
the primacy that Husserl attributed to theory over lived experience and to the pure transcendental ego 
over what Heidegger at this point called the ‘historical ego’ and ‘the ego of the situation’ and that he 
would later term ‘Dasein’” (1993:78). 
10 Richard Polt examines this tendency pointing out that: “In §7 Heidegger presents his understanding of 
philosophy as transcendental, hermeneutical, phenomenological ontology. In later years, he preferred to 
call what he did simply ‘thinking.’ While we might wish he had kept things equally simple here, his 
jargon  is  not  beyond  clarification.  Instead  of  appealing  to  Husserl,  Heidegger  explains  the  term 
phenomenology by a laborious etymological route […] The point is that when we examine phenomena, 
we are not just examining superficial illusions; we are trying to notice ‘the things themselves’ as they 
reveal themselves to us (49-50/27) (Heidegger is fond of this Husserlian motto, although he abandons 
most of Husserl’s technical terminology)” (1999:38).   102 
                                                                                                                                              
11 Guignon expands on the manner in which Heidegger defamiliarised this taken-for-granted a priori 
ontology: “Insofar as our common sense outlook is pervaded by past theorizing, and especially by the 
Cartesian ontology of modernity, fundamental ontology will involve ‘doing violence’ to the complacent 
assumptions  of  common  sense.  Nowhere  is  this  challenge  to  commonsense  more  evident  than  in 
Heidegger’s description of being human, or Dasein. This description is sharply opposed to the pictures of 
humans we have inherited from Descartes. According to the Cartesian view, we are at the most basic 
level minds located in bodies. And this is indeed the way we tend to think of ourselves when we step back 
and reflect on our being. The binary I a kind of Cartesian extortion which tells us that if we ever question 
the existence of mental substance, we will sink to the level of being crude materialists who can never 
account for human experience and agency” (1993:7). 
12 Richard Polt articulates Heidegger’s view of the failure of the metaphysics of presence: “For much of 
modern philosophy, to be is to be either an object present in time and space and time as measured by 
quantitative natural science, or a subject, a mind, that is capable of self-consciousness, or self-presence. 
According  to  Heidegger,  these  traditional  approaches  may  be  appropriate  to  some  beings,  but  they 
misinterpret others. In particular, they fail to describe our own Being. We are neither present substances, 
nor present objects nor present subjects: we are beings whose past and future collaborate to let us deal 
with  all  other  beings  we  encounter  around  us.  (Readers  have  come  to  use  […]  the  ‘metaphysics  of 
presence’ to describe the philosophical tradition that Heidegger is criticizing)” (1999:4-5). 
13 Sheehan explains Heidegger’s questionable timing: “On March 23, the Reichstag passed the Enabling 
Act, giving Hitler plenipotentiary lawmaking powers, and with that the Nazi dictatorship was born. This 
was followed on April 5 by the Nazi ‘cleansing laws’ aimed at excluding Jews and Marxists from the 
civil service.  Then on Monday, May 1 — one day before Hitler would arrest hundreds of labour leaders 
[…] — Martin Heidegger, the newly elected rector of Freiburg University, very ostentatiously joined the 
National Socialist German Workers Party” (1993:85). 
14 This constant questioning and contradiction is replete throughout Being and Time and I include here 
two more example of this tendency: “Thus the fundamental ontological of Interpreting Being as such 
includes working out the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of Temporality the 
question of the meaning of Being will first be  concretely answered” (1967:40) as opposed to: “This 
cannot  mean,  however,  that  ‘Dasein’  is  to  be  construed  in  terms  of  some  concrete  possible  idea  of 
existence. At the outset of our analysis it is particularly important that Dasein should not be Interpreted 
with the differentiated character […] of some definite way existing, but that it should be uncovered […] 
in the undifferentiated character which it has proximally and for the most part” (1967:69). 
15 Heidegger explains this apparent structure explicitly at the beginning of Being and Time stating that: 
“Within the range of basic philosophical concepts — especially when we come to the concept of ‘Being’ 
— it is a dubious procedure to invoke self-evidence, even if the ‘self evident’ […] is to become the sole 
explicit and abiding theme for one’s analytic — ‘the business of philosophers.’ By considering these 
prejudices, however, we have made plain not only that the question of Being lacks an answer, but that the 
question itself is obscure and without direction. So if it is to be revived, this means that we must first 
work out an adequate way of formulating it” (1967:24). 
16 Although the essential ‘mineness’ of death cannot be disputed, I would argue that nature of death is in 
many cases taken out of our hands by the violent or unthinking actions of ‘Others’ or ‘the they.’ 
17 Richard Polt explains the impossibility of a truly authentic Being using Heidegger’s own extravagant 
dress sense as an example: “Section 27 is known for its powerful writing. Here Heidegger claims that 
usually, one does not exist authentically: one does not truly own up to one’s own existence. Instead, one 
exists as das Man. Can I escape the ‘they’ by dressing against prevailing fashion, then? No — the ‘they’ 
is much more insidious than that, if I rebel by adopting a counterculture hairstyle, body markings and 
clothes, I am still basing my personal look on the ‘they’ — I still depend on the ‘they’ as a guideline (a 
negative guideline) for how I should behave. Furthermore, I am embracing a new ‘they’ — the counter—
cultural ‘they.’ Often enough, ‘nonconformists’ are rigid conformists within their own subculture. It takes 
hard work to devise a truly individual way of dressing — such as Heidegger’s ‘existential outfit,’ which 
Karl Lowith perceived as an attempt to shock the ‘they’” (1999:62). 
18 The demarcation between the early and mature Heidegger, the importance of his phenomenological 
deconstruction of metaphysics, and his recognition of this theoretical aporia is expanded by Polt: “It is a 
rare thinker who can construct an elaborate set of interrelated analyses and a special vocabulary, and then 
manage to break through this structure in order to think anew. But Heidegger did exactly that. Writing 
Being and Time […] may have allowed him to set aside an old set of concepts — or perhaps, his love of 
restless questioning led him to exert himself deliberately to cast off his old concepts. However this may 
be, in the late twenties we find him working towards fresh formulations and stressing new phenomenon 
[…] Heidegger begins to undergo a transformation that will turn our thinker into the so-called ‘later 
Heidegger’ or ‘Heidegger II.’ This transformation is usually known as the ‘turn’ or Kehre”  (1999:117).   103 
                                                                                                                                              
19 It is true that Heidegger remains unpopular because of his involvement with the Nazi party and is all 
too often overlooked, and we see that he barely rates a mention in Jonathan Culler’s On Deconstruction 
or even makes it into Diané Collinson’s list of Fifty Major Philosophers. 
20 Richard Polt explains Heidegger’s use of the term discourse in Being and Time, before  it became 
commonly used in contemporary theory: “speech acts and vocabularies and grammars — all of them 
elements of language — are based on an essential trait of Dasein’s Being, a trait that Heidegger calls 
discourse. Unless we grasp how we ourselves exist as discursive elements, we will never understand the 
nature  of  particular  manifestations  of  this  discursiveness,  such  as  words,  sentences  and  languages” 
(1999:74). 
21 Stephen Mulhall explains the manner in which Heidegger approaches his defamiliarisation of ontology 
arguing  that:  “Heidegger  does  not  […]  regard  the  philosophical  tradition  purely  as  something 
constraining or distorting. What he inherits from the past, that which defines and delimits the possibilities 
with which he is faced in engaging with his fundamental question, is not simply to be rejected. After all, 
the complete and undiscriminating rejection of every possibility that this tradition offers would leave him 
with no orientation for his enquiry, with no possible way of carrying on his questioning […] Heidegger 
never  claims  that  every  contribution  to  this  tradition  was  benighted;  on  the  contrary  he  stresses  the 
positive elements of relatively recent philosophical work” (1996:21). As we shall see the  trap of the 
hermeneutic circle and the metaphysical nature of language, is further embellished by Derrida. 
22 In the ‘Translator’s Preface’ to Discourse on Thinking, Anderson and Freund explain this frustration 
and  seeming  rejection  of  his  philosophical  past  and  his  own  metaphysical  concepts:  “How  does 
Heidegger  lead  us  towards  the  transmutation  of  man  he  desires,  if  not  by  making  extensive  use  of 
technical terminology as in his earlier works? He does it, in part, by using a language that is simple and 
has the flavour of the earth. He strives for simile and metaphor involving the soil and growth, and by this 
means he achieves a poetic tone. Not that his sentence structure or paragraph organization is poetic, for it 
is not; but phrases and words occurring in the larger context often evoke overtones of feeling associated 
with the land, with fields, and with what is the ground of things […] words are used with the directedness 
of reference which only poetic handling can achieve” (1966:14). 
23  Safranski  suggests  that  Heidegger  himself  was  aware  of  the  possibility  of  inauthentic  Being  on  a 
cultural level in relation to the fervour that the German population felt toward Hitler and the Nazi Party 
before WWII.  He explains that, when discussing the poetry of Hølderlin, Heidegger believed that: “There 
are periods of history that favor such a Seyns-Bezug — such a ‘relation to being’ — and others that render 
it more difficult or even impossible. The ‘night of the gods,’ or, as Heidegger calls it, the ‘darkening of 
the  world,’  engulfs  entire  epochs”  (1999:286).  Perhaps  then  we  can  view  Heidegger’s  exuberant 
involvement with the Nazi Party and his own fall from grace as an example of inauthentic Being, and 
WWII as such an example of this ‘darkening of the world.’ 
24  Christina  Howells  indicates  the  extent  of  his  published  works:  “The  extraordinary  acceleration  of 
Derrida’s publishing record is daunting as well as impressive. When I started thinking seriously about 
Derrida in 1980 he had published a dozen books, four in the 1960s and the rest in the seventies, as well, 
of course, numerous articles and essays. Reading the written corpus seemed a manageable goal. By 1990, 
when  I  first  considered  writing  a  book  on  Derrida,  he  had  published  another  twenty.  Nor  could  I 
anticipate that his output would further accelerate: at least another twenty books have appeared since 
1990, three in the first three months of 1997, just as I imagined I was putting the final touches to my last 
chapter” (1999:3). 
25  Nicholas  Royle  has  fun  with  the  difficulties  in  pinpointing  a  true  conceptual  understanding  of 
deconstruction  by  contrasting  his  non-definition  with  that  paragon  of  différance,  the  Oxford  English 
Dictionary:  “So  here  are  a  couple  of  dictionary-style  definitions.  First  from  the  1989  edition  of  the 
Oxford English Dictionary: deconstruction [f. DE + CONSTRUCTION] a. The action of undoing the 
construction of a thing. b. Philos. And Lit. Theory. A strategy of critical analysis associated with the 
French  philosopher  Jacques  Derrida  (b.1930),  directed  towards  exposing  unquestioned  metaphysical 
assumptions and internal contradictions in philosophy and literary language. And here is a more recent 
definition which, as you might be able to guess, does not come from a dictionary: deconstruction n. not 
what you think: the experience of the impossible: what remains to be thought: a logic of destabilization 
always  already  on  the  move  in  ‘things  in  themselves:’  what  makes  every  identity  at  once  itself  and 
different from itself: a logic of spectrality: a theoretical and practical parasitism or virology: what is 
happening today in what is called society, politics, diplomacy, economics, historical reality, and so on: 
the opening of the future itself” (2000:11). 
26 Christopher Norris handily explains how deconstruction found its way into, and defamiliarised the 
philosophical  tradition  from  within  the  margins:  “What  these  consist  of  […]  is  the  dismantling  of 
conceptual oppositions, the taking apart of hierarchical systems of thought which can then be re-inscribed 
with a different order of textual signification. Or again: deconstruction is the vigilant seeking-out of those 
‘aporias,’  blind-spots  or  moments  of  self-contradiction  where  a  text  involuntary  betrays  the  tension 
between  rhetoric  and  logic,  between  what  it  manifestly  means  to  say  and  what  it  is  nonetheless   104 
                                                                                                                                              
constrained  to  mean.  To  ‘deconstruct’  a  piece  of  writing  is  therefore  to  operate  a  kind  of  strategic 
reversal, seizing on precisely those unregarded details (causal metaphors, footnotes, incidental turns of 
argument) which are always, and necessarily, passed over by interpreters of a more orthodox persuasion. 
For it is here, in the margins of the text […] that deconstruction discovers those same unsettling forces at 
work” (1987:19). 
27 Derrida explains the traditional view of consciousness as self-present in ‘Différance’ wherein he states 
that: “Most often in the very form of ‘meaning,’ consciousness in all its modifications is conceivable only 
as self-presence, a self-perception of presence. And what holds for consciousness also holds here for what 
is  called  subjective  existence  in  general.  Just  as  the  category  of  subject  is  not  and  never  has  been 
conceivable without reference to presence as hypokeimenon or ousia, etc., so the subject as consciousness 
has never been able to be evinced otherwise than self-presence” (1996:147). 
28 The manner that deconstruction is caught up in metaphysics is explained in Of Grammatology: “The 
movements  of  deconstruction  do  not  destroy  structures  from  the  outside.  They  are  not  possible  and 
effective, nor can they take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a 
certain  way, because one always inhabits, and all  the more when one does not suspect it. Operating 
necessarily from inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion from the old 
structure, borrowing them structurally, that is  to say without being able  to isolate their elements and 
atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work” (1997:24). 
29 Niall Lucy explains how the necessarily repeatable nature of the written word necessitates the loss of 
the certitude of truth or authorial intent: “In order to become significant, then, a mark must be repeatable. 
But to repeat it is also to alter it, by taking it out of one context into another. Strictly, then, repetition is 
impossible, since alteration must also occur whenever repetition takes place. However  imperceptible, 
however seemingly incidental, a change takes place during every act of so-called repetition […] Anything 
that could be used to communicate must be iterable, able to be repeated and therefore altered, always 
already, from the beginning, at the first occasion of its use. Misrepresentation is never accidental, then — 
it is structural” (1995:24-26). 
30 Norris argues that: “Far from standing out as a mere freakish episode, Plato’s treatment of writing in 
the Phaedrus sets a pattern for similar encounters down through the history of Western thought. It is this 
pattern that Derrida will trace so intently in the texts of that tradition, from, Plato to Kant, Hegel, Husserl” 
(1987:33-4). 
31 For a full outline of Saussure’s linguistic approach to signs see his Course for General Linguistics and 
for Derrida’s deconstruction of the same, see ‘The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing’ and 
‘Linguistics  and  Grammatology’  in  Of  Grammatology.  In  ‘Deconstruction  as  Criticism,’  Rodolphe 
Gasché  indicates  how  Saussure  undermined  his  own  argument:  “Saussure’s  famous  thesis  of  the 
arbitrariness of the sign that completely blurs the traditional opposition of speech and writing. Saussure 
excluded writing from language and chased it to its outer fringes because he considered it to be only an 
exterior  reflection  of  the  reality  of  language,  that  is,  nothing  but  an  image,  a  representation  or  a 
figuration” (1979:197). 
32 True to Derrida’s anti-metaphysical position, and his belief in the arbitrary nature of the metaphysics of 
presence he is keen to point out that: “Différance is neither a word nor a concept” (1996:130). That is, the 
play of difference in the system of signs is an actual process, and as such différance simply exist as 
neither a word, nor a concept, for to be so would make this ineluctable process metaphysical. 
33 Derrida explains the process of ‘play’ and the manner in which it undermines presence at length in 
‘Structure Sign and Play’ wherein he states that: “Besides the tension between play and history, there is 
also  the  tension  between  play  and  presence.  Play  is  the  disruption  of  presence.  The  presence  of  an 
element is always a signifying and substitutive reference inscribed in a system of differences and the 
movement of a chain. Play is always play of absence and presence, but if it is to be thought radically, play 
must  be  conceived  of  before  the  alternative  of  presence  and  absence.  Being  must  be  conceived  as 
presence or absence on the basis of the possibility of play and not the other way around” (1997:292). 
34 In ‘Structure, Sign and Play’ Derrida explains the impact that the non-presence of the ‘transcendental 
signifier’ has had on the self-present subject: “This was the moment when language invaded the universal 
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse  — 
provided we can agree on this word — that is to say, in a system in which the central signified, the 
original  or  transcendental  signified,  is  never  absolutely  present  outside  a  system  of  differences.  The 
absence  of  the  transcendental  signified  extends  the  domain  and  the  play  of  signification  infinitely” 
(1997:280). 
35 The inappropriate manner in which deconstruction has been subsumed by theories of literary criticism 
is  explained  by  Christopher  Johnson  who  states  that:  “Though  the  literary  critical  conscription  of 
‘écriture’  has  no  doubt  been  of  specific  strategic  use  within  the  field  of  literary  criticism  itself,  an 
unfortunate corollary of this conscription has been a refusal on the part of many philosophers to regard 
Derrida’s work as serious philosophy. The fact that Derrida’s own difficult style, combined with  the 
modality of the initial assimilation of his work into academic institutions in Britain and the United States   105 
                                                                                                                                              
(via literary studies), has led to a number of misinterpretations of his philosophy. It has been variously 
construed  as  destructive  criticism,  a  philosophy  of  nihilism,  or  a  theory  of  infinite  polysemy,  and 
Derrida’s reputation with philosophers has accordingly suffered” (1993:9). Rudolphe Gasché highlights 
the way in which the misuse of deconstruction ostensibly ignores the lessons in Derrida’s approach by 
failing  to  acknowledge  the  ontological  origins  of  his  neologisms,  arguing  that:  “In  fact,  the 
unproblematized application of borrowed tools to the analysis of literary texts already proves the affinity 
of deconstructive and traditional criticism. Indeed, the newly fashionable a-theoretical stand which in the 
present configuration pretends to come to the rescue of literary, aesthetic, and ethical values is by its very 
definition not only violently theoretical, but this hypocritical innocence in matter of theory stems from its 
blindness and an ignorance of its own presuppositions that are in the end all dependent on various extra-
literary  disciplines  such  as  psychology,  history,  and  philosophical  aesthetics.  The  origins  of  these 
disciplines in nineteenth-century philosophy are never admitted or made explicit” (1979:179). 
36 In this extended footnote we observe the tendency of Derrida’s critics to rely on secondary sources, and 
see Habermas doing so when conflating Derrida’s philosophy with literary criticism: “Jonathan Culler 
recalls the strategic meaning of Derrida’s treatment of philosophical texts through literary criticism in 
order to suggest that, in turn, literary criticism treat literary texts also as philosophical texts” (1987:192). 
Howells, picks up on Habermas’ perfunctory dismissal of Derrida: “If Derrida seems inimical at first 
reading, it is much easier to dismiss him than to spend the immense amount of time required to learn to 
read and understand him. Hence even competent theorists like Habermas will resort to expository texts 
such as this one, or Culler’s, and attack them instead of the original […] because they are more interested 
in their own arguments than in the correctness of their reading of others. Misrepresentation of this kind 
probably  occurs  on  a  large  scale  all  the  time,  but  it  is  rarely  analysed  and  responded  to  with  such 
brilliance and scholarship as Derrida seems to be able to muster at any moment. Derrida’s intelligence is 
formidable: this is why it is vital to read and understand him, not merely dismiss him as obscurantist” 
(1999:71). In an example of his clever critical responses Derrida takes a sly swipe at Habermas in ‘An 
Interview with Derrida,’ from Le nouvel observateur, indicating that it is  incorrect  to carry out such 
critical reductions of his work, and implying that his texts are illusive because so too is language: 
“N.O.:  In  sum,  then,  to  read  you,  one  must  have  some  notion  not  only  of  philosophy,  but  also  of 
psychoanalysis, literature, history, linguistics, or the history of painting … 
J.D.: Above all, there is the potential movement of one text through others, and whether one wishes it or 
not, this is necessary — its a kind of chemistry, so to speak … 
N.O.: To read you, one must have read Derrida … 
J.D.: But that’s true for everyone! It is unwarranted to consider a course previously taken, a writing which 
is gradually confirmed itself, at least in part? How could one do otherwise? Nonetheless, it is interesting 
to  undo,  to  disconfirm.  I  also  try  to  begin,  again,  from  the  often  difficult  and  dangerous  notion  of 
simplicity …” (1988:72). 
37 ‘A footnote on a footnote on ‘Signature, Event, Context:’’ A prime example of the loss of Derrida’s 
playfulness  is  seen  in  Alan  Bass’  translation  of  ‘Signature,  Event,  Context,’  wherein  we  find  the 
following  quizzical  statement:  “To  conclude  this  very  dry  discourse,”  accompanied  by  Footnote  15, 
reading: “TN. [Translator’s Note] Derrida’s word here is sec, combing the initial letter of the three words 
that form his title, signature, event, context” (1972:329). Of course the fact that sec is French for dry and 
an acronym for Derrida’s text does not translate playfully and require Bass’ footnote to become apparent 
indicating the ‘double play’ involved in any translation. 
38 Two examples of this tendency to conflate Derrida and postmodernism can be seen firstly in Steven 
Connor’s Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction To Theories of the Contemporary wherein he describes 
Derrida’s Glas as having: “been taken as the object- or limit-text of postmodern criticism” (1989:215-
216). And secondly by John Sturrock who deliberately avoids labelling Derrida a deconstructionist — 
seemingly to advance his own deterministic thesis regarding Derrida as the father of post-structuralism — 
stating  that:  “Derrida  came  to  prominence  in  the  late  1960s,  when  Structuralism  was  very  much  an 
intellectual fashion in France […] I choose here to consider Derrida as a post-Structuralist rather than by 
the alternative name of ‘deconstructionist,’ by which both he and his followers have tended to be called, 
because of the description of ‘post-Structuralism’ preserves within it the close relation to Structuralism on 
which Derrida depends for many of his effects. Post-Structuralism is not ‘post’ in the sense of having 
killed  Structuralism  off,  it  is  ‘post’  only  in  the  sense  of  coming  after  and  of  seeking  to  extend 
Structuralism in its rightful direction” (1986:136-37). 
39 This concern regarding an apparent lack of content and certitude in Derrida’s work can even be seen in 
Newton Garver’s ‘Preface’ to Speech and Phenomena: “The other worrisome aspect of the present work 
is the uncertainty about how Derrida views logic, knowledge, and philosophy […] Derrida gives us few 
hints, if any, as to how he will deal with this problem. In this respect there is a sharp contrast between 
Derrida and Wittgenstein, especially when we remember that in its wider implications the problem about 
logic  includes  the  question  whether  we  can  ever  really  know  anything  […]  One  hopes  that  Derrida,   106 
                                                                                                                                              
having helped to shatter the reign of epistemology over our conception of language and metaphysics, will 
one day return to this problem” (1996:xxvii). 
40 Howells explains the negative reception of deconstruction, and, in line with this thesis, takes a positive 
view of Derrida’s work, if one postulates the defamiliarisation of conceptual orders, and the impact this 
could have on the subject: “Deconstruction does arouse intense fear and hostility among many liberal or 
conservative thinkers precisely because  it pulls  the carpet out from under their feet: it questions the 
comfortable assumptions of common sense, and replaces them with the questions themselves, rather than 
a new set of answers; it dismantles the liberal consensus, shows up its illogicalities and simplifications, 
but it puts no new ideology in its place; indeed, it argues that there is no firm ground or foundation to our 
most cherished preconceptions. Derrida, and perhaps you and I, may find this exciting and liberating, we 
may delight in the attempt to found an ethics and politics in the shifting sands of a subject which is an 
effect not a cause, but the accusations of nihilism, however misplaced, are hardly surprising” (1999:142). 
41  For  a  full  account  of  these  accusations  see  Jürgen  Habermas’  ‘Excursus  on  Leveling  the  Genre 
Distinction  between  Philosophy  and  Literature,’  in  which  he  constantly  conflates  deconstruction  and 
literary criticism arguing against Derrida’s apparent ‘genre levelling.’ 
42 This view is expanded by Howells: “It means that philosophical texts are subject to the same kind of 
analysis as literary ones; to some eyes this may look suspiciously like treating the philosophical texts as if 
it were literature, but this suspicion is based on the assumption that philosophy is ‘above’ questions of its 
language” (1999:72). As such, it becomes apparent that many criticisms levelled at Derrida result from an 
inability to come to grips with his work, highlighting the impossibility of escaping ontological aspects of 
Western metaphysics, such as definitive genre boundaries. 
43 For an overview Nicholas Royle outlines a list of Derrida’s literary interests ranging temporally from 
Rousseau to Coetzee. (2003:87). 
44 Jonathan Culler carries out a critique of Derrida and deconstruction and uses the selfsame metaphorical 
style  of  writing  apparently  completely  unaware  of  the  irony:  “deconstruction’s  procedure  is  called 
‘sawing off the branch on which one is sitting.’ This may be, in fact, an apt description of the activity, for 
though it is unusual and somewhat risky, it is manifestly something one can attempt. One can and may 
continue to sit on a branch while sawing it. There is no physical or moral obstacle if one is willing to risk 
the consequences. The question then becomes whether one will succeed in sawing it clear through, and 
where  and  how  one  might  land.  A  difficult  question:  to  answer  one  would  need  a  comprehensive 
understanding of the entire situation — the resilience of the support, the efficacy of one’s tools, the shape 
of the terrain — and an ability to predict accurately the consequences of one’s work. If [this] seems 
foolhardy to men of common sense, it is not so for Nietzsche, Freud, Heidegger, and Derrida; for they 
suspect that if they fall there is no ‘ground’ to hit and that the most clear-sighted act may be a certain 
reckless sawing, calculated dismemberment or deconstruction of the great cathedral-like tree in which 
Man has taken shelter for millennia” (1993:149). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Nihilism, Existentialism, Absurdism and the Diminished Subject — 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus 
 
 
3.1.a. Friedrich Nietzsche and The Death of Metaphysics 
 
In  keeping  with  the  increased  literary  focus  of  this  thesis,  the  work  of  Friedrich 
Nietzsche can be seen to exemplify the manner in which various forms of writing, such 
as aphorisms, poetry and literature, can be read as valid explorations of the recurring 
crises  of  philosophy,  culture  and  subjectivity.  Furthermore,  despite  the  controversy 
regarding his oeuvre, and the tendency for a continued misunderstanding of his key 
ideas  due  to  inaccurate  translations  and  the  misappropriation  of  some  of  his  more 
extreme ideas, his influence on succeeding theorists cannot be underestimated. With this 
in mind I will attempt to address these issues and highlight within his work a prescient 
expectation of the proposition of the a priori aporia of the diminished subject, while 
trying  to  avoid  the  inherent  trap  of  context  free  misquotation  given  his  metaphoric 
writing style. Once again this necessitates the deliberate choice of certain key themes 
that  support  my  proposition,  and  for  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  I  shall  focus  on 
Nietzsche’s  ‘mature’  works  beginning  with  the  aphoristic  Human,  All  Too  Human 
(1878) ending with the autobiographical Ecce Homo (1888). In doing so I shall pay 
specific attention to his attack on the metaphysical traditions of philosophy and religion 
— or what he refers to as the ‘Will to Truth’ — the resultant defamiliarisation of the 
self-present subject in favour of the ‘free spirit’ or ‘overman,’ and the manner in which 
his writing style, its content, and its reception, illustrate the problematic and arbitrary 
nature of language and the ontological tradition.  
 
3.1.b. The Antichrist, Ressentiment, ‘The Will to Truth’ and the restricted subject 
 
The predilection of strength for questions for which no one today has the courage; 
the courage for the forbidden; the predestination to the labyrinth […] New ears for 
new music. New eyes for what is most distant. A new conscience for truths that have   108 
so far remained mute. And the will to the economy of the great style: keeping our 
strength,  our  enthusiasm  in  harness.  Reverence  for  oneself;  love  of  oneself; 
unconditional freedom before oneself. Well then! Such men alone are my readers, 
my right readers, my predestined readers: what matter the rest? The rest — that is 
merely mankind. One must be above mankind in strength, in loftiness of soul — in 
contempt. 
 — Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Preface’ to The Antichrist (1954:568-69). 
 
In keeping with this discussion of the diminished subject, Nietzsche’s perception of a 
crisis  in  culture  and  subjectivity  —  or  ‘mankind’  —  as  the  raison  d’être  for  his 
philosophical investigations, continues this thematic, especially given that a view of the 
‘eternal recurrence’ of such crises is replete in his writing. However, the manner in 
which  he  set  about  addressing  the  issues  of  his  day  are  quite  spectacular,  and 
particularly  controversial,  given  that  his  attack  on  oppressive  discourses,  and  the 
limiting  self-regulation  of  subjectivity,  continues  to  reverberate  through  to 
contemporary ‘postmodern’ culture. In her ‘Introduction’ to Beyond Good and Evil, 
Helen Zimmerman indicates the extent of these crises, stating that: “In the increasingly 
prosperous,  complacent,  and  mechanized  atmosphere  of  the  late-nineteenth-century 
Europe, Nietzsche railed against what he saw as the slide of Western culture into a 
morass  of  conformity,  mediocrity,  and  bureaucratic  specialization  that  stifled  man’s 
higher creative impulses” (1997:vi-vii). Moreover, she indicates that for Nietzsche the 
greatest threat to mankind was Christian morality, explaining that in his view it:  
[B]reeds a timorous retreat from life by postponing happiness and redemption to the 
next  world.  According  to  Nietzsche,  this  abnegation  of  the  self  in  service  of  an 
abstract ideal […] suppresses the healthiest and most primal human instinct: the will 
to power, the lonely quest for mastery of life’s difficulties, the indefatigable striving 
that disdains the deadening narcotics of traditional morality and mass conformism 
(vii). 
 
That is, for Nietzsche the predominance of metaphysical morality led to an abstinence 
of experience in favour of the redemption of the hereafter, leading him to identify with 
the Dionysian
1 character of Greek tragedy that affirmed life through the acceptance of 
suffering  and  the  endangerment  of  the  self,  rather  than  remaining  subservient  to 
metaphysical doctrines.     109 
  That subjectivity was being stifled both creatively and experientially by the blind 
acceptance of intangible metaphysical beliefs was to become one of the key focuses of 
Nietzsche’s  work,  and  his  view  that  Christian  ascetic  morality  was  predominantly 
responsible for this acquiescence and conformity of experience led to some of his most 
infamous, yet influential proclamations. However, his view of the crisis of subjectivity 
was not limited to Christian metaphysics but also to religious philosophy, explaining his 
disdain  for  this  ‘remnant  of  Philosophy’  in  Beyond  Good  and  Evil  stating  that: 
“Philosophy reduced to ‘theory of knowledge,’ actually no more than a timid epochism 
and abstinence doctrine: a philosophy that does not even get over the threshold and 
painfully denies itself the right of entry — that is philosophy at its last gasp, an end, an 
agony, something that arouses pity. How could such a philosophy — rule!” (1977:42). 
That is, this apparent crisis of subjectivity was the result of a desire for metaphysical 
certitude — what he referred to as ‘The Will to Truth’ — whereby philosophy become 
merely an arm of Christianity, embellishing and reinforcing the nihilistic doctrines of 
ascetic morality, and a belief in the transcendental self-present subject at the expense of 
the continued positive development of ‘mankind.’
2  
  Having arrived at the conclusion that the subject of his day was suffering from a 
crisis brought about by a nihilistic perspective of subjectivity based on the deferment of 
existence  in  favour  of  redemption,  Nietzsche  set  about  attacking  the  institution  he 
believed  was  most  responsible  for  mankind’s  frustrations.  He  believed  that  by 
embracing the meaninglessness suffering of existence the subject could overcome the 
crises which afflicted it instead of wallowing in nihilistic fear, arguing that the Christian 
Church had commandeered this negative, yet a priori, aspect of being for its own ends. 
He explains in On The Genealogy of Morals that: 
Apart from the ascetic ideal, man, the animal man, hitherto had no meaning. His 
existence on earth contained no goal; ‘why man at all?’ — was a question without an 
answer; the will for man and earth was lacking; behind every great human destiny 
there resounded as a refrain an even greater ‘In vain!’ That is the meaning of the   110 
ascetic ideal: that something was lacking, that a tremendous chasm surrounded man 
— he did not know how to justify, to explain, to affirm himself, he suffered from the 
problem  of  his  meaning.  He  also  suffered  otherwise,  he  was  essentially  a  sickly 
animal: but it was not suffering itself that was his problem, it was a lack of an answer 
to  the  crying  question  ‘Why  suffering?  […]  The  meaningless  of  suffering,  not 
suffering itself, was the curse which hitherto lay over mankind — and the ascetic 
ideal gave it meaning! (1977:162). 
 
Arising  from  this  meaningless  suffering  came  a  resentment  towards  life  which  was 
directed away from the dominant social discourses and back onto the individual in a 
process of Ressentiment. Nietzsche proposed that this was a way of managing ‘good’ 
and the ‘evil’ whereby the potential ‘evildoer’ was forced to internalise their frustration: 
“‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’ — thus thinks every sickly sheep. But his 
shepherd, the ascetic priest, tells him: ‘Quite so, my sheep!  Someone must be to blame 
for it’ […] you alone are to blame for yourself! — This is brazen and false enough: but 
one thing at least is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered […] to render 
the sick to a certain degree harmless, to work the self-destruction of the incurable, to 
direct the ressentiment of the less afflicted sternly back upon themselves […] and in this 
way to exploit the bad instincts of all sufferers for the purpose of self-discipline, self-
surveillance,  and  self-overcoming”  (1989:128).  Thus,  the  ascetic  ideal  utilises  the 
frustration of the a priori meaninglessness of existence as a form of social and moral 
control, replacing the terror of being with the promise of redemption in the afterlife.
3   
  Needless to say, his attack on Christianity caused consternation and outrage, yet 
as Walter Kaufmann explains in his ‘Introduction’ to the Genealogy, for Nietzsche: 
“Resentment is reprehensible, but so is the failure to engage in the fight against infamy. 
It is only when the infamy to be crushed turns out to be Christianity that most readers 
recoil. But Nietzsche’s attack, of course, depends on his concept of Christianity and — 
as he himself insists — cannot be understood at all except as part of his campaign 
against resentment” (1989:208). That is, rather than simply carrying out an attack on 
ascetic morality, Nietzsche attempts to destroy the metaphysics of the ‘Will to Truth’ —   111 
in a process of defamiliarisation akin to deconstruction — and create an awareness of 
the arbitrary limitations placed on the subject with his vitriolic diatribes. Without doubt 
the most controversial of Nietzsche’s attacks came with his proclamation that ‘God is 
dead.’ However, in his ‘Preface’ to Human, All Too Human, he indicates that this view 
was less about a nihilistic desire for the end of all morals, but rather an attempt to shift 
the focus of philosophy away from the purely metaphysical and onto tangible physical 
experience, stating that: 
‘What’s that? Everything is only — human, all too human?’ With such a sigh one 
comes from my writings, they say, with a kind of wariness and distrust even toward 
morality, indeed tempted and encouraged in no small way to become the spokesman 
for the worst things: might they perhaps be only the best slandered? My writings 
have been called a School for Suspicion, even more for Contempt, fortunately also 
for Courage and, in fact, for Daring. Truly, I myself do not believe that anyone has 
ever looked into the world with such deep suspicion, and not only as an occasional 
devil’s advocate, but every bit as much, to speak theologically, as an enemy and 
challenger of God (1994:4).  
 
That is, in order to question metaphysics one must necessarily doubt the existence of 
God,  and  in  The  Antichrist  he  extrapolates  this  explaining  that:  “The  Christian 
conception of God […] is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God arrived at on 
Earth  […]  God  degenerated  to  the  contradiction  of  life,  instead  of  being  its 
transfiguration and eternal Yes! In God a declaration of hostility towards life, nature, the 
will to life! God the formula for every calumny of ‘this world,’ for every lie about ‘the 
next world!’ In God nothingness defied, the will to nothingness sanctified!” (1977:187). 
Thus, for Nietzsche, the irony of the self-regulation of ascetic morality reaches its nadir, 
for if one accepts that a belief in God is metaphysical then, ipso facto, one defers the 
truth  of  the  meaninglessness  of  human  existence  for  the  hope  of  redemption,  or 
‘nothingness.’  Therefore,  Nietzsche’s  anti-metaphysical  position  was  geared  toward 
destroying  the  ideals  and  idols  that  restrict  the  creative  development  of  the  subject 
through an a priori belief in nothing.   112 
  With this view we appreciate that Nietzsche’s vitriolic propositions diminish the 
security  of  the  pure  self-present  subject  of  religious  belief  and  transcendental 
philosophy, for as he explains in The Antichrist: 
When one places life’s center of gravity not in the life but in the ‘beyond’ — in 
nothingness — one deprives life of its center of gravity altogether. The great lie of 
personal immortality destroys all reason, everything natural in the instincts […] That 
everyone as an ‘immortal soul’ has equal rank with everyone else, that in the totality 
of  living  beings  the  ‘salvation’  of  every  single  individual  may  claim  eternal 
significance, that little prigs and three-quarter madman may have the conceit that the 
laws of nature are constantly broken for their sakes — such an intensification of 
every kind of selfishness into the infinite, into the impertinent, cannot be branded 
with too much contempt (1954:618-9).  
 
Thus, Nietzsche argues that the Christian subject has no factual basis, leaving it alone 
and faced with being ‘human, all too human,’ and embracing the meaninglessness of 
existence, although we shall see that rather than viewing the subject free of metaphysics 
in negative terms, Nietzsche had a far more optimistic outlook. 
  The awareness that his undertaking acted as a break with the tradition of ascetic 
moral  belief  and  metaphysical  philosophy  was  not  lost  on  the  somewhat  immodest 
Nietzsche, who explained in the Genealogy: “Let us articulate this new demand: we 
need a critique of moral values, the values of these values themselves must be called 
into  question  —  and  for  that  there  is  needed  a  knowledge  of  the  conditions  and 
circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed (morality as 
consequence, as symptom, as mask, as tartufferie, as illness, as misunderstanding; but 
also morality as a cause, as a remedy, as stimulant, as restraint, as poison), a knowledge 
of a kind that has never existed or even been  desired” (1989:20). That Nietzsche’s 
approach  can  be  seen  as  a  form  of  proto-deconstruction  that  marked  a  break  with 
tradition cannot be doubted, with many of his key ideas expanded by Heidegger and 
Derrida, while his genealogical method was used by Foucault. However, despite his 
desire to deconstruct a priori beliefs, he also recognised the danger of substituting his 
own metaphysical ideals, something he makes apparent in the Genealogy, when he asks:   113 
‘What are you really doing, erecting an ideal or knocking one down?’ I may perhaps 
be asked. But have you ever asked yourselves sufficiently how much the erection of 
every ideal on earth has cost? How much reality has had to be misunderstood and 
slandered,  how  many  lies  have  had  to  be  sanctified,  how  many  consciences 
disturbed, how much ‘God’ sacrificed every time? If a temple is to be erected a 
temple must be destroyed: that is the law — let anyone who can show me a case in 
which it is not fulfilled! (95).  
 
That is, Nietzsche’s attempt to defamiliarise the monolithic metaphysical assumptions 
of his day were guarded, and his ideas speculative rather than ideal. This fantastical 
desire to postulate rather than dictate can be seen in ‘Aphorism 52’ of Human, All Too 
Human, entitled ‘The cyclops of culture’ wherein he argues that: “When we behold 
those deeply-furrowed hollows in which glaciers have lain, we think it hardly possible 
that a time will come when a wooded, grassy valley, watered by streams, will spread 
itself out upon the same spot. So it is, too, in the history of mankind: the most savage 
forces beat a path, and are mainly destructive; but their work was nonetheless necessary, 
in order that later a gentler civilization might raise its house. The frightful energies — 
those  which  are  called  evil  —  are  those  cyclopean  architects  and  road-makers  of 
humanity” (1977:80). Therefore, despite an overwhelming desire to destroy the tradition 
of the ‘Will to Truth’ Nietzsche did so without an ideal outcome, this ‘deconstruction’ 
was not carried out in order to replace any given metaphysical idea with an ideal or idol 
of his own, but rather — much like the inhospitable glacial valley — to simply see what 
would arise from its destruction. 
 
3.1.c. Free Spirits, Overman and Úbermensch  — The Terror of Freedom 
 
And now, after having been thus under way for a long time, we argonauts of the 
ideal, braver perhaps than is prudent and often enough shipwrecked and come to 
grief  but,  as  said,  healthier  than  others  would  like  us  to  be,  dangerous  healthy, 
healthy  again  and  again  —  it  seems  to  us  as  if  we  have,  as  a  reward,  a  yet 
undiscovered  country  before  us  whose  boundaries  none  have  ever  seen,  a  land 
beyond all known lands and corners of the ideal, a world so over-full of the beautiful, 
strange,  questionable,  terrible  and  divine  that  our  curiosity  and  our  thirst  for 
possession are both besides themselves — so that nothing can any longer satisfy us! 
How,  after  such  prospects  and  with  such  a  ravenous  hunger  in  conscience  and 
knowledge, could we remain content with the man of the present?  
— Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Aphorism 382’ in The Gay Science (1977:210).   114 
 
Having outlined Nietzsche’s defamiliarisation of the metaphysics of ascetic morality, it 
is  important  to  note  that  he  was  particularly  scathing  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
philosophical tradition had created an artificial perspective of the subject as fixed and 
stable, explaining in Twilight of the Idols that: “They think that they show their respect 
for a subject when they de-historicize it, sub specie aeterni — when they turn it into a 
mummy. All that philosophers have handled for thousands of years have been concept-
mummies: nothing real escapes their grasp alive. When these honorable idolators of 
concepts worship something, they kill and stuff it; they threaten the life of everything 
they worship. Death, change, old-age, as well as procreation and growth, are to their 
minds  objections  —  even  refutations”  (1954:479).  As  already  seen  with  the 
transcendental  subject  of  Christianity,  Nietzsche  viewed  the  self-present  subject  of 
philosophy as a conceptual artifice that had been ‘embalmed,’ thus ‘burying’ possible 
alternative expressions of subjectivity to those of dominant cultural discourses. 
  That Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical perspective of subjectivity was influenced by 
the more radical scientific thinkers of his day such as Charles Darwin, is explained by 
R.J. Hollingdale, in his ‘Introduction’ to A Nietzsche Reader:  
I see his distinctive contribution to European thought to lie in his perception that 
Western man was facing a radical change in his relationship with ‘truth:’ a change 
that would come about when he recognized that the metaphysical, religious, moral 
and rational truths which were formerly both backbone and substance of the Western 
tradition were in fact errors. This conclusion is, or will be, a consequence of the 
pretensions of such truths to absoluteness, a pretension which is being undercut by 
the  evolutionism  of  Hegel  and  Darwin.  Modern  man  is  acquiring  the  idea  of 
‘becoming’ as his ruling idea: and if everything evolves, then ‘truth,’ too, evolves — 
so  that,  if  ‘truth’  is  synonymous  with  absolute  truth  true  for  all  time  and  for 
everybody, a loss of belief in the truth of truth is on the way. ‘Everything evolves’ 
will come to mean ‘nothing is true’ (1977:9). 
 
Although,  the  idea  that  ‘nothing  is  true’  has  taken  on  a  life  of  its  own  and  tarred 
Nietzsche with the brush of anti-humanism and nihilism, it is apparent that once he 
destroyed the God of metaphysics, the conceptual base of the philosophy needed to be 
called into question.
4 In ‘Aphorism 16’ of Human, All Too Human, he explains that this   115 
dependence on metaphysics has allowed philosophers and logicians to: “overlook the 
possibility that that painting [sic] — that which to us men means life and experience — 
has gradually evolved, indeed is still evolving, and therefore should not be considered a 
fixed quantity, on which basis a conclusion about the creator (the sufficient reason) may 
be made, or even rejected” (1994:23). That is, rather than seeing the subject as fixed in 
time and space, suffocated by the concepts of philosophy and the nihilism of ascetic 
moral law, Nietzsche indicates that this seemingly a priori truth is in fact an error, that 
when recognised empowers and emancipates the subject. 
  Therefore, although he ‘paints’ a positive picture of the non-present subject free 
of metaphysics, it still remains vulnerable to the condition of the possibility of change, 
yet despite claims to the contrary Nietzsche once again resisted the temptation to create 
an  ideal  metaphysical  outcome  from  this  new  perspective  of  an  evolving  subject. 
Instead,  he  continued  to  postulate  rather  than  predict,  a  tendency  made  clear  in 
‘Aphorism 638’‘The wanderer’— the very last of Human, All Too Human:  
He who has come only in part to a freedom of reason cannot feel on earth otherwise 
than as a wanderer — though not as a traveler towards a final goal, for this does not 
exist. But he does want to observe, and keep his eye open for everything that actually 
occurs  in  the  world;  therefore  he  must  not  attach  his  heart  too  firmly  to  any 
individual thing; there must be something wandering within him, which takes its joy 
in change and transitoriness (1994:266-7).  
 
That the joy of the freedom from metaphysics is so palpable in Nietzsche’s writing is 
ironic when one considers his links to the so-called ‘postmodern crisis,’ and given that 
his attack was born from a perceived pre-modernist crisis! He explains this joy in The 
Gay Science stating that: “We philosophers and ‘free spirits’ in fact feel at the news that 
the  ‘old  God  is  dead’  as  if  illuminated  by  a  new  dawn;  our  heart  overflows  with 
gratitude, astonishment, presentiment, expectation — at last the horizon seems to us 
again free, even if it is not too bright, at last our ships can be put out again, no matter 
what the danger, every daring venture of knowledge is again permitted, the sea, our sea 
again lies there open before us, perhaps there has never yet been such an ‘open sea’”   116 
(1977:209-10). Thus, having indicated the manner that Nietzsche’s attack on traditional 
metaphysics at once diminished and emboldened the subject, I shall now investigate his 
postulated ‘free spirit’ and the controversy surrounding this Úbermensch.  
  Despite Nietzsche’s repeated claims that the subject unshackled from metaphysics 
would be free to explore new horizons and continue to evolve, he was also aware of 
certain conceptual and contextual limitations to this development. Furthermore, in line 
with his interest in evolutionary theory, at no time did he posit a metaphysical endpoint 
for this new subject, although this did not prevent him investigating certain fantastical 
possible outcomes of the terror of freedom. Given the deterioration of his mental health 
— possibly as a result of syphilis — it is no surprise that Nietzsche’s postulations took 
on a certain grandiose nature, something that was not lost on subsequent readers. In 
Human, All Too Human, he brings forth the concept of the ‘free spirit,’ an idea that he 
would  continue  to  develop  as  the  ‘higher  man,’  ‘overman’  and  ‘Úbermensch,’ 
explaining in Ecce Homo that:  
Human, All-Too-Human is the monument of a crisis. It is subtitled ‘A Book for Free 
Spirits:’ Almost every sentence marks some victory — here I liberated myself from 
what in my nature did not belong to me. Idealism, for example; the title means: 
‘where you see ideal things, I see what it is — human, alas, all-too-human’ — I 
know man better. The term ‘free spirit’ here is not to be understood in any other 
sense; it means a spirit that has become free, that has again taken possession of itself 
(1989:283).  
 
Despite coining the term ‘free spirit’ Nietzsche is at pains to distance himself from 
metaphysical ideals indicating that it is in fact metaphysics that the spirit must escape.
5 
Furthermore,  this  crisis  was  not  limited  to  the  subject  of  ascetic  moral  laws  and 
metaphysical  philosophy  it  also  represents  Nietzsche’s  famous  break  with  his  idol, 
composer Richard Wagner, and the limitations of the philosophical tradition following 
his  resignation  from  Basel  University  due  to  ill  health.  Therefore,  the  ‘free  spirit’ 
contextually represents the freedom Nietzsche achieved by distancing himself from the 
unpalatable anti-Semitic nationalism of Wagner, and the dominant dictates of accepted   117 
philosophical discourse.
6 Thus, it is with certain irony — given Nietzsche’s repeated 
denunciation of metaphysics — that his ideas soon became the ideals of many, and the 
‘free spirit’ a popularised idol and an apparent evolutionary certainty.  
  In his ‘Introduction’ to Ecce Homo, Walter Kaufmann explains that this irony was 
not lost on Nietzsche  stating that  we: “hear the anguished cry of one who  sees — 
foresees — himself mistaken for a writer he is not: for an apostle of military power and 
empire,  a  nationalist,  and  even  a  racist.  In  order  to  define  himself  emphatically, 
Nietzsche underlines (too often) and shrieks — to no avail. Those who construe the 
overman in evolutionary terms he calls ‘oxen’ — in vain” (1989:206). That is, despite 
repeated protestations, Nietzsche’s idea of the ‘free spirit’ quickly became viewed as a 
metaphysical ideal, yet he explains in Human, All Too Human that this is a ‘relative 
concept,’
7 and in the Genealogy questions if this new subject is “even possible today” 
(1989:96), going on to explain the hypothetical nature of the concept stating: 
But some day, in a stronger age than this decaying, self-doubting present, he must 
yet come to us, the redeeming man of great love and contempt, the creative spirit 
whose compelling strength will not let him rest in any aloofness or any beyond, 
whose isolation is misunderstood by the people as if it were a flight from reality — 
while it is only his absorption, immersion, penetration into reality, so that, when he 
one day emerges again into the light, he may bring home the redemption of this 
reality: its redemption from the curse that the hitherto reigning ideal has lain upon it. 
This man of the future, who will redeem us not only from the hitherto reigning ideal 
but also from that which was bound to grow out of it, the great nausea, the will to 
nothingness, nihilism; this bell-stroke of noon and of the great decision that liberates 
the will again and restores its goal to the earth and his hope to man; this Antichrist 
and antinihilist; this victor over God and nothingness — he must come one day (96). 
 
As such, Nietzsche shows great prescience when repeatedly arguing that the ‘free spirit’ 
was merely conceptual and not a metaphysical certitude, indicating that he was aware 
that the tendency to embrace new ideal and idols would not be overcome quickly, and 
probably not in his own time. Thus, he continued to distance himself from metaphysics 
despite acknowledging that his work would likely be subsumed by determinism as a 
result of context free quotation, a view of his aphorisms as free standing, and as we 
shall see, due to the conceptual limitations of an inherited philosophical tradition.   118 
  Although Nietzsche was consistent in his attack on metaphysics, his perspective 
was one based more on defamiliarisation rather than destruction — that in many ways 
represents  a  form  of  proto-deconstruction  —  and  included  an  awareness  of  the 
difficulties  in  escaping  those  metaphysical  concepts  deeply  entrenched  in  everyday 
language.  In  The  Twilight  of  the  Idols  he  indicates  the  limitations  of  both  the 
‘hermeneutic  circle’  and  the  ‘metaphysics  of  language’  stating  that:  “‘Reason’  in 
language — oh, what an old deceptive female she is! I am afraid we are not rid of God 
because we still have faith in grammar” (1954:483). While in his Assorted Opinions and 
Maxims — the first supplement to Human, All Too Human — he arrived at the startling 
conclusion that rather than destroying the tradition of metaphysical philosophy it still 
retained value, stating in the ‘Error of philosophers,’ that: “The philosopher believes 
that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the building: posterity discovers it 
in the bricks with which he built and which are then often used again for better building: 
in fact, that is to say, that that [sic] the building can be destroyed and nonetheless posses 
value as material” (1977:33). Thus, showing an awareness normally associated with 
contemporary philosophical theory, Nietzsche indicates the impossibility of escaping 
the ontology of metaphysics,
8 seeing such concepts as necessary tools for his attack on 
this arbitrary tradition and for the further development of the subject, for if one destroys 
a temple one need not necessarily use the materials to build another! 
  The difficulties faced in overcoming metaphysics were not simply confined to the 
rational  in  the  form  of  conceptual  and  linguistic  constraints,  but  also  included  the 
irrational regression of the ‘free spirit’ with the realisation of the terror of freedom and 
the meaninglessness of existence. He explains this in ‘New struggles,’ ‘Aphorism 108’ 
of The Gay Science, announcing that: “After Buddha was dead, his shadow was for 
centuries still pointed out in a cave — an immense, frightful shadow. God is dead: but, 
men being what they are, perhaps there will for millennia still be caves in which his   119 
shadow  is  pointed  out.  —  And  we  —  we  still  have  to  conquer  his  shadow  too!” 
(1977:206-7). That is, despite proclaiming the death of God, he believed it likely that 
this  tradition  of  worship  and  idolatry  would  be  hard  to  vanquish.  Furthermore,  in 
Human, All Too Human, we see the newly released ‘free spirit’ falling into old habits 
wherein ‘Aphorism 99,’ entitled ‘Art makes the thinker’s heart heavy,’ he states: 
How strong the metaphysical need is, and how hard nature makes it to bid it a final 
farewell, can be seen from the fact that even when the free spirit has divested himself 
of everything metaphysical the highest effects of art can easily set the metaphysical 
strings, which have long been silent or indeed snapped apart, vibrating in sympathy. 
[…] If he becomes aware of being in this condition he feels a profound stab in the 
heart and sighs for the man who will lead him back to his lost love, whether she be 
called religion or metaphysics. It is in such moments that his intellectual probity is 
put to the test (1977:126).  
 
That is, the metaphysical abounds in art as in all culture, and faced with the terror of 
existence even the ‘free spirit’ will pine for the security of the metaphysics of comfort 
in a manner not unlike certain responses to the apparent ‘postmodern condition.’  
 
3.1.d. Misrepresenting Nietzsche — Language, literature and philosophy 
 
Language as a putative science. — The significance of language for the evolution of 
culture lies in this, that mankind set up in language a separate world beside the other 
world, a place it took to be so firmly set that, standing upon it, it could lift the rest of 
the world off its hinges and make itself master of it. To the extent that man has for 
long ages believed in the concepts and names of things as in aeternae veritates he 
has appropriated to himself that pride by which he raised himself above the animal: 
he really thought that in language he possessed knowledge of the world. The sculptor 
of  language  was  not  so  modest  as  to  believe  that  he  was  only  giving  things 
designations,  he  conceived  rather  that  with  words  he  was  expressing  supreme 
knowledge  of  things;  language  is,  in  fact,  the  first  stage  of  the  occupation  with 
science. Here, too, it is the belief that the truth has been found out of which the 
mightiest sources of energies have flowed. Very much subsequently […] it dawns on 
men that in their belief in language they have propagated a tremendous error. 
— Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Aphorism 11’ in Human, All Too Human (1977:55-56). 
 
Having explored the manner in which Nietzsche diminished the ideal metaphysical self-
present  subject,  I  shall  discuss  how  his  particular  writing  style  blurred  the  ago-old 
distinctions between the literary and the philosophical. Having freed himself from the 
restrictive  environment  of  Basel  University,  Nietzsche  fully  embraced  an  aphoristic 
form  of  writing,  explaining  in  his  ‘Preface’  to  the  Genealogy  that:  “An  aphorism,   120 
properly stamped and moulded, has not been ‘deciphered’ when it has simply been read; 
one has then rather to begin its exegesis, for which is required an art of exegesis. […] 
To be sure, to practise reading as an art in this fashion one thing above all is needed, 
precisely the thing which has nowadays been most thoroughly unlearned — and that is 
why it will be some time before my writings are ‘readable’ — a thing for which one 
must be almost a cow and in any event not a ‘modern man:’ rumination” (1977:20). 
Thus, for Nietzsche the aphorism was, to begin with at least, the perfect medium for his 
anti-metaphysical perspective, for much like  Barthes’ ‘readerly text’ it was open to 
interpretation and designed to make the reader ‘ruminate’ as he suggested.  
  Following  the  completion  of  Human,  All Too Human  Nietzsche  expanded  his 
writing style further to include poetry, and in her ‘Introduction’ to that text, Marion 
Faber acknowledges the importance of the literary arguing that although these poems 
are: “flawed as art, they do help to indicate the other fundamental philosophical position 
revealed by Nietzsche’s new style. His blend of verse, pathos, and scientific exposition 
demonstrates  his  rejection  of  the  idea  that  the  work  of  a  philosopher  must  be  to 
construct  a  system  to  explain  the  world.  Unlike  his  predecessors  Kant  and 
Schopenhauer,  Nietzsche  follows  the  fundamental  tenet,  evident  already  here,  that 
‘everything has evolved’ […] that truth — or better, truths — are therefore relative, 
shifting, never absolute. Given this insight, the aphorism, which allows for a loosely 
organized,  shifting  whole  containing  specific  ideas  but  no  iron-clad  explanation  for 
everything, constitutes the style that best represents his philosophy” (1994:xiii-xiv). As 
such, Nietzsche acknowledged that any defamiliarisation of metaphysical philosophy 
would still be constrained by conceptual limitations, and he saw a conjoining of art and 
philosophy as the medium by which to overcome this.  
  The fact that Nietzsche questioned the dominant discourses of his day, yet left the 
reader without the metaphysical certitude they had come to expect, created problems of   121 
its  own.  In  his  ‘Introduction’  to  the  Genealogy  Walter  Kaufmann  explains  that: 
“Nietzsche had an almost pathological weakness for one particular kind of ambiguity, 
which, to be sure, is not irremediable: he loved words and phrases that meant one thing 
out of context and almost the opposite in the context he gives them. He loved language 
as poets do and relished these ‘revaluations.’ All of them involve a double meaning, one 
exoteric and one esoteric, one — to put it crudely — wrong, and the other right. The 
former is bound to lead astray hasty readers, browsers, and that rapidly growing curse of 
our time — the non-readers who do not realize that galloping consumption is a disease” 
(1989:6). If Nietzsche hoped to defamiliarise metaphysical presumptions, and redefine 
the acceptable discourses of philosophical discussion, then he succeeded. However, his 
anti-metaphysical position, non-committal aphoristic approach, and difficult to translate 
word-play, all reiterated the metaphysical arbitrariness of language, something that left 
his  work  open  to  some  not  so  ‘free  spirits’  to  draw  their  own  deterministic  and 
controversial conclusions.
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  Coupled with the obtuse nature of Nietzsche’s aphoristic writing, the fact that his 
works only achieved fame after the onset of insanity simply added to a propensity to 
misinterpret his work. Furthermore, once his sister — who previously gave him little 
encouragement — took charge of his estate and actively promoted his work, he also 
became  vulnerable  to  exploitation.  In  his  ‘Introduction’  to  Ecce  Homo,  Kaufmann 
indicates the irony of this situation stating that: “The first section of the Preface ends: 
‘Above all, do not mistake me for someone else!’ He underlined his cry — but soon his 
sister  imposed  her  exceedingly  unsubtle  notion  of  hero  and  prophet  on  a  mindless 
invalid — and in her sign he triumphed. That was but the beginning. Far worse mischief 
followed.  Nietzsche’s  voice  was  drowned  out  as  misinterpretations  that  he  had 
explicitly repudiated with much wit and malice were accepted and repeated […] until 
most readers knew what to expect before they read Nietzsche, and so read nothing but   122 
what they had long expected” (1989:204). Under the supposed aegis of his sister, both 
Nietzsche  and  his  writing  underwent  an  extreme  ‘make-over,’  being  transformed in 
paper, oil and bronze, from a short and sickly individual into a wildly moustachioed, 
handsomely stern Úbermensch — very much ‘someone else’ indeed! 
  That questionable interpretations of Nietzsche’s works — especially those of the 
Nazis  —  were  the  result  of  his  sister’s  meddling  is  explained  by  Kaufmann: 
“Nietzsche’s sister had mocked her brother’s claims to fame, but then, switching to his 
cause after her husband’s suicide, she took private lessons in Nietzsche’s philosophy 
from  Rudolph  Steiner
10  […]  Soon  Steiner  gave  her  up  as  simply  incapable  of 
understanding  Nietzsche.  Meanwhile  she  became  her  brother’s  official  exegete  and 
biographer, tampered with his letters — and was taken seriously by almost everyone. 
And who was not taken seriously? Even the most unscrupulous Nazi interpretations 
were taken seriously not only inside Germany, but a host of foreign scholars who did 
not  bother  to  check  Nazi  quotations”  (1989:204-5).  That  is,  although  Nietzsche’s 
vehement attacks on all metaphysical conventions saw him take exception to the likes of 
both the Semites and the British people, a close reading of his work finds him equally, if 
not more, critical toward Christianity, Buddhism and German Nationalism, as seen in 
Nietzsche contra Wagner. As Kaufmann explains in The Portable Nietzsche: “no other 
German writer of equal stature has been so thoroughly opposed to all proto-nazism […] 
If  some  Nazi  writers  cited  him  nevertheless,  it  was  at  the  price  of  incredible 
misquotation  and  exegetical  acrobatics,  which  defy  comparison  with  all  the  similar 
devices that Nietzsche himself castigated in the name of the philological conscience” 
(1954:14).  It  is  ironic  that,  despite  his  best  intentions,  and  constant  clarification, 
Nietzsche was transformed into the ideal of a regime with the worst of intentions, and 
out of the Great Depression he emerged as the new idol of nationalistic Germany in the 
form of Nazism. As he cautiously explains in his ‘Preface’ to Ecce Homo: “The last   123 
thing I should promise would be to ‘improve’ mankind. No new idols are erected by 
me; let the old ones learn what feet of clay mean. Overthrowing idols (my word for 
‘ideals’) — that comes closer to being part of my craft. One has deprived reality of its 
value,  its  meaning,  its  truthfulness,  to  precisely  the  extent  to  which  one  has 
mendaciously invented an ideal world” (1989:217-8). Therefore, Nietzsche can be seen 
to best exemplify his own philosophical position, for as the ‘free spirit’ released from 
metaphysics became the worst type of totalitarian ‘mankind,’ he in turn became the 
centre of a new and terrifying form of idolatry in a less than ideal world.
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3.1.e. Nietzsche and Zarathustra — Dangerous literature and Prescience 
 
Dangerous books. — Somebody remarked: ‘I can tell by my own reaction to it that 
this book is harmful.’ But let him only wait and perhaps one day he will admit to 
himself that this same book has done him a great service by bringing out the hidden 
sickness of his heart and making it visible. — Altered opinions do not alter a man’s 
character  (or  do  so  very  little);  but  they  do  illuminate  individual  aspects  of  the 
constellation of his personality which within a different constellation of opinions had 
hitherto remained dark and unrecognizable. 
— Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Aphorism 58’ in Assorted Opinions and Maxims (1977:15). 
 
I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with the memory of something 
tremendous — of a crisis without equal on earth, the most profound collision of 
conscience,  a  decision  that  was  conjured  up  against  everything  that  had  been 
believed, demanded, hallowed so far. I am no man, I am dynamite.  
— Friedrich Nietzsche, from ‘Why I Am destiny’ in Ecce Homo (1989:326).  
 
Finally then, it is apparent that not only does Nietzsche reiterate the proposition of the a 
priori  diminished  subject,  and  the  inappropriate  demarcation  between  literature  and 
philosophy  arising  from  the  ‘wrong  turn,’  there  also  exists  a  certain  prescience 
regarding  the  possible  impact  of  his  work  and  the  resultant  crisis  of  determinism. 
Certainly, the reception of his two most famous books, Beyond Good and Evil and Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, clearly exemplify this point, for in the appropriately immodest titled 
‘Why I write such excellent books’ from Ecce Homo, Nietzsche discusses their negative 
critical reception: 
[A] professor of Berlin University kindly gave me to understand that I really ought to 
avail myself to a different form: no one read stuff like mine […] An essay of Dr. V.   124 
Widmann  in  the  Bund  on  Beyond  Good  and  Evil  under  the  title  ‘Nietzsche’s 
Dangerous Book,’ and a general report on my books as a whole on the part of Herr 
Karl Spitteler, also in the Bund, constitute a maximum in my life — of what I care 
not to say […] The latter, for example dealt with my Zarathustra as an advanced 
exercise in style, with the request that I might later try to provide some content; Dr 
Widmann expressed his respect for the courage with which I strive to abolish all 
decent feelings (1977:22).  
 
Even in his day, these responses reflect a similar attitude to the so-called ‘postmodern’ 
text being viewed as counter discursive and nihilistic. In the Genealogy he goes on to 
explain that: “I have no doubt for what sole purpose modern books (if they last, which 
we fortunately have little reason to fear, and if there will one day be a posterity with a 
more severe, harder, healthier taste) — for what purpose everything modern will serve 
this posterity: as an emetic” (1989:137). As such, it is possible to draw comparisons 
between  the  negative  reception  of  Nietzsche’s  ‘modern  text’  and  that  of  certain 
contemporary texts that have elicited vehement responses due to their defamiliarisation 
of conventions, extreme fictionalised expressions of subjectivity, and attempts to release 
the subject from the constraints of metaphysical discourses.   
  Not only is it possible to compare the notion of Nietzsche ‘dangerous book’ with 
negative views of the ‘postmodern’ text, but one could also argue that his perspective of 
a crisis born out of the death of God, and the end of the ‘Will to truth,’ is predictive of 
the  ‘postmodern  condition.’  Once  again  sounding  the  klaxons  of  concern  while 
deconstructing the a priori tradition of metaphysics in ‘Disbelief in the ‘monumentum 
aere perennius’
12 ‘Aphorism 22’ of Human, All Too Human, he cautions that: “One 
crucial disadvantage about the end of metaphysical views is that the individual looks his 
own short life span too squarely in the eye and feels no strong incentives to build on 
enduring institutions, designed for the ages. He wants to pick the fruit from the trees he 
has planted himself, and therefore no longer likes to plant those trees which require 
regular care over centuries, trees that are destined to overshade long successions of 
generations” (1994:28). While in Twilight of the Idols he continues to deconstruct his   125 
own position positing that: “The whole of the West no longer possesses the instincts out 
of which institutions grow, out of which a future grows: perhaps nothing antagonizes its 
‘modern spirit’ so much. One lives for the day, one lives very fast, one lives very 
irresponsibly: precisely this is called ‘freedom’” (1954:543). In a self-awareness that 
undermines  the  multitude  of  negative  interpretations  of  his  work,  with  these  two 
quotations  Nietzsche  not  only  casts  doubt  over  the  effectiveness  of  his  work,  but 
presciently hypotheses something akin to the ‘postmodern condition,’ although in many 
ways he indicates that this crisis of subjectivity rather than being a case of ‘eternal 
recurrence,’ is simply eternal.
13 
  Finally then, and yet another nail in the coffin of the ‘dangerous book’ and the 
fight against the metaphysics of presence, Nietzsche indicates that regression is also an 
aspect of eternal recurrence, explaining in ‘Whispered to the conservatives,’ ‘Aphorism 
43’ of Twilight of the Idols, that:  
What is not known formerly, what is known, or might be known, today, a reversion, 
a return in any sense or degree is simply not possible. We physiologists know that. 
Yet  all  priests  and  moralists  have  believed  the  opposite  —  they  wanted  to  take 
mankind back, to screw it back, to a former measure of virtue. Morality was always a 
bed of Procrustes. Even the politicians have aped the preachers of virtue at this point: 
today too there are still parties whose dream it is that all things must walk backwards 
like crabs (1954:546–7).  
 
That  is,  Nietzsche’s  view  of  the  possible  outcome  of  the  end  of  metaphysics  is 
something that parallels the rise of conservative right wing fundamental Christianity in 
the contemporary political landscape — that which attempts to counter the ‘free spirit’ 
by reinstating metaphysics to its right-ful place. Elsewhere in Twilight of the Idols, in 
‘The error of free will’ Nietzsche’s view of the future following ‘the death of God’ and 
the  ‘Will  to  truth’  takes  on  an  eerie  verisimilitude  in  relation  to  the  ‘postmodern 
condition’  and  the  ‘new  world  order,’  wherein  he  states  that:  “Today  […]  we 
immoralists are trying with all our strength to take the concept of guilt and the concept 
of punishment out of the world again, and to cleanse psychology, history, nature, and   126 
social institutions and sanctions of them, there is in our eyes no more radical opposition 
than that of the theologians, who continue with the concept of a ‘moral world-order’ to 
infect the innocence of becoming by means of ‘punishment’ and ‘guilt.’ Christianity is a 
metaphysics of the hangman” (1954:500). Indeed! 
 
3.2.a. Sartre, Philosophy, Literature and The Diminished Subject 
 
The inclusion of Jean-Paul Sartre in this thesis is not simply because his existential 
theories  continue  the  anti-metaphysical  postulations  of  Nietzsche,  Husserl  and 
Heidegger, but also due to the influence of literature on his philosophy, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, it is my belief that his view of subjectivity not only indicates a view of the 
subject as diminished, but that aspects of his life — such as his fall from favour and the 
subsequent  critical  treatment  of  his  oeuvre  —  indicate  a  far-reaching  crisis  in  both 
subjectivity and theory. Not only was his creative output prodigious, it was constantly 
evolving, and as such this section will be divided roughly into two parts. Firstly, I shall 
discuss the key aspects of Being and Nothingness that continue this teleology of the 
diminished subject, while secondly, I shall focus on his literary and ficto-critical output 
— beginning with Nausea and ending with his faux-autobiography Words — including 
pertinent insights into the fascinating life of this philosopher and writer.   
 
3.2.b. Being and Nothingness — Sartre’s Diminished Existential Subject 
 
Broadly speaking, it is not fear of man that we should desire to see diminished; for 
this fear compels the strong to be strong, and occasionally terrible — it maintains the 
well-constituted type of man. What is to be feared, what has a more calamitous effect 
than any other calamity, is that man should inspire not profound fear but profound 
nausea; also not great fear but great pity. Suppose these two were one day to unite, 
they would inevitably beget one of the uncanniest monsters: the ‘last will’ of man, 
his will to nothingness, nihilism […] The sick are man’s greatest danger; not the evil, 
not the ‘beast of prey.’ Those who are failures from the start, downtrodden, crushed 
—  it  is  they,  the  weakest,  who  must  undermine  life  among  men,  who  call  into 
question and poison most dangerously our trust in life, in man, and in ourselves. 
Where does one not encounter that veiled glance which burdens one with a profound 
sadness, that inward-turned glance of the born failure which betrays how such a man 
speaks to himself — that glance which is a sigh! ‘If only I were someone else,’ sighs   127 
this glance: ‘but there is no hope of that. I am who I am: how could I ever get free of 
myself ? And yet — I am sick of myself!’  
— Friedrich Nietzsche, in On The Genealogy of Morals (1989:122). 
 
Although Jean-Paul Sartre is known principally as an exponent of existentialism, he 
also referred to his work as existential psychoanalysis and existential phenomenology, 
thus expressing the importance of psychology, Nietzschean proto-existentialism, and 
phenomenology to the development of his theories. In his early work at least, Sartre 
appears to continuing a perceived teleology of the diminished subject, beginning with 
his reworking Freud’s concepts of the conscious and unconscious, and his measured 
appropriation  of  the  phenomenological  approaches  of  Husserl  and  Heidegger  that 
attempted to avoid their slip into metaphysics.
14 As René Lafarge explains in Sartre: 
His  Philosophy  he:  “belongs  to  a  tradition  which  shuns  the  abstract  as  much  as  it 
possibly can, and tries to remain glued to the real. He did not wish to build a system, but 
rather, to unveil the most intimate and most mysterious aspects of existence. For when 
he spoke of existence, it was of human existence he spoke, the only one that exists in 
his  view”  (1970:2-3).  That  is,  while  wishing  to  understand  the  human  condition,
15 
Sartre was at pains to avoid metaphysical postulations, although as we have already 
seen this is never entirely possible.  
  The extent that Sartre’s existential approach was determinedly anti-metaphysical, 
yet has not been read as such, is made apparent by Hazel Barnes in the ‘Translator’s 
Introduction’ to Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, for 
when emphasising this often overlooked subtitle she explains that:    
Mistakes are often made by those who would treat the work as a metaphysics. Sartre 
states clearly his distinction between the two: Ontology studies ‘the structures of 
being of the existent taken as a totality;’ it describes the conditions under which there 
may be a world, human reality, etc. It answers the questions ‘How?’ or ‘What?’ and 
is  description  rather  than  explanation.  For  this  reason  it  can  state  positively. 
Metaphysics, on the other hand, is concerned with origins and seeks to explain why 
there is this particular world. But since such explanations seek to go behind the 
Being which they must presuppose, they can only be hypotheses. Sartre does not 
disapprove of metaphysical attempts, but he noticeable refrains from engaging in 
them (1956:xliii).   128 
 
Sartre was not interested in extrapolating the various metaphysical postulations of either 
his predecessors or his contemporaries, but rather investigated the subject released from 
the deterministic dictates of traditional philosophy and religious belief. In Existentialism 
and Humanism he famously clarifies the confusion regarding his position stating that: 
“The question is only complicated because there are two kinds of existentialists. There 
are, on the one hand, the Christians […] and on the other the existential atheists, among 
whom we must place Heidegger as well as French existentialists and myself. What they 
have in common is simply the fact that they believe that existence comes before essence 
— or, if you will, that we must begin from the subjective” (1975:26). That is, following 
the ‘death of God,’ and upholding anti-metaphysical perspective of subjectivity that 
denied  any  inherent  ‘human  nature’  or  ‘essence,’  Sartre  focused  on  the  tangible 
existence of Being-in-the-world, while attempting to avoid speculative hypotheses.  
  That Sartre held an a priori perspective of subjectivity as diminished is explained 
by Christina Howells in ‘Sartre and the deconstruction of the subject,’ wherein she 
states: “Sartre was one of the first French philosophers to think through some of the 
implications of what has been called the ‘divided subject’ (or the ‘split subject’ for 
Lacanians)” (1992:326). Although greatly influenced by the psychoanalytical division 
of  self-present  consciousness,  he  still  had  difficulties  with  its  inherent  metaphysics, 
explaining in Being and Nothingness that: “Psychoanalysis has not gained anything for 
us […] The effort to establish a veritable duality, even a trinity (Es, Ich, and Uberich 
expressing  itself  through  the  censor)  has  resulted  in  a  mere  verbal  terminology” 
(1968:144). Therefore,  we  see  Sartre  rejecting Freud’s  metaphysical  division  of  the 
unconscious into the id, ego and superego as conceptually hypothetical, arguing that 
psychoanalysis has little practical use. 
  If we follow Nietzsche’s proposition that a faith in metaphysics is  a belief in 
nothingness, then the problematic division of the conscious and unconscious by Freud   129 
and the primacy of consciousness in Descartes’ cogito — where neither has tangible or 
recognisable  Being-in-the-world  —  ipso  facto  suggests  that  consciousness  is 
nothingness. Although Sartre agrees with Nietzsche’s view of consciousness as lacking, 
he  goes  further  still  and  —  albeit  mostly  unacknowledged  —  adopts  Heidegger’s 
proposition regarding the subject in Being and Time, and pre-empts many of Derrida’s 
tenants regarding the momentary nature of presence in relation to consciousness. That 
is, not only is the subject diminished by the loss of the primacy of the metaphysics of 
consciousness,  we  find  it  further  divided  in  relation  to  time,  as  seen  with  the 
relationship between a ‘present’ and possible ‘future being’ in Being and Nothingness: 
[A] nothingness has slipped into the heart of this relation; I am not the self which I 
will be. Firstly I am not that self because time separates me from it. Secondly, I am 
not that self because what I am is not the foundation of what I will be. Finally, I am 
not that self because no actual existent can determine strictly what I am going to be. 
Yet I am already what I will be (otherwise I would not be interested in this rather 
than that), I am the self which I will be, in the mode of not being it. It is through my 
horror that I am carried toward the future, and the horror nihilates itself in that it 
constitutes the future as possible. Anguish is precisely my consciousness of being my 
own future, in the mode of not-being (119-20). 
 
Thus, Sartre explains ‘nothingness’ as a process of self-negation or ‘nihilation’ where 
the momentary presence of consciousness is immediately overrun by an absent future 
presence, and is therefore unable to maintain either self-presence nor cling to the absent 
past presence. Thus, the condition of the possibility of change undermines self-presence 
by grounding the subject in a fleeting moment with no tangible recourse to either past or 
future presences. However, the potential horror of this negation of the present presence 
is nihilated with the imposition of the facticity of a possible future presence. Thus, the 
self-present  subject  is  further  diminished  as  consciousness  accepts  its  ‘translucent’ 
nature on the one hand while recognising the unavoidable ‘facticity’ of its physicality 
on the other, in a necessary relationship between Being and consciousness described by 
Sartre as the ‘transphenomenality of Being:’
16 “This being emerges into the world along 
with consciousness, at once in its heart and outside it; it is absolute transcendence in   130 
absolute immanence. It has no priority over consciousness, and consciousness has no 
priority over it. They form a dyad. Of course this being could not exist without the for-
itself, but neither could the for-itself exist without it” (172). However, as we shall now 
see this division between the nothingness of the for-itself of consciousness, and the 
tactile facticity of the in-itself of Being, gives the subject the awareness of the increased 
possibility of freedom. 
  Having  established  the  lack  of  metaphysical  certitude  following  the  ‘death  of 
God,’ and that the for-itself of consciousness is nothingness, we are now faced with a 
subject  free  from  the  dictates  of  aesthetic  religious  dogma,  and  without  a 
predetermining essence by which to make sense of its life. This led Sartre to postulate 
that  if  consciousness  is  nothingness  due  to  a  lack  of  metaphysical  presence,  and 
nothingness is freedom from metaphysics, then ipso facto, consciousness itself must be 
freedom. However, there exist a variety of problems, for despite this apparent freedom 
none of us appear to be living our lives to the extent of its possibilities — something he 
puts down to the apparent anguish of the recognition of the limitless possibilities of 
consciousness,
17  and  the  meaninglessness  of  Being.  Sartre  explains  the  necessary 
relationship between freedom and anguish explaining that: 
[I]f  freedom  is  the  being  of  consciousness,  consciousness  ought  to  exist  as 
consciousness of freedom. What form does this consciousness of freedom assume? 
In freedom the human being is his own past (as also his own future) in the form of 
nihilation. If our analysis has not led us astray, there ought to exist for the human 
being, insofar as he is conscious of being, a certain mode of standing opposite, his 
past and his future, as being both this past and this future and as not being […] it is in 
anguish that man became the consciousness of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish 
is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that 
freedom is, in its being, in question for itself (116). 
 
That is, this awareness of the freedom of consciousness is expressed as anguish — itself 
a manifestation of the lack of metaphysical certitude and possibility of ever being self-
present — as it recognises that the past is nothing, the present momentary, and the 
future a mere possibility. Furthermore, as the future is a metaphysical nothingness, it is   131 
up  to  the  individual  to  make  choices  regarding  its  possible  future  presence,  thus 
increasing the anguish of the subject, and is explained by Sartre thus:  
[M]y future being is always nihilated and reduced to the rank of a simple possibility 
because the future which I am remains out of reach. But we ought to note that in 
these various instances we have to do with a temporal form where I await myself in 
the future, where I ‘make an appointment with myself on the other side of that hour, 
of that day, or of that month.’ Anguish is the fear of not finding myself at that 
appointment, of no longer even wishing to be there (124).  
 
Thus, anguish is the recognition of a fundamental lack of self-presence and inability to 
achieve it, while this freedom of choice is placed firmly back onto consciousness and 
forces  the  subject  to  accept  responsibility  for  the  future  of  its  own  limitless  yet 
nihilating Being,
18 causing yet another division within an already diminished subject. 
  Indicating  that  consciousness  as  nothingness  becomes  aware  of  its  freedom 
through anguish, Sartre then undermines both this position and criticisms of his work, 
with  his  discussion  of  ‘bad  faith.’  While  we  have  already  seen  the  subject  divided 
between the in-itself and the for-itself, with the concept of bad faith he divides the 
subject further still, for it is the anguish of freedom that causes consciousness to deny 
the extent of that freedom:  
[T]he one who practices bad faith is hiding a displeasing truth or presenting as truth a 
pleasing untruth. Bad faith then has in appearance the structure of a falsehood. Only 
what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding 
the truth. Thus the duality of the deceiver and the deceived does not exist here. Bad 
faith on the contrary implies the unity of a single consciousness (139).  
 
In other words, not only does consciousness avoid the anguish of freedom, it then takes 
flight from its potential in a process of self-deception that further divides the subject. As 
René  Lafarge  argues,  for  the  subject  suffering  from  bad  faith:  “Freedom  is  just  a 
nuisance, so we just declare that it does not exist” (1970:93), while going on to explain 
that: “It is the refusal of our condition, of freedom and the anguish which constitute us. 
The first act of bad faith is to flee what one cannot flee, to flee what one is” (110). That 
is,  the  act  of  bad  faith  comes  about  when the censor
19  acting  within  consciousness 
instructs  it  to  flee  from  freedom  and  nothingness,  while  at  once  undermining  this   132 
freedom through the interpellation of a past presence, or facticity, by the for-itself, in 
order to become an in-itself Being-in-the-world.  
  Sartre  proposes  that  consciousness  actively  rejects  freedom  through  bad  faith 
arguing that: “A person frees himself from himself by the very act by which he makes 
himself an object for himself. To draw up a perpetual inventory of what one is means 
constantly to repudiate oneself and to take refuge in a sphere where one is no longer 
anything but a pure, free look. The goal of bad faith, as we said, is to put oneself out of 
reach;  it  is  an  escape”  (1968:160).  Thus,  bad  faith  finds  the  subject  denying  the 
nothingness of consciousness, while attempting to become the in-itself that it is not. In 
his discussion of Being and Time in Philosophy: The Classics, Nigel Warburton, puts 
this  process  succinctly:  “We  maintain  ourselves  in  bad  faith  by  keeping  our 
transcendence and facticity separate from each other, by thinking of ourselves either as 
wholly different from our bodies (denying an aspect of our facticity […]) or else as 
wholly different from our possibilities (pretending to be an in-itself)” (1998:199). In 
other words, bad faith leads us to deny the translucent nothingness of consciousness and 
to interpellate ourselves as an in-itself,
20 and further denies the subject self-presence by 
embracing the metaphysical facticity of a past presence while attempting to maintain it 
as a future presence, thereby denying the possible freedom of alternative being. We see 
clearly  in  Sartre’s  discussion  of  bad  faith  the  aporia  of  subjectivity,  wherein  the 
division  of  the  for-itself  and  in-itself  is  further  compounded  as  self-deception 
irrevocably divides the subject in a negative manner, given that: “The being of human 
reality is suffering because it emerges in being  as perpetually haunted by a totality 
which it is without being able to be it, precisely because it could not attain the in-itself 
without losing itself as a for-itself. Human reality therefore is by nature an unhappy 
consciousness  with  no  possibility  of  transcending  its  unhappy  state”  (1968:172).   133 
However, as we shall see, this division is not the only expression of the diminished 
subject in Sartre’s work. 
  Thus  far,  this  discussion  of  Sartre’s  existential  investigation  into  Being  has 
focused on the manner in which the subject is internally divided between the in-itself 
and for-itself, and the manner in which consciousness undermines the possibilities of 
freedom with bad faith. The supposed extent of this freedom has led to much criticism 
of Sartre, yet we shall now turn our attention to the relationship between Being and 
Other, whereby he further divides the subject by placing external limits on the extent of 
this freedom while answering many of his critics.
21 Needless to say, this problematic 
relationship  with  the  Other  is  one  that  amplifies  the  previously  mentioned  divide 
between the in-itself and for-itself leading to yet more bad faith. Sartre explains this 
proposition in Being and Nothingness when arguing that: 
[A]lthough this metastable concept of ‘transcendence-facticity’ is one of the most 
basic instruments of bad faith it is not the only one of its kind. We can equally well 
use another kind of duplicity derived from human reality which we will  express 
roughly by saying that its being-for-itself implies correlatively a being-for-others. 
Upon any one of my actions it is always possible for two looks to converge, mine 
and that of the Other. The action will not present exactly the same structure in each 
case. But as we shall see later, as everyone feels, there is between these two aspects 
of my being, no difference between appearance and being — as if I were to myself 
the truth of myself and as if the Other possessed only a deformed image of me. The 
equal  dignity  of  being,  possessed  by  my  being-for-others  and  by  my  being-for-
myself permits a perpetual disintegrating synthesis and a perpetual game of escape 
from the for-itself to the for-others and from the for-others to the for-itself (150). 
 
With the arrival of the Other we see yet another limit placed on consciousness, and it is 
this external phenomena that diminishes the potential possibilities of the freedom of 
nothingness. For in the Other we come up against an-Other who is as free with possible 
transcendence as we are, yet can in no way be expected to recognise, or accept, the 
unlimited freedom of our own translucence, and thus we become an object-for-others 
and vice versa. The freedom of this Other consciousness limits the possibility of our 
transcendence and increases the chance of a ‘deformed’ image of my being becoming   134 
irrevocably recognised as a facticity for the Other, and with this object state comes the 
limitation of my possible future freedom. 
  The recognition of the for-itself as an object for the Other manifests itself as fear 
and shame, as our consciousness realises that it is not in sole control of its Being-in-the-
world, and that its freedom is diminished in a necessary relationship with the Other: 
Fear implies that I appear to myself as threatened by virtue of my being a presence in 
the world, not in my capacity as for-itself which makes the world exist. It is the 
object which I am which is in danger in the world and which as such, because of its 
indissoluble unity of being with the being which I have to be. Fear is therefore the 
discovery of my being-as-object on the occasion of the appearance of another object 
in my perceptive field. It reflects the origin of all fear, which is the fearful discovery 
of my pure and simple object-state insofar as it is transcended by possibilities which 
are not my possibilities (204). 
 
Therefore, this recognition of the Other has a limiting effect on Sartre’s conception of 
the freedom of consciousness, for not only is the for-itself forced to acknowledge its 
necessary  relationship  with  the  in-itself,  it  recognises  that  yet  another  unavoidable 
‘dyad’ at once threatens and diminishes both its current and possible future presence. 
He goes on to explain that this manifests itself as a shame that: “is the recognition of the 
fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging. I can be 
ashamed only as my freedom escapes me in order to become a given object” (199), and 
that:  “If  there  is  an  Other,  whatever  or  whoever  he  may  be,  whatever  may  be  his 
relations  with  me,  and  without  acting  upon  me  in  any  way  except  by  the  pure 
emergence of his being — then I have an outside, I have a nature. My original fall is the 
existence of the Other” (201). Thus, the realisation that the for-itself is an object-for-
the-Other is expressed as shame, while the interaction between the in-itself and the 
Other threatens the freedom of consciousness by ‘bringing it back to earth,’ giving it 
facticity, albeit in a greatly diminished manner.
22 As Sartre goes on to explain: “The 
Other is the first permanent flight of things towards a limit which I apprehend as an 
object at a certain distance from me but which escapes me inasmuch as it unfolds about 
itself its own distances. Moreover this process of disintegration gains momentum […]   135 
The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds therefore to a congealed sliding 
of  the  whole  universe,  to  a  decentralization  of  the  world  which  undermines  the 
centralization  which  I  am  simultaneously  effecting”  (192)  In  ‘other’  words,  the 
existence of the Other necessarily undermines any attempt by consciousness to exist as 
purely present to itself, indicating that Sartre’s conception of the possible extent of the 
freedom of being is always already diminished.
23 
 
3.2.c. Sartre and Literature: The Roads to Freedom?  
 
‘Humanity will continue on its futile journey, the usual people will ask themselves 
the usual questions, and wreck their lives in the usual way.’ 
Jacques eyed him with a knowing smile. ‘And what does it all come to?’ 
‘Well, just to nothing,’ said Mathieu.   
— Jean-Paul Sartre, in The Reprieve, (1945:179-80). 
 
Although  there  has  been  an  increased  focus  on  the  literary  in  this  teleology  of  the 
diminished subject, in Sartre’s work we see a concerted effort to carry out a ‘linguistic 
turn’ and redresses the divisions between literature and the  specialised discourse of 
philosophy that stretch back to the ‘wrong turn.’ The importance of literature to Sartre is 
best exemplified when we consider the impact his first novel Nausea — published in 
France as The Diary of Antoine Roquentin — had on his most famous philosophical text 
Being  and  Nothingness.  That  Nausea  can  be  read  as  a  work  of  literature  that 
successfully transcends the traditional boundaries between discourses is explained by 
Hazel Barnes who argues that: “until the publication of Being and Nothingness, Sartre’s 
concern with men’s happiness and unhappiness, their ethical problems, purposes, and 
conduct was expressed largely in his purely literary works. Of these the novel, Nausea 
[…] is the richest in philosophical content. In fact one might truthfully say that the only 
full exposition of its meaning would be the total volume of Being and Nothingness” 
(1956:xix). In other words, not only was Nausea a philosophical work which fictionally 
investigated many of the theoretical propositions of the work of Nietzsche, Husserl and 
Heidegger, for Barnes, Being and Nothingness is a companion piece which extrapolates   136 
these ideas in a more traditional academic framework, albeit with its own flourishes of 
metaphoric prose.
24 Barnes goes on to explain that Nausea can be read as: “the ‘taste of 
my  facticity,’  the  revelation  of  my  body  to  me  and  of  the  fact  of  my  inescapable 
connection with Being-in-itself” (xx). Thus Sartre explores the tactile facticity of the 
recognition of consciousness of itself as an object-in-the-world that manifests itself as a 
feeling  of  sickness.  Although  Being  and  Nothingness  elucidates  the  philosophical 
propositions he initiates in Nausea, the latter remains a far more accessible investigation 
into his complex theoretical propositions.
25     
  That  Nausea  can  be  read  as  a  prototype  for  Being  and  Nothingness  becomes 
apparent when it makes reference to the refutation of the primacy of consciousness, as 
seen with his humorous reworking of Descartes cogito as: “I do not think therefore I am 
a moustache” (1983:147). The problematic relationship of consciousness, time and bad 
faith: “For me the past was only a pensioning off: it was another way of existing, a state 
holiday and inactivity; each event, when it had played its part, dutifully packed itself 
away  in  a  box  and  became  an  honorary  event:  we  find  it  so  difficult  to  imagine 
nothingness. Now I knew. Things are entirely what they appear to be and behind them 
[…] there is nothing” (140). The metaphysical nothingness of consciousness and shame 
of being an object-in-the-world: “I haven’t any troubles, I have some money like a 
gentleman of leisure, no boss, no wife, no children; I exist, that’s all. And that particular 
trouble is so vague, so metaphysical, that I am ashamed of it” (153). The meaningless of 
existence: “‘I was just thinking,’ I tell him, laughing, ‘that here we are, all of us, eating 
and  drinking  to  preserve  our  precious  existence,  and  that  there’s  nothing,  nothing, 
absolutely no reason for existing.’” (162). The interpellation of bad faith in the act of 
sincerity:  “‘Perhaps  you  are  a  misanthrope?’  I  know  what  this  fallacious  effort  at 
conciliation hides. He is asking very little from me in fact: simply to accept a label. But 
this  is  a  trap:  if  I  consent,  the  Autodidact  triumphs,  I  am  promptly  out-flanked,   137 
recaptured, overtaken, for humanism takes all human attitudes and fuses them together” 
(170). Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical view of the subject as Human, All Too Human, 
and Roquentin’s Pro-crustacean-like acquiescence to moral law mimicking ‘Aphorism 
43’ of Twilight of the Idols: “I don’t need to turn around to know that they are watching 
me through the windows; they are looking at my back with surprise and disgust: they 
thought that I was like them, that I was a man, and I deceived them. All of a sudden, I 
lost the appearance of a man and they saw a crab escaping backwards from that all too 
human room” (178). The absurdity of existence and the arbitrary nature of language: 
“And without formulating anything clearly, I understood that I had found the key to 
Existence, the key to my Nausea, to my own life. In fact, all that I was able to grasp 
afterwards came down to this fundamental absurdity. Absurdity: another word; I am 
struggling against words” (185). And the notion of freedom in the face of bad faith: “I 
am free: I haven’t a single reason for living left, all the ones I have tried have given way 
and I can’t imagine any more. I am still quite young, I still have enough strength to start 
again. But what must I start again? Only now do I realise how much, in the midst of my 
great terror and nausea, I had counted on Anny to save me. My past is dead, Monsieur 
Rollebon is dead, […] I am alone in this white street lined with gardens. Alone and free. 
But this freedom is rather like death. Today my life comes to an end” (223).  
  Despite the nihilism of the denouement of Nausea Sartre introduces the notion of 
freedom  and  literature  that  he  would  explore  further  upon  completing  Being  and 
Nothingness. After recognising the nauseating aporia of the nothingness of his Being 
and the trap of bad faith, Roquentin has an epiphany while recognising his love of jazz, 
and realises the time wasted writing a history of Monsieur Rollebon, postulating that: 
Couldn’t I try … Naturally, it wouldn’t be a question a tune … But couldn’t I in 
another medium? … It would have to be a book: I don’t know how to do anything 
else. But not a history book: history talks about what has existed — an existent can 
never justify the existence of another existent. … Another kind of book. I don’t quite 
know which kind — but you would have to guess, behind the printed words, behind 
the pages, something which didn’t exist, which was above existence. The sort of   138 
story, for example, which could never happen, an adventure. It would have to be 
beautiful and hard as steel and make people ashamed of their existence (252). 
 
Thus, Nausea literally becomes the Diary of Antoine Roquentin, an explanation of the 
philosophical implications behind the writing of the book we have just read. As David 
Caute explains in the ‘Introduction’ to What is Literature? Roquentin is: “Experiencing 
acute anguish in the face of the gulf which divides him from the world — the gulf 
which Sartre defines as freedom — he attempts to escape into the In-Itself. He can 
scarcely maintain a relationship with any other human being. Taken at face value, this 
novel exudes pessimism. But Sartre already believed that the literary exploration of 
such a condition, if penetrating and truthful, has the therapeutic value of helping the 
reader to identify and transcend his alienation” (1986:xi). Therefore, Nausea can be 
seen as an attempt to fictionalise complex theoretical premises, while defamiliarising 
everyday  experiences  through  the  facticity  of  nausea  —  something  Sartre  believed 
could shock the reader from their complacent bad faith. However, in Jean-Paul Sartre: 
A  Literary  and  Political  Study,  Philip  Thody  questions  the  extent  of  his  success 
indicating that he: “does not […] succeed in persuading us that our life is a useless 
excrescence of which we should be ashamed. It is a matter of empirical fact that few 
people do experience their own existence as nauseating or are overwhelmed with horror 
at the thought of so many unnecessary beings. The main argument against Existential 
philosophy  […]  is  that  it  often  rests  on  a  highly  specialized  personal  experience” 
(1972:17).
26 And it is the problematic nature of freedom and the validity of literature as 
philosophy that I shall now turn to.   
  Although What is Literature? was published for the first time in 1948, the essays 
collected  therein  were  individually  published  in  Les  Tempes  modernes  —  a  journal 
established  and  edited  by  Sartre  —  and  explain  his  manifesto  for  a  ‘committed 
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possibilities of the fear of their potential freedom. This was something he alluded to 
much earlier in Being and Nothingness wherein he argued that: 
Since the writer recognizes, by the very fact that he takes the trouble to write, the 
freedom of his readers, and since the reader, by the mere fact of his opening the 
book, recognizes the freedom of the writer, the work of art, from whichever side you 
approach it, it is an act of confidence in the freedom of men. And since readers, like 
the author, recognize this freedom only to demand it manifest itself, the work can be 
defined as an imaginary presentation of the world insofar as it determines human 
freedom. Thus there is no ‘gloomy literature,’ since, however dark may be the colors 
in which the writer paints the world, he paints it only so that free men may feel their 
freedom as they face it (1968:376). 
 
That is, the metaphysical nature of language, employed by both the self and other, 
legitimates bad faith when the sincere naming of the subject alienates them from the 
possibilities of their potential freedom. He posits that the ‘imaginary presentation’ of 
the free subject in literature goes some way towards defamiliarising of the act of bad 
faith  by  making  the  reader  aware  of  certain  stifling  cultural  conventions  that  are 
interpellelated  by  everyday  language  as  a  priori.  As  Caute  acknowledges,  Sartre 
believed that: “literature, properly employed, can be a powerful means of liberating the 
reader  from  the  kinds  of  alienation  which  develop  in  particular  situations.  By  this 
process the writer also frees himself and overcomes his own alienation. Sartre argued 
that literature is alienated when it forgets or ignores its autonomy and places itself at the 
service of the temporal power, dogma and mystification. It is the writer’s mission to 
dispel inertia, ignorance, prejudice and false emotion” (1986:ix). 
  What is important to Sartre here is not simply the act of writing — for he himself 
shows a deterministic value judgment by showing disdain towards poetic writing
27 — 
but instead calls for a committed writing that would instead be an irritant.
28 He explains 
the idea of ‘committed’ writing as a form of democracy in the essay ‘Why Write?’ 
arguing that: “A day comes when the pen is forced to stop, and the writer must then take 
up arms. Thus, however you might come to it, whatever the opinions you might have 
professed,  literature  throws  you  into  battle.  Writing  is  a  certain  way  of  wanting   140 
freedom; once you have begun, you are committed, willy-nilly” (1986:47). However, 
what Sartre is referring to here is not the democracy of a political dogma, or cultural 
value,  but  rather  the  fundamental  philosophical  freedom  of  the  subject,  something 
explained  by  Bernard-Henri  Levy  in  Jean-Paul  Sartre:  The  Philosopher  of  the 
Twentieth Century, wherein he categorically states that:  
The concept of commitment is not a political concept underlining the writer’s social 
duties;  it  is  a  philosophical  concept  designating  the  metaphysical  powers  of 
language. To speak of commitment is not to ‘rope in’ writers; it is to remind them of 
what everyone knows or should know: that every act of naming ‘becomes an integral 
part of the objective spirit;’ that it thereby gives to the word and the things a ‘new 
dimension;’ that each word spoken contributes to unveiling the world, and that to 
unveil it is already to ‘change’ it (2003:62).  
 
By virtue of its metaphysical nature, prose can be used as a weapon against the act of 
bad faith for this arbitrary tool can not only be used to legitimate the sincere naming of 
oneself as an object-in-the-world, it can defamiliarise this process. Levy expands on the 
question of freedom in Sartre’s text stating that: “Nor does What is Literature? say 
(what, I must repeat it, it never said, and what it was read as saying only at the cost of 
huge misrepresentation of its meaning) that literature should put itself, in particular, at 
the service of political causes and combats — that it should be expected to produce 
poems or novels militating for the Just, the True and the Good” (2003:62). As we shall 
see, the Sartre of What is Literature? was optimistically committed to the philosophical 
freedom of the subject through the literary, while his ‘political turn’ was to come later. 
  To see how successful Sartre was in creating a literature of freedom, one has to 
look no further than his Roads to Freedom trilogy. However, it is important to note that 
his impetus for this manifesto of writing stemmed not only from his perspective of 
freedom above all else, but also as the result of a vitriolic attack on François Mauriac’s 
La Fin de la Nuit, in the Novelle Revue Française in 1939. These criticisms were based 
on his view of the role of the writer in literature and attacked Mauriac for his authorial 
omniscience, which he argued denied the freedom of the reader to engage and identify   141 
with  fictional  characters.
29  Given  this  optimistic  belief  in  the  liberating  powers  of 
literature, following WWII Sartre began a prodigious output of both plays and novels 
espousing  his  views  on  subjectivity  and  of  the  role  of  fiction.  The  most  widely 
acknowledge being his incomplete Roads to Freedom series which can be viewed as 
examples of his perspective of a ‘literature of extreme situations,’ a term he first used in 
‘Footnote 10’ of ‘The Situation of the Writer in 1947’ in What is Literature? wherein he 
investigates the predominance of violence in contemporary literature: “What are Camus, 
Malraux, Koestler, etc. now producing if not a literature of extreme situations? Their 
characters are at the height of power or in prison cells, on the eve of death or of being 
tortured  or  of  killing.  Wars,  coups  d’états,  revolutionary  action,  bombardments, 
massacres. There you have their everyday life. On every page, in every line, it is always 
the whole man who is in question” (1986:228). Thody suggests that Sartre’s ‘literature 
of extreme situations’ soon entered all aspects of his writing: 
It is true that when Sartre was writing The Roads to Freedom he was convinced, 
perhaps rightly, that the apocalyptic world of the thirties and forties had come to 
stay. So much is obvious from his discussions of the popularity of the American 
novel of violence in What is Literature? He appears so certain, in 1947, that the 
‘literature of extreme situations’ represented by Hemingway, Faulkner, Malraux and 
Saint-Exupéry is the only form of writing possible at the present day that he is unable 
to even consider the possibility of a novel which describes fairly peaceful everyday 
events (1972:67-68). 
 
Sartre’s writing not only centered on the recent extreme situation of the war in Europe, 
but  also  continued  to  defamiliarise  human  relationships  —  something  he  began  in 
Intimacy published in 1939. Thody indicates that: “Sartre has often been accused of 
writing semi-pornographic literature, and he has in general replied with the defence that 
he is merely describing things as they are” (1972:28-29).
30 Themes such as abortion, 
heroin use, homosexuality, paedophilia, self harm, murder, suicide and violence are 
replete in the trilogy and in particular The Age of Reason, indicating that Sartre’s latest 
literary venture remained the understanding of extreme aspects of subjectivity and being 
— something that clearly resembles the content of a supposed ‘postmodern’ literature.     142 
  Despite  Sartre’s  initial  optimism  regarding  the  freedom  of  literature,  his 
deterministic manifesto for committed writing would come back to haunt him, and led 
to criticisms of the ‘Trilogy’ and his eventual failure to complete the fourth and final 
installment. Philip Thody suggests that the failure of The Roads to Freedom to deliver 
its promise stems from Sartre’s inability to recognise the limitations of this supposedly 
free medium, and to follow his own manifesto, explaining that: “The real point is that 
the rules which Sartre try to lay down in his article on Mauriac are quite arbitrary and 
bear little relation to the practice of the majority of novelists […] What Sartre forgets is 
that there are no hard and fast rules for literature” (1972:65). That is, while Nausea 
succeeds as a philosophical novel, for Thody the ‘Trilogy’ fails to engage the reader 
successfully as either literature or philosophy arguing that it: 
[F]requently read like attempts to put his own rules about novel-writing into practice. 
In The Age of Reason, for example, he tells his story as far as possible from the point 
of view of each individual character and refrains from intervening personally in the 
narration.  In  The  Reprieve  personal  motives  are  swamped  by  the  rush  of  world 
events. In the third volume […] he gives up the attempt to present a complete over-
all picture, and returns to the detailed examination of private motives (1972:43-44). 
 
Rather than successfully espousing his philosophical propositions in the ‘Trilogy,’ both 
style and content became transparent arbitrators of Sartre’s current philosophical and 
political  ideas,  undermining  the  main  premise  of  his  attack  on  Mauriac.  This  is 
especially true of The Reprieve which gained notoriety for being overtly aligned with 
the narrative style of Dos Passos’ Manhattan Transfer (1925). Thody expresses this 
negative attitude toward the ‘Trilogy’ when he argues that: “the characters in The Age of 
Reason are not particularly alive and not particularly free. They are manipulated by 
their author to demonstrate certain ideas, even though the author’s hand may not be as 
visible as it is in some of Mauriac’s novels. The title of the complete novel, however, 
indicates  that  the  character’s  in  The  Age  of  Reason  are  on  their  way  to  freedom” 
(1972:52). If the characters of The Age of Reason are on the ‘road to freedom,’ then by 
the time Sartre had completed the Iron in the Soul, and with his failure to complete the   143 
fourth instalment — La Derniére Chance — it seemed that the journey was over, and 
Sartre’s committed literature had missed its ‘Last Chance.’ Thody goes on to state that 
although:  “the  narrative  style  in  Iron  in  the  Soul  is  still  very  highly  charged  with 
imagery, Sartre’s inventiveness as a novelist seems to have deserted him […] What he 
does seem to have lost, together with his inventiveness, is his original idea that the 
problems  of  liberty  could  be  worked  out  in  the  framework  provided  by  the  novel” 
(1972:63). One possible conclusion to be drawn is that Sartre’s literature of freedom, as 
an expression of everyday being, began to resemble his political position — a valid 
perspective given that he was a card carrying member of the Communist Party — and 
that following WWII he had became so disillusioned with literature that by the time he 
wrote the blind alley that is the Iron In The Soul
31 he became focused solely on politics. 
  The extent of the disillusionment Sartre felt toward literature would come to a 
dramatic head in Words — his faux-autobiography — that acts as an expression of the 
aporia he had reached both as writer and philosopher. Rather than being the literature of 
freedom that Sartre envisioned, the novel instead became the inevitable vehicle of the 
metaphysics of nothingness and the inaction of bad faith. As Levy explains:  
Literature is a lure, because it is a lie. And it is a lie because it makes us take the 
words for things and the images of reality, its simulacra, for reality itself […] Sartre 
had  long  thought  that  literature  was  a  response  to  the  illness,  the  treatment,  the 
remedy […] He didn’t believe this any more. He even believed the direct opposite. 
He  thought,  in  a  nutshell,  that  it  was  ‘a  long,  bitter  and  sweet  madness’  whose 
symptoms he had barely begun to catalogue and from which he urgently needed to 
recover.  He  wrote  Words  against  words.  Words  is  called  Words  because  of 
Shakespeare’s ‘Words, words, words!’ — they are merely words […] we must free 
ourselves  from  the  absurd  fascination  we  have  for  these  less  than  nothings 
(2003:454-56).  
 
While in Nausea and the Roads to Freedom we saw Sartre carrying out a ‘literary turn,’ 
with Words we see him turn full-circle taking his own ‘wrong turn.’ This comparison is 
not lost on Levy also who indicates that the manner in which Sartre turned his back on 
literature: “is reminiscent of the way in which Plato excluded the poets from the city 
[…] Hence, after Words, a whole series of texts, often interviews, in which we see the   144 
old Sartre, ill and weary, articulating for anyone who still wants to hear his poor theory 
of  a  prose  without  style,  without  beauty,  without  effect  and,  basically,  without  any 
literature at all, whose effectiveness would come about not because of, but in spite of, 
words” (2003:461). This perspective of a jaded Sartre in the grip of aporia is expressed 
by Geoffrey Wall in his ‘Introduction’ to Modern Times: Selected Non-Fiction, wherein 
he paints a picture of a philosopher in need of political change and affirmative action, 
having been let down by literature, stating that after Words: “There would be no more 
novels,  no  sequel  to  The  Roads  to  Freedom.  After  Auschwitz  and  Hiroshima,  in  a 
decade  marked  by  neo-colonial  warfare  in  Korea,  Algeria  and  Vietnam,  perhaps 
literature  alone  could  not  illuminate  the  dark  corners  of  our  modernity.  Perhaps 
literature was part of the problem, a superior narcotic, dulling the senses and diverting 
the mind from the imperative of the age” (2000:xxxvi). Thus with the failure of Stalinist 
Communism  following  the  end  of  WWII,  and  his  own  doubts  over  the freedom  of 
literature, we can view Sartre’s ‘political turn’
32 as a choice for action rather than the 
continuation of bad faith, for as Levy points out: “The Sartre of Words […] now saw in 
the movement and slowness proper to writing, not so much the time truth takes to be 
true, but a waste of time, time lost and squandered, a time in which one was really 
fleeing  from  life  and  seeking  death”  (2003:474).  Thus,  in  Words  we  see  Sartre 
reviewing his literary pretensions as those of a writer and philosopher who had acted in 
bad faith, and he turned instead to a functional writing free of embellishments.
33 
 
3.2.e. Jean-Paul Sartre and The Diminished Subject 
 
Finally then it is important to note that despite a belief in his own failings, the literary 
and  philosophical  works  of  Sartre  can  be  seen  to  represent  the  premise  of  the 
diminished subject in a number of positive ways, for not only did he defamiliarise the 
nothingness of metaphysical philosophical discourses, his attempt at a ‘literary turn’ 
showed  the  work  of  literature  as  ineluctably  constrained  due  the  unavoidably   145 
metaphysical and arbitrary nature of writing. It would be possible to expand this section 
to include such thought-provoking texts as Saint Genet, and the manner in which Sartre 
— seemingly suffering from existential envy — appeared to pin all his hopes of a life 
and literature of ‘extreme situations’ onto Jean Genet, nevertheless it was my aim to 
focus  on  Sartre’s  work  alone.
34  Needless  to  say,  much  of  what  passes  for  critical 
opinion regarding Sartre has been inherited from the critical assassinations carried out 
by  structuralist  and  post-structuralist  thinkers  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,
35  and  in  his 
defence Christine Howells argues that: “his earliest writings problematizes any easy 
understanding of the subject, casting doubt on all attempts at identifying it other than 
self  divided  and  self-negating  […]  this  lack  of  self-identity  is  less  a  curse  to  be 
disguised than an escape route from a noxious fixity” (1992:334). That is, despite his 
best  efforts  Sartre  failed  to  understand  in  toto,  the  human  condition  free  from 
metaphysics, yet with this self-doubt — seen with his constant reworking and vitriolic 
criticism  of  his  own  work  —  he  personally  expressed  better  than  anyone  the 
philosophical expression the aporia of subjectivity he posited in Nausea and Being and 
Nothingness. However, Sartre’s mistake was to  determine a way out of that aporia 
through the metaphysical ‘literature of freedom,’ rather than seeing it as a ‘possible’ 
Road to Freedom. As Howells explains, despite all of these shortcomings: “however 
fragile the Sartrean subject may appear, however far from the creative, self-determining 
humanist ideal, a subject of sorts still remains: be it alienated or non self-identical, its 
very fissures and cracks are what lets it escape the deterministic process” (339). And 
perhaps  it  is  with  this  a  priori  inability  to  account  for  a  self-present  subject  in  a 
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3.3.a. Albert Camus — The Absurd Rebel and the Aporia of Existence 
 
To conclude this atemporal theoretical teleology of the diminished subject I shall now 
turn my attention to the life and works of Albert Camus who, despite being critically 
derided for a supposed lack of intellectual rigour, is included in this thesis due to his 
belief  in  the  validity  of  literary  investigations  into  human  existence.  However,  the 
controversy regarding his theoretical propositions also indicates a tacit complicity by his 
critics with the age-old dichotomy that continues to divide literature and philosophy. It 
is my contention that while Camus continues to attack metaphysics and attempts to 
redress Plato’s ‘wrong turn,’ in his personal conflicts we see raised the spectre of an 
aporia replete throughout his art and life. For the purpose of this section then, I shall 
limit my discussion of Camus’ oeuvre to his most famous novels, The Outsider and The 
Plague,  and to  his  two  key  theoretical  texts,  The  Myth  of  Sisyphus  and  The Rebel, 
focusing on the  shift from an earlier nihilistic existentialism towards  a hypothetical 
perspective  of  a  meaningful  existence  through  rebellion  and  community  despite  the 
absurdity of existence. Needless to say certain aspects of Camus’ personal life not only 
make for interesting reading, they are also pertinent to this thesis, and this is especially 
true of his relationship with Jean-Paul Sartre. Therefore, the latter part of this section 
will include a discussion of Sartre’s ‘political turn,’ something deliberately overlooked 
in the previous section given the impact it would have on Camus’ life and work and, in 
light of his untimely death, an unjustly negative perspective of both.  
 
3.3.b. The Outsider — The Aporia of the Absurd 
 
‘A few years ago I read a book by an American author, called Is Life Worth Living? 
Isn’t that the question you are asking yourself?’ 
No, obviously that isn’t the question I am asking myself. But I don’t want to explain 
anything. 
‘He concluded,’ the Autodidact tells me in a consoling voice, ‘in favour of deliberate 
optimism. Life has a meaning if you choose to give it one. First of all you must act, 
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already  cast,  you  are  already  involved. I  don’t know  what  you  think  about  that, 
Monsieur?’  
‘Nothing,’ I say … 
The  Autodidact  smiles  with  a  certain  malice  and  much  solemnity:  ‘It  isn’t  my 
opinion either. I don’t think we need to look so far to find the meaning of our life.’  
‘Ah?’  
‘There is a goal, Monsieur, there is a goal … there are people.’  
— Jean-Paul Sartre, in Nausea (1983:162). 
 
Although Albert Camus has been closely associated with French existentialism, this 
affiliation  was  limited  to  the  existential  nihilism  personified  in  the  character  of 
Meursault in The Outsider. Published two years after Sartre’s Nausea, his first novel is 
a fictional exploration of a subject embodying the meaninglessness of existence free of 
the  metaphysics  of  comfort,  existing  isolated  in  a  world  reluctant  to  embrace  the 
defamiliarisation  of  the  absurdities  that  apparently  give  meaning  to  our  lives.  The 
metaphysical self-present subject is greatly diminished in The Outsider as Meursault 
accepts that the only guarantee we have in life is the absurdity of existence, and the 
limitations placed on consciousness by a necessary relationship between our bodies and 
the Other. The extent of Meursault’s rejection of metaphysics and the manner in which 
his  absurdist  perspective  diminishes  the  subject,  is  succinctly  articulated  by  David 
Sprintzen in his text, Camus: A Critical Examination, wherein he explains that:  
Meursault’s revolt is not only the metaphysical rejection of social hypocrisy, but also 
the personal purgation of the temptation to play by the rules […] Meursault’s revolt 
thus consummates a series of rejections: 
* Of resignation in the face of death’s inevitability. 
* Of acceptance of the meaninglessness of life without transcendence. 
* Of any ‘leap of faith’ in an afterlife at the expense of the only life we are given 
with certainty. 
* Of the rituals of habit through which one’s life is reduced to a meaningless routine 
— often rationalized in terms of a hoped-for-life hereafter. 
* Of the oppression of normal social order in which we are expected to be, feel, and 
behave in accordance with the ‘rules of the game’ (1988:39-40). 
 
While not wishing to condense the plot of this well-known novel, Meursault’s actions 
can be seen to exist outside of the metaphysical conventions of acceptable society, and 
see  him  conclude  his  last  moment  of  ‘freedom’  with  the  cold-blooded  murder  of  a 
nameless Arab. However, it the lack of emotion he shows over the recent death of his   148 
Mother that convinces the jury to sentence him to death, and indicates the extent of the 
limitations placed on existential freedom which is soon replaced with anguish as the 
finitude of corporeal existence is brought into sharp relief with the temporal proximity 
of the guillotine brought to bear by the ‘Law’ of the Other. Camus explains that the 
recognition of death as a possible future presence is an example par excellence of the 
absurdity  of  being,  arguing  in  his  posthumously  published  Selected  Essays  and 
Notebooks that: “There is only one case which despair is pure: that of the man sentenced 
to  death  […]  A  man  driven  to  despair  by  love  might  be  asked  if  he  wanted  to  be 
guillotined on the next day and would refuse. Because of the horror of punishment? 
Yes. But here, the horror springs from the complete certainty of what is going to happen 
[…] Here the absurd is perfectly clear” (1979:216). Thus, despite his rejection of the 
metaphysical, his impending death leads Meursault to the ultimate expression of the 
absurdity of existence, as a set of discursive codes and conventions ‘literally’ bring 
about his death. Thus, Meursault’s failure to effect any change in a world caught up in 
the metaphysics of comfort, indicates the failure of the subject to attain the existential 
freedom alluded to by Sartre, and highlights the absurdity of isolated rebellion. 
  The difficulties faced by the individual embracing existential nihilism become 
clear with Meursault’s interaction with certain figures of authority following his arrest. 
Nietzsche’s view of the lingering shadow of God becomes apparent when Meursault 
explains to the Magistrate that he is an unbeliever: “This was unthinkable, he said; all 
men believed in God, even those who reject Him. Of this he was absolutely sure; if he 
ever  came  to  doubt  it,  his  life  would  lose  all  meaning.  ‘Do  you  wish,’  he  asked 
indignantly, ‘my life to have no meaning?’ Really I couldn’t see how my wishes came 
into it, and I told him as much” (1960:39). Meursault’s rejection of the metaphysics of 
an inherent moral human essence is expressed by the Prosecutor: “And I tried to follow 
what came next, as the prosecutor was now considering what he considered my ‘soul.’   149 
He said he’d studied it closely — and had found it blank, ‘literally nothing, gentlemen 
of the jury.’ Really, he said, I had no soul, there was nothing human about me, not one 
of those moral qualities which normal men possess had any place in my mentality” 
(1960:57). And the Chaplain expresses the unlimited nihilism of the recognition of the 
meaninglessness of existence: “I could see the chaplain was old hand at it, as his gaze 
never faltered. And his voice was quite steady when he said: ‘Have you no hope at all? 
Do you really think that when you die you die outright, and nothing remains?’ I said: 
‘Yes.’ He dropped his eyes and sat down again. He was truly sorry for me he said. It 
must make life unbearable for a man, to think as I did” (1960:65).  
  Therefore, The Outsider can be viewed as the ultimate negation of subjectivity as 
we see Meursault ‘literally’ diminished to death, and rather than being a tale of abject 
absurdity,  it  can  instead  be  read  as  a  cautionary  tale  regarding  the  limitations  of 
existential  nihilism.  Furthermore,  we  see  in  Meursault’s  final  comments  a  calm 
resignation regarding the meaninglessness of existence and a recognition that death is 
the closest the subject can ever get to attaining pure self-presence: “Actually, I was 
surer of myself, sure about everything, far surer than he; sure of my present life and of 
the death that was coming […] I’d passed my life in a certain way, and I might have 
passed it in a different way, if I’d felt like it. I’d acted thus, and I hadn’t acted otherwise 
[…] And what did all that mean? That, all the time, I’d been waiting for this present 
moment, for that dawn, tomorrow’s or another day’s, which was to justify me. Nothing, 
nothing had the least importance, and I knew quite well” (1960:67). This is the nearest 
Meursault comes to expressing regret, and leaves us with little doubt that Camus is 
suggesting that such an absurdist existence is far from a sensible way to live one’s life. 
Germaine Brée supports this view in her book Camus arguing that:  
Meursault, in his short life, via his physical person, spans life and death, violence 
done  and  suffered,  understanding,  love,  delight,  solitude,  joy,  and  suffering.  The 
body limits and defines man’s freedom, the feel of his options, and the nature of his 
relations  with  other  human  beings.  Social  conventions  are  secondary,  and   150 
subsequent. All options people make in life are of consequence because they concern 
finite human beings. Meursault is not responsible for the world given to him nor for 
the people he encounters. He is responsible for the manner in which he acts in it and 
upon them; neither is his initial ‘innocence’ not his awakening can change his act. 
Remorse would not change it either (1972:145).  
 
This ironic acceptance of the inevitability of death as life’s only certitude, coupled with 
the isolated absurdist’s inevitable conflict with society and the Other — as seen with the 
death  of  the  Arab  —  greatly  influenced  Camus’  subsequent  work.  Thus,  with 
Meursault’s literal death, we see Camus turn away from the existentialist aporia of 
nihilism in order to postulate a meaningful existence for the subject alongside the Other, 
and  not  in  spite  of  them,  although  as  we  shall  see  this  was  not  without  its  own 
metaphysical problems.   
 
3.3.c. The Myth of Sisyphus — The Rejection of Existential Nihilism 
 
Having explored in The Outsider the ultimate negation of existential nihilism as the 
recognition  of  the  meaninglessness  of  existence,  in  The  Myth  of  Sisyphus  Camus 
ironically undertakes a certain resurrection of the individual by exploring suicide as a 
possible  solution  to  the  absurdity  of  being.  It  is  Camus’  proposition  that  despite  a 
realisation of the aporia of existence, the failure of the human race to commit suicide en 
masse has legitimate philosophical implications, explaining that: “There is but one truly 
serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth 
living amounts to answering the fundamental questions of philosophy” (1975:11). He 
goes on in the 1955 ‘Preface’ to The Myth to explain that: 
The  fundamental  subject  of  The  Myth  of  Sisyphus  is  this:  it  is  legitimate  and 
necessary to wonder whether life has a meaning; therefore it is legitimate to meet the 
problem of suicide face to face. The answer, underlying and appearing through the 
paradoxes which cover it, is this: even if one does not believe in God, suicide is not 
legitimate.  Written  fifteen  years  ago,  in  1940,  amidst  the  French  and  European 
disaster, this book declares that even within the limits of nihilism it is possible to find 
the means to proceed beyond nihilism. In all the books I have written since, I have 
attempted  to  pursue  this  direction.  Although  The  Myth  of  Sisyphus  poses  mortal 
problems, it sums itself up as for me as a lucid invitation to live and create, in the 
very midst of the desert (1975:7). 
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For  Camus,  that  the  recognition  of  the  absurdity  of  being  does  not  lead  to  suicide 
implies  a  sufficient  reason  for  being  which  sustains  the  subject,  and  a  necessary 
rejection of existential nihilism and an uneasy acceptance of the aporia of a world still 
replete with limiting metaphysical constraints. Camus advises that to survive we must 
reject  nihilism  and  suicide  as  options  and  must  co-exist  with  the  absurd  in:  “a 
confrontation  and  an  unceasing  struggle,  [and  by]  carrying  the  absurd  logic  to  its 
conclusion, I must admit that that struggle implies a total absence of hope (which has 
nothing to do with despair), a continual rejection (which must not be confused with 
renunciation), and a conscious dissatisfaction (which must not be compared to immature 
unrest)” (1975:34-5). Thus, in The Myth we see a shift away from the purely nihilistic 
existential  view  of  subjectivity  toward  an  acceptance  of  the  aporia  of  metaphysics, 
while Camus postulates how the irrevocably diminished subject can continue to exist 
despite this impasse. 
  While it is true that Camus explored the anti-metaphysical opportunities opened 
up with Nietzsche’s declaration of the ‘death of God,’ we see in both the style and 
content of The Myth a determinedly anti-determinist approach yet further removed from 
existentialism, which he began referring to as philosophical suicide.
36 David Sprintzen 
outlines the distancing of The Myth from the existential nihilism of The Outsider: 
If  […]  the  origins  of  this  essay  in  a  sensibility  in  rebellion  against  Christian 
absolutism are beyond question, that existential negation, with which Camus is all 
too  often  uncritically  associated,  hardly  provided  the  answer  for  him.  Quite  the 
contrary! He finds in existentialism the same unquenchable thirst for the Absolute 
and an impassioned inability to come to terms with nonbelief (1988:43).  
 
Thus, in Meursault we find a fictional exploration of existential negation and resultant 
nihilism, while in The Myth we see Camus the essayist setting out on his own. That 
Camus intended to postulate rather than predict the possible outcomes of this aporia of 
the  absurd  as  opposed  to  the  deterministic  existentialism  of  negation,  is  more  than 
apparent, and finds him explaining early in The Myth — in ‘An Absurd Reasoning’ —   152 
that:  “The  pages  that  follow  deal  with  an  absurd  sensitivity  that  can  be  found 
widespread in the age — and not with an absurd philosophy which our time, properly 
speaking, has not known […] But it is useful to note at the same time that the absurd, 
hitherto taken as a conclusion, is considered in this essay as a starting point […] There 
will be found here merely the description, in the pure state, of an intellectual malady. 
No metaphysic, no belief is involved in it for a moment” (1975:10). As such, for Camus 
The Myth is a genealogical essay into the absurd, which attempts to express knowledge 
rather than metaphysical propositions. He explains further that: “It must be repeated that 
the reasoning developed in this essay leaves out altogether the most widespread spiritual 
attitude of our enlightened age: the one, based on the principle that all is reason, which 
aims  to  explain  the  world”  (1975:43).  However,  while  rejecting  the  history  of 
metaphysical  reasoning  we  find  him  clearly  calling  for  a  new  optimistic  approach 
suggesting that: “In fact, our aim is to shed light upon the step taken by the mind when, 
starting from a philosophy of the world’s lack of meaning, it ends up by finding a 
meaning and depth in it” (1975:44). Therefore, in The Myth we find Camus searching 
for  a  middle  ground  between  metaphysics  and  nihilism,  yet  it  was  his  increasing 
distance from existentialism that would have a marked impact.
37 
  Having  accepted  the  failure  of  suicide  to  provide  a  viable  alternative  to  the 
meaninglessness  of  existence,  Camus  set  about  hypothesizing  what  life  with  the 
acceptance of the aporia of the absurd would resemble, and argued that once suicide 
was  removed  as  a  viable  option,  the  recognition  of  the  arbitrary  and  metaphysical 
limitations of existence would empower the subject, arguing in The Myth that: “It was 
previously a question of finding out whether or not life had to have a meaning to be 
lived. It now becomes clear on the contrary that it will be lived all the better if it has no 
meaning. Living an experience, a particular fate, is accepting it fully […] [t]he theme of 
permanent revolution is thus carried into individual experience” (1975:53). Thus, for   153 
Camus,  this  acceptance  of  the  absurdity  of  existence  leaves  the  subject  at  once 
metaphysically diminished and enhanced by the opportunities of freedom.
38 He expands 
on  this  proposition  arguing  that  with  the  rejection  of  suicide  comes  an  increased 
awareness of the finitude of existence and the relative approximation of one’s death: 
Losing oneself in that bottomless certainty, feeling henceforth sufficiently remote 
from one’s own life to increase it and take a broad view of it — this involves the 
principle of a liberation. Such new independence has a definite time-limit, like any 
freedom of action. It does not write a cheque on eternity. But it takes the place of the 
illusion of freedom, which all stopped with death. [I]t is clear that death and the 
absurd are here the principles of the only reasonable freedom: that which a human 
heart can experience and live (1975:58). 
 
Thus, with the recognition of the meaninglessness of existence we see Camus postulate 
a new ‘absurd man’
39 emboldened by the realisation of the finitude of mortality and free 
to explore and enjoy existence despite its limitations, leading him to argue that: “Thus I 
draw from the absurd three consequences which are my revolt, my freedom and my 
passion. But the mere activity of consciousness I transform into a rule of life what was 
an invitation to death — and I refuse suicide” (1975:62). Finally we see in the ‘absurd 
man’  —  for  we  are  still  at  this  stage  discussing  a  singular  process  —  a  greater 
appreciation of a life free of nihilism and suicidal thoughts, with Camus indicating that: 
“Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth. They are inseparable. It 
would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd discovery. 
It happens as well as that the feeling of the absurd springs from happiness” (1975:110). 
Thus, we see in The Myth a concerted effort by Camus to hypothesise a raison d’être 
for a subject who, although still greatly diminished by the absurd, can find a joy in 
living instead of wallowing in existential despair.
40  
  Despite the obvious differences between The Outsider and The Myth, there began 
a process of conflation whereby Camus’ literature began to be judged in light of his 
philosophical works. In Camus: A Critical Study, Patrick McCarthy argues that Sartre 
was especially guilty of this explaining that: “Camus was justly irritated when Sartre   154 
used Le Mythe de Sisyphe to interpret L’Etranger. To write about the alien universe in a 
book of ideas was different from depicting it in a novel. As pieces of writing these 
works  have  separate  as  well  as  overlapping  origins”  (1982:143).  Thus,  began  the 
problematic  relationship  between  Camus,  Sartre  and  philosophy,  whereby  his 
theoretical propositions were often ignored and — despite his clear intentions, and due 
in part to the close temporal proximity of these texts — The Myth was mistakenly read 
as  a  deterministic  manifesto  for  the  nihilistic  existential  subject  of  The  Outsider.
41 
Furthermore, despite Sartre’s initial call for a ‘literary turn,’ this deterministic tendency 
to read Camus’ literature in light of his own philosophical and political positions was to 
have major ramifications. 
  
3.3.d. The Plague — Commitment or Community 
 
The language he used was that of a man who was sick and tired of the world he lived 
in — though he had much liking for his fellow-men — and had resolved for his part, 
to have no truck with injustice and compromises with the truth.  
— Albert Camus, in The Plague (1960:76).  
 
Having investigated the manner in which The Outsider an The Myth of Sisyphus explore 
the individual embracing the absurdity of existence in divergent fashions, I shall now 
turn  my  attention  to  the  manner  in  which  Camus  explored  how  the  ‘absurd  man’ 
necessarily interacts with the Other. By the time that The Plague was published in 1947 
— after a lengthy gestation period due to the German occupation of France — Sartre 
had already published both Being and Nothingness and the essays that would make up 
What is Literature? An inevitable friendship between the two was born out of their 
involvement in the Resistance, and resulted in Camus being closely associated with the 
existential movement. However, as seen with The Myth, Camus had begun to distance 
himself from the negativity of existentialism, an attitude that had been exacerbated by 
the recent atrocities of WWII. Furthermore, we see Camus having problems reconciling 
himself  with  Sartre’  tendency  to  demonise  the  Other  in  both  his  literature  and   155 
philosophy,  something  understandable  given  his  experiences  successfully  rebelling 
alongside so many ‘Others’ as the editor of the clandestine newspaper Combat, and 
witnessing firsthand many sacrifices during his time with the Resistance.  
  That  Camus  should  take  steps  to  distance  himself  theoretically  from  Sartre’s 
nihilistic  view  of  the  Other  is  made  clear  by  Hazel  Barnes  in  her  ‘Translator’s 
Introduction’  to  Being  and  Nothingness,  wherein  she  explains  that:  “In  light  of  the 
numerous statements to the effect that man is a useless passion and that life is absurd, 
and in view of Sartre’s attempt to show that all of the familiar attitudes towards the 
Other — love, hate, masochism, sadism, and indifference — result in failure, it is no 
wonder  that  critics  have  been  sceptical  as  to  the  possibility  of  future  positive 
development” (1956:li). As such, The Plague investigates the possibility of the ‘absurd 
man’ existing in solidarity with Others in the face of the ultimate absurd situation of a 
random and indiscriminate death, and can be seen as a direct response to his experiences 
in WWII and his postulations in The Myth. If ‘hell is other people’ as Sartre believed, 
then in The Plague we see a community in hell, forced to work communally for their 
survival.  Although  The  Plague  has  been  read  predominantly  as  an  allegory  of  the 
French Resistance, it can also be read as an example of ‘Others’ being forced to work 
together in the face of a far greater absurdity. Camus’ text embraces and expands on the 
acceptance  of  the  aporia  of  the  absurd,  and  uses  the  metaphor  of  the  plague  to 
defamiliarise  the  metaphysics  of  everyday  life  through  the  drastic realisation  of  the 
imminence of death, in much the same way as he did with Meursault in The Outsider, 
and as seen during the Occupation of wartime France. Thus, we see him continuing the 
teleology of the diminished subject, as the possibility of an imminent death removes the 
metaphysics of existential freedom, and results in the subject being forced to live from 
moment to moment.
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  As narrator of The Plague, Doctor Rieux articulates the manner that the condition 
of the possibility of change has manifested itself as a disease that defamiliarises the 
metaphysics of self-presence, stating that: “This drastic, clean-cut deprivation and our 
complete ignorance of what the future had in store had taken us unawares; we were 
unable to react against the mute appeal of presences, still so near and already so far, 
which  haunted  us  all  day  long”  (1960:110).  Furthermore,  there  is  little  doubt  that 
Camus believed that an encounter with such an extreme example of the absurdity of 
existence would force the individual to take stock of their relationship with the Other, 
using the example of the separated lovers to explain this: “To come at last, and more 
specifically, to the case of parted lovers who present the greatest interest and of whom 
the  narrator  is,  perhaps,  better  qualified  to  speak  —  their  minds  were  the  prey  of 
different emotions, notably remorse. For their present situation enabled them to take 
stock of their feelings with a sort of feverish objectivity. And, in these conditions, it was 
rare for them not to detect their own shortcomings” (112). Thus, we see the subjects of 
The  Plague  variously  diminished,  for  not  only  is  there  an  acute  awareness  of  the 
momentary nature of self-presence, the taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life — as 
seen with such metaphysical concepts such as love — cannot be guaranteed beyond the 
present moment. Rieux explains that the: “Here and Now had come to mean everything 
to them. For there is no denying that the plague had gradually killed off in all of us the 
faculty  not  of  love  only  but  even  of  friendship.  Naturally  enough,  since  love  asks 
something of the future, and nothing was left for us but a series of present moments” 
(176).  Thus,  in  The  Plague,  we  see  Camus  literally  diminishing  the  metaphysical 
subject out of existence, as the momentary and fragile nature of all human presence 
replaces the nihilism of the absurd individual.  
  Despite the extreme nature of their situation, at no time do the characters in The 
Plague stop fighting the disease, and it is here that the novel becomes more than just an   157 
allegory of the war, and rather a metaphor for the continued fight against metaphysical 
determinism.  That  is,  the  aporia  of  the faceless  nature  of  death  represented  by  the 
plague  becomes  a  metaphor  for  various  forms  of  totalitarianism  replete  throughout 
Europe at the time. Despite the inhabitants of the town continuing to battle the plague it 
eventually abates of its own accord, and much like the Resistance following the Allied 
invasion  of  Normandy,  the  characters  are  not  wholly  responsible  for  their  victory. 
Furthermore, as Rieux observes the celebrations that understandably erupt following the 
end of the plague, he recognises the need for continued vigilance should another type of 
pestilence arise — much as Nazism did following WWI.
43 Rieux expresses this caution 
in the final passages wherein we observe the observer thus: 
[A]s he listened to the cries of joy rising from the town, Rieux remembered that such 
joy is always imperilled. He knew what those jubilant crowds did not know but could 
have learned from books; that the plague bacillus never dies or disappears for good; 
that it can lie dormant for years and years in furniture and linen-chests; that it bides 
its time in bedrooms, cellars, trunks and bookshelves; and that perhaps the day would 
come when, for the bane and the enlightenment of men, it roused up its rats again 
and sent them forth to die in a happy city (250). 
 
Therefore, we can read The Plague as a cautionary tale regarding our confidence in a 
possible future presence free of the oppression of totalitarian dogmas as fraught with 
danger,
44 while Doctor Rieux best exemplifies this vigilance and reflects Camus’ own 
questions  regarding  the  violent  activities  then  taking  place  in  Stalinist  Russia.
45 
However, despite the overall pessimistic tone of the novel, The Plague does represent a 
marked shift from the absurd individual both The Outsider and The Myth, and this move 
towards a view of a community rebelling against the absurdity of existence does indeed 
mark a break from the existential nihilism of Sartre. That Camus still maintains an 
optimistic  perspective  toward  humanity  despite  this  absurdity  is  best  expressed  by 
Rieux  when  he  proclaims:  “to  state  quite  simply  what  we  can  learn  in  a  time  of 
pestilence: that there are more things to admire in men than to despise” (25).  
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3.3.e. The Rebel: Camus’ Failed Rebellion 
 
Having carried out a fictionalised account of a  community fighting against extreme 
absurdity in The Plague, Camus used the theme of hopeful resistance as his springboard 
for The Rebel, returning to the lyrical essay form to explore the nature of rebellion 
stretching back to the French Revolution. This new focus was a logical progression that 
questioned at what point a community would revolt against the metaphysical absurdity 
of their lives, implying that any rebellion — despite the inherent meaninglessness of 
existence  —  must  necessarily  be  in  defence  of  something.  Camus  explains  this 
perspective  early  on  arguing  that:  “Rebellion  cannot  exist  without  feeling  that 
somewhere, in some way, you are justified. It is in this way that the rebel slave says yes 
and no at the same time. He affirms that there are limits and also that he suspects — and 
wishes to preserve — the existence of certain things beyond those limits. He stubbornly 
insists that there are certain things in him which ‘are worth while …’ and which must be 
taken into consideration” (1975:19). That is, despite the realisation of the metaphysical 
limits that restrict the existential freedom implicit in Sartre’s work, Camus posits that 
under certain circumstances rebellion is necessary to prevent totalitarian oppression, 
such as seen during WWII. However, as he explains this: 
Metaphysical rebellion is the means by which a man protests against his conditions 
and against the whole of creation. It is metaphysical because it disputes the ends of 
man and of creation. The slave protests against the conditions of his state of slavery; 
the metaphysical rebel protests against the human condition in general. The rebel 
slave affirms there is something in him which will not tolerate the manner in which 
his master treats him; the metaphysical rebel declares that he is frustrated by the 
universe (29).  
 
As such, we see Camus continuing his attack on totalitarianism indicating that the fight 
against deterministic regimes such as neo-Nietzschean Nazism — and seen with his 
increasing distance from existential nihilism — are still responses to metaphysics.
46  
  Stylistically The Rebel is an attempt at a non-deterministic history of rebellion, 
that hypothesises that the aim of any given revolt is to free a community from various   159 
forms of totalitarianism that threaten the happiness he sees as necessary for meaningful 
existence.
47 David Sprintzen supports this view suggesting that The Rebel:  
[I]s  not  offered  as  a  comprehensive  or  universal  theory  of  human  nature,  or  of 
politics and  social theory, nor does it attempt to present any precise program of 
action. Rather its aim is diagnostic, attending to what Camus feels to be a pathology 
of  the  Western  mind  prevalent  for  the  last  150  years  […]  These  concerns, 
metaphysical in nature, bear upon human destiny as cultural and historical forces 
have contoured the terms in which such issues find expression (1988:121).  
 
Furthermore, it is Camus’ proposition that the recent history of revolt coinciding with 
the  ‘death  of  God’  —  as  witnessed  with  the  deterministic  view  of  negation  as  the 
metaphysics  of  existential  philosophy  —  has  seen  revolt  transformed  into  political 
ideology,  explaining  that:  “Human  rebellion  ends  in  metaphysical  revolution.  It 
progresses from appearance to facts, from dilettantism to revolutionary commitment. 
When  the  throne  of  God  is  overthrown,  the  rebel  realizes  that  it  is  now  his  own 
responsibility to create the justice, order, and unity that he sought in vain within his own 
condition and, in this way, to justify the fall of God. Then begins the desperate effort to 
create, at the price of sin if necessary, the dominion of man” (1975:31). That is, one 
form of metaphysics replaces another just as the vacuum of religious belief is filled by 
politics. As Sprintzen goes on to explain, the: “reduction of philosophy to ideology in 
the  service  of  a  totalizing  praxis  is  the  contemporary  response  to  a  metaphysical 
imperative legated to us by the collapse of traditional religion […] The task of The 
Rebel  is  to  diagnose  this  pathology  of  intellect  that  underlies  and  undermines 
revolutionary  experience  in  order  to  contribute  to  the  rebirth  of  creative  rebellion” 
(1988:123). And it is this view of the recent totalising nature of political rebellion that 
Camus would investigate. 
  However,  the  extent  that  Camus  was  to  attack  this  counter-revolution  against 
metaphysical rebellion in The Rebel, and its reception in certain quarters, was to have 
huge ramifications. In a chapter entitled ‘State Terrorism and Irrational Terror,’ we find 
Camus discussing the Nazi Party in the same breath as pseudo-Marxist Stalinism:    160 
[T]he strange and terrifying growth of the modern State can be considered as the 
logical conclusion of inordinate technical and philosophical ambitions, foreign to the 
true spirit of rebellion, but which nevertheless gave birth to the revolutionary spirit of 
our time. The prophetic dream of Marx and the over-inspired predictions of Hegel or 
of Nietzsche ended by conjuring up, after the city of God had been razed to the 
ground, either a rational or an irrational State,  but one which in both cases was 
founded on terror (1975:146).  
 
This overtly critical response to the French Communist Party — which in 1951 held 
25%  of  the  vote  —  was,  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight  not  only  correct,  but  also 
incredibly  naïve.  Needless  to  say,  following  the  failure  of  Sartre’s  manifesto  of 
‘committed writing’ as a plausible tool for change, he had thrown himself with renewed 
vigour into left-wing politics, and it was with the publication of The Rebel that the 
evangelical-like card-carrying communist — and his team of left-wing intellectuals at 
Les Temps Modernes — turned their attention to Camus.  
  Much has been written regarding the widely publicised conflict between Camus, 
Sartre and Les Temps Modernes over their response to The Rebel. Yet Camus’ negative 
perspective of political totalitarianism was not without warrant, for although he had 
been a member of the Communist Party in Algeria before WWII, he broke with the 
party 10 years prior to Sartre joining. Germaine Brée explains this break indicating that: 
“He  could  not  accept  a  view  of  the  world  in  which  individual  human  beings  were 
considered  expendable,  whatever  the  end.  In the  thirties  it  was  because  he  saw  the 
Stalin-directed policy toward the Algerian Muslims, as a political game of checkers, 
that he broke with the Party” (1972:67). Linking political totalitarianism with violence 
was not difficult following WWII
48 — with millions dead across Europe and many still 
suffering in Communist Europe — causing a growing unease that eventually led Camus 
to side with Arthur Koestler against Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s increasingly desperate 
justifications of Stalin’s use of violence in the U.S.S.R.
49 The Rebel, therefore, can be 
read as a cautionary tale regarding violence in any form of rebellion, but especially 
when used for political ends. McCarthy also argues this perspective indicating that The   161 
Rebel was: “A philosophical essay, it was to expound the moral and political values that 
lay  beyond  nihilism.  Its  secondary  purpose  was  to  criticize  the  false  concept  of 
revolution  that  was  then  being  expounded  by  the  Communist  and  by  Les  Temps 
Modernes. Camus would show that violence could not be justified in the name of a 
future utopia” (1982:232). However, to Camus’ great misfortune by the time The Rebel 
was published, Sartre had made his ‘political turn’ in an attempt to escape the aporia 
that  was  ‘committed  literature,’  and  a  fervent  Communist  ideal  became  his  latest 
existential raison d’être. 
  Due to his close, but increasingly frosty relationship with Camus, Sartre asked for 
a volunteer at Les Temps Modernes to review The Rebel, and Francis Jeanson obliged. 
However, as McCarthy points out, with hindsight this turned out to be a mistake, as 
Jeanson merely espoused Sartre’s deterministic perspective, yet did so in a far from 
conciliatory manner, a move that understandably enraged Camus: 
In general Jeanson’s view of Camus’ writing was like Sartre’s: Camus deified the 
absurd and refused to combat it: he had a religious not a political vision […] Jeanson 
followed the same line. He talks about Hegel but neither he nor Sartre really cared 
about  the  philosophical  dispute.  He  criticizes  Camus’  style  because  his  flowing 
sentences  are  a  mark  of  acquiescence  rather  than  protest.  His  main  criticism, 
however, is that by personifying revolt and revolution and turning them into deities 
of  good  and  evil,  Camus  is  detaching  himself  from  the  flux  of  existence.  If  he 
entered it in a dialectic of revolt and situation he would be able to change it. More 
simply,  Jeanson  is  saying  that  L’Homme  Révolté  contains  many  dire  warnings 
against rebellion but no vision of revolt. Its practical conclusion is ‘that nothing can 
be done and that the only wisdom is to observe the status quo’ (256). 
 
Ironically, we see levelled at Camus the same charge of nihilism that he brought against 
existentialism  and,  more  worryingly,  the  spectre  of  right-wing  conservatism.  This 
aporia  led  Camus  to  develop  a  hypothetical  and  anti-deterministic  approach to  The 
Rebel which was unfortunately overlooked by the those at Les Temps Modernes, and 
saw the argument degenerate into an attack on his philosophical ability, rather than a 
discussion  of  the  text’s  propositions.  Thody  highlights  the  extent  of  this  vitriol 
explaining that: “the attacks on him from the left, and especially from Jean-Paul Sartre   162 
and his allies, were vigorous to the point of being quite vicious. Camus was accused of 
selling out to the middle classes, of abandoning all the fervour and moral purity of his 
early work, and of depriving the French working class, by his attack on Marxism, of all 
hope  of  improving  their  position”  (1989:12).  While  Camus  was  searching  for 
metaphysical comfort and individual joy through revolt — in a world where existential 
nihilism and political totalitarianism had both proved untenable
50 — Sartre responded 
by asking Camus: “what is the mystery that prevents people from discussing your books 
without  robbing  mankind  of  its  reason  to  live?”  (Quoted  in  McCarthy:1982:257). 
Understandably, the irony of this statement was possibly lost on Camus at the time! 
  It is important to note that despite his best efforts at a non-deterministic approach 
to writing born out his experiences in Algeria and in France during WWII, Camus was 
living  in  virulently  political  times.  Furthermore,  his  rejection  of  Sartre’s  political 
position continued with his attack of his left-wing manifesto of a politically ‘committed 
writing,’ and Brée makes this apparent indicating that Sartre: “had in fact been applying 
to  French  literature  a  Marxian  type  of  analysis  completely  new  in  his  writing.  It 
emphasized  rather  schematically  the  relation  between  the  mental  perspective  and 
ambiance  of  French  writing  and  the  class  structure  of  French  society”  (1972:27). 
Having  already  distanced  himself  from  existential  nihilism  and  turning  his  back  on 
political totalitarianism, Brée goes on to explain that: “Camus could hardly have been 
overly impressed by the tenor of Sartre’s manifesto […] He once ironically proposed an 
equivalent for the term ‘committed:’ ‘impressed,’ a literature ‘impressed’ or conscripted 
into compulsory service” (1972:35). However, in a counter irony, and despite Camus’ 
protestations, his novels and lyrical essays became the victims of a form of determinism 
that was the endpoint of various attempts to redress Plato’s ‘wrong turn.’  
  Sartre’s  fundamental  problem  with  Camus’  philosophical  position  was  the 
opposite of his own, in that he saw Camus as a writer who dabbled in philosophy while   163 
he viewed himself as a philosopher who ultimately failed as a writer. This issue is not 
lost on Henri-Bernard Levy who, when discussing Camus, states that: 
He was a writer. A journalist, a political thinker, a dramatist, but also a writer. And 
what  a  writer!  Isn’t  The  Stranger,  in  the  opinion  of  Sartre  himself,  one  of  the 
masterworks of ‘modern times’? Isn’t Meursault another Roquentin? And Roquentin 
another Meursault? And who is to say in which of the two novels the winds of the 
new  spirit  blew  more  strongly  in  those  years?  But  there  is  [a  problem]  on  the 
philosophical side of things. Camus was an amateur. The Rebel was theoretically 
superficial:  its  opponents  had  a  field-day,  alas,  castigating  its  ‘second-hand 
references,’ and its metaphysical substrate was far inferior to its impressive political 
institutions. Doubtless Sartre too was no French Heidegger. But at least he worked at 
it. At least he made an effort to pull himself up to the rigour and excellence of the 
German masters and models. His rival, meanwhile, seems to have been content with 
the master of the ‘essay’ (2003:46).  
 
This point was lost on those at Les Temps Modernes, who politically and personally 
vilified Camus for the popular success of The Rebel, despite what they saw — in an 
extreme  case  of  intellectual  snobbery  —  as  its  lack  of  intellectual  rigour.
51  In  an 
exchange that lasted several months, the vitriolic debate highlighted this elitism, and 
Sartre’s desperate belief that a faith in politics was the way out of his theoretical aporia. 
Emphasising this proposition, Brée explains that: “Sartre made short shrift of Camus’s 
[sic] point of view — discussing it in terms of his own postulations. But something 
humanly precious was lost in the debate, which is just what  Camus had wanted to 
prove. In a small way, the incident verified his contention: a totalitarian view of the 
world is antihuman” (1972:247). Thus, the hopeful voice of The Rebel is silenced as a 
result of the intellectual and political bullying of left-wing totalitarian thought.
52  
  This apparent defeat would lead Camus to focus more and more on his ‘apolitical 
art’
53 and further remove him from the political arena. However, it is important to note 
that, in a final irony, this also led to an indifference toward what he viewed as outmoded 
political factionalism which had little validity in a Cold War world at the brink of the 
ultimate existential negation in the form of nuclear annihilation
54 — something that was 
to backfire terribly. This political apathy would see the work and the life of this French 
Algerian conflated with the 1950s Algerian War, and in an extreme case of critical   164 
revisionism, would lead some to view the death of the Arab in The Outsider as proof of 
Camus’ inherent racism.
55 Thus, we see the dangers in conflating fictional characters 
with  their  authors,  and  the  deterministic  tendency  to  search  for  authorial  intent  in 
literature, something explained by Thody when indicating the irony of this situation:  
By a coincidence which Camus could not have foreseen when he wrote the novel in 
the late 1930s, it also reflects the historical situation of a culture which, like that of 
France in the early 1940s, has been deprived of its past and refused a future. Like all 
literary texts L’Etranger, can never be read ‘sub specie aeternitatis.’ It was only 
when the Algerian war made critics and readers more aware of the racial tensions 
inseparable from colonialist societies that everyone thought of analysing L’Etranger 
as an unconscious expression of a set of racialist attitudes. Since nobody can predict 
the future, it is impossible to say what meanings the readers will find fifty years from 
now (1989:43). 
  
Thus, despite Camus’ repeated attacks on metaphysics, nihilism and totalitarianism we 
see retrospective criticisms of his work along those very lines. Furthermore, we see the 
dangers in prescribing in metaphysical terms a role for literature, and of the difficulties 
in  undoing  the  dichotomy  of  the  ‘wrong turn.’ This  becomes  apparent  when  Sartre 
deterministically undermined Camus’ argument in The Rebel in light of his own flawed 
perspective  of  the  philosophical  and  political  role  of  left-wing  ‘committed  writing,’ 
something that Camus had foreseen would quickly be outmoded as world events moved 
beyond the metaphysics of Sartre’s temporally specific ‘political turn.’ 
  Finally then, we see in Camus an example par excellence of the various issues 
explored in this teleology of the diminished subject, for despite the repeated attempts of 
the  aforementioned  theorists  to  escape  the  theoretical  impasse  of  the  philosophical 
tradition,  and  to  posit  a  conclusive  understanding  of  human  existence  beyond 
metaphysics,  they  all  ended  in  aporia.  However,  Camus  accepted  the  absurdity  of 
meaninglessness of existence and wholeheartedly embraced this aporia, positing the 
inevitable need for the metaphysics of comfort at some level. This recognition of the 
inherent limitations of any given investigation into subjectivity, is stressed in The Rebel 
wherein he argues that:    165 
We know at the end of this long inquiry into rebellion and nihilism that rebellion 
with no other limits but historical expediency signifies ultimate slavery. To escape 
this fate, the revolutionary mind, if one wants to remain alive, must therefore return 
again to the source of rebellion and draw its inspiration from the only system of 
thought which is faithful to its origins; thought that recognizes limits (1975:9).  
 
That is, Camus’ dichotomy stems from the recognition that while an optimistic future 
for  the  subject  necessitates  the  acceptance  of  certain  metaphysical  and  arbitrary 
constraints, the need to rebel against oppression remains necessary in order to defend 
what he viewed as an innate human right to joyful existence.
56 
  However,  as  is  made  clear  with  the  critical  responses  to  his  metaphysical 
postulations in The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel, the intelligentsia of his day — 
despite their own philosophical and political determinisms — were still railing against 
metaphysics and denied Camus’ absurd subject a meaningful existence, in both a literal 
and figurative sense, by refusing to accept the a priori nature of the metaphysics of 
comfort.  Camus  indicates  this  tendency  clearly  in  The  Myth  when  he  states,  with 
metaphysical certitude that, the only guarantees in life are that there are no guarantees:  
What I know, what is certain, what I cannot deny, what I cannot reject — this is what 
counts. I can negate everything of that part of me that lives on vague nostalgias, 
except this desire for unity, this longing to solve, this need for clarity and cohesion. I 
can refute everything in this world surrounding me that offends or enraptures me, 
except this chaos, this sovereign chance and this divine equivalence which springs 
from anarchy. I don’t know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it. But 
I know that I do not know that meaning and it is impossible for me to know it. What 
can a meaning outside of my condition mean to me? I can understand only in human 
terms. What I touch, what resists me — that is what I understand. And these two 
certainties — my appetite for the absolute and for unity and the impossibility of 
reducing  this  world  to  a  rational  and reasonable  principle  —  I  also  know  that  I 
cannot reconcile them. What other truth can I admit without lying, without bringing 
in a hope I lack, which means nothing within the limits of my condition? (51).   
 
Thus, despite Camus’ acceptance of the limiting metaphysical nature of existence, he 
was  unable  to  maintain  his  own  rebellion  in  the  face  of  totalitarian  political  and 
philosophical  views,  such  as  existential  nihilism  and  Marxism,  thus  becoming  a 
philosophical ‘outsider.’ In turn, we find the subject still crying out for the certitude of 
being and the need for the metaphysical comfort wrenched from their lives with the   166 
‘death of God,’ and with the failure of philosophy, politics and religion to provide them 
with a suitable panacea. Therefore, it is possible to view the deterministic silencing of 
Camus’ investigation into the possibility of a future subject ‘happily’ existing with the 
recognition of the absurdity of existence, as giving rise to a ‘condition’ that has created 
‘nostalgia’ for a loss of certitude in the face of nihilism. Thus, despite the hopes of The 
Rebel, there has arisen a predominant view of the contemporary subject as suffering 
from a ‘postmodern condition’ — yet another name for the aporia of the diminished 
subject — and being incapable of dealing with the absurdity of existence without a 
misplaced desire for metaphysical transcendence.  
 
3.4.a. In Summation — Chapter 3 
If one thing becomes clear from this investigation into the meaninglessness of existence 
it is the danger of determinism, and the unfortunate tendency for those fighting the 
oppression of certain metaphysical discourses to become victim to the more aggressive 
and totalitarian responses of those fearful of any manifestation of the condition of the 
possibility  of  change,  or  due  to  the  eager  appropriation  of  temporally  specific,  and 
problematic,  political  beliefs  to  fill  this  a  priori  void.  Although  Nietzsche  argued 
repeatedly against the traditional determinism of metaphysical philosophy and religion 
— urging those ‘free subjects’ to recognise the terror of existence and embrace the 
possibilities of their freedom — his anti-metaphysical pursuits were problematised by 
the condition of the possibility of change. This led to the metaphorical postulations of 
his  aphoristic  writing  style  being  taken  literally  by  those  eager  to  justify their  own 
totalitarian political views, and to legitimate unimaginable acts of terror by proposing 
the political dogma of nationalism in order to provide the metaphysics of comfort in a 
time  of  extreme  crisis.  Although  Sartre  himself  continued  this  anti-metaphysical 
teleology — following the terror of WWII and the failure ‘committed writing’ to stir the 
‘inauthentic subject’ from ‘bad faith’ — he also unquestionably appropriated Marxist   167 
discourses to assuage his need for tangible change. However, he fell into the trap of 
metaphysical  determinism,  and  swept  aside  any  counter-arguments  to  his  need  for 
certitude letting his lofty academic mind resort to the lowly character assassination of 
those  opposing  his  intellectual  might.  And  although  Camus  —  who  cautiously  and 
optimistically posited a future for the subject aware of the meaninglessness of existence, 
and the need for the metaphysics of comfort to maintain the joy of living as opposed to 
existential  nihilism  —  found  himself  on  the  receiving  end  of  Sartre’s  deterministic 
diatribes,  the  possible  positive  outcomes  of  his  postulations  remain  unknown,  not 
simply  because  of  the  diminished  credibility  that  his  work  suffered  as  a  result  of 
Sartre’s attacks, but because his particular narrative was cut short by a fatal automobile 
accident — perhaps an extreme example of a physical manifestation of the condition of 
the possibility of change. 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
1 For a full explanation of Nietzsche’s investigation into the Dionysian character see The Birth of Tragedy 
(1872), wherein he argues that tragedy acts as a genre of compromise between the absolute austerity of 
the  Apollonian  and  the  profligate  excesses  of  the  Dionysian.  In  Death,  Desire  and  Loss,  Jonathan 
Dollimore  explains  that  Nietzsche’s  interest  in  Dionysus  instigated  his  attack  on  metaphysical 
subjectivity: “Earlier he had taken from Schopenhauer the idea that to be in touch with the most profound 
reality involves a dissolution of individuality, a death of the self. This is an idea that Nietzsche will retain, 
albeit  in  a  modified  form.  Such  dissolution  is  what  happens  in  Dionysiac  rapture:  the  principle  of 
individuation is shattered in ‘mystical self-abrogation’ or ‘un-selving;’ it is shown to be a ‘mere figment.’ 
One ‘sinks back into’ the ‘primordial One.’ The process involves a ‘Lethean element in which everything 
that has been experienced by  the individual  is drowned,’  a ‘chasm of oblivion,’  a ‘shattering of the 
individual,’ a ‘delight felt at the annihilation of the individual’” (1998:236-237). 
2  For  Nietzsche,  the  acceptance  of  ascetic  morality  was  a  nihilistic  abdication  of  responsibility  and 
restrictive to the growth and development of the subject, explaining in The Antichrist that: “Life itself is 
to my mind the instinct for growth, for durability, for an accumulation of forces, for power: where the 
will to power is lacking there is decline. It is my contention that all the supreme values of mankind lack 
this will — that the values which are symptomatic of decline, nihilistic values, are lording it under the 
holiest names” (1954:572). 
3 In the Genealogy Nietzsche explains the manner in which subjectivity is delivered from the nausea of 
the meaningless of existence through the self-presence of transcendence, yet indicates that this in fact 
diminishes the subject. Needless to say this perspective was to be extrapolated further by Jean-Paul Sartre 
in Nausea and Being and Nothingness.   
4  Nietzsche  explains  this  need  for  a  revaluation  of  what  he  views  as  the  arbitrary  nature  of  the 
philosophical tradition in the ‘Preface’ to Human, All Too Human stating that: “With an evil laugh he 
overturns what he finds concealed, spared until then by some shame; he investigates how these things 
look if they are overturned. There is some arbitrariness and pleasure in the arbitrariness to it, if he then 
perhaps  directs  his  favour  to  that  which  previously  stood  in  disrepute  —  if  he  creeps  curiously  and 
enticingly around what is most forbidden. Behind his ranging activity … stands the question mark of an 
ever more dangerous curiosity. ‘Cannot all values be overturned? And is Good perhaps Evil? And God 
only an invention, a nicety of the devil? Is everything perhaps ultimately false?” (1994:7). 
5 In her ‘Introduction’ to Human, All Too Human, Marion Faber explains that rather than destroying 
conventions, it is with the ‘free spirit’ that Nietzsche begins postulating the possible outcome of his   168 
                                                                                                                                              
‘deconstruction:’ “In these four books, Nietzsche’s famous ‘philosophizing with a hammer’ is anticipated, 
for his prime aim is not so much to construct new systems of values or beliefs as to shatter — with some 
regret for their loss — the old, erroneous way of thinking. However, in Section Five, on high and low 
culture,  Nietzsche  is  no  longer  simply  destroying.  Rather,  he  also  presents  his  own  answer  to  the 
demolition he has just accomplished, formulating at some length and depth the idea of the ‘free spirit’ 
(Freigeist), which is to evolve in his later works into the sage Zarathustra, one who is paving the way for 
the  Superman,  the  ultimate  form  of  man  […]  In  [‘A  Book  for  Free  Spirits’]  Nietzsche  outlines  the 
function of the free spirit within a culture: it is his role to challenge the old, the conventional, to wound 
the society at its vulnerable spot” (1994:xxi). 
6 That idea that Nietzsche’s ‘free spirit’ was born out of the possibilities of freedom is explained by Faber 
who explains that in 1876: “the prodigious young professor of philosophy at Basel […] was forced to 
leave the academy. His increasingly bad health [due to syphilis] made it necessary for him to request a 
leave from his academic duties […] It was not only his health, however, but also his conviction that 
academic life was stifling and a hindrance to a true philosopher which prompted his departure” (1994:x). 
7 Nietzsche explains the conceptual nature of the ‘free spirit’ in ‘Aphorism 225,’ the aptly titled ‘The free 
spirit a relative concept,’ explaining that: “A man is called a free spirit if he thinks otherwise than would 
be expected, based on his origin, environment, class, and position, or based on prevailing contemporary 
views. He is the exception: bound spirits are the rule; the latter reproach him that his free principles have 
their origin either in a need to be noticed, or else may even lead one to suspect him of free actions. That 
is, actions that are irreconcilable with bound morality. Sometimes it also said that certain free principles 
derive from perverseness  and eccentricity; but it  is only  the voice of malice,  which does not, itself, 
believe what it says, but only wants to hurt […] Incidentally, it is not part of the nature of the free spirit 
that his views are more correct, but rather that he has released himself from tradition, be it successfully or 
unsuccessfully. Usually, however, he has truth, or at least the spirit of the search for truth, on his side: he 
demands reasons, while others demand faith” (1994:139-40). 
8 He explains this in Beyond Good and Evil arguing: “That individual philosophical concepts are not 
something arbitrary, something growing up autonomously, but on the contrary grow up connected and 
related to one another; that, however suddenly and arbitrarily they appear to emerge in the history of 
thought, they nonetheless belong just as much to a system as do members of the fauna of a continent” 
(1977:64). He goes on in ‘Aphorism 20’ of Human, All Too Human, entitled ‘A few rungs down’ to 
explain  that  anyone  attempting  to  overcome  metaphysics  would  do  well  to  maintain  a  respect  and 
understanding  of  the  history  and  achievement  of  philosophy,  something  apparently  lost  on  certain 
‘postmodern’ theorists: “One level of education, itself a very high one, has been reached when man gets 
beyond  superstitious  and  religious  concepts  and  fears  and,  for  example,  no  longer  believes  in  the 
heavenly angels or original sin, and has stopped talking about the soul’s salvation. Once he is at this level 
of  liberation,  he  must  still  make  a  last  intense  effort  to  overcome  metaphysics.  Then,  however,  a 
retrograde  movement  is  necessary:  he  must  understand  both  the  historical  and  the  psychological 
justification in metaphysical ideas. He must recognize how mankind’s greatest advancement came from 
them  and  how,  if  one  did  not  take  this  retrograde  step,  one  would  rob  himself  of  mankind’s  finest 
accomplishments to date. With regard to philosophical metaphysics, I now see a number of people who 
have arrived at the negative goal (that all positive metaphysics is an error), but only a few who climb back 
down a few rungs. For one should look out over the last rung of the ladder, but not want to stand on it. 
Those who are most enlightened can go only as far as to free themselves of metaphysics and look back on 
it with superiority, while here, as in the hippodrome, it is necessary to take a turn at the end of the track” 
(1994:27-8). 
9  In  The  Portable  Nietzsche  Walter  Kaufmann  expresses  these  inherent  difficulties  in  his  ‘Editor’s 
Preface’ to Zarathustra explaining that: “the book comes close to being untranslatable. What is one to do 
with Nietzsche’s constant play on words? […] The problems encountered in translating Zarathustra are 
tremendous. Where Nietzsche does not deliberately bypass idioms in favour of coinages, he makes fun of 
them literally, then again by varying them slightly. Here too he is a dedicated enemy of all convention, 
intent  exposing  the  stupidity  an  arbitrariness  of  custom”  (1954:108).  While  in  his  ‘Introduction,’ 
Kaufmann indicates the problems with dubious translations of Nietzsche’s oeuvre stating that: “Suffice it 
to say here that it is impossible to be faithful to the content while sacrificing form: meaning and mood are 
inseparable. If the translator makes things easy for himself and omits a play on words, he unwittingly 
makes a lighthearted pun or rhyme look serious, if he does not reduce the whole passage to nonsense. 
And he abets the common misconception of the austere Nietzsche, when, in fact, no other philosopher 
knew better how to laugh at himself” (1954:6). 
10 This refers to German philosopher Rudolph Steiner: founder of anthroposophy and the Steiner Schools. 
11 The extent of the criticisms of Nietzsche based on misquotations and mistranslation, is explained by 
Kaufmann in his ‘Introduction’ to the Genealogy: “There are many reasons for Nietzsche’s [sic] being 
one of the great scapegoats of all time. During World War I British intellectuals found it convenient to 
contribute to the war effort by denouncing a German intellectual of stature whom one could discuss in   169 
                                                                                                                                              
print without losing a lot of time reading him — and Nietzsche had said many nasty things about the 
British. Henceforth Nietzsche was a marked man, and World War II contributed its share to this type of 
disgraceful literature. But there are even more such studies in German — which is scarcely surprising. 
After all, Nietzsche said far more wicked things — incomparably more and worse — about the Germans 
than he ever did about the British […] Once it was established that this writer was a scapegoat, anybody 
was allowed to play and vent his own ressentiment on him, no matter what the source” (1989:9-10). 
12 Read as ‘a monument more enduring than brass’ from Horace, Odes 3.30.1. 
13  In  her  ‘Introduction’  to  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  Helen  Zimmerman,  writing  in  the  late  twentieth 
century, explains that Nietzsche’s book: “had sold only 114 copies a year after its original printing in 
1886. It has since become, along with the rest of his work, one of the essential texts of the Western canon. 
And now, as the peaks of the human spirit flatten under the steamrollers of mass culture — shopping 
malls, movies, television, the advertising industry, the Internet — the extent of which Nietzsche could 
only  have  dimly  imagined,  his  ‘critique  of  modernity’  resounds  more  powerfully  than  ever  before” 
(1997:viii). 
14 In fact Sartre had addressed the problems associated with Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego’ in his first 
publication, The Transcendence of Ego, published in 1936.  
15 In Philosophy: The Classics, Nigel Warburton explains that: “Being and Nothingness is one of the very 
few philosophical books written this century which genuinely grapple with fundamental questions about 
the  human  predicament.  In  its  more  lucid  passages  it  can  be  both  enlightening  and  exhilarating” 
(1998:193).  
16 Hazel  Barnes  explains  this relationship  and division at  length  in her ‘Translator’s Introduction’  to 
Being and Nothingness: “This ‘transphenomenality of Being’ means that the object of consciousness is 
always outside and transcendent, that there is forever a resistance, a limit offered to consciousness, an 
external  something  which  must  be  taken  into  consideration.  Nevertheless  we  have  not  substituted  a 
realistic position for the idealistic. For without consciousness, being does not exist either as a totality (in 
the sense of ‘the world,’ ‘the universe’) or with differentiated parts […] Without consciousness there 
would not be a world, mountains, rivers, tables, chairs, etc.; there would be only Being. In this sense there 
is no thing without  consciousness, but  there is not nothing. Consciousness causes there to be things 
because it is itself nothing. Only through consciousness is there differentiation, meaning, and plurality for 
Being” (1956:xxiv). Barnes goes on to explain this diminishing of the subject as an a priori internal 
division arguing that: “Nothing external to being caused the rupture in the self-identity of Being-in-itself. 
It occurred somehow in Being. Thus the For-itself would be a mere abstraction without Being, for it is 
nothing save the emptiness of this Being and hence is not an autonomous substance […] Moreover the 
For-itself is dependent on the In-itself not only in its origin but its continued existence” (1956:xxvi). That 
is, the for-itself and in-itself exist in spite of each other and prevent the subject ever being self-present, 
while being unable to exist without each other. 
17 It is important to note that despite Sartre theoretical implying a greater freedom for the subject, and 
with many critical readings of his work pertaining to this supposed unlimited freedom of subjectivity, he 
was aware of certain unavoidable limitations. Lafarge reiterates this point stating that: “true freedom, 
which we say constitutes man, is the freedom of choice, and we are speaking of this freedom alone when 
we  are  speaking  of  consciousness.  This  freedom,  like  the  freedom  of  ‘being  able,’  seems  to  have 
limitations. It did not decide the existence of its being; it is not its own foundation. This privilege would 
be refused to god himself if he existed” (1970:72). 
18 Lafarge explains the extent of the anguish associated with the realisation of the extent of its freedom: 
“And this is anguish indeed, this feeling which grips us when we realize that we are alone and helpless, 
separated from ourselves — from our past which has no other reality, no other efficacy than that we 
bestow upon it, but separated also from our future in which we lay our projects and of which we cannot 
foretell,  alone  in  the  face  of  a  world  of  possibilities  which  are  our  possibilities  and  which  nothing 
compels us to realize” (1970:87-88). 
19 While not wishing  to explain Sartre’s theories regarding consciousness in  toto, the  concept of the 
censor needs elucidating further given the manner that this metaphysical concept divides the subject, and 
finds Sartre returning to certain Freudian premises in order to justify the inability of the subject to fully 
embrace its supposed freedom. In Being and Nothingness he explains the manner in which the censor 
allows us to act in bad faith: “[I]f we abandon all the metaphors representing the repression as the impact 
of blind forces, we have to admit that the censor must choose and in order to choose must be aware of so 
doing. How could it happen otherwise that the censor allows licit sexual impulses to pass though, that it 
permits needs (hunger, thirst, sleep) to be expressed in clear consciousness? And how are we to explain 
that it can relax this surveillance, that it can be deceived by the disguises of the instinct? But is it not 
sufficient that it discerns the condemned drives; it must also apprehend them as to be repressed, which 
implies in it at the very least an awareness of this activity. In a word how could the censor discern the 
impulses needing to be repressed without being conscious of discerning them?” (1968:144).   170 
                                                                                                                                              
20  While  Sartre’s  discussion  of  bad  faith  is  complex,  many  criticisms  arise  from  his  pessimistic 
perspective of ‘sincerity’ and ‘good faith,’ whereby we believe we are supposedly acting in bad faith. In 
Being and Nothingness he uses the example of the coward to explain the problems with sincerity: “Bad 
faith is possible only because sincerity is conscious of missing its goal inevitably, due to its very nature. I 
can try to apprehend myself as ‘not being cowardly,’ when I am so, only on the condition that the ‘being 
cowardly’ is in itself ‘in question’ at the very moment when it is, on condition that it is itself a question, 
and at the very moment when I wish to apprehend it, it escapes me on all sides and is annihilated. The 
condition under which I can attempt an effort in bad faith is that in one sense, I am not this coward which 
I do not wish to be. But if I were not cowardly in the simple mode of not-being-what-one-is-not, I would 
be ‘in good faith’ by declaring that I am not cowardly. Thus this inapprehensible coward is evanescent; in 
order for me not to be a cowardly, I must in some way also be cowardly. That does not mean that I must 
‘a little’ cowardly, in the sense that ‘a little’ signifies ‘to a certain degree cowardly — and not cowardly 
to a certain degree” (1968:161). 
21 Nigel Warburton explains that: “A major criticism of Sartre’s existentialism is that it presupposes a 
degree of freedom that human beings don’t in fact have. He sometimes writes as though we could choose 
anything;  as  if  we  could  think  beyond  the  limitations  imposed  upon  us  by  our  social  situation  and 
upbringing. We make the choices that we do because of what we are, and we are what we are because of 
what has happened to us. Sartre’s focus is almost entirely on the individual and the choices he or she 
makes, rather than on the social context in which groups of people live. For many people, social, political, 
and  economic  pressures  are  far  more  constraining  than  Sartre  seems  to  acknowledge”  (1998:202). 
Whereas Lafarge argues the opposite stating that: “Inseparable from Being, which simultaneously repel 
and fascinate him, at grips with himself in anguish and bad faith, man is condemned to make himself, but 
not in solitude […] I make myself it is true; but I make myself among the others, it would be sheer 
madness to say otherwise” (1970:112).  
22 Lafarge explains the necessary relationship between the for-itself and the Other explaining that: “Pure 
shame is not a feeling of being this or that guilty object but in general of being an object; that is, of 
recognizing myself in this degraded, fixed, and dependent being which I am for the Other. Shame is the 
feeling of an original fall, not because of the fact that I may have committed this or that particular fault 
but simply that I have ‘fallen’ into the world in the midst of things and that I need the mediation of the 
Other in order to be what I am” (1970:119). 
23 Sartre explains the relationship between the for-itself and Other in more depth than I can cover here, 
but suffice it to say that this relationship ends in conflict: “Everything which holds for me in my relations 
with the Other holds for him as well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other 
is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me. We 
are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but with reciprocal and moving 
relations […] descriptions of concrete behaviour must therefore be envisaged with the perspective of 
conflict.  Conflict  is  the  original  meaning  of  being-for-others”  (1968:209).  Interestingly,  the  ultimate 
extreme outcome of this conflict leads to sado-masochistic relationships whereby the sadist regains power 
by literally reducing the Other to an object. 
24 For a prime example of the manner in which Nausea and Being and Nothingness parallel each other 
please refer to Barnes’ ‘Translator’s Introduction’ (p.xx), wherein she highlights this cross fertilisation 
with a quote from each text regarding the absurdity of existence which are literally identical. 
25 The success of Nausea is still being recognised as seen with the recently published 1001 Books You 
Should Read Before You Die which states that: “Sartre’s Nausea is that rare thing in literary history — a 
‘philosophical’  novel  that  succeeds  in  both  its  endeavours.  The  novel  is  at  once  a  manifesto  for 
existentialist philosophy and a convincing work of art. In fact, it succeeds to such an extent that it blurs 
the distinction between literature and philosophy altogether” (Thomas:2006:396). 
26 On a personal note having read Nausea many years ago I found it quite a difficult book. Having re-read 
it with a background in phenomenology and existentialism I found it a far more engaging text, which 
does support Thody’s criticism.  
27  David  Caute  explains  that  criticisms  of  Sartre  were  levelled  at  this  deterministic  value  judgment 
towards  practical,  unembellished  writing:  “In  this  respect  belles-lettres,  both  prose  and  poetry,  is 
characterised by a ‘poetic’ quality which ordinary language does not possess. Sartre does not help his 
own case when he declares his dislike for poetic prose which uses words in order to obtain obscure, 
harmonic effects and vague, evocative meanings. This suggests that his distinction between prose and 
poetry is masking a value-judgment: his personal preference is for language which is descriptive and 
unembellished,  a  language  tailored  to  express  with  urgency  the  most  immediate  issues  of  the  time” 
(1986:viii). 
28 This is also expressed by Caute when he states that: “The writer is urged to try and embrace the human 
condition in its totality and, in exploring a situation, to unite the specific with the absolute. Literature 
must help the reader to make himself a full and free man in and through history. Sartre deplores novels 
and plays which aim to reconcile man with his environment or which encourage him to escape from life.   171 
                                                                                                                                              
Literature should not be a sedative but an irritant, a catalyst provoking men to change the world in which 
they live and in so doing change themselves” (1986:ix-x).  
29 Thody expands on his attack on Mauriac in his book Jean-Paul Sartre: A Literary and Political Study, 
wherein he explains that Sartre: “criticized Mauriac for disobeying the first rule of the novel, which is that 
the novelist must never appear to know more about his own characters than they do themselves. The 
assumption of a God-like omniscience […] was, in Sartre’s view, quite alien to the spirit of the novel […] 
Anticipating  the  argument  he  was  to  put  forward  in  more  detail  in  What  is  Literature?  […]  Sartre 
maintained that a character in a novel is brought to life only by the free decision of the reader to identify 
himself with him […] he can only lend his powers of anticipation and sympathy to someone he believes 
to be free” (1972:42-3). However, as we shall see this deterministic approach and the criticism of other 
writers and the make-up of a free literature would backfire badly against Sartre.    
30  Thody  expands  on  this  point  indicating  the  controversy  surrounding  such  incidents  as  Marcelle’s 
impending abortion in The Age of Reason: “In 1946, for example, he justified the fact that the plot of the 
first volume of [The Roads to Freedom] centered round the projected abortion by referring to the statistics 
which might be used to show that in 1938 there were more abortions than tramway employees. He also 
maintained  that  the  rather  curious  sexual  relationship  between  the  invalid  Charles  and  the  nurse 
Jacqueline [in The Reprieve] was something of which he had been told at first hand [An ironic comment 
given it involves masturbation]. He has not so far specifically mentioned the incidents in his short stories, 
but a remark which he made in 1951 was obviously intended to cover the whole of his work […] that: ‘If 
we speak of the body at its lowest functions, it is because we must not try to forget that the mind goes 
right down into the body … It is not for my own amusement that I talk about these things, but because in 
my opinion a writer should take hold of man in all aspects of his being’” (1972:29). Yet more irony! 
31 For a full account refer to Sartre’s Iron in the Soul and to Philip Thody’s Jean-Paul Sartre in which he 
hypothesises that: “Either Sartre grew tired of the novel as a genre and decided to concentrate on plays 
and political essays as his chosen medium of expression, or he was unable, for political and philosophical 
reasons, to find a solution to the many problems he had raised in The Roads to Freedom. A clue to one of 
the possible reasons why Sartre has not yet finished the novel is to be found in the growing importance 
which  the  figure  of  Brunet  comes  to  assume  in  the  third  novel  […]  It  is  Brunet’s  dilemma,  as  the 
Communist betrayed by the party, which provides one of the reasons why The Roads to Freedom lead in 
fact only to loneliness and despair” (1972:59). 
32 The extent of the ‘turn’ away from literature in Words is noted by Levy: “But the real implication, the 
book’s tacit message […] is set out much more frankly, is that writers should submit to the very same law 
which  Sartre  […]  absolutely  refused  to  acknowledge  at  the  time  of  What  is  Literature?  and  which 
consisted  in subjecting  their  work, enslaving it,  the political imperative of the moment. Humanity is 
suffering, he now says. Children, all around us, are dying of hunger. And ‘faced with a child who starves 
to death,’ Nausea ‘is of little importance.’ Words [and] Nausea […] I have always felt that this was the 
watershed, the great line of fracture in the Sartrean mountain range” (2003:461). 
33 Levy goes on to explain the extent at Sartre’s vitriol: “The Sartre of Words, the Sartre who pulled to 
pieces the grotesque figure of the writer who ‘finds it difficult to hold up his morose swollen head,’ was 
ripe for the hatred of thought: absolutely any tract, however hateful, written by any worker who spoke his 
own voice was better, in his eyes, than the mere words of an intellectual. This Sartre was going to be 
prejudiced in favour of young people […] This Sartre was not just ready for, but actively capable of 
subjecting himself to […] political and moralizing self-criticism […] explaining that his philosophy and 
his literature were worthless” (2003:474). 
34 For a full account of Sartre’s investigation of the life and works of Jean Genet see Jean Genet: Saint 
and Martyr, his ‘Introduction’ to Our Lady of the Flowers, and Genet’s The Thief’s Journal. Needless to 
say, Genet’s life as a recidivist thief, homosexual, drug user and long time prison inmate fascinated Sartre 
in an existentially counter-discursive manner. 
35 Howells explains the manner in which Sartre’s legacy has been overlooked and often tainted without 
acknowledging his influence on subsequent theorists: “Rather than recognize Sartre as a forerunner, his 
immediate  successors  preferred  to  return  directly  to  the  German  thinkers  and  […]  to  radicalize  still 
further  their  insights  into  the  deconstruction  of  the  subject.  Sartre’s  own  discussions  become  an 
embarrassment, coming so close in many ways to the points the philosophers of the 1960s and 1970s 
wished  to make, but without  the brutal iconoclasm  then  in favour. The solution was parricide. Only 
certain aspects of Sartre’s writing were recognized, his radicalism was almost willfully suppressed, and 
he was accused of that very bourgeois humanism and individualism he so profoundly and persistently 
attacked” (1992:326). She goes on to explain that: “Twenty years later, Derrida still seems unwilling to 
acknowledge that Sartre is not merely a forerunner but a real originator of much of what Deconstruction 
has to say on the subject. I have attempted to show here that Sartre, like Descartes, Kant, and perhaps 
Husserl,  actually  made  a  valiant  attempt  to  grapple  with  the  problems  inherent  in  the  theory  of 
subjectivity — those of freedom/determinism, praxis/structure, self/other, and so on, rather than merely   172 
                                                                                                                                              
acknowledging that such a work is necessary, or even inevitable. The present climate of thinking about 
the subject may now perhaps enable us to reread Sartre and not merely take him as read” (1992:349-50). 
36  Camus  explains  his  proposition  stating  that:  “I  am  taking  the  liberty  at  this  point  of  calling  the 
existential attitude philosophical suicide. But this does not imply a judgment. It is a convenient way of 
indicating  the  movement  by  which  a  thought  negates  itself  and  tends  to  transcend  itself  in  its  very 
negation. For the existentialists negation is their God. To be precise, that god is maintained only through 
the negation of human reason” (1975:43). 
37 David Sprintzen explains Camus’ desire to find a new theoretical position stating that: “He is seeking 
to diagnose a malady, albeit an intellectual one, from which he and many of his contemporaries suffer in 
order to point the way toward a cure. He is not claiming that those who do not suffer from that malady are 
wrong, any more than he suggests that his cure is proof of the illegitimacy of other remedies. He is simply 
seeking to determine the logic of those alternative prescriptions” (1988:46). Sprintzen then goes on to 
explain how Camus’ work came to be seen as a philosophy of the absurd despite his rejection of that aim: 
“Camus  constantly  refined  his  essay  […]  in  the  direction  of  greater  objectivity  and  universality  of 
expression. Thus many readers were led  to read  more  into his  argument  than he  intended. And yet, 
repeatedly, throughout his essay, he sort to underscore its limits. Not a philosophy of the absurd, nor an 
effort to prove that suicide is unjustifiable, nor even a critique of religion and the ‘leap of faith,’ The Myth 
expresses Camus’s [sic] determination to work out a rule of life consonant with the absurd” (1988:47). 
38 The view that Camus was exploring such opportunities is exemplified by Brée: “The epigraph he chose 
for The Myth of Sisyphus aptly describes his own dynamism: ‘O my soul, do not aspire to immortal life, 
but exhaust the field of the possible.’ The ‘field of the possible’ was the realm within which he intended 
to limit and contain his own thought and action […] Camus, in The Myth, had set out to counter what 
seemed  to  him  the  mood  of  the  times,  the  least  conducive  to  action,  a  Neo-Nietzschean  nihilism” 
(1972:133). 
39 Camus explains his notion of the ‘absurd man’ in The Myth wherein he asks: “What, in fact, is the 
absurd man? He who, without negating it, does nothing for the eternal. Not that nostalgia is foreign to 
him. But he prefers his courage and his reasoning. The first teaches him to live without appeal and to get 
along with what he has; the second informs him of his limits. Assured of his temporally limited freedom, 
of his revolt devoid of a future and of his mortal consciousness, he lives out his adventure within the span 
of his lifetime. That is his field, that is his action, which he shields from any judgment but his own. A 
greater life cannot mean for him another life. That would be unfair” (1975:64). 
40 Camus then evokes The Myth of Sisyphus as a lyrical exploration of the search for happiness whereby 
Sisyphus rebelled against the Gods preferring a pointless life pushing a rock up and down a hill rather 
than  death.  Patrick  McCarthy  indicates  that  this  view  caused  much  consternation  among  his 
contemporaries including the esteemed Samuel Beckett who in Molloy: “writes sarcastically that ‘certain 
commentators’ depict a happy Sisyphus. This seems silly to Beckett whose narrators are incapable of 
happiness because they are corroded by the meaninglessness of things” (1982:151). 
41  Brée  indicates  that  such  aspirations  were  counter  to  Camus’  optimistic  investigation  into  new 
possibilities opposed to existential nihilism, explaining that: “The Myth of Sisyphus explored the ‘walls’ 
that limit human enterprise: death; the bounds put upon men’s understanding of their own existence; the 
discrepancy of their own vital drives. These in his eyes are not ‘traps’ but facts. His purpose was to define 
an area where human preferences are of no avail. Where men have no choice, their freedom is not in 
question, not their responsibility. Camus here accepts the common attitude towards responsibility. This 
preserves him from the assertion of total responsibility and guilt that accompanies Sartre’s assertion of 
man’s unconditional freedom […] He is concerned with the use a man can make of his life within the 
range of possibilities open to him” (1972:136). 
42 The momentary and fragile nature of presence is a repeated theme, and indicates  an unrecognised 
lineage from Heidegger through to Derrida: “Thus week by week the prisoners of the plague put up what 
fight they could. Some, like Rambert, even contrived to fancy that they were still behaving as free men 
and had the power of choice. But actually it would have been truer to say that by this time, mid-August, 
the plague had swallowed up everything and everyone. No longer were there individual destinies; only a 
collective destiny, made of plague and the emotions shared by all” (1960:167). 
43 At the end of The Plague Rieux is ‘rueful’ at the innate tendency of forgetfulness, and expresses this by 
evoking the spectre of Nazi gas chambers over the joyful scene of celebration: “Calmly they denied, in 
the teeth of the evidence, that we had ever known a crazy world in which men were killed off like flies, or 
that precise savagery, that calculated frenzy of the plague, which instilled an odious freedom as to all that 
was not the Here and Now; or those charnel-house stenches which stupefied those they did not kill. In 
short, they denied that we had ever been that hag-ridden populace a part of which was daily fed into a 
furnace and went up in oily fumes, while the rest, in shackled impotence, waited their turn” (1960:243).  
44 Brée also expresses the success of The Plague: “Camus’s choice of the plague as the organic metaphor 
for his novel has been adversely criticized. Yet it was the symbol he needed. In The Plague, violence is a 
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machine, purposelessly piling up their bodies like so much industrial ‘waste,’ and silently, restlessly, 
invading  all  the  spheres  of  private  life,  destroying  identities,  feelings,  hopes,  joys  […]  Camus  had 
something in mind beyond the ‘good’ and the ‘bad’ dichotomy of the two sides, a new form of tyranny, 
the totalitarian aspect of modern war itself; the new methods of impersonal organization; the threat to the 
individual of the police state, or less dramatically, of ‘the system’” (1972:219). 
45 As Tarrou explains to Rieux: “I know positively […] that each of us has the plague within him; no one, 
no one on earth, is free from it. And I know, too, that we must keep endless watch on ourselves lest in a 
careless moment we breathe in someone’s face and fasten the infection on him. What’s natural is the 
microbe. All the rest — health, integrity, purity (if you like) — is a product of the human will, of a 
vigilance that must never falter. The good man, the man who infects hardly anyone, is the man who has 
the fewest lapses of attention. And it needs tremendous will-power, a never-ending tension of the mind, to 
avoid such lapses. Yes, Rieux, it’s a weary business, being plague stricken. But it’s still more wearying to 
refuse to be it. That’s why everybody in the world looks tired; everyone is more or less sick of the plague. 
But that is also why some of us, those who want to get the plague out of their systems, feel such desperate 
weariness, a weariness from which nothing remains to set us free, except death” (1960:218).  
46 The popularity of The Rebel is best expressed by the effusive Sir Herbert Read in his ‘Forward’ to that 
text: “With the publication of this book a cloud that has oppressed the European mind for more than a 
century begins to lift. After an age of anxiety, despair, and nihilism, it seems possible once more to hope 
— to have confidence again in man and in the future. M. Camus has not delivered us by rhetoric, or by 
any of the arts of persuasion, but by the clarity of his intelligence. His book is a work of logic. Just as an 
earlier work of his […] began with a meditation on living or not living — on the implications of the act of 
suicide; so this work begins with a meditation on enduring or not enduring — on the implications of the 
act of rebellion” (1975:7). While the import of this text on Camus is made clear as he evokes the memory 
of the disaster of the Spanish  Civil War:  “Having previously been willing  to compromise,  the  slave 
suddenly adopts and attitude of All or Nothing. Knowledge is born and consciousness awakened […] The 
rebel himself wants to be ‘All’ — to identify himself completely with this blessing of which he has 
suddenly become aware and of which he wishes to be recognized and proclaimed as the incarnation — or 
‘Nothing’ which means to be completely destroyed by the power that governs him. As a last resort he is 
willing to accept the final defeat, which is death, rather than be deprived of the last sacrament which he 
would call for, for example, freedom. Better to die on one’s feet than to live on one’s knees” (1975:20-1). 
47 Brée explains that: “The Rebel was Camus’s [sic passim] reappraisal of a mythology of revolt and 
revolution woven into the very texture of Western culture. Its meaning lies in a conclusion upon which 
much scorn has been poured. Camus had separated the question of social action from the rhetoric of 
revolt and revolution in which it had been entangled since the French Revolution […] The Rebel restates 
Camus’s dedication to that community of men, in which contention and conflict are qualified and limited 
by  the  consent  and  acceptance  of  the  imperfections,  inadequacies,  inconsistencies,  and  never-ending 
struggles inherent in the human lot, and of men’s simple addiction to their happiness” (1972:222-23).  
48 The violence in France did not end with the Allied victory and led to a great slaughter which Camus 
could not reconcile himself with: “The year of great euphoria at the time of the liberation of France. But 
1944 was also the year that had produced the outburst of hatred which had exploded in a vast lawless 
purge,  only  too  slowly  brought  under  control  by  the  courts,  supported  by  de  Gaulle’s  provisional 
government. By conservative estimates, in 1944 alone, approximately 40,000 Frenchmen were killed and 
some 400,000 sent to jail by their compatriots” (Brée:1970:204). 
49 Although this attitude toward Communist Russia finally soured with the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 
1956, Brée explains how leftist luminaries such as Merleau-Ponty, continued defending Communism: 
“The outbreak of the Korean war, coming on top of disturbing revelations concerning Stalin’s rule by 
terror, had led Merleau-Ponty scrupulously to reassess his position with regards to Russia and the Marxist 
theory of dialectical history. In a first phase, when the outcry against the Siberian camps first arose in a 
France still  shaken by  the horrors of the Nazi camps, the French  left was deeply divided.  Capitalist 
propaganda, argued the orthodox communists; while others, like Camus, read into the facts the proof that 
Stalin’s  rule  had  become  a  dictatorship,  as  ferocious  as  any,  and  which  as  such  must  be  exposed. 
Merleau-Ponty had argued at the time and convinced Sartre by his arguments, that within the context of 
the Cold War, an ethical option could be made between the two super powers” (1972:102). 
50 The failure of many to see past Camus’ attack of Communism is made apparent by Brée: “What went 
unnoticed or was jeered at was the anticipatory thrust of the book. Camus had questioned the adequacy, in 
the  modern  situation,  of  the  Marxist-Leninist  view  of  the  historical  process  on  which  left-wing 
intellectuals so obdurately based their interpretations of France’s future. He also saw it as a recoil from 
reality, a blindness to the present, its dangers and potentialities. A new situation was emerging which did 
not fit the catastrophist pattern of social change through the proletariat revolution. Thence, at the end of 
The Rebel, the call to a new outlook upon the world to come. He did not try to predict what kind of world 
[…] But this was not the case with Sartre and Les Tempes modernes in the fifties. Sartre was convinced at 
the  time  that,  in  its  doctrinaire  Leninist  formulation,  Marxism,  both  as  a  total  world  view  and  as  a   174 
                                                                                                                                              
revolutionary doctrine unifying theory and practice, was the only rational guide to the future, and to 
responsible action” (1972:7). 
51  Brée  explains  that:  “The  confrontation  of  Camus  with  Les  Tempes  modernes  was  merely  an 
epiphenomenon. It reveals the familiar human flaws in many intellectuals: the taunting tone and smug 
assumption of intellectual superiority on the part of Jeanson; his deliberate reductio ad absurdum of 
Camus’s [sic] argument; the mocking parody of imagery and style. The need to refute was obviously 
overriding” (1972:247). 
52 Sartre’s undeniable impact on French intellectual thinking is explained by Brée who indicates that: “He 
could attack, persuade, conquer ‘the others,’ dominate and instruct them, at will. It was essentially suited 
to Sartre’s vision of commitment of a crisis — as a moment when a man is wrenched free of self-delusion 
and accepts his ‘role,’ from which their is no escape; accept, the play, the role Sartre has meted out to 
him” (1972:251-2). 
53 Camus explains his own manifesto for writing in ‘Rebellion and Art’ from The Rebel when he states 
that:  “Art  is  an  activity  which  exalts  and  denies  simultaneously.  ‘No  artist  tolerates  reality,’  says 
Nietzsche. This is true, but no artist can ignore reality. Artistic creation is a demand for unity and a 
rejection of the world. But it rejects the world on account of what it lacks and in the name of what it 
sometimes is. Rebellion can be observed here in its pure state and its original complexities. Thus, art 
should give us a final perspective on the content of rebellion” (1975:219). 
54 Brée supports this perspective of Camus as a prescient, though reluctant, political observer stating that: 
“Although controversies that fused around The Rebel reveal much concerning the politico-literary tangles 
of  the  time,  they  missed  the  fact  that  Camus  had  intuitively  glimpsed  the  French  political  situation 
returning to relative normalcy. The short-term tension and dramas of the occupation and immediate post-
occupation years, and the rhetoric they had engendered, had become obsolete and, sustained, would lead 
writers to sterile political isolations and literature into irrelevancy. Therefore, the concluding chapter of 
The  Rebel,  with  its  quasi-lyrical  invocation  to  creativity  […]  was  Camus’s  release  from  political 
bondage” (1972:6). 
55  McCarthy  indicates  the  problems  that  Camus’  political  indifference  would  cause  when  he  was  in 
Sweden to receive his Nobel Prize for Literature: “During a Stockholm press conference an Arab student 
spoke up. He denounced Camus as an agent of French repression no different from the paratroopers. 
When Camus tried to reply the youth shouted him down. Camus was furious but he kept his self-control. 
He insisted on replying and concluded with sentences that were flashed around the world: ‘I have always 
condemned the use of terror. I must also condemn a terror which is practiced blindly on the Algiers 
streets and which may any day strike down my mother or my family. I believe in justice but I will defend 
my  mother  before  justice.’  In  context  the  sentence  about  justice  and  mother  means:  ‘I  condemn  all 
terrorism, even yours, whose cause contains much justice.’ At most it repeats what Camus had told the 
Arab students who visited him at L’Express: ‘I cannot support the destruction of French Algeria because I 
am a French Algerian’” (1982:294). 
56 Although this too had its limits as Camus set up a problematic system of justifying the use of violence, 
or rebellion, that was distinguished from political violence, which he viewed as murder.    175 
Chapter 4 
 
The Diminished Subject, Contemporary Theory and Literature — 
The Postmodern Condition and Generation X 
 
 
4.1.a. PO-FACE 2007 — Against a Concept of Postmodernism? 
 
‘Postmodernist’?  Nothing  about  this  term  is  unproblematic,  nothing  about  it  is 
entirely satisfactory. It is not even clear who deserves the credit — or the blame for 
coining  it  in  the first  place  […]  There  are  plenty  of  candidates.  But  whoever  is 
responsible, he or she has a lot to answer for.  
— Brian McHale, in Postmodernist Fiction (1999:3).   
 
I am not sure what postmodernism is, although I do know a good deal about the 
arguments  surrounding  that  term.  None  of  the  world-scale  or  even  national 
modelings  of  the  postmodern  leave  me  entirely  comfortable.  An  industry  of 
definition and subdefinition has grown up around the question of the postmodern, so 
that there is already a need for a history of usages. 
—  David  Simpson,  in  The  Academic  Postmodern  and  the  Rule  of  Literature 
(1995:1). 
 
To begin this section I must emphasise that despite the abundant confusion regarding 
this nomenclature I have no desire to answer the question ‘what is postmodernism?’  
However,  it  is  one  of  life’s  great  ironies  that  while  arguments  rage,  the  term 
postmodernism has rapidly entered the vernacular becoming widely used throughout 
contemporary culture. Of course it is possible to tolerate this curious state of affairs if 
you adopt an anti-metaphysical position that questions all deterministic concept usage, 
or if you are comfortable with the a priori lack of the metaphysics of presence laid 
down  by  existentialism,  post-structuralism  and  deconstruction.  Yet,  this  lack  of 
theoretical  certitude  has  proven  problematic  to  many  giving  rise  to  a  plethora  of 
positions arguing both for and against the term, thereby interpellating
1 and legitimating 
it. While not proposing a definition of postmodernism myself — for to do so would be 
determinedly metaphysical — there remain many who attempt to do just that. As John 
Rundell argues in his ‘Introduction: The Symptom of Postmodernism’ from the aptly 
titled Between Totalitarianism and Postmodernism: “There appears in the postmodern 
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postmodern  means.  But  […]  two  aspects  have  emerged  —  on  the  one  hand, 
postmodernity is indicative of a new social form, and on the other, postmodernity is a 
new  cultural  sensibility,  a  new  sensibility  of  self-recognition.  There  is  a  third,  the 
postmodern  critique  of  modernity”  (1992:140).  The  irony  within  the  irony  here  of 
course,  is  that  while  arguing  that  there  is  ‘no  agreement’  regarding  the  term 
postmodernism, Rundell — in true ‘deterministic’ fashion — proposes that there are 
two, no wait, three contrary elements that can be attributed to it.
2  
  One  convenient  locus  that  extrapolates  this  postmodern  confusion  is  Ihab 
Hassan’s  well-known  ‘POSTFACE  1982:  Towards  a  Concept  of  Postmodernism,’ 
wherein, despite warning of the vague outline he was about to mark in the shifting sands 
of philosophical theory, he provides an extensive list — and a handy schematic — of 
those theorists and attributes which may, or may not be postmodern: 
Some names, piled here pell-mell, may serve to adumbrate postmodernism, or at 
least suggests its range of assumptions: Derrida [Then a list of 58 writers, historians, 
psychoanalysts, philosophers, dancers, literary critics, the entire Yale School etc. up 
to] Robert Wilson. Indubitably, these names are far too heterogeneous to form a 
movement, paradigm, or school. Still, they may evoke a number or related cultural 
tendencies, a constellation of values, a repertoire of procedures and attitudes. These 
we call postmodern (1995:260). 
 
Although Hassan indicates that this is merely a sketch of a possible postmodernism, the 
arbitrary  nature  of  his  ‘constellation’  makes  his  now  (in)famous  ‘POSTFACE’  an 
example  par  excellence  of  the  thriving  industry  in  the  metaphysics  of  determining 
postmodernism.  This  problem  is  expressed  by  Linda  Hutcheon  in  The  Politics  of 
Postmodernism, wherein she determines that the true definition of postmodernism is 
that it defies being determined, while adding to the argument herself when proposing 
that: “Few words are more used and abused in discussions of contemporary culture than 
the word ‘postmodernism.’ As a result, any attempt to define the word will necessarily 
and simultaneously have both positive and negative dimensions. It will aim to say what 
postmodernism is but at the same time it will have to say what it is not. Perhaps this is   177 
an appropriate condition, for postmodernism is a phenomenon whose mode is resolutely 
contradictory  […]  In  general  terms  it  takes  the  form  of  self-conscious,  self-
contradictory,  self-undermining  statement”  (1990:1).  That  is,  for  Hutcheon,  among 
others,
3  a  definition  of  ‘postmodernism’  is  always  self-defeating,  yet  this  does  not 
prevent  her  using  this  dubious  nomenclature  as  the  impetus  for  writing  a  book! 
However, despite having just added to the postmodern debate myself by highlighting 
the inherent problem of articulating this metaphysical concept, I will now turn to the 
work  of  Jean-François  Lyotard  and  Fredric  Jameson,  and  discuss  the  ‘positive  and 
negative  dimensions’  of  their  specific  postmodernism(s),  and  explore  how  these 
dichotomous perspectives play out in their respective works. 
 
4.1.b. Jean-François Lyotard and the Crisis of Narratives 
 
In his ‘Introduction’ to The Postmodern Condition, Jean-François Lyotard argues that 
postmodernism  is  a  response  to  an  apparent  crisis  of  confidence  in  traditional 
philosophical narratives due to a sustained attack on the problematic truth claims of 
metaphysics, stating that: “I have decided to use the word postmodern to describe that 
condition […] it designates the state of our culture following the transformations which, 
since  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  have  altered  the  game  rules  for  science, 
literature, and the arts. The present study will place these transformations in the context 
of the crisis of narratives” (1984:xxiii). The continued critical focus on metaphysics 
reached its climax with post-structuralism and deconstruction, whereby deterministic 
philosophical discourses — and the supposedly self-present subject — were implicated 
in the problematics of arbitrary and non-essential nature of language. Lyotard views the 
contemporary  crisis  of  postmodernism  as  a  result  of  the  appreciation  of  the 
metaphysical nature of various ‘metanarratives’ which participated in the legitimation 
of the ‘grand narratives’ of science, art and philosophy, explaining that: 
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[I]f  a  metanarrative  implying  a  philosophy  of  history  is  used  to  legitimate 
knowledge, questions are raised concerning the validity of the institutions governing 
the social bond: these must be legitimated as well. Thus justice is consigned to the 
grand  narrative  in  the  same  way  as  truth.  Simplifying  to  the  extreme,  I  define 
postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives. This incredulity is undoubtedly a 
product of progress in the sciences: but that progress in turn presupposes it. To the 
obsolescence  of  the  metanarrative  apparatus  of  legitimation  corresponds,  most 
notably, the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of the university institution which 
in the past relied on it. The narrative function is losing its functors, its great hero, its 
great dangers, its great voyages, its great goal (1984:xxiv). 
 
Thus,  Lyotard  argues  that  the  ‘postmodern  condition’  is  a  result  of  an  increased 
scepticism  towards  the  metaphysical  certitude  of  those  ‘grand  narratives’  that  have 
traditionally  determined  the  validity  of  philosophy  and  the  certitude  of  subjectivity. 
However, there exists a certain political bias in his view, for much like Camus before 
him, he had become frustrated by post-war French Communism arguing in ‘Re-Writing 
Modernity,’  that:  “Today  we  know  that  the  October  Revolution,  as  well  as  all 
revolutions, brought about or carried on the same hell on behalf of Marxism. It has 
repeated  the  alienation  of  man,  though  Marxists  claim  they  were  working  for 
disalienation” (1987:6). This perspective is double edged as it also takes aim at Fredric 
Jameson and his belief that the return of such ‘grand narratives’ as Marxism, would cure 
the ills of the postmodern subject.
4 Furthermore, we see yet another theorist eagerly 
interpellating this term, and attempt to turn this supposedly anti-metaphysical approach 
to theory into yet another ‘grand narrative.’  
  It is important to note that despite Lyotard’s attack on certain grand narratives, he 
was  still  guilty  of  determinism  when  arguing  that  rather  than  postmodernism 
superseding and replacing modernism in toto, it in fact predated it. He explains this 
perspective in ‘Answering the Question: What is Postmodernism:’  
What, then, is the postmodern? What place does it or does it not occupy in the 
vertiginous work of the questions hurled at the rules of image and imagination? It is 
undoubtedly  a  part  of  the  modern.  All  that  has  been  received  if  only  yesterday 
(modo, modo Petronius used to say), must be suspected [a] work of art becomes 
modern  only  if  it  is  first  postmodern.  Postmodernism  thus  understood  is  not 
modernism at its end but in the nascent state, and this state is constant (1983:338-39).  
   179 
Lyotard argues that rather than following modernism — as the prefix ‘post-’ would 
suggest — this anti-metaphysical narrative is designed to overturn and re-write —what 
he refers to as récrit — the totalising grand narratives of modernism. In ‘Re-Writing 
Modernity’ he states that: “As you know, I have made use of the word ‘postmodern:’ it 
was  but  a  provocative  way  to  put  the  struggle  in  the  foreground  of  the  field  of 
knowledge. Postmodernity is not a new age, it is the re-writing of some key features 
modernity had tried or pretended to gain, particularly in founding its legitimation upon 
the  purpose  of  the  general  emancipation  of  mankind.  But  such  a  re-writing,  as  has 
already been said, was for a long time active of modernity itself” (1987:8-9).  
  Therefore,  Lyotard  proposes  an  apparent  overlap  between  modernism  and 
postmodernism, indicating that the latter is in fact a ‘re-writing’ and continuation of the 
humanistic narratives which will lead to a new positive form of modernism. As Bill 
Readings notes in Introducing Lyotard: “Lyotard refuses to think of the postmodern as a 
new ‘now,’ a look, the latest fashionable attitude. This has made Lyotard into a rather 
uncomfortable bedfellow with other theorists of the postmodern, who tend to be rather 
more interested in apocalyptic announcements about the end of modernity” (1991:54). 
Thus, in Lyotard we see a deterministically optimistic attitude toward postmodernism, 
and  the  inevitable  ‘paralogic’  proliferation  of  ‘little  narratives’  over  oppressive 
totalitarian  grand  narratives.
5  That  Lyotard  hopes  for  a  modernism  free  of 
totalitarianism and scepticism with the advent of postmodernism is made clear when he 
proclaims in ‘Note on the Meaning of ‘Post-,’’ that if there is an answer to the question, 
‘What is postmodernism?’ then: “The answer is: Let us wage war on totality; let us be 
witness to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the honor of the 
name” (1983:341). That is, the honour of a new determinism in the form of yet another 
metaphysical narrative beget by the progenitor postmodernism! 
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4.1.c. Fredric Jameson’s Anti-Postmodern Metaphysics 
 
In contrast to Lyotard’s positive view of postmodernism we find the virulently anti-
postmodern position of Fredric Jameson who views this new ‘condition’ as a complete 
break with the traditions of high modernism. In his ‘Forward’ to Postmodernism, or, the 
Cultural  Logic  of  Late  Capitalism,  Jameson  appears  keen  to  avoid  the  confusion 
surrounding this term arguing that: “I have not tried to systemize a usage or to impose 
any conveniently coherent thumbnail meaning, for the concept is not merely contested, 
it is also internally conflicted and contradictory” (1991:xxii). However, Jameson moves 
seamlessly  from  this  proposition  and  quickly  enters  the  debate  by  arguing 
deterministically that postmodernism is an effect of post-industrial, or ‘late-capitalist’ 
production. He argues that the conjoining of this contemporary ‘mode of production’ 
with an increased philosophical scepticism resulting from French deconstruction,
6 the 
‘death  of  man,’  the  rise  of  schizophrenia  and  pastiche  in  place  of  self-present 
subjectivity and originality of art,
7 acts as the last phase in the inevitable rise of the 
Marxist grand narrative.
8 The theme of a loss of metaphysical certitude is replete in 
Jameson’s  work,  especially  in  relation  to  the  demise  of  strictly  delimited  academic 
disciplines at the hands of literary criticism. He articulates this point in ‘Postmodernism 
and Consumer Society’ stating that: 
A generation ago there was still a technical discourse of professional philosophy — 
the great systems of Sartre or the phenomenologists, the work of Wittgenstein or 
analytical  or  common  language  philosophy  —  alongside  which  one  could  still 
distinguish  that  quite  different  discourse  of  the  other  academic  disciplines  —  of 
political science, for example, or sociology or literary criticism. Today, increasingly, 
we have a kind of writing simply called ‘theory’ which is all of or none of those 
things at once. This kind of new discourse, generally associated with France, and so-
called French theory, is becoming widespread and marks the end of philosophy as 
such […] and I will suggest that such ‘theoretical discourse’ is also to be numbered 
among the manifestations of postmodernism (1998:3).    
 
Apart from the continuing tendency to conflate  deconstruction with postmodernism, 
Jameson’s perspective ignores the recurrent crisis of philosophy and the diminished 
subject seen clearly in the phenomenology of Husserl, the existential nihilism of Sartre,   181 
and with Wittgenstein’s doubts regarding his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Thus, the 
rigorous  philosophical  disciplines  Jameson  holds  as  prime  examples  of  modernist 
‘grand narratives,’ are themselves theoretical responses to perceived crises in culture 
and philosophy. Furthermore, that all of these approaches invariably failed to escape 
this  aporia,  makes  Jameson’s  call  for  a  return  to  this  mythical  utopia  of  arbitrary 
metaphysical discourses naïvely problematic.  
  While not content to lament the apparent ‘death of philosophy,’ Jameson carries 
out an extensive eulogy to the recently deceased self-present subject, who he sees as the 
victim of the end of rigid modernist disciplines and resultant loss of historicity, as late-
capitalist production consumes itself and brings the demise of originality of art, history 
and  subjectivity,  only  to  be  replaced  with  a  regurgitated  culture  of  ‘pastiche,’  and 
referent  free  ‘schizophrenic’  postmodern  subjects.  He  articulates  this  eulogy  to  the 
modernist individual further in ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society’ arguing that: 
[W]e have to introduce a new piece into the puzzle, which may help to explain why 
classical modernism is a thing of the past and why postmodernism should have taken 
its place. This new component is what is generally called the ‘death of the subject’ 
or, to say it in more conventional language, the end of individualism as such. The 
great modernisms were, as we have said, predicated on the invention of a personal, 
private style, as unmistakable as your fingerprint, as incomparable as your own body. 
But this means that the modernist aesthetic is in some way organically linked to the 
conception  of  a  unique  self  and  private  identity,  a  unique  personality  and 
individuality, which can be expected to generate its own unique vision of the world 
and to forge its own unique, unmistakable style. Yet from today, any number of 
distinct perspectives, the social theorists, the psychoanalysts, even the linguists, not 
to speak of those of us who work in the area of culture and formal change, are all 
exploring the notion that this kind of individualism and personal identity is a thing of 
the past; that the old individual or individualist subject is ‘dead;’ and that one might 
even  describe  the  concept  of  the  unique  individual  and  the  theoretical  basis  of 
individualism as ideological (1998:5-6).  
 
Interestingly, Jameson’s perspective of the postmodern subject in many ways resembles 
my own premise of the a priori diminished subject. However, while Jameson views this 
crisis as temporally specific to postmodernism, I would argue that this is an ineluctable 
aspect of subjectivity and not as a result of either the cultural ‘logic’ of late-capitalism, 
or contemporary theory. Furthermore, despite my teleology providing this ‘fragmented’   182 
and  divided  subject  with  temporal  loci  that  both  predate,  and  inhabit  modernism, 
Jameson argues determinedly that originality and progress in cultural production and 
subjectivity have only recently come to an end. In Postmodernism, or, the Cultural 
Logic of Late Capitalism he makes this explicit arguing that: “I take it as axiomatic that 
‘modernist history’ is the first casualty and mysterious absence of the postmodernism 
period […] the notion of progress and telos remained alive and well up until very recent 
times indeed” (1991:xi). Therefore, we see the shadow of metaphysics loom large on 
Jameson’s  office  wall,  as  he  bemoans  the  ‘depthlessness’  of  contemporary  culture, 
while upholding a metaphysical ideal of the specialised discourses of high modernism. 
 
4.1.d. Postmodern Literature? — A Loose Canon!  
 
Unfortunately, ‘postmodernism’ is a term bon a tout faire. I have the impression that 
it is applied today to anything the user of the term happens to like. Further, there 
seems to be an attempt to make it increasingly retroactive: first it was apparently 
applied to certain writers or artists active in the last twenty years, then gradually it 
reached  the  beginning  of  the  century,  then  still  further  back.  And  this  reverse 
procedure continues; soon the postmodern category will include Homer.  
— Umberto Eco, in Reflections on The Name of the Rose (1994:65-6). 
 
Having  not  only  called  into  question  the  notion  of  a  temporally  specific  crisis  of 
subjectivity,  and  the  recurrent  scepticism  towards  the  metaphysical  pursuits  of 
philosophy,  I  shall  now  discuss  the  idea  of  a  ‘postmodern  literature’  and  certain 
negative responses to this ‘loose’ canon. Given that the concept of postmodernism has 
been proven problematic, it follows that applying this epithet to contemporary literature 
is equally questionable, and when one begins to investigate the supposed stylistic make-
up of this canon then the inherent contradictions become manifest. In his ‘POSTFACE,’ 
Hassan  immediately  undermines  the  possibility  of  a  temporally  specific  literary 
archetype  that  can  be  attributed  to  postmodernism  when  he  points  out  that:  “we 
continually discover ‘antecedents’ of postmodernism — in Sterne, Sade, Blake […] 
Bataille […] and Kafka. What this really indicates is that we have created in our mind a 
model of postmodernism, a particular typology of culture and imagination, and have   183 
proceeded to ‘rediscover’ the affinities of various authors and different moments with 
that model” (1995:264-5). Thus, while Hassan clearly recognises the subjective nature 
of canon formation,
9 he sets about establishing a series of stylistic elements that can be 
classified  postmodern,  and  then  transcends  the  contemporary  realm  to  include  both 
modern and pre-modern texts in this category — something Lyotard would approve of, 
but Jameson would decry. Adam Roberts explains Hassan’s prerogative stating that he: 
[L]abels  this  new  writing  ‘postmodern,’  but  also  insists  that  this  term  does  not 
describe a new period in literature, but rather a particular sort of literature that has 
been present in Western culture for several hundred years, lurking in the background 
as it were. In particular, modernism contained within it, as a sort of more extreme 
version of itself, the thing that Hassan calls postmodernism [that] involves resistance, 
negation,  the  spirit  of  ‘unmaking’  that  Hassan  calls  the  ‘literature  of  silence.’ 
Actually, modernism is also concerned with this for Hassan, but postmodernism is 
more self-reflexive and ironic about this project, more indeterminate and sometimes 
more playful. What this means is that the critics following Hassan need not limit 
their studies of postmodernism to works published in the later third of the twentieth 
century;  they  can  write  (and  some  have)  studies  of  ‘postmodern  modernism,’ 
‘postmodern Renaissance drama,’ and the like (2000:113-114).  
 
As with the a priori nature of diminished subject undermining the notion of a recently 
fragmented postmodern subject, many of the stylistic elements that apparently make up 
postmodern literature can be attributed to texts that predate this period, thus questioning 
any deterministic canon of contemporary fiction and any value judgments thereof. As 
Robert Cohen, explains in his paper ‘Do Postmodern Genres Exist?’ “Ihab Hassan is 
correct in noting that what we call ‘postmodern’ writing is espied in an earlier time, but 
eighteenth-century  genres  exhibited  some  of  the  same  features.  We  rename  these 
features in terms of our critical language, but Tristam Shandy’s marbled pages were 
transgressions then as now as were the foregrounding of literary artifice [and] non-
linear narration […] The basis for a genre theory of mixed forms or shared generic 
features is as old as Aristotle’s comparison of tragedy and epic” (1999:294). That is, 
Hassan  appears  to  have  carried  out  a  form  of  theoretical  revisionism,  whereby  the 
stylistic elements of ‘postmodern fiction’ are attributed to pre-postmodern literature, 
creating an expanded ‘canon’ and legitimating an economy of academic research that   184 
conveniently overcomes the limitation of the study of contemporary texts alone.  
  This process of legitimation has also been noted by Ian Gregson in Postmodern 
Literature, despite being guilty of doing so himself: “A concept of what it is to be a 
postmodernist author is widespread in academic circles and this has led to courses being 
invented  on  the  basis  of  that  concept.  There  is a  profound  paradox  underlying this 
because  postmodernism  is  supposed  to  be  about  rejecting  canons  and  subverting 
orthodoxies of all kinds — yet it has managed to impose this orthodoxy with awesome 
effectiveness”  (2004:viii-xiv).  That  is,  despite  the  lack  of  consensus  regarding  a 
definition of postmodernism — and the eclectic and dubious nature of a literature which 
has been attributed to it — we see this problematic theoretical and cultural discourse 
infiltrating all aspects of contemporary society, and become legitimated by the self-
perpetuating ivory towers of academia.  
 
4.2.a. The Postmodernism Condition, Contemporary Literature and Generation X 
 
This book studies twenty-six writers, necessarily with a certain nostalgia, since I seek 
to isolate the qualities that made these authors canonical, that is, authoritative in our 
culture. ‘Aesthetic value’ is sometimes regarded as a suggestion of Immanuel Kant’s 
rather than an actuality, but that has not been my experience during a lifetime of 
reading. Things have however fallen apart, the centre has not held, and mere anarchy 
is in the process of being unleashed upon what used to be called ‘the learned world.’  
— Harold Bloom, in The Western Canon (1994:1). 
 
Most  people  from  outside  Generation  X
10  condemn  the  twentysomethings  as 
illiterate, unmotivated, and apathetic couch potatoes: We appear, apparently, to have 
no career goals, no cultural pride, no political ideology, no family values, and no 
discernible ambitions […] Unable to see through the guise of apathy and anger worn 
[…] and unable to understand what’s beneath it if they could, the many chroniclers 
of Generation X have reduced us to, at best, a market segment and, at worst, the 
downfall of the Western world.  
— Douglas Rushkoff, in The Gen X Reader (1994:3-4).  
 
A  high  proportion  of  what  passes  for  intellectual  discourse  regarding  contemporary 
subjectivity and literature appears to suffer from a bad case of glib generalisation and 
frantic  literalism.
11  The  majority  of  the  critical  engagement  with  recent  theory  and 
culture has been dominated by a ‘howl’ of derision and fear, following the malignant   185 
appropriation,  and  demonising,  of  post-structuralist  theories  of  language  and 
subjectivity  by  postmodern  writers  and  the  mainstream  media.  A  metaphysically 
comforting  a  priori  perspective  of  society  and  identity  has  been  undermined  by  a 
determined  (mis)reading  of  Derrida’s  theories  of  deconstruction,  bringing  about  the 
death of the author, the subject, philosophy, originality in art and literature, and the 
demise of high modernism, leading to calls for the return of the pre-eminent individual, 
secure on its self-present throne. Yet, as we have seen, this postmodern wasteland —
littered with the remains of the self-present subject — is also a site of contestation 
between those calling for the return of humanist grand narratives, and those eager to 
explore the ‘little narratives’ of this new and exciting terrain. 
  In his text Gangland: Cultural Elites and the New Generationalism Mark Davis 
suggests that this negative perspective is the result of a ‘new generationalism’ leading 
certain  social  commentators  to  view  contemporary  culture  and  subjectivity  as 
meaningless and ‘anarchic,’ and to call for the preservation of the ‘grand-narratives’ of 
the dominant cultural discourses. This attitude can be seen with Bloom’s lament to the 
future of the privileged position of The Western Canon in the face of such anarchy. This 
fear of the loss of cultural certitude and the fragmentation of subjectivity has led, what 
Davis  refers  to  as  the  ‘old  generation,’  to  view  with  suspicion  the  approaches  of 
deconstruction and post-structuralism: 
Somewhere out the back there must be a big scrap heap. That’s where all the ‘dead 
white males’ are. It’s where all the lovers of literature are too. And the authors. Even 
the Bard himself, complete with nasty gunshot wound. History is out there — stone 
cold dead, its fans with nothing left to do but pick over a carcass. […] In this palace 
of  dead  icons,  truth  and  beauty  have  pride  of  place,  alongside  the  old-fashioned 
humanities, and any possibility of normal relations between men and women. Or so 
they say, the bevy of prominent social commentators, writers, reviewers and critics 
[…] And who’s behind all this? Like a class full of dutiful primary-school children, 
we’re  all  supposed  to  know  by  now:  the  ‘big,  bad,  wolf’  —  of  cultural  studies 
practitioners, poststructuralists, feminists and postmodernists (1999:155-6).   
 
Rather than viewing these much-maligned theoretical practices as empowering tools to 
defamiliarise  seemingly  a  priori  cultural  discourses  in  a  positive  manner,  these   186 
approaches are viewed as anti-humanist. This accusation arises despite the problematic 
arbitrary  nature  of  all  hegemonic  practices  and  due  to  their  inherent  textual  nature, 
leading them to be seen by many as oppressive and dictatorial as they often suppress the 
counter-discursive activities of marginal groups. However, what at first appears to be 
anti-humanist can be viewed as a call for a revision of humanism, for rather than being 
purely negative, these often-derided approaches defamiliarise — rather than interpellate 
as a priori —subjectivity and society, highlighting our unavoidable complicity with 
hegemonic  discourses.
12  This  at  once  decentres  and  emancipates  the  subject  by 
illuminating the limits these cultural practices place on self-expression and, rather than 
viewing them as de rigueur, proposes the condition of the possibility of change. 
  This  anti-humanist  perspective  dominates  critical  discussions  of  contemporary 
discourse and articulates a view that conflates post-structuralism and deconstruction as 
postmodern, yet the positive possible outcomes of deconstruction as an approach for the 
analysis of subjectivity are also well argued. In The Politics of Postmodernism, Linda 
Hutcheon  —  while  evoking  Theodore  Adorno  —  argues  that  the  autonomy  of  the 
individual in capitalist society is in need of questioning, stating that: “In a capitalist 
context, as Adorno argued, the pretence of individualism (and thus, of choice) is in fact 
proportional  to  the  ‘liquidation  of  the  individual’  (1978:280)  in  mass  manipulation, 
carried out, of course, in the name of democratic ideals” (1990:13). With this view, it 
can be argued that the anti-humanist critiques of post-structuralism and deconstruction 
are problematic, while for Hutcheon, the humanist ideal of the self-present individual in 
capitalist society is already under suspicion due to the acceptance of certain discursive 
rules and roles therein, which, to a greater or lesser degree, deny the subject its implied 
freedom.  Furthermore,  she  points  out  that  if:  “postmodernism  is  identified  with  a 
‘decentring’ of this particular notion of the individual, then both humanist and capitalist 
notions  of  selfhood  or  subjectivity  will  necessarily  be  called  into  question”  (13).   187 
Therefore,  rather  than  being  anti-humanist,  deconstruction  defamiliarises  the  non-
essential limiting discourses of contemporary culture, something that has struck a chord 
with many who have appropriated this approach in order to explore certain counter-
discursive expressions of subjectivity. 
  A further problem encountered with any discussion of contemporary subjectivity 
is  that  this  association  with  the  ‘postmodern  condition’  has  not  only  resulted  in  a 
dominant perspective of the contemporary subject as fragmented and ‘decentred,’ it has 
apparently led to a loss of originality in art, with consumer culture, pastiche and parody 
becoming the dominant (un)creative forms of expression. As such, contemporary works 
of literature that appropriate theories of deconstruction are seen as representations of 
this ‘condition’ par excellence. In James Annesley’s Blank Fictions — an investigation 
into  contemporary  American  literature  —  we  find  a  variety  of  epithets  given  to 
contemporary works of fiction now synonymous with the postmodern canon, such as: 
“the  ‘fiction  of  insurgency,’  ‘new  narrative,’  ‘blank  generation  fiction,’  ‘downtown 
writing,’ ‘punk fiction,’ and … ‘blank fiction’” (1998:2). Annesley goes on to explain 
how his favoured expression, ‘blank fiction,’ represents a ‘blank scene’ that negatively 
reflects contemporary society: 
One  view  suggests  that  [certain]  disturbing  thematics  are  the  product  of  an 
‘apocalypse culture,’ the reflexive gestures of a society torn by millennial angst. 
Other  versions  see  a  culture  dominated  by  a  ‘Generation  X,’  slackers  whose 
indifference is reflected in the atomised, nihilistic world-view articulated in these 
texts. An alternative account speculates about the possible existence of some kind of 
radical aesthetic that finds expression in the extreme, and marginal pronouncements. 
More familiar and, perhaps, more persuasive is the well-worn suggestion that this 
modern mood can be explained in relation to ‘postmodern culture.’ Blank fictions are 
read, in these terms, as the product of a postmodern condition (3). 
 
Outlining  the  various  attributes  of  ‘blank  fiction,’  Annesley  also  indicates  the 
difficulties in trying to define and pigeonhole contemporary literature in fixed terms. 
Although  I  will  refer  to  Annesley’s  critical  position  later,  for  the  moment  I  am 
interested  in  his  second  and  fourth  positions  —  that  is,  the  idea  that  contemporary   188 
literature belongs to ‘Generation X,’ or a ‘slacker generation,’ and that it can be seen as 
a  reflection  of  the  ‘postmodern  condition.’  However,  I  will  still  have  a  view  to 
Annesley’s third definition of ‘blank fiction’ as a ‘radical aesthetic’ and will investigate 
this proposition at a later stage. 
  Mark  Davis’  proposition  of  ‘new  generationalism’  has  been  given  repeated 
credence among many younger writers, such as Douglas Rushkoff  — author, editor and 
contributor to the Gen X Reader — who pinpoints the rejection of contemporary society 
by the so-called ‘slacker’ generation as a reaction to the ideologies of the baby boomers 
— a demographic born roughly between 1945-60. Rushkoff believes that the supposed 
nihilism and apathy of the ‘Why Me?’
13 generation is because the ideal world promised 
to the ‘baby busters’ — those born between 1961-71 — by their ‘boomer’ elders, does 
not exist, and that this apathy stems from a frustrating lack of alternatives. As Rushkoff 
points out the GenXers stood back: 
[A]s baby boomers went to college, got great jobs, crashed the economy, and left us 
with nothing but McJobs
14 — low wage menial employment or ‘temping’ — for 
their vastly overqualified little brothers and sisters. We watched rock‘n’roll take over 
the nation and then dry up like Mick Jagger before we got to college. We watched a 
generation drop acid and turn on, only to find the atmosphere of ‘just say no’ and 
mandatory prison sentences by the time we were old enough to care for a buzz now 
and again. We watched the sexual revolution evolve into forced celibacy as the many 
excesses of the 1970s and 1980s rotted into the sexually transmitted diseases of our 
1990s (1994:5). 
 
It is possible to argue, as Rushkoff does, that ‘slacker’ culture is a deliberate political 
response to an inherited world, and that the derision levelled against ‘Gen X’ is an 
expression of guilt, and the fear of reprisal, by the elder demographic. As he indicates, 
many  social  critics  of  contemporary  culture  and  literature  are  themselves  the 
spokespeople of the ‘baby boomer’ generation. By rejecting contemporary consumer 
society and ‘dropping-out’ the ‘slacker’ rejects what the ‘boomers’ stand for, leading 
the latter to criticise contemporary culture as nihilistic and apathetic.    189 
  In Gangland, Davis goes so as far as to reject the term postmodernism altogether 
—  something  not  that  uncommon  —  seeing  it  as  a  concept  fraught  with  inherent 
limitations  which  deny  the  possibility  of  any  positive  or  political  creativity  in 
contemporary theory and art, stating that: 
I don’t think it’s possible to be ‘for’ or ‘against’ postmodernism […] I don’t regard 
postmodernism as any one thing, or as having any intrinsic qualities, whether it be a 
style or a set of ideas. But I do think that, as a way of describing what is happening 
now, it has become a disabling term. In particular, the notion of the future that it 
proffers, no matter who is doing the talking, is a kind of endism. It speaks of a world 
where everything is ‘post;’ where all the best things are already done […] I don’t 
think, though, that such theorists have come to grips with contemporary life. The 
terms  offered  up  by  the  postmodern  debate  don’t  adequately  describe  the  new 
cultural forms and trends […] being produced everywhere you look, with a sheer 
energy that is daunting (1999:263-4). 
 
It is Davis’ disavowal of this perspective of ‘post-’modernism, and his optimistic view 
of contemporary ‘cultural forms,’ that I shall now turn to. The apathetic nihilism of 
Generation  X  and  the  fragmentation  of  the  subject  suffering  from  the  so-called 
‘postmodern condition,’ is expressed by Eric Lui in his paper ‘The End of Progress,’ in 
which he responds to the negative attitude of the ‘baby boomers’ towards contemporary 
culture  and  literature  suggesting  that:  “Apocalyptic  visions  and  dark  millennial 
predictions abound. The end of history. The end of progress. The end of equality. Even 
something as ostensibly positive as the end of the Cold War has a bittersweet tinge, 
because for the life of us, no one in America today can get a handle on the big question, 
‘What next?’ We are post-ideological, even post-modern. But we are not yet ‘pre’-
anything” (1994:73). Although, this perspective is one that prescribes criticisms of an 
apathetic  and  nihilistic  postmodern  contemporary  culture  that  embraces  the  loss  of 
certitude, and a metaphysical perception of the tangible and transcendental, it does pose 
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4.2.b. The Argument for Contemporary Literature  
 
Having  examined  problematic  negative  generalisations  regarding  contemporary 
literature and culture, and the tendency to view postmodernism as a totalising discourse, 
I will now carry out a defence of certain contemporary ‘culture forms’ that are both 
inherently  creative  and  political,  and  in  fact  continue  a  long  tradition  of  counter-
discursive literature. Throughout this atemporal teleology of the diminished subject I 
have  included  a  discussion  of  the  transgression  of  the  deterministic  divide  between 
philosophy  and  literature,  and  as  seen  with  the  ‘wrong  turn’  we  have  inherited  a 
tradition of philosophical and literary theory that valorises the rhetoric and the supposed 
clarity of the former, and mistrusts the metaphoric nature of the latter. However, this 
demarcation  has  been  proved  tenuous,  as  shown  with  the  textual  nature  of 
deconstruction and post-structuralist approaches, whereby no discursive formation is 
prioritised  over  another,  thus  blurring  the  boundaries  between  the  two.  In 
Postmodernism and Popular Culture, John Docker states that: “the difference between 
fiction and non-fiction lies not so much in possession of truth […] but, in the case of 
scholarly writing, in the declared presence of certain agreed conventions and protocols 
[…] Post-structuralism has raised for us the difference of non-fiction and fiction as 
permanent question, enigma, the insoluble, aporia” (1994:144).
15 Like Docker, it is my 
proposition that post-structuralism and deconstruction both successfully and usefully 
undermine these limiting ‘conventions and protocols.’     
  With a view to the reduced import of the rhetorical over supposedly less rigorous 
modes  of  expression,  many  texts  can  be  viewed  as  being  more  than  generically 
determined  works  of  literature,  and  instead  transcend  the  boundaries  between  these 
discursive  forms,  thus  blurring  the  distinction  between  theory  and  practice.
16  In 
Postmodern Literary Theory: An Introduction, Niall Lucy emphasises the deterministic 
limitations of the ‘wrong-turn,’ as seen in the speech versus writing debate, stating that:   191 
In order to count as literature […] any instance of writing has to be seen to display 
some  order  of  values  belonging  to  speech  (originality,  truth,  sincerity,  mastery, 
courage and so on): it cannot simply ‘be’ writing in the strict or Platonic sense. For 
this reason literature is never only just that. It is always at the same time writing-in-
general, such that any instance of literary writing-in-particular could, under certain 
circumstances be (mis)taken for an example of philosophical, political, historical, 
scientific or other writing (1997:125). 
 
That is, Lucy proposes that literature need not be judged as a particular instance of 
writing in black and white terms, but can be read as an instance of philosophy — its 
traditional other — and rather than reinforcing these demarcations, I believe that by 
virtue  of  its  arbitrary  nature  a  work  of  literature  always  transcends  metaphysical 
boundaries. As seen with the philosophical implications of the fictional work of Sartre 
and Camus, this is nothing new. However, what is of interest here is that the inherent 
possibility of intertextual and interdisciplinary discourses coexisting in any given text, 
is  something  which  seems  to  have  been  conveniently  overlooked  in  predominant 
arguments that deride contemporary literature as lacking value and originality.  
  This point has not escaped the notice of Linda Hutcheon who, in the Politics of 
Postmodernism,  argues  that  the  inherent  philosophical  nature  of  literature  is  being 
explored to a greater extent due to the advent of postmodernism: 
There are other kinds of border tension in the postmodern too: the ones created by 
the  transgression  of  the  boundaries  between  genres,  between  disciplines  or 
discourses,  between  high  and  mass  culture,  and  most  problematically,  perhaps, 
between  practice  and  theory.  While  there  is  arguably  never  any  practice  without 
theory, an overtly theoretical component has become a notable aspect of postmodern 
art, displayed within the works themselves as well as in the artists’ statements about 
their  work.  The  postmodern  artist  is  no  longer  the  inarticulate,  silent,  alienated 
creator of the romantic/modernist tradition. Nor is the theorist the dry, detached, 
dispassionate writer of the academic tradition (1990:18-19). 
 
That is, for Hutcheon, within ‘postmodern literature’ we see an overtly political and 
philosophical  content.  Furthermore,  this  recognition  of  the  inherent  confusion  of 
discursive boundaries has had a corresponding effect with many theoreticians adopting 
literary styles for their theoretical and critical work, something most notably seen in the 
latter works of Roland Barthes. Despite a clear understanding of the interdisciplinary   192 
nature  of  all  forms  of  writing,  contemporary  literature  and  the  work  of  the  ‘blank 
generation’ of writers is still criticised and devalued as nihilistic, morally bankrupt and 
apolitical.  However,  a  view  of  postmodernism  and  contemporary  literature  as  both 
philosophical and political does have validity among certain critics and commentators. 
Referring to Linda Hutcheon in his ‘Introduction’ to Postmodernism and Contemporary 
Fiction, Smyth emphasises this point when discussing her notion of ‘historiographic 
metafiction’  —  a  term  she  uses  to  discuss  ‘postmodern  texts’  —  stating  that  she: 
“provides a convincing demonstration of the politically liberating effects of postmodern 
writing as a counterblast to the Eagleton/Jameson position. For her, postmodernism is 
‘resolutely  historical,  and  inescapably  political,’  […]  ‘historiographic  metafiction’ 
encompasses  oppositional  texts  which  are  both  self-reflexive  and  historical, 
problematising the dominant ideology” (1991:12). While this runs counter to Jameson’s 
perspective of the loss of historicity — and it is possible that much of what passes for 
postmodern literature may well be ‘inescapably political’ — it remains true that this 
‘problematising’  of  cultural  formations  is  predominantly  viewed  as  having  counter-
discursive tendencies due to the open ended aporia associated with deconstruction.  
  Despite  these  counter-arguments  to  the  negative  perspectives  of  contemporary 
theory and literature, I believe that it is wrong to presuppose that the deconstruction of 
traditional grand narratives — such as the metaphysics of presence — and the resultant 
aporia is necessarily a nihilistic activity. Davis gives us cause to return to the problems 
associated with the notion of postmodernism when he argues that:    
Postmodernism may or may not be a handy way of speaking about contemporary 
cultural conditions, but it doesn’t provide much in the way of useful narratives for a 
hopeful future. One thing that ‘post’ addicts of all colours have not been able to 
anticipate is the remarkable degree of political engagement on the part of the young. 
Younger people have never been more serious about issues, despite their cynicism 
about mainstream politics and the fodder served up in the mainstream news and 
current-affairs programmes and in the newspapers. That we live in postmodern times 
has not resulted in the atomisation of all political reflexes or disabled the will to 
organise, as some critics and theorists of postmodernity have predicted. Nor has it 
resulted in the empty, ‘relativistic’ nihilism that many conservatives take as an article   193 
of faith. This complex, multi-layered world might be confusing and disquieting for 
some, but younger people, it seems to me, are by and large making sense of it. They 
are familiar, even comfortable, with the contingency (1999:264). 
 
That is, for Davis the term postmodernism is inherently problematic, and argues that the 
fears  of  those  who  view  the  world  in  light  of  this  ‘post-’  prefix  are  unfounded. 
Furthermore, he believes that the generation of supposed ‘slackers’ has been able to 
make sense of this decentred world and find room for creative and political engagement 
with it. Perhaps what we are witnessing is a generation accepting the aporia of the 
fallacy  of  metaphysical  discourses  and  self-present  subjectivity,  and  embracing  the 
diversity of ‘little narratives’ on a creative and personal level, leading to innovative and 
exciting  explorations  of  this  terrain.  I  would  argue  then,  that  a  perspective  of 
contemporary  subjectivity  as  inherently  diminished  illuminates  this  aporia  as  an  a 
priori aspect of being rather than constituting a temporally specific affliction, and that 
this  realisation  has  encouraged  divergent  explorations  of  alternative  expressions  of 
contemporaneous individuality to those of dominant discursive practices.  
  This optimistic perspective of contemporary theory and literature — although still 
reliant on the dubious rubric postmodernism — is ironically a repeated exception to the 
predominant  criticisms.  In  ‘Postmodernism;  A  Preface:’  —  his  introduction  to  the 
seminal, Postmodern Culture, which includes works by Lyotard and Habermas — Hal 
Foster argues that the positive possibilities of ‘postmodern’ deconstruction outweigh the 
predominant nihilistic perspective of it as an ‘anti-aesthetic’ determinedly opposed to 
high modernism, explaining that: 
It was modernism that was marked by such ‘negations,’ espoused in the anarchic 
hope of an ‘emancipatory effect’ or in the utopian dream of a time of pure presence, 
a space beyond representation. This is not the case here: all these critics take for 
granted  that  we  are  never  outside  representation  —  or  rather,  never  outside  its 
politics. Here then, the ‘anti-aesthetic’ is the sign not of a modern nihilism [–] but 
rather of a critique which destructures the order of representations in order to re-
inscribe them (1985:xv). 
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That  is,  despite  determining  a  clear  ‘postmodernism’  period,  Foster’s  perspective 
clearly  supports  a  view  of  contemporary  art  and  theory  as  far  removed  from  the 
nihilistic instrument of doom that destroyed the modernist grand narratives of art and 
subjectivity, and brought about the end of deterministic science and philosophy that had 
attempted to fill the metaphysical void left with the ‘death of God.’ Rather than viewing 
contemporary theory and literature as inherently negative, we see that it always already 
exhibits  an  awareness  of  the  a  priori  aporia  of  representation  contained  in  this 
argument, and of the impossibility of returning to a historically specific period wherein 
the  individual  could  attain  this  metaphysical  certitude  of  subjectivity.  Rather  than 
postmodernism  bringing  about  the  demise  of  the  self-present  subject  of  high 
modernism, the diminished subject can be seen to flourish as anterior and posterior to 
both  the  modernist  and  postmodernist  periods.  This  perspective  is  duly  noted  by 
Hutcheon  who  argues  that  this  predominantly  negative  view  of  all  elements  of 
contemporary culture — located under the banner of postmodernism — is the result of 
an increasingly vitriolic conservative backlash, stating that: “For the neoconservative 
critic,  postmodernism  is  fundamentally  destabilizing,  a  threat  to  the  preservation  of 
tradition  (and  the  status  quo)”  (1990:16).  Therefore,  it  could  be  argued  then  that 
postmodernism  is  a  chimera,  a  metaphysical  construct  wherein  these  supposed 
‘neoconservatives’  can  collate,  and  critique,  any  counter-discursive  expressions  of 
subjectivity  that  may  undermine  the  metaphysical  comfort  and  security  of  the  long 
established grand narratives of literature, philosophy, religion and more recently and 
more frequently, that of the capitalist economy. 
 
4.2.c. Predating postmodern subjectivity 
 
The questionable application of the term postmodernism to contemporary theory and 
literature becomes more apparent when it is compared to temporally disparate texts that 
not only predate this epithet, but also defamiliarise the subject in a similar manner. This   195 
theme of a crisis of subjectivity can be found clearly in existential texts — such as 
Camus’  The  Outsider  and  Sartre’s  Nausea  —  written  long  before  the  notion  of  a 
‘postmodern condition’ became accepted in theoretical circles and legitimated by the 
wider  community.  That  certain  postmodern  characteristics  are  not  limited  to 
contemporary fiction alone but clearly predate them, is supported by Edmund Smyth 
who states that: “As more than one commentator has observed, the evaluative criteria 
for deciding upon the admission of a work into [a] postmodernist canon can be applied 
to almost any literary work from any given ‘period’ [a] concern with fictionality and 
self-consciousness has of course been a feature of the novel since its very inception” 
(1991:11). With this in mind, and having explained that any attempt to determine a 
postmodern  canon  in  concrete  terms  is  problematic,  I  will  now  carry  out  a  brief 
investigation  into  a  pre-postmodern  text  whose  content  has  much  in  common  with 
contemporary views of the fragmented postmodern subject. 
  In  his  seminal  1956  text  The  Outsider,  Colin Wilson  carries  out  an  extensive 
investigation into the history of the disaffected outsider in fiction. My interest in this 
text not only stems from his interest in existential works of literature, but because my 
own view of the diminished subject and contemporary literature has many similarities 
with his depiction of this ‘outsider.’ In his discussion of Barbusse’s L’Enfer Wilson 
states that a sense of ‘unreality’ is what defines the object of his study: 
And  once  a  man  has  seen  it,  the  world  can  never  afterwards  be  quite  the  same 
straightforward place. Barbusse has shown us that the Outsider is a man who cannot 
live in the comfortable, insulated world of the bourgeois, accepting what he sees and 
touches as reality. ‘He sees too deep and too much,’ and what he sees is essentially 
chaos. For the bourgeois, the world is a fundamentally an ordered place, with  a 
disturbing element of the irrational, the terrifying, which his preoccupation with the 
present usually permits him to ignore. For the Outsider, the world is not rational, not 
orderly. When he asserts this sense of anarchy […] it is a distressing sense that truth 
must be told at all costs, otherwise there can be no hope for an ultimate restoration of 
order. Even if there seems to be no room for hope, truth must be told […] The 
Outsider is a man who has awakened to chaos (1956:25). 
   196 
There are many parallels here with my own discussion of contemporary subjectivity, 
post-structuralism and deconstruction, for whereas Barbusse’s character attempts to rail 
against the perceived rationality and order of bourgeois life, the theorists discussed in 
my  teleology  are  responding  to  the failed  attempts  of  the  philosophical  tradition  to 
provide the metaphysics of presence for language and subjectivity. His sense of chaos 
and anarchy could be compared to the demise  of the ‘grand narratives’ of religion, 
philosophy and science, and the concept of the contemporary subject suffering from 
fragmentation of the postmodern condition. However, his desire to tell the truth about 
the supposed chaos of existence is what brings him closest to my perception of the 
diminished subject, for he recognises that the world is not ordered and must speak out. 
His need for an ‘ultimate restoration of order,’ and the awareness of chaos, could be 
read as an attempt to find new discourses opposed to the bourgeois, a possible return to 
the metaphysics of comfort, or perhaps a desire to defamiliarise the problems associated 
with dominant cultural formations.  
  Wilson goes on to describe the ‘outsider’ in greater detail allowing me to draw 
even more parallels with my own investigations into the diminished subject, when he 
states that the Outsider is: “preoccupied with sex, with crime, with disease […] The 
Outsider’s case against society is very clear. All men and women have these dangerous, 
unnameable  impulses,  yet  they  keep  up  a  pretence,  to  themselves,  to  others;  their 
respectability, their philosophy, their religion, are all attempts to gloss over, to make 
look civilized and rational something that is savage, unorganized, irrational. He is an 
Outsider because he stands for Truth. This is his case. But it is weakened by his obvious 
abnormality, his introversion. It looks, in fact, like an attempt at self-justification by a 
man who knows himself to be degenerate, diseased, self-divided” (23-4). This historical 
perspective of the introverted and divided individual not only emphasises a proposition 
of  the  diminished  subject,  it  undermines  the  notion  that  deconstruction  and   197 
postmodernism alone have brought about the end of self-presence as we find Barbusse’s 
character exhibiting many symptoms of the postmodern condition — and comparable to 
the subject suffering the moral and philosophical fall-out of deconstruction — left with 
a preoccupation with the sordid aspects of contemporary culture, following the end of 
history, the death of God, the subject, and the author.  
  Although Wilson is predominantly interested in existential fiction, this in itself 
does  not  prevent  me  from  making  further  comparisons  with  my  own  notion  of  the 
diminished contemporary subject. As I have already indicated one of the main criticisms 
levelled against post-structuralism and deconstruction is that of an aporia, the open-
ended process of defamiliarisation which, despite highlighting the arbitrary discursive 
nature of contemporary culture and subjectivity, fails to provide the subject with any 
tangible  alternatives.  When  discussing  Camus’  The  Outsider,  and  Meursault’s 
impending demise, Wilson states that: 
[T]he reason for his indifference is his sense of unreality […] The prospect of death 
has wakened him up […] It has, admittedly, wakened him up too late as far as he is 
concerned.  But  at  least  it  has  given  him  a  notion  of  the  meaning  of  freedom. 
Freedom is release from unreality. ‘I had been happy and I was happy still,’ but what 
is the point in being happy if the happiness is hidden from the consciousness by a 
heavy grime of unreality? Sartre’s later formulations of Meursault’s realization is: 
‘Freedom is terror.’ […] Obviously, freedom is not simply being allowed to do what 
you like; it is intensity of will, and it appears under any circumstances that limit man 
and arouse his will to more life. […] Its imperative seems to be: Claim your freedom, 
or  else  …  For  the  men  who  fail  to  claim  their  freedom  there  is  the  sudden 
catastrophe, the nausea, the trial and execution, the slipping to a lower form of life 
(40-41). 
 
It is the sense of freedom that comes with the realisation of the ‘unreality’ of any given 
situation that is important here. If theories of deconstruction and post-structuralism have 
indicated  the  manner  in  which  dominant  cultural  discourses  dictate  our  roles  and 
expressions of self, then the realisation of this unreality brings with it an incredible 
sense  of  opportunity.  However,  it  could  be  argued  that  this  freedom,  and  loss  of 
certitude, has created a critical backlash by those who are terrorised by the extent of this 
liberation. Are those calling for a return to the totalising metaphysical discourses of   198 
modernism and certitude of subjectivity, as Sartre would say, merely acting in ‘bad 
faith’?  If  so,  then  it  would  appear  that  the  postmodern  subject  is  suffering  from 
something  akin  to  an  existential  crisis,  caused  by  the  recognition  of  the  inherently 
metaphysical nature of all cultural practices, and the meaninglessness of existence. 
  The problem with embracing this freedom, according to Wilson, is grounded in 
the  need  to  escape  the  unreality  of  existence  and  make  a  choice  to  do  something 
tangible.  Here  we  can  see  a  similarity  with  the  contrition  of  deconstruction  being 
ineluctably caught up in the system it wishes to defamiliarise, and as he explains:  
Freedom posits free-will; that is self-evident. But Will can only operate when there is 
first a motive. No motive, no willing. But motive is a matter of belief; you would not 
want to do anything unless you believed it possible and meaningful. And belief must 
be belief in the existence of something; that is to say, it concerns what is real. So 
ultimately, freedom depends upon the real. The Outsider’s sense of unreality cuts off 
his freedom at the root. It is impossible to exercise freedom in an unreal world (49).  
 
For Wilson then, it appears that any attempt to defamiliarise and escape the unreal must 
necessarily be based on faith, and it is my contestation that the work of deconstruction 
and  the  theories  of  post-structuralism,  along  with  the  majority  of  contemporary 
literature, all exhibit a belief in the meaningfulness of their activities. I would argue that 
rather than seeing theories of deconstruction and contemporary literature as nihilistic 
and  aimless,  there  is  a  belief  that  these  investigations  into  subjectivity  represent 
examples of the condition of the possibility of change. Rather than simply determining 
contemporary  cultural  discourses  as  pre-given  and  unquestionable,  certain  literary 
explorations  of  subjectivity  appear  to  search  for  meaningful  counter-discursive 
alternatives, and it can be argued that this view undermines the negative attitude toward 
the validity and importance of contemporary literature, indicating the arbitrary nature of 
all  dominant  cultural  discourses.  Thus,  with  this  reading  of  Colin  Wilson’s  The 
Outsider, it becomes apparent that rather than the contemporary subject suffering from a 
particular temporal condition, this diminishing of the subject can be seen as an inherent 
aspect of being that varies only in context and intensity.    199 
 
4.3.a. Apathy, Boredom and Nihilism: — Generation X and Less Than Zero 
 
There’s an emphasis on the extreme, the marginal and the violent. There’s a sense of 
indifference and indolence. The limits of the human body seem indistinct, blurred by 
cosmetics,  narcotics,  disease  and  brutality.  The  contemporary  American  scene  is 
littered with imagery of this kind and it’s hard to escape the conclusion that culture is 
taking a new direction, exploring new kinds of experiences and moving towards new 
forms  and  subjects  […]  This  portrait  of  American  culture  can  be  developed  by 
considering  the  specific  implications  raised  by  its  preoccupation  with  violence, 
indulgence, sexual excess, decadence, consumerism and commerce.  
— James Annesley, in Blank Fictions (1998:1). 
 
As  an  entry  point  into  my  discussion  of  the  diminished  subject  and  contemporary 
literature, Bret Easton Ellis’ debut novel Less Than Zero
17 makes an ideal starting point. 
Set in mid-80s Los Angeles, this collection of vignettes follows the activities of a group 
of  twentysomethings  over  a  four-week  summer break  focussing  on  the  character  of 
Clay, and had an immediate, yet disparate, critical impact upon its release. As Peter 
Freese explains in ‘Bret Easton Ellis: Entropy in the ‘MTV Novel:’’ 
While one group of critics expressed their outraged rejection of the book’s juvenile 
sensationalism conveyed, as one aggravated reviewer put it, ‘in the inarticulate style 
of  a  petulant  suburban  punk,’  another  group  celebrated  the  novel  as  ‘a  weirdly 
fascinating  book’  and  greeted  it  as  an  authentic  literary  expression  of  a  new 
generation.  However  drastically  the  critical  estimations  diverged,  two  statements 
were frequently repeated: Less Than Zero was understood as The Catcher in the Rye 
updated  for  the  eighties,  and  the  slim  book  was  classified  as  an  ‘MTV  novel’ 
(1999:113). 
 
That opinions of Less Than Zero differed so radically is what interests me, for although 
derided as ‘inarticulate’ and ‘sensational,’ it was also compared with The Catcher in the 
Rye — J.D. Salinger’s well-respected story of  adolescent angst and search for self. 
Furthermore, that such an ‘authentic literary expression’ could be so articulated by one 
so young —Ellis was 21 at the time of publication — and mentioned in the same breath 
as Salinger, suggests that rather than exploring a specific ‘postmodern condition,’ this 
member of the ‘new generation’ was treading a well worn path. Although the style and 
context of this so-called ‘MTV novel’
18 differ to The Catcher in the Rye, the stories of 
Clay and Holden Caulfield are very similar.    200 
  In  light  of  my  discussion  of  the  supposed  lack  of  content  in  the  novels  of 
‘generation X,’ that Ellis’ novel received this divergent critical attention reflects the 
difficulties in the reception of what could be classified, in Barthes’ terms, a ‘writerly’ 
text.  Much  of  this  criticism  was  based  on  the  tendency  to  conflate  author  and 
character,
19 and the controversy surrounding its extreme subject matter. As Mark Davis 
points out many: “complain that there is little room for metaphor and experimentation 
in recent culture; meanwhile its contexts and subtleties remain unread. Novels such as 
Bret Easton Ellis’s [sic] Less Than Zero and American Psycho, which attempted to be 
satires as a well as social documents, have been treated as literal prescriptions for moral 
decline” (1999:14). The fact that Less Than Zero received such vehement critical and 
moral appraisals reinforces the dominant view that youth culture is apathetic, apolitical, 
amoral and above all dangerous. These negative commentators are, in Davis’ view, 
guilty  of  generalisation  and  literalism,  whereby  the  speculative  aspects  of  creative 
writing have been overlooked and the text taken at face value, while the possibility of 
social satire and philosophical content is ignored, as contemporary culture and literature 
become victims of a conservative backlash in politics and morality. 
  Interestingly, there are also claims that Less Than Zero is a classic example of the 
postmodern text and exhibits all of the characteristics of a younger generation suffering 
from a clear-cut case of the postmodern condition. As James Annesley points out in 
Blank Fictions Ellis’ novel has been read as representing: 
[T]he  postmodern  jetset  described  by  Jean-François  Lyotard,  an  impression 
strengthened by the text’s repeated emphasis on postmodern cultural forms like the 
geography  of  Los  Angeles,  fast  food  and  MTV.  These  features  have  fostered 
approaches that read the text as a simple literalisation of Baudrillard’s hyperreal, or 
regard  it  as  an  image  of  a  postmodern  world  that  seems,  from  a  Jamesonian 
perspective,  all-embracing.  Less  Than  Zero,  […]  is  thus  identified  as  a  text  that 
simultaneously  reflects  postmodern  conditions  while  replicating  and  reproducing 
those  conditions.  The  text’s  description  of  characters  lost  in  a  fluid  postmodern 
culture,  an  environment  in  which  their  reference  points  appear  to  have  been 
destroyed, supports this kind of approach and fosters comparisons that link Ellis’s 
[sic] vision to […] these postmodern theorists (1998:98). 
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This reading not only supports the notion of the contemporary subject as suffering from 
a particular temporal condition — as opposed to my own proposition of the a priori 
diminished subject — it also suggests that the depictions of contemporary American 
society in Less Than Zero, simply ‘replicate’ and legitimate them. This view overlooks 
the fact that any discussion of discursive formations is immediately caught up in an act 
of contrition, whereby any critical appraisal must necessarily involve itself in the very 
discourse it seeks to defamiliarise, or run the risk of becoming non-sense. 
  Linda Hutcheon explains this problem in The Politics of Postmodernism, stating 
that  theorists  such  as  Derrida,  Lyotard  and  Foucault  are  caught  up  in  their  own 
‘detoxifying logic,’ and that such complicity is an inevitable aspect of critical discourse, 
contemporary literature and art. She goes on to state that: “Each of these theoretical 
perspectives can be argued to be deeply — and knowingly — implicated in that notion 
of centre they attempt to subvert. It is this paradox which makes them postmodern” 
(1990:14).  Despite  this  problematic  reference  to  Foucault  and  Derrida  as 
postmodernists,  it  is  true  that  post-structuralism  and  deconstruction  highlight  the 
inherent aporia involved in the critical act, whereby the discussion of any discursive 
practice  necessarily  partakes  in  the  legitimisation  of  that  discourse,  yet  what  is 
important here is the self-awareness of this contrition. It is my proposition that rather 
than accepting and ‘interpellating’ dominant cultural discourses, Ellis is aware of this 
aporia and is carrying out a satirical deconstruction through the fictional representation 
that is Clay, and his attempts to make sense of his meaningless social milieu. 
  Annesley supports this view in his economically determined reading of Less Than 
Zero, which explores the relationship between character and capitalism, and suggests 
that  Ellis  is  carrying  out  a  negative  appraisal  of  capitalist  culture.  However,  for 
Annesley, Ellis’ constant reference to consumer items is not simply an act of contrition,   202 
but rather: “he creates a text that is able to speak about the experience of living in the 
contemporary world by using the language of that world” (1998:92-93), and argues that: 
Unable to differentiate his writing from the flow of commercial culture, Ellis has 
produced a commodified prose […] It could even be argued that a novel that includes 
so much product placement actually strengthens contemporary capitalist structures 
by promoting further consumerism. Ellis’ commodity-heavy style is, however, not as 
passive or limited as it first appears […] On the contrary, the commodified style 
works to highlight the text’s preoccupation with consumer culture and develops a 
formal dynamic that supports the narrative’s wider negotiations with this complex 
and contradictory sphere […] he does not simply provide a straightforward mirror-
image of this commercial world (94-5).  
 
In other words Ellis’ constant referral to consumer items is not only a political and 
critical act, but determines Annesley’s own Marxist reading of Less Than Zero, wherein 
he argues — like Jameson — that rampant consumerism has led to the commodification 
of subjectivity. Although I respect this reading, I would argue that the theme of the 
novel  is  one  less  of  the  economic  determinism  of  identity  than  a  complicated 
investigation  into  subjectivity  that  happens  to  be  set  in  Beverley  Hills,  and  that 
consumer items are used to highlight the culturally specific aspects of the metaphysics 
of subjectivity, rather than being used solely to critique capitalist society. 
  I suggest that such negative appraisals of Less Than Zero and certain sections of 
contemporary  literature  have  repeatedly  been  shown  to  be  false,  and  propose  like 
Annesley  that  Ellis’  novel  can  instead  be  read  as  a  critique  of  contemporary 
subjectivity. In addition, readings such as Nicki Sahlin’s, ‘‘But This Road Doesn’t Go 
Anywhere:’ the Existentialist Dilemma in Less Than Zero,’ not only provide alternative 
views of Ellis’ novel, they reiterate the proposition that this crisis of subjectivity is far 
from temporally specific. As Sahlin explains:  
Whatever the immediate influences, the elements of existentialism evident in Less 
Than Zero are most readily seen as a mixture stemming from both Camus and Sartre. 
Like the ‘stranger’ or ‘outsider’ portrayed in Camus […] Ellis narrator feels intensely 
alienated, a stranger in familiar territory. Moreover […] he becomes aware of the 
absurd in its existential sense as his month-long experience tells him that all the 
practices and values that he previously accepted have no meaning (1991:123).  
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That is for Sahlin, Clay is far removed from the disaffected youth suffering from the 
postmodern condition, but rather can be seen as a contemporary ‘outsider’ compared 
with the great works of existential literature and the ficto-philosophical works of the 
likes of Sartre and Camus.  
  Although Sahlin supports the notion of a possible philosophical content in certain 
works of contemporary fiction, she explains the theme of subjectivity and the search for 
meaning and freedom in Less Than Zero in a far more positive light, suggesting in 
existential terms that:  
Ellis’s  [sic  passim]  protagonist  also  becomes  painfully  aware  of  the  void  or 
‘nothingness’ […] and the resulting anxiety brings him the burden of freedom and 
responsibility, a burden that is part of both Camus’s and Sartre’s existential schemes. 
[…] For the most part, a reliance on the most familiar elements of existentialism — 
alienation and anxiety, increasing awareness of the absurd and nothingness, then, 
more positively, the awakening to individual responsibility — serves as the best way 
to approach a novel that is constantly existential in its outlook without being highly 
sophisticated in a philosophical sense (123-4).  
 
It is his awareness of the absurdity of life in Los Angeles that raises Clay above his 
peers, for rather than being a simple product of contemporary consumer society — or 
blindly accepting the chaos and moral degradation around him — Clay exhibits many of 
the fundamental symptoms of an existential crisis. Although I have only used Sahlin’s 
ideas briefly, my aim thus far has been to contrast a variety of positions that not only 
support  the  proposition  of  the  diminished  subject,  but  also  indicate  differing 
philosophical perspectives and value judgements within the same work of fiction, and 
having achieved this I shall now carry out my own reading of Less Than Zero as a clear 
exploration of the a priori aporia of diminished subjectivity. 
 
4.3.b. The Diminished Subject in Less Than Zero 
 
People are afraid to merge on freeways in Los Angeles. This is the first thing I hear 
when I come back to the city. Blair picks me up a LAX and mutters this under her 
breath […] She says, ‘People are afraid to merge on the freeways in Los Angeles.’ 
Though that sentence shouldn’t bother me, it stays in my mind for an uncomfortably 
long time. Nothing else seems to matter […] All it comes down to is that I am a boy   204 
coming home for a month and meeting someone who I haven’t seen for four months 
and people are afraid to merge  (1985:9-10). 
 
Because so much has been written about Less Than Zero it makes for a perfect starting 
point  for  my  investigation  into  subjectivity  and  contemporary  literature,  yet  this 
abundance  of  criticism  means  treading  a  well-worn  path.  Therefore,  my  aim  is  to 
expand  on  Nicki  Sahlin’s  existential  reading  and  incorporate  a  brief  psychoanalytic 
reading of my own, before investigating the matter of choice and freedom in relation to 
subjectivity. James Annesley has argued that Less Than Zero is a prime example of the 
postmodern text, with its MTV style, and its nihilistic theme of relentless accounts of 
drugs, drink, sex, abortion, prostitution, rape, sexual confusion and apathy. The Kirkus 
Reviews’ summation of Less Than Zero follows this line suggesting that: “first-novelist 
Ellis  and  narrator  Clay  register  everything  here  with  utter  coolness:  there  is  no 
inflection,  no  viewpoint;  you’re  supposed  to  simply  sponge  up  all  the  horror. 
Unfortunately,  however,  the  effect  is  one  of  overkill  […]  you  never  experience 
revulsion,  only  eventual  boredom”  (Hall:1986:55).  However,  it  is  this  lack  of 
‘revulsion’ and a relentless boredom among both the characters, and certain readers that 
makes the novel so effective and interesting. 
  Peter Freese questions the stylistic themes that support a view of the aimlessness 
of  both  character  and  plot  in  Ellis’  novel  indicating  that:  “the  atmosphere  which 
pervades Less Than Zero is not that of the apocalypse, that is, […] an end and a new 
beginning, but that of entropy with its irreversible movement towards final chaos and 
decay” (1990:121). He goes on to state that this entropy has left the characters with the: 
“speechlessness of an almost autistic generation living in a world in which true meaning 
has long been buried under the relentless onslaught of never-ceasing ‘information’” 
(121). However, I disagree with Freese regarding the level of entropy in Less Than 
Zero,  and  his  notion  of  a:  “gradual  reduction  in  communicable  information”  (121) 
leading  to  an  almost  ‘autistic  generation.’  Not only  does  this  support  the  dominant   205 
nihilistic perspective of contemporary youth, it ignores the possibility that this stylistic 
choice was made in order to satirise the very notion of the postmodern condition and 
resultant loss of individual self-expression in contemporary consumer society. All in all, 
Freese’s  focus  ignores  the  possibility  that  political  and  philosophical  issues  of 
subjectivity can be usefully articulated in contemporary literature and culture. 
  It is my belief that it is the overlooked issue of subjectivity that dominates Less 
Than Zero, wherein the lack of communication between characters reflects the issues of 
trust,  honesty  and  a  search  for  meaningful  relationships  and  expressions  of  self  in 
American society. There are certain repeated phrases that become themes, such as when 
Clay is told that ‘people are afraid to merge on the freeways of L.A.’ that turns into the 
mantra that ‘people are afraid to merge’ full stop! Clay observes a billboard on Sunset 
Boulevard that simply says ‘Disappear Here’
20 which coupled with the repetition of ‘I 
wonder if he’s for sale’ become synonymous with his relationship with Julian who has 
strayed into a world of heroin addiction and prostitution. Clay has a poster of the cover 
of Elvis Costello’s album Trust 
21 on his wall that becomes symbolic of a deeper sense 
of fear and provides a link to his psychiatrist, who also has a Costello poster, and with 
whom Clay has difficulties communicating. Clay is fearful that he is loosing his sense 
of self in a setting which is replete with identical blond haired, blue eyed, tanned young 
men with the “same empty toneless voices” and that he is starting to “look exactly like 
them” (152). Each character has a dysfunctional relationship with their parents, most of 
whom are absent — either skiing in Alberta, or shopping in Japan — and any attempt at 
meaningful conversation quickly degenerates into mindless repetition and the avoidance 
of serious issues, as seen in the following excerpt between Clay and Kim: 
‘What have you been doing?’ I ask. 
‘What have you been doing?’ she asks back. I don’t say anything. 
She looks up bewildered. ‘Come on Clay, tell me.’ She looks through the pile of 
clothes. ‘You must do something.’ 
‘Oh, I don’t know.’  
‘What do you do?’ she asks.   206 
‘Things, I guess.’ I sit on the mattress.  
‘Like what?’ 
‘I don’t know. Things.’ My voice breaks and for a moment I think about the coyote 
[which Blair ran over and Clay watched die] and I think I’m going to cry, but it 
passes and I just want to get out… 
‘For instance?’  
‘What’s your mom doing?’ 
‘Narrating a documentary about teenage spastics. What do you do Clay?’…  
‘What else is your mom doing?’ 
‘She’s going to do this movie in Hawaii. What do you do?’ 
‘Have you spoken to her?’  
‘Don’t ask me about my mother.’ 
‘Why not?’  
‘Don’t say that.’… 
‘Why not?’  
‘What do you do?’ she asks …  
‘What do you do?’ 
‘What do you do?’ she asks, her voice shaking. ‘Don’t ask me, please. Okay, Clay?’ 
‘Why not?’ …  
‘Because I don’t know,’ she sighs. 
I look at her and don’t feel anything and walk out … (148-9) 
 
Not  only  do  Clay  and  Kim  avoid  discussing  anything  meaningful,  we  begin  to 
understand  that  Clay  is  deliberately  avoiding  revealing  himself,  for  reasons  I  shall 
discuss  next.  Kim’s  reluctance  is  plain,  as  we  realise  that  her  mother  —  in  true 
philanthropic style — is kept so busy helping so-called ‘spastics’ that she is neglecting 
the needs of her own dysfunctional ‘teenage’ daughter. While this excerpt supports 
Freese’s proposition regarding the apathetic postmodern subject, I will now highlight 
the ways in which Less Than Zero explores subjectivity in a more optimistic manner. 
 
4.3.c. Ellis and Elvis — Existentialism, Psychoanalysis and Punk Rock 
 
Having outlined various divergent interpretations of Less Than Zero, I will now return 
briefly to Nicki Sahlin’s paper ‘But This Road Doesn’t Go Anywhere’ as a way of 
exploring the intertextual influences involved in Ellis’ investigation into subjectivity. 
As  already  shown  with  Annesley’s  Marxist  reading  of  the  novel  as  a  critique  of 
consumer  society,  and  Sahlin’s  existential  perspective,  Ellis’  novel  is  replete  with 
possible readings that go beyond the nihilistic ‘MTV novel’ for the ‘slacker’ generation. 
However, I will now include another position, and argue that there is a possible mis-  207 
reading by Sahlin of a key element of the novel that indicates an intertextual epiphany 
for Clay, and a turning point in the novel. 
  The importance of British proto-punk musician Elvis Costello to the narrative of 
Less Than Zero has been almost completely ignored in various critical reviews, the most 
obvious  omission  being  that  its  title  comes  from  Costello’s  1977  song  of  the  same 
name. As a lyrical call to arms against the rise of the fascistic National Front in England 
— and the lack of remorse shown by ageing Nazi sympathiser Baronet Oswald Mosley 
when  attempting  to  clear  his  name
22  —  this  connection  implicates  the  novel  in  an 
overtly political act and provides a link between Clay’s poster of Costello and that of 
his  psychiatrist.  In  a  novel full  of  meaningless  conversations  and  avoidance  of  any 
interpersonal interaction, one particular passage in Less Than Zero stands out as a clear 
attempt by Clay to address his problems. On a number of occasions Clay meets with his 
nameless psychiatrist. during which the following conversation takes place:  
I’m sitting in my psychiatrist’s office the next day, coming off from coke, sneezing 
blood. My psychiatrist’s wearing a red V-neck sweater with nothing on underneath 
and a pair of cut-off jeans. I start to cry really hard. He looks at me and fingers the 
gold necklace that hangs from his tan neck. I stop crying for a minute and he looks at 
me some more then writes something down on his pad. He asks me something. I tell 
him I don’t know what’s wrong; that maybe it has something to with my parents but 
not really or my friends or that I drive sometimes and I get lost; maybe its the drugs. 
‘At least you realize these things. But that’s not what I’m talking about, that’s not 
really what I’m asking you, not really.’ 
He gets up and walks across the room and straightens a framed cover of a Rolling 
Stone with Elvis Costello on the cover and the words ‘Elvis Costello Repents’ in 
large white letters. I wait for him to ask me the question. 
‘Like him? Did you see him at the Amphitheatre? Yeah? He’s in Europe now, I 
guess. At least that’s what I heard on MTV. Like the last album?’ 
‘What about me?’ 
‘What about you?’  
‘What about me?’ 
‘You’ll be fine.’  
‘I don’t know,’ I say. ‘I don’t think so.’ 
‘Let’s talk about something else.’ 
‘What about me?’ I scream choking. 
‘Come on Clay,’ the psychiatrist says. ‘Don’t be so … mundane’ (122). 
 
Like all authority figures in Less Than Zero, Clay’s psychiatrist pays little heed to this 
genuine expression of subjectivity. However, the outcome of this conversation can be   208 
viewed as an epiphany, as Clay realises that he alone must deal with his issues, and 
finds  him  terminating  his  therapy  by  telling  him  to  ‘fuck  off’  over  the  phone. 
Furthermore,  the  casual  nature  of  this  relationship  —  coupled  with  Clay’s  own 
experimental bisexuality — suggests that although he is entrusted to care for Clay he 
may  also  be  interested  in  exploiting  him  sexually.  This  is  implied  when,  following 
Clay’s outpouring of grief, he states: ‘that’s not what I’m really asking you, not really,’ 
and tells him to ‘stop being so mundane,’ suggesting that Clay’s problems may stem 
from sexual confusion, while at the same time encouraging this doubt. 
  Sahlin picks up on the questionable adult figures in Less Than Zero  and also 
argues that parents and interim authority figures repeatedly exploit the needy rather than 
giving them requisite love and affection. In existential terms she suggests that: “When 
Clay finally admits that he has problems with his parents, his friends and drugs, the 
doctor’s response is to start a meaningless conversation about Elvis Costello […] The 
caretaker assigned to Clay’s emotional well-being is so indifferent that he considers 
Clay’s fears and anxiety boring and treats his survival instinct as a kind of absurdity. As 
with the indifference of the parents, the effect is negation of the self, the brief scene 
reinforcing the fact that Clay is totally alone in his quest for meaning” (1991:126). 
Although Sahlin’s the theme of absent or abusive figures of authority is an important 
one leading to a diminishing of the subject — as seen in the relationship between Julian 
and  his  drug  dealing  pimp  —  her  casual  dismissal  of  these  references  to  Costello 
overlooks the fact that this apparent coincidence acts as a catalyst for Clay and his need 
to explore alternative expressions of subjectivity. 
  It is my proposition that there is a link between Clay’s quiet introspection beneath 
his poster of the cover of Costello’s album Trust, and his eventual emotional expression 
of subjectivity to his psychiatrist — he with whom we would believe he could (en)Trust 
his deepest secrets in return for a reasoned and professional response. Furthermore, the   209 
framed cover of the issue of Rolling Stone in Clay’s psychiatrist’s office bearing the 
proclamation, ‘Elvis Costello Repents!’ has more importance than the purely semiotic, 
for it is the content of Greil Marcus’ article in that particular edition that pulls the 
various strands together. While on tour in America in 1979, Costello was knocked out 
by  Bonnie  Bramlett  —  a  female  member  of  The  Stephen  Stills  Band  —  after  he 
drunkenly referred to Ray Charles as a ‘blind, ignorant old nigger.’ This became a 
widely  publicised  event,  and  despite  his  anti-fascist  song  ‘Less  Than  Zero,’  his 
forthcoming  production  of  the  classic  debut  album  by  interracial  2-Tone  band  The 
Specials, and his involvement with the Rock Against Racism organisation, in America 
at least he was labelled a racist.
23 In a scene reminiscent of an unrepentant Oswald 
Mosley,  Costello  called  a  press  conference  to  explain  his  actions.  However,  as  he 
explained later to Marcus: “The press conference was unsuccessful because I was fried 
on that tour. This is aside from the incident; now I’m talking from a personal point of 
view […] I was, I think, rapidly becoming not a very nice person. I was losing track of 
what  I  was  doing,  why  I  was  doing  it,  and  my  own  control”  (1993:232-3). 
Unfortunately this incident had a negative impact on his career in America and became 
a millstone around his neck. The failure of Mosley and Costello to clear their names 
also mirrors Clay’s inability to find internal solace when ‘repenting’ to his psychiatrist. 
The parallels between Clay and Costello become clearer when Costello ‘repents’ to 
Marcus three years later: 
When we were playing, the frustration […] just ate me up. And with my lack of 
personal control of my life, and my supposed emotions, and drinking too much, and 
being on the road too much — I’m not saying that I wasn’t responsible for my 
actions; that sounds like I’m trying to excuse myself. But I was not very responsible. 
There’s a distinct difference. I was completely irresponsible, in fact. And far from 
carefree  —careless  with  everything  that  I  really  care  about.  And  I  think  that, 
inasmuch  as  it  was  said  that  we  feed  ourselves  to  the  lions,  you  could  say  that 
whatever the incident was, it was symptomatic of the condition I was in, and that I 
deserved what happened regardless of the intentions of the remarks (233). 
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With the benefit of hindsight Costello realised his own failings and in an interview that 
very much resembles the interaction between analyst and analysand, he repents and 
accepts his own culpability for his actions and for the reaction of others. It could be 
argued that Costello, like Clay, has reached the very bottom, and that this event marked 
an epiphany whereby he became isolated, and alienated himself from his once adoring 
public, causing him to reassess his subjectivity and stop acting in ‘bad faith.’ 
  Realising  that  he  alone  can  effect  any  change  in  his  life,  Clay  embarks  on  a 
journey  of  self-discovery  that  takes  him  into  Julian’s  sordid  world  and  to  the  very 
bottom of his immediate existence. Having lent Julian a substantial sum of money, Clay 
discovers he is addicted to heroin and heavily in debt to his drug dealer Finn, who in 
turn is prostituting him by way of repayment. This downward spiral culminates when 
Clay  —  while  trying  to  regain  his  money  —  is  coerced  by  Finn  into  partaking  in 
prostitution by acting as a voyeur while Julian has sex with a male client: 
[I]n the elevator on the way down to Julian’s car, I say, ‘Why didn’t you tell me the 
money was for this?’ and Julian, his eyes all glassy, sad grin on his face, says, ‘Who 
cares? Do you? Do you really care?’ and I don’t say anything and realize that I don’t 
care and suddenly feel foolish, stupid. I also realize that I’ll go with Julian to the 
Saint Marquis. That I want to see if things like this can actually happen. And as the 
elevator descends, passing the second floor, and the first floor, going even farther 
down, I realize that the money doesn’t matter. That all that does is that I want to see 
the worst (1985:172). 
 
The lift’s descent represents Clay’s own journey into the seedy life of drug addiction 
and prostitution, and to reach the very bottom just as Costello did. It is possible to argue 
that given his own sexual confusion, drug use, and once close affiliation with Julian, 
that Clay’s desire to witness this act of degradation could be seen as an example of 
experience by proxy. Clay realises that his own position is not that far from Julian’s, 
and  what  happens  in  Room  101  of  the  Saint  Marquis  Hotel  —  with  its  obvious 
Orwellian and Sadean connotations, and as close to ‘Less Than Zero’ as you can get — 
suggests  a  sense  of  self  preservation  and  a  need  to  escape  from  an  increasingly 
meaninglessness existence.   211 
 
4.3.d. Catharsis and Redemption: The Case for Choice  
 
Having explored how Less Than Zero can be read as a text that repudiates the common 
conception of the aimless, apolitical and nihilistic nature of contemporary subjectivity 
and literature, I will now conclude my discussion of Ellis’ novel with the optimistic 
theme of redemption. In his article ‘Zombies,’ published in Time magazine in 1985, 
Paul Gray paints  a very pessimistic view of the novel, and focuses on its  apparent 
stylistic shortcomings and the lack of character substance, stating that:     
Ellis conveys the hellishness of aimless lives with economy and skill: his efforts to 
distance Clay, the narrator, from all the other zombies is unsuccessful. True, he has a 
few  scruples.  He  does  not  mainline  heroin,  he  walks  out  before  the  end  of  an 
apparently genuine snuff film, and he refuses an obliging friend’s invitation to rape a 
drugged and trussed up twelve-year-old girl. He is also sensitive. The crying jag he 
experiences at his psychiatrist’s office may suggest some inner anguish, although it 
might just as easily occur because he spends so much time drugged to the eyeballs. 
Ultimately Ellis’ novel is anchored to a hero who stands for nothing. How Clay 
managed to muster the energy to go to college in the first place remains mysterious: 
So too do the forces that made him so passive and world-weary at age 18. That such 
questions about the central character seem unimportant is a tribute to Ellis’ talent; his 
refusal to address them is thus all the more unsettling. In spite of its surface vitality 
and  macabre  glitter,  Less  Than  Zero  offers  little  more  than  its  title  promises 
(1986:57-58). 
 
As already seen, Grey’s derision of Clay’s scruples and his dismissal of his attempt to 
convey his fears to his psychiatrist have been proven false, and run counter to my own. 
That Clay makes the choice not to partake in heroin use, rape an underage girl and view 
a snuff movie does in fact set him apart from his peers and indicate the only expressions 
of moralistic choice throughout the novel, and the idea that he stands for nothing is also 
problematic given his innate sense of self-preservation. Furthermore, in a novel full of 
meaningless communication and fear of trust, Ellis’ narrative choice to leave so many 
questions unanswered not only fits well with the stylistics of the novel but also with the 
character  depiction.  Any  outpouring  of  internal  insight  —  other  than  those  already 
discussed  — that answer the questions posed by Grey, would necessarily undermine 
the impact of this intense feeling of hopelessness.   212 
  James Annesley also expresses this perspective of contemporary American fiction 
as lacking in catharsis or transcendence of character, arguing that: “The gloomy tones 
that colour Clay’s portrait of Los Angeles at the end of Less Than Zero are typical of 
the kind of apocalyptic elements that pattern blank fiction […] there is no relief, no real 
revaluation  or  redemption,  only  a  profoundly  depressing  sense  of  impending 
destruction” (1998:108). The case against Annesley’s position is one that repudiates the 
continuation of a metaphysical notion of a transcendent and self-present subject, and 
having already determined that such a view is problematic with my own theoretical 
proposition of the diminished subject, it follows that any thought of redemption and 
catharsis in Less Than Zero would need to be influenced by these considerations. 
  Having  reached  an  epiphany  following  his  disastrous  meeting  with  his 
psychiatrist, Clay begins to take control of his life and attempts to stop acting in ‘bad 
faith.’ The idea that the characters in Less Than Zero are denying the condition of the 
possibility of change in the formation of their subjectivity, and are complicit with the 
meaninglessness of existence, is a repeated theme clearly expressed in the following 
excerpt when Julian confronts Finn and attempts to escape his self-destructive situation: 
‘Don’t you appreciate what I’ve done for you?’ Finn pushes Julian harder against the 
door. ‘Huh? Don’t you?’ 
‘Stop it, you asshole pimp.’ 
‘Don’t you? Answer me. Don’t you?’ 
‘Done for me? You’ve turned me into a whore.’ Julian’s face is all red and his eyes 
are wet and I’m freaking out, just trying to stare at the floor whenever Julian or Finn 
looks over at me. 
‘No. I haven’t done that, man,’ Finn says quietly.  
‘What?’ 
‘I didn’t turn you into a whore. You did it yourself’ (1985:182). 
 
The extent that Julian has slipped into nothingness is driven home when Finn coerces 
him into injecting yet more heroin, and rather than standing up to him and accepting his 
own complicity in the situation, Julian resigns himself to his fate and acts in ‘bad faith.’ 
Clay can only look on having reached his epiphany, realising that Julian’s only hope is 
to face the ‘terror of his freedom’ and make the choice to escape his current situation.   213 
The  increasing  distance  between  the  two  indicates  Clay’s  desire  to  escape  and 
culminates with a complete loss of respect as he watches an older man sodomise him. 
  It is at this point that Clay reaches a catharsis as the various themes of the novel 
finally come together: “Disappear Here. The Syringe fills with blood. You’re a beautiful 
boy, that’s all that matters. Wonder if he’s for sale. People are afraid to merge. To 
merge”  (183).  Following  his  first  hand  observation  of  Julian’s  decline  and  his 
subsequent  break-up  with  his  girlfriend,  Clay  decides  to  leave  L.A.  and  return  to 
college,  indicating  the  need  to  make  a  new  start.  With  a  view  to  Clay’s  choice  of 
freedom over nihilism Sahlin states that: 
By making Clay’s final choice survival rather than oblivion, Ellis offers redemption 
in  a  nearly  hopeless  situation.  For  some  readers,  the  circumstances  surrounding 
Clay’s confrontation with the void may strike a dismaying minor note in terms of 
existential possibilities, but given the nihilistic alternatives, Less Than Zero holds its 
own. Ellis has created a character who is in realistic terms no hero but who has 
nevertheless grappled with a fundamental question. Clay has become aware of his 
own anxiety and alienation, as well as the meaninglessness around him; and though 
he has found no solution, he has found the courage to continue to live. In having 
faced the absurd as he finds it, Clay takes on the proportions of an existential hero 
(1991:132). 
 
While Clay makes the ‘choice’ to return to College the outcome remains unknown, for 
having recognised that his situation in L.A. is ultimately futile and potentially fatal, he 
realises he is unable to find a space within his social milieu that doesn’t constitute an 
instance of ‘bad faith.’ He has chosen to face the terror of freedom and leave L.A. and 
although this may prove to be equally unsatisfactory,
24 it shows he has the courage to 
embrace the condition of the possibility of change. As such, Clay can be seen as an 
instance  of  a  diminished  subject  who  has  made  the  choice  for  self-preservation. 
However, while still being constrained by the dominant cultural discourses, he faces yet 
another aporia in having to find a fulfilling alternative expression of subjectivity within 
those ultimately limiting discursive formations.  
 
4.4.a. In Summation — Chapter 4 
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By  integrating  my  perspective  of  the  a  priori  diminished  subject  into  the  recent 
theoretical arena, it becomes apparent that the predominance of postmodernism as the 
current mode of cultural production is problematic in the extreme. Furthermore, the 
perspective of a fragmented and schizophrenic contemporary subject suffering from a 
temporally specific crisis — as a result of a loss of the metaphysics of presence — can 
be  viewed  as  the  a  priori  eternal  recurrence  of  the  recognition  of  the  terror  of  the 
meaninglessness of existence, that finds the capitalist mode of production fulfilling an 
inherent need for metaphysical comfort — filling the void left with the demise of the 
traditional ‘grand’ narratives — and has much in common with existential nihilism. 
Interestingly, within the many negative critical discussions of postmodernism, we see a 
surprising lack of engagement with the anti-metaphysical pursuits of the great many 
theorists  who  have  undoubtedly  influenced  the  postmodern  debate,  despite  the 
deterministic appropriation of many of their key themes and concepts. Furthermore, that 
this tradition is ignored by many contemporary theorists is apparent when we observe 
ad nauseam those attempts to deterministically define postmodernism — and in turn 
legitimate  another  arbitrary  discursive  formation  —  and  an  economy  of  critical 
appraisal which calls for the return of the certitude of self-presence in a form theoretical 
retrogression  that  beggars  belief.  More  worrying  are  the  vitriolic  neo-conservative 
attacks that deride certain contemporary cultural productions for being nihilistic, amoral 
and valueless. Thus, in one fell swoop, we find dismissed those texts which attempt to 
draw  attention  to  the  eternal  recurrence  of  the  crisis  of  subjectivity  through  the 
defamiliarisation  of  restrictive  everyday  discourses,  and  the  positive  possibilities  of 
extreme explorations of certain fictionalised accounts of the a priori condition of the 
possibility of change.  
                                                 
Notes: 
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1 A term coined by French philosopher Louis Althusser, referring to the manner that non-essential aspects 
of  societal  and  personal  behaviour  become  legitimated  once  they  are  appropriated  and  accepted  by 
members of that society as de rigueur. 
2 Although I will expand on the modernism/postmodernism debate further, John Docker indicates the 
difficulties  inherent  in  all  concept  usage,  arguing  that:  “While  my  sympathies  are  clearly  with 
postmodernism rather with modernism, I do not pose them as alternatives to any simple way. I have tried 
to present postmodernism as varied, heterogeneous, contradictory, as was, is, modernism. ‘Post’ means 
coming after as well as critical of, in tension with. The history of their relations is inevitably messy and 
confused […] But modernism was also deeply divided, bewilderingly diverse, often highly contradictory. 
It was international, yet different in different continents and different cities. It was always more than a 
cultural  phenomenon;  it  always  involved  philosophical,  sociological  and  economic  contexts  and 
arguments as well. Like any aesthetic, its political implications and associations varied enormously, from, 
at various times and places, the nihilist, the socialist, to the conservative, even the fascist” (1994:xviii). 
3 In his text  Postmodernist Fiction Brian  McHale indicates his frustration with the term  exclaiming: 
“‘Postmodernist’? The term doesn’t even make sense. For if ‘modern’ means pertaining to the ‘present,’ 
then ‘post-modern’ can only mean ‘pertaining to the future,’ and in that case what could postmodernist 
fiction be except fiction that has not yet been written? Either the term is a solecism, or this ‘post’ does not 
mean what the dictionary tells us it ought to mean, but only functions as an intensifier. ‘In a world which 
values  progress,’  says  John  Gardener,  ‘‘post-modern’  in  fact  means  New!  Improved!’  and  Christine 
Brooke-Rose says that ‘it merely means moderner modern (most-modernism?)’” (1989:4). 
4  In  his  text  Fredric  Jameson,  Adam  Roberts  indicates  the  conflict  between  Jameson  and  Lyotard 
explaining that: “what postmodernism represents is the breaking down of these ‘master narratives.’ It is 
no longer possible to believe in a grand story that explains everything. From the various relativisms and 
uncertainties of scientific discourse, Lyotard extrapolates out into a general indeterminacy, a suspicion of 
metanarratives. This is a position close to the attitudes of deconstructionists, of course, and is clearly 
opposed to Jameson’s position. For Jameson […] literature and culture only made sense if placed in the 
context of a grand narrative — Marxism. But Lyotard reserved a special hostility for Marxism, which he 
identified squarely with the practical Communism he despised as an agent of massive human misery. 
There is a certain gleefulness in which he tolls the death knell of one of the most potent of ‘master 
narratives’” (2000:116). At least the spectre of dubious philosophical practices has been laid to rest! 
5 Bill Readings explains Lyotard’s optimistic view of the ‘paralogic’ nature of postmodernism stating 
that: “This is what Lyotard refers to in The Postmodern Condition as the ‘horizon of dissensus,’ in which 
consensus is never reached but always displaced by a new paralogical narrative, which does not aim at 
installing a new consensus but evoking a further paralogical move — its own displacement (PMC: 61). 
This is the pragmatic of experimentation characteristic of postmodernity. Crudely, each little narrative 
does not aim to tell the story, to put an end to narrative; rather a little narrative evokes new stories by the 
manner in which in its turn it has displaced preceding narratives in telling a story. Thus, Lyotard’s claim 
is not so much that ‘everything is narrative’ as that a story is not the story, that there can be no narrative 
to put an end to narratives” (1991:69). 
6 Jameson argues this point in ‘Postmodernism and Consumer Society:’ “I believe that the emergence of 
postmodernism is closely related to the emergence of this new moment of late consumer or multinational 
capitalism. I believe also that its formal features in many ways express the deeper logic of this particular 
social system. I will only be able, however, to show this for one major theme: namely the disappearance 
of a sense of history, the way in which our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to 
lose its capacity to retain its own past, has begun to live in a perpetual present and in perpetual change 
that obliterates traditions of the kind which all earlier social information have had, in one way or another, 
to preserve” (1998:20). 
7  He  explains  this  when  arguing  that:  “I  want  here  to  sketch  a  few  of  the  ways  in  which  the  new 
postmodernism expresses the inner truth of that newly emergent social order of late capitalism, but will 
have  to  limit  the  description  to  only  two  of  its  significant  features,  which  I  will  call  pastiche  and 
schizophrenia” (1998:3). 
8 Adam Roberts indicates that Jameson’s political position is a Marxist one, which not only colours his 
theoretical  position  regarding  postmodernism,  but  also  his  outrage  towards  French  theorists,  such  as 
Derrida and Lyotard, who argue in favour of the death of ‘grand’ narratives. He explains that: “the first 
thing to note  is the way in which Jameson’s approach to the postmodern condition has always been 
thoroughly Marxist. Where previous theorists had looked at postmodern poetry, or art, or architecture, as 
a style or series of styles, Jameson was the first to link it directly to socio-political circumstances — to 
history,  in  other  words.  Just  as  realism  was  an  embodiment  in  terms  of  literary  form,  of  nineteenth 
century capitalism, and modernism was the expression of the reified, post-industrial capitalism of the 
early  twentieth  century,  so  postmodernism  is  the  expression  on  an  aesthetic  and  textual  level  of  the 
dynamic of ‘late capitalism’” (2000:112).   216 
                                                                                                                                              
9 McHale draws attention to this tendency when he explains that: “If as literary historians we construct 
the objects of our description […] in the very act of describing them, we should strive at the very least to 
construct  interesting  objects.  Naturally  I  believe  that  the  fiction  of  postmodernism  which  I  have 
constructed in this book is a superior construction. I have tried to make it internally consistent; I believe 
its scope is appropriate, neither indiscriminately broad or unhelpfully narrow; and I hope it will prove to 
be both productive and interesting” (1989:5). 
10 The term ‘generation X’ came to prominence with the publication of Douglas Coupland’s novel of 
‘slacker’ culture of the same name in 1992. The term came from the title of the 1964 — and therefore 
baby  boomer  —  publication,  which  was  a  ‘vox  pop’  account  of  the  Mod  versus  Rocker  battles  at 
Brighton and Margate in the early 1960s, edited by Charles Hamblett and Jane Deverson, and became 
widely popularised by Billy Idol — a.k.a William Broad — the lead singer of the British punk band 
Generation  X  who  released  between  1976  and  1981,  the  seminal  singles  ‘Your  Generation’  ‘Ready, 
Steady, Go,’ ‘Wild Youth’ and ‘Dancing With Myself.’ For more information on the influence of punk 
music on popular culture see Jon Savage’s England’s Dreaming, and Greil Marcus’ Lipstick Traces and 
In The Fascist Bathroom. 
11 We shall see that the vitriolic critical response to Bret Easton Ellis’ American Psycho is a case in point. 
12 Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish investigates the various discourses of power that, despite 
having no a priori existence, become accepted and legitimated as the individual begins a process of self-
regulation due to the mere possibility of the punishment of unacceptable behaviour. 
13  This  perspective  is  ‘well’  argued  by  David  Martin  in  ‘The  Whiny  Generation  —  (Anti-rant  for 
Newsweek):’ “Well enough is enough. As a baby boomer, I’m fed up with the ceaseless carping of a 
handful of spoiled, self-indulgent, overgrown adolescents. Generation Xers may like to call themselves 
the  ‘Why  me?’  generation,  but  they  should  be  called  the  whiny  generation.  If  these  pusillanimous 
purveyors of pseudo-angst would put as much effort into getting a life as they do into writing about their 
horrible fate, we’d be spared the weekly diatribes that pass for reasoned argument in newspapers and 
magazines” (1994:236). 
14 A term taken from Douglas Coupland’s Generation X: “MCJOB: A low-pay, low-prestige, low-dignity, 
low-benefit,  no-future  job  in  the  service  sector.  Frequently  considered  a  satisfying  career  choice  by 
people who have never held one” (1992:5). 
15  Docker  reiterates  that  the  deconstruction  of  traditional  distinctions  pertaining  to  discursive  forms 
predate postmodernism, arguing that: “Poststructuralism has […] introduced into cultural play what is 
usually perceived as a postmodern writing consciousness (écriture), that there can be no objective text 
writing about other texts. All texts, including the philosopher’s or critic’s or historian’s own, are suffused 
with  tropes,  metaphors,  figural  language  that  will  always  exceed  claims  to  transparent  truth.  The 
philosopher or historian or critic is acknowledged as a narrator in her or his own texts, texts shaped by 
particular genres and generic expectations. These texts, as much as the avowedly fictional, are susceptible 
to detailed ‘literary’ analysis, the revealing of narrative and metaphoric elements that undo any text’s 
attempt to present itself as without inconsistency and contradiction […] Poststructuralism has raised for 
us  the  difference  of  non-fiction  and  fiction  as  permanent  questions,  enigma,  the  insoluble,  aporia” 
(1994:143-44). 
16 While having no wish to enter into a debate regarding the determinism of genre boundaries, I will take 
the opportunity to quote Jacques Derrida from ‘The Law of Genre’ wherein he articulates the associated 
dangers of genre usage: “As soon as the word genre is sounded, as soon as it is heard, as soon as one 
attempts to conceive of it, a limit is drawn. And then when a limit is established, norms and interdictions 
are not far behind. ‘Do,’ ‘Do not,’ says ‘genre,’ the word genre, the figure, the voice, the law of genre, be 
it a question of a generic or a general determination of what one calls ‘nature’” (1992:224). 
17 A title taken from Elvis Costello’s song of the same name from My Aim is True released in 1977. 
18 The New Republic review describes the style of Less Than Zero thus: “Reading it is like watching 
MTV. Each of the brief, videoesque vignettes that make up the book hints at depths never explored. 
There’s a glimpse of real feeling; then, click, it’s onto the next episode of ennui” (Hall:1986:57). Whereas 
Freese states that: “The reader’s initial impression of formlessness and contingency is underscored by the 
fact that the 208 pages of the novel are divided into 108 very short chapters. These chapters are obviously 
geared  to  the  limited  attention  span  of  both  the  drug-impaired  narrator  himself  and  the  readers  he 
addresses” (1990:72). Ouch! 
19 Less Than Zero has been read by many as semi-autobiographical account of Ellis’ life in LA and his 
subsequent university education in the East. 
20 The term ‘Disappear here’ is repeated on at least six occasions in Less Than Zero (pp: 41, 66, 176, 183 
& 204) and can be found in Ellis’ The Rules of Attraction and Glamorama (416). 
21 Elvis Costello’s fifth album Trust was released in 1981. 
22 Oswald Moseley created the British Union of Fascists in the thirties that evolved into the National 
Front and enjoyed political success during the race riot torn UK of the late 1970s.   217 
                                                                                                                                              
23 This is extremely ironic given that Costello’s involvement with The Specials continued and led to his 
production of  their 1984 hit single,  and political call to  arms, ‘Nelson  Mandela,’  a song which  was 
arguably  instrumental  in  bringing  about  a  greater  awareness  of  the  plight  of  the  then  incarcerated 
Mandela, and resulted in a greater pressure being applied to the Apartheid regime. 
24  Although  not  an  instrumental  character  in  Ellis’  second  novel  The  Rules  of  Attraction,  Clay  does 
reappear briefly, and from this we are given the impression that little has actually changed when he states 
that:  “People  are  afraid  to  merge  on  campus  after  midnight  [a  question  of  a  rapist]”  and  in  his  last 
moment in the novel that: “I miss the beach”(1987:184), after singing a line from California Dreaming, 
indicating that despite everything Clay thinks he would be ‘safe and warm’ if he was in L.A.   218 
Chapter 5 
 
The Prescient Text:  Subjectivity, Literature and Philosophy in 
Trainspotting, Empire of the Senseless, Cocaine Nights  
and American Psycho 
 
 
5.1.a. Introduction   
 
Given that certain criticisms that view contemporary fiction as meaningless, nihilistic 
and postmodern have been proven inherently problematic, the aim of this chapter is to 
continue to refute these claims through a close reading of four texts that clearly counter 
this negative perspective. What follows then is a discussion of the divergent critical 
responses to Irvine Welsh’s Trainspotting, Kathy Acker’s Empire of the Senseless, J.G. 
Ballard’s  Cocaine  Nights  and  Bret  Easton  Ellis’  American  Psycho.  By  relating  my 
readings to the author’s wider oeuvre, I shall argue that these novels problematise the 
age-old  division  between  literature  and  philosophy,  carry  out  important  and 
immediately recognisable investigations into contemporary subjectivity, and indicate an 
acceptance of the aporia of the meaninglessness of existence, while postulating a future 
for the a priori diminished subject free from nihilism and the supposed ‘postmodern 
condition.’ That  is,  through  the  exploration  of  extreme  and  transgressive  aspects  of 
subjectivity — those that confront the reader by defamiliarising the seemingly a priori 
role of the subject in society — these texts can be read as fictional articulations of the 
inherent  lack  of  the  metaphysics  of  self-presence  and  —  for  better  or  worse,  and 
depending on the text — the condition of the possibility of change.  
 
5.2.a. Trainspotting — Irvine Welsh, Psychoanalysis, Self-Presence and Heroin 
 
Irvine Welsh’s debut novel Trainspotting quickly transcended its initial underground 
success, becoming a hugely popular bestseller that controversially explored alternative 
expressions  of  counter-discursive  subjectivity,  and  an  awareness  of  the  a  priori 
meaninglessness of existence, on many levels. However, this extreme story of heroin   219 
addiction, AIDS and overdose resulted in a swift critical backlash. In Gangland Mark 
Davis indicates the moral indignation Trainspotting evoked when discussing Mandy 
Sayer’s  review  entitled  ‘A  Blistering  Ride  Underground,’  wherein  we  find  her 
blustering: “I can’t help thinking […] of dirty realism and deconstruction as two parallel 
tracks taking us on a hurtling train ride into nothingness [s]ure, we’re all travelling in 
the same direction, but I think I’d rather walk” (1999:131). Davis responds by pointing 
out that: “Sayer not only managed to ignore the chord the mega-selling Trainspotting 
struck among many young readers, but in a single sentence pandered to both of the 
literary establishment’s currently fashionable prejudices, lambasting both ‘dirty realism’ 
and deconstruction” (131) — and once again we see deconstruction blamed for culture’s 
apparent ‘ride into nothingness.’ Although Trainspotting was attacked for romanticising 
drug use, glamorising heroin chic, and over the validity of Welsh’s description of heroin 
addiction,
1 such literalist readings not only failed to see past the subject matter, they 
ignored the possibility of political and philosophical content. 
  Structurally Trainspotting consist of a number of temporally disparate and loosely 
connected  vignettes,  and  despite  having  very  few  characters,  this  anti-teleological 
narrative ultimately focuses on Mark Renton. For Renton, heroin use is a determinedly 
philosophical decision to adopt a counter-discursive practice in order to retreat from a 
society that makes him an outsider, and threatens his attempts to simplify his existence 
through the selfish pleasure of drug use. It can be argued that he is attempting to achieve 
an ideal form of subjectivity approximating pure self-presence but — as he repeatedly 
discovers  —  the  condition  of the  possibility  of change,  and  his  dependency  on  the 
Other, encroach on his introspection. This dichotomy is highlighted when Renton states 
that: “Ah love nothing (except junk), ah hate nothing (except forces that prevent me 
getting any) and ah fear nothing (except not scoring)” (1993:2). Although, it may be 
true that he has simplified his life, this extreme choice between contemporary culture   220 
and  heroin  addiction  could,  in  turn,  be  read  as  the  choice  between  life  and  death. 
Furthermore,  this  counter-discursive  decision  can  also  be  seen  as  a  micro-level 
reflection of the very thing he wishes to avoid, for Renton remains a consumer — albeit 
of illicit substances — and reaches an aporia whereby he finds himself still constrained 
by the hegemonic discourses he wishes to escape. 
  Like all works of fiction Trainspotting can be read in a variety of different ways, 
as the controversy surrounding it attests to. In a chapter entitled ‘Searching for the Inner 
Man’ Renton is forced to see psychiatrist Tom Forbes, in a judicially enforced attempt 
at drug rehabilitation. However, he has his own insights into psychoanalysis, and views 
the whole practice with humorous disdain: 
Ah  did  learn  a  few  things  though,  based  oan  Forbes’s  disclosures  and  ma  ain 
researches into psychoanalysis and how ma behaviour should be interpreted. Ah have 
an unresolved relationship wi ma deid brother, Davie, as ah been unable tae work oot 
or express ma feelings about his catatonic life and subsequent death. Ah have oedipal 
feelings towards ma mother and an attendant unresolved jealousy towards ma father. 
Ma  junk  behaviour  is  anal  in  concept,  attention-seeking,  yes,  but  instead  of 
withholding the faeces tae rebel against parental authority, ah’m pittin smack intae 
ma body tae claim power over it vis-a-vis society in general. Radge, eh? (185).    
 
It could be argued that Welsh’s fictional rejection of psychoanalysis is a response to its 
efforts to sublimate counter-discursive expressions of subjectivity into supposed normal 
society, for as Renton points out: “Rehabilitation means the surrender ay the self” (181). 
The derision Renton feels towards Forbes could therefore be read as his attempt to resist 
yet another attempt by society to deny him his simple life and reintegrate him into 
socially  acceptable  behaviour.  Needless  to  say  this  effort  fails,  and  Renton  quickly 
resumes his habit although, like the impediments to his supply of heroin and resultant 
problems with the law, Renton’s attempts at counter-discursive subjectivity are always 
problematised  due  to  his  necessary  interaction  with  both  the  Other  and  those 
inescapable  hegemonic  discourses.  Furthermore,  it  is  also  possible  to  see  Renton’s 
choice of heroin as an instance of ‘bad faith’ when, despite his mistrust of Forbes, he 
states that: “Tom seemed tae get us closer tae what ah believe the truth might be. Ah   221 
despised  masel  and  the  world  because  ah  failed  tae  face  up  tae  ma  ain,  and  life’s, 
limitations” (185). As such, heroin addiction can be read as a manifestation of self-
loathing and the terror of freedom and Renton leaves this meeting with a much clearer 
perspective on what choices he has, and how to make them. 
 
5.1.b. ‘Choose Life’ — The end of the downward spiral 
 
The  existential  themes  of  bad  faith,  freedom  and  choice  are  replete  throughout 
Trainspotting  which  is  unsurprising  given  that  Renton  is  portrayed  as  a  well-read 
autodidact who briefly attended university and, despite his counter-discursive lifestyle 
choice, has a genuine penchant for philosophy. This interest becomes apparent in the 
exchange between Renton and his magistrate when he faces court following his arrest 
for stealing philosophical books: 
— You stole the books from Waterstone’s bookshop, with the intention of selling 
them, he states. Sell fuckin books. My fuckin erse. 
— No, ah sais … 
— Mr Renton, you did not intend to sell the books? 
— Naw. Eh, no, your honour. They were for reading. 
— So you read Kierkegaard. Tell us about him, Mr. Renton, The patronising cunt 
sais. 
— I’m interested in his concepts of subjectivity and truth, and particularly his ideas 
concerning  choice;  the  notion  that  genuine  choice  is  made  out  of  doubt  and 
uncertainty, and without recourse to the experience or advice of others. It could be 
argued, with some justification, that it’s primarily a bourgeois existential philosophy 
and would therefore seek to undermine collective societal wisdom. However, it’s 
also a liberating philosophy, because when societal wisdom is negated, the basis for 
social control over the individual becomes weakened and … but I’m rabbiting a bit 
here (166). 
 
Renton’s obvious familiarity with the works of Søren Kierkegaard, coupled with his 
choice not to conform to ‘collective societal wisdom’ can be read as a deliberate attempt 
to  gain  greater  control over  his  own  subjectivity  in  existential  terms.  However,  the 
freedom gained from heroin use is problematic given the exigencies of this choice, such 
as the problems in obtaining heroin, the danger of overdose, and the repeated attempts 
by hegemonic practices to control this illegal and counter-discursive activity. Renton 
can clearly see the absurdity of society and the meaninglessness of his life, yet his   222 
choice is ultimately self-defeating, for as the title of the book suggests, heroin addiction, 
like ‘trainspotting’ — grown men watching locomotives and noting their identification 
numbers — is effectively a pointless exercise.
2 
  The inability of Renton to maintain a counter-discursive expression of self-present 
subjectivity becomes apparent as outside influences impinge and ‘change’ the direction 
of his quest. Examples of the condition of the possibility of change can be seen when 
Renton overdoses, when ‘baby Dawn’ dies from cot death, and, most importantly, when 
Tommy — his once ‘clean’ friend who he introduces to heroin — dies from AIDS 
related illness. Within Renton there comes a greater awareness of the failure of heroin to 
deliver his ideal self-present freedom, thus faced with a choice between the unreliable 
and  dangerous  nature  of  his  addiction,  and  the  restrictions  of  dominant  cultural 
discourses, he realises that he alone must decide what choice to make:  
Society  invents  spurious  convoluted  logic  tae  absorb  and  change  people  whae’s 
behaviour is outside its mainstream. Suppose that ah knew the pros and cons, know 
that ah’m gaunnae hav a short life, am ay sound mind, etcetera, etcetera, but still 
want tae use smack? They won’t let ya dae it. They won’t let ye dae it, because it’s 
seen as a sign of thir ain failure. The fact is ye jist simply choose tae reject whit they 
huv tae offer. Choose us. Choose life. Choose mortgage payments; choose washing 
machines; choose cars; choose sitting on a couch watching mind-numbing and spirit-
crushing  game  shows,  stuffing  fuckin  junk  food  intae  yir  mooth.  Choose  rotting 
away, pishing and shiteing yersel in a home, a total fuckin embarrassment tae the 
selfish, fucked-up brats ye’ve produced. Choose life. Well, ah choose no tae choose 
life. If the cunts can’t handle that, it’s thair fuckin problem (187-9).  
 
Thus, Renton has reached the bottom and can see no satisfactory options, but similarly 
he has become aware of his complicity in this situation. He made the choice not to 
choose the life offered by mainstream cultural discourses, but that choice has proven to 
be as meaningless as that which he rejected, forcing Renton to choose between survival 
and oblivion. Yet he is afraid to make the move, terrified by the choice of freedom and 
caught  up  in  unhealthy  friendships  with  the  likes  of  the  self-centred  Sick  Boy,  the 
ineffectual Spud and the psychotic Begbie. Renton, therefore, not only needs to escape   223 
his cycle of heroin use but also the limitations of his so-called friends and social milieu, 
so he makes the choice to ‘choose life,’ and not to choose Leith! 
  The  chance  to  make  this  break  comes  unexpectedly  when  the  ‘friends’ 
inadvertently come into possession of a large quantity of heroin, which they take to 
London and sell for a substantial sum of money. However, during their celebrations 
Francis Begbie — also know as ‘General Franco’ because of his fascistic tendencies — 
carries out one of his routinely violent episodes and humiliates Renton — who routinely 
avoids violence — by disparagingly refers to him as Rent Boy
3 in front of the others. 
Following this event, Renton makes the choice to steal the proceeds of the drug deal, 
realising that this choice is less terrifying than his hazardous friendship with Begbie: 
Ironically it was Begbie who was the key. Ripping off your mates was the highest 
offence in his book, and he would demand the severest penalty. Renton had used 
Begbie,  used  him  to  burn  his  boats  completely  and  utterly.  It  was  Begbie  who 
ensured he could never return. He had done what he had wanted to do. He could now 
never go back to Leith, to Edinburgh, even to Scotland, ever again. There, he could 
not be anything other than he was. Now free from them all, for good, he could be 
what  he  wanted  to  be.  He’d  stand  or  fall  alone.  This  thought  both  terrified  and 
excited him as he contemplated life in Amsterdam (344). 
 
Thus, Renton has made a complete break from his meaningless life and dubious friends. 
Standing alone, he is free to choose his own destiny and although the outcomes of this 
choice are unknown he has at least faced up to the terror of freedom and acted in ‘good 
faith.’ Therefore, Renton can be seen as existential explorer of subjectivity, and there 
are  no  guarantees  in  this  novel,  no  happy  endings,  and  no  transcendence  of  the 
characters  into  holistic  self-present  subjects.  Instead,  Renton  can  be  viewed  as  a 
fictional  representation  of  the  proposition  of  the  diminished  subject  aware  of  the 
inherent aporia of existence when faced with his ineluctable complicity with dominant 
cultural discourses. Thus, Renton is unable to find an expression of subjectivity that is 
independent of these discursive practices, yet despite this he chooses to make a change, 
leading me to argue that despite certain negative receptions, Trainspotting can be read 
as optimistic exploration of subjectivity and the condition of the possibility of change.    224 
5.2.a. Empire of the Senseless — Kathy Acker and the Failure of Theory 
 
The ceiling of languages is falling down. Either add to this rubble or shove at least 
some of it away. Liberty, shit. The liberty to starve. The liberty to speak words to 
which no one listens. The liberty to get diseases no doctor treats or can cure. The 
liberty to live in conditions cockroaches wouldn’t touch except to die in. The liberty 
to be an eighty-three-year-old Ukrainian shuffling in her slippers among the cat shit 
in the slum building hallways — ‘Is the landlord here? Is there light anywhere?  
— Kathy Acker, in The Empire of the Senseless (1987:163-4).  
 
A considerable amount has been written about Kathy Acker’s oeuvre,
4 much of which 
has  centred  on  the  influence  of  queer  theory  on  her  attacks  of  ‘phallologocentric’ 
society, and her exploration of alternative modes of expression for women beyond those 
of dominant and oppressive discourses. Yet despite the predominance of discussions of 
her  impact  as  a  feminist  writer,  I  will  instead  focus  on  the  manner  in  which  she 
combines  theory  and  fiction  in  Empire  of  the  Senseless,  and  her  view  of  the 
deconstruction of subjectivity as a positive political act which brings together a view of 
the diminished subject and the philosophical possibilities of literature.  
  Empire of the Senseless is a strangely disjointed novel that alternates between the 
perspectives of the characters Thivai and Abhor, and a variety of fantasies that find 
them living as pirates, and caught up in a future Algerian revolution in Paris. Moments 
of prose mingled with vulgar obscenities and literary theory make this difficult book a 
rewarding  read,  and  finds  Acker  carrying  out  a  deconstruction  of  language  as  the 
dominant tool of oppressive hegemonic discourses such as psychology — by exploring 
dysfunctional familial situations and confusing gender roles — with an overall theme of 
literature as a counter-discursive tool. The extent of Acker’s interest in the relationship 
between language and subjectivity can be seen a section entitled ‘Demolition’ wherein 
the following questions are posed: “What is language? Does anyone speak to anyone? Is 
language  computer  language,  journalese,  diction  of  expectation  and  behaviour, 
announcement  of  the  allowed  possibilities  of  reality?  Does  language  control  like 
money?” (164). Quite clearly, it is the defamiliarisation of language that is fundamental   225 
to Acker’s work, for not only is she aware of the inherent relationship between subject 
and  language,  she  views  cultural  practices  as  ineluctably  bound  by  language  and 
discursively oppressive, diminishing the subject in much the same way a Marxist would 
view the capitalist mode of production. 
  Acker’s theoretical approach to the question of language has an obvious lineage 
that clearly highlights the influence of Freud, Lacan, Kristeva, Cixous and Derrida to 
name but a few. Referring to Acker in an article entitled ‘Punko Panza,’ in the New 
Republic journal, David Van Leer states that: 
It is easy to understand the intellectual and political point that Acker would make, 
and  to  recognize  its  source  in  the  philosophical  scepticism  of  French  post-
structuralism,  especially  deconstruction.  Post-structuralism  began  the  business  of 
dismantling the concepts of ‘history,’ ‘nature,’ ‘self:’ deconstruction continued the 
job by showing language — even the language of people who want to criticize social 
arrangements — to be itself simply the product of and reinforcer of existing power 
relations (1987:40). 
 
With this in mind, it can be seen that Acker is not merely interested in the relationship 
between  the  subject  and  language,  but  also  the  difficulties  in  engaging  in  counter-
discursive practices within dominant cultural formations. This realisation is based on 
the appropriation of deconstructive practices, that propose that any act of resistance is 
always implicated in reinforcing, and legitimating, that which it seeks to undermine due 
to an ineluctable linguistic relationship with those discourses. 
  Therefore,  Acker  is  patently  aware  that  her  literary  responses  to  dominant 
discursive practices — and the way in which language oppresses and limits expressions 
of  subjectivity  —  are  implicitly  involved  in  perpetuating  all  that  she  ‘abhors,’  thus 
rendering them senseless activities. This aporia becomes clear when Abhor states that: 
“The demand for an adequate mode of expression is senseless. Then why is there this 
searching for an adequate mode of expression? Was I searching for a social and political 
paradise? Since all acts, including expressive acts, are inter-dependent, paradise cannot 
be  an  absolute.  Theory  doesn’t  work”  (113).  Acker  not  only  carries  out  a  literary   226 
deconstruction of subjectivity, she also deconstructs her own position, as is explained 
by R.H.W. Dillard in his New York Times review of Empire of the Senseless, entitled 
‘Lesson No.1: Eat Your Mind:’  
One way to look at the novels of Kathy Acker in general and this one in particular is 
to see them all as the log of her almost desperate search for an ‘adequate mode of 
expression’ for a time and a world whose centre will not only not hold, but hasn’t 
been able to hold her so long that the very idea of a centre seems absurd. Even as she 
denies the legitimacy of the struggle, she wrestles in her work as directly as any 
writer  has  ever  done  with  the  actual  language  of  literature.  Distrusting  it  almost 
completely, but nevertheless  completely dependent on it, she attacks it, twists it, 
deconstructs  it  and  distorts  the  cultural  values  implicit  in  its  structures,  seeking 
always  to  make  a  literature  ‘which  denounces  and  slashes  apart  the  repressing 
machine at the level of the signified’ (1999:10). 
 
Clearly  despite  the  fact  that  Acker  uses  literature  to  deconstruct  discursive  cultural 
practices and search for new forms of expression, she is also aware of the ‘senseless’ 
nature of this act. So when Abhor, asks, ‘why is there this search for an adequate mode 
of expression?’ and points out that ‘[t]heory doesn’t work,’ Acker creates an aporia 
which  discounts  both  literature  and  theory  as  valid  ways  of  exploring  alternative 
subjectivity. What she is faced with then, is the choice to find ‘modes of expression’ 
within  existing  cultural  and  theoretical formations,  or  to  embrace  the  apolitical  and 
meaningless nature of the only truly original expressions of  self, such  as nonsense, 
gibberish and schizophrenia.
5 
  The constraints of language, and the inherent diminished nature of subjectivity — 
given the limitations of a culture dominated by discursive practices — coupled with the 
aporia  of  an  ineluctable  contrition  with  these  oppressive  discourses,  and  problems 
associated with the meaningless nature of (non)sense, is made clear by Acker in the 
following excerpt: 
That part of our being (mentality, feeling, physicality) which is free of all control 
let’s call our ‘unconscious.’ Since it’s free of control, it’s our only defence against 
institutionalized  meaning,  institutionalized  language,  control,  fixation,  judgement, 
prison. Ten years ago it seemed possible to destroy language through language: to 
destroy language which normalizes and controls by cutting that language. Nonsense 
would  attack  the  empire-making  (empirical)  empire  of  language,  the  prisons  of 
meaning. But this is nonsense, since it depended on sense, simply pointed back to the   227 
normalizing institutions. What is the language of the ‘unconscious’? (If this ideal 
unconscious or freedom doesn’t exist: pretend it does, use fiction, for the sake of 
survival, all our survival). Its primary language must be taboo, all that is forbidden. 
Thus, an attack on the institutions of prison via language would demand the use of 
language or languages which aren’t acceptable, which are forbidden. Language, on 
one level, constitutes a set of codes and social and historical agreements. Nonsense 
doesn’t per se break down the codes; speaking precisely that which the codes forbid 
breaks the codes (1988:133-34). 
 
For Acker then, the only forms of expression that have any political impact are those 
necessarily implicated with the ‘prison of meaning’ and are therefore marginalised. As 
such, she focuses on suppressed expressions of subjectivity which exist in the margins 
of society and — more often than not — leads to those exhibiting them being subsumed 
by even more extreme and totalising discourses — such as psychiatric institutions and 
prisons. Thus, the closest we can get to alternative and adequate modes of expression is 
through those texts deemed taboo or too extreme to be accepted by mainstream society. 
  Extreme expressions of subjectivity abound in Empire of the Senseless and, as in 
all  her  work  Acker  uses  all  aspects  of  language,  narrative  structure  and  content  to 
explore the counter-discursive in contemporary society.
6 Her use of parody and pastiche 
— as seen with her feminist interpretation of Don Quixote and her rewriting of Great 
Expectations — undermine the traditional notion of the novel as an original artistic act, 
reflecting her own perspective of the impossibility of original and adequate forms of 
expression for the subject. This position is supported by Naomi Jacobs in her paper, 
‘Kathy Acker and the Plagiarized Self,’ wherein she states that: “Through semantic and 
stylistic  crudeness,  pastiche-appropriations  of  famous  literary  texts,  and  outrageous 
manipulations  of  historical  and  literary  figures,  Acker  attempts  simultaneously  to 
deconstruct the tyrannical structures of official culture and to plagiarize an identity, 
constructing a self from salvaged fragments of those very structures she has dismantled” 
(1999:21). Thus, Acker’s work becomes the embodiment of the post-structuralist text 
representing  the  discursive  subject,  which  rather  than  exhibiting  comforting  self-  228 
presence  and  transcendence,  closely  resembles  a  narrative  function  that  is  being 
constantly written, bringing subjectivity yet closer to language and literature. 
  Rather  than  viewing  both  literature  and  subjectivity  as  original  modes  of 
expression, Acker instead sees them as palimpsests to be written upon over and over 
again. As such, pastiche and tattooing become major themes in Empire of the Senseless 
whereby pastiche represents the inherent intertextual and the non-determining function 
of meaning in all aspects of writing, and the tattoo acts as a metaphor for the narrative 
and textual elements of subjectivity. The importance of the taboo in Acker’s work is 
explained by Ellen G. Friedman in her article ‘‘Now Eat Your Mind’: An Introduction 
to the Works of Kathy Acker,’ wherein she points out that: 
The tattoo, in fact, is the central image in […] Empire of the Senseless, a work 
dedicated  to  her  tattooist.  A  precise  metaphor  for  her  writing,  the  tattoo  is  an 
outlawed, magical language written directly onto the body, becoming part of the 
body, the body turning into text, an audacious rendering of Cixous’s writing the body 
[…] Acker, obsessively explores the territory of the taboo, claims it as the proper 
domain  from  which  to  launch  attacks  on  Western  culture  —  an  empire  of  the 
senseless. In Empire of the Senseless, she systematically summons up every taboo 
she  can  think  of  —  including  incest,  rape,  terrorism,  vomit,  shit,  menstruation, 
homosexuality, a very long list (1999:20). 
 
As such, with the realisation of the inherently discursive nature of subjectivity, those 
counter-discursive and taboo practices deemed unacceptable by wider society can be 
read as attempts to establish modes of expression that — although still existing within 
mainstream  culture  —  are  not  tolerated  and  are  repeatedly  marginalised. Therefore, 
Acker’s investigations into taboo subjectivity can be read as a form of deconstruction 
that defamiliarises and problematises dominant cultural discourses by focussing on their 
‘Other.’ That such counter-discursive activities can be read as the expression of a desire 
for greater individuality is made clear by Acker when explaining that: “A black boy cut 
his right arm with a razor blade: ‘Since I’m now making blood come out of my own 
arm, I can’t be nothing.’ The boy stared at his flowing blood” (1987:71). Thus, the   229 
desire for control over the subject of language in the face of meaningless, oppressive 
and senseless cultural discourses becomes manifest as self-mutilation.
7  
This desire for greater control does not mean that Acker is calling for an ideal 
self-present subject, rather she is expressing a belief in the possibility of change through 
counter-discursive and taboo articulations of being. If culture is inherently textual in 
nature, then Acker’s own notion of the tattoo, and the ‘black boy’s’ desire to carve 
himself  a  new  form  of  subjectivity,  can  be  seen  as  literal  attempts  to  rewrite  the 
narrative  of  self.  As  such,  supposedly  anti-social  activities,  such  as  self-harm,  drug 
abuse and tattooing, can be viewed in an optimistic light, for as Abhor points out: “I’m 
playing with only my blood and shit and death because mommy ordered me to be only 
what she desired, that is, to be not possible, but it isn’t possible to be and not to be 
possible.  By  playing  with  blood  and  shit  and  death,  I’m  controlling  my  life”  (51). 
Therefore, the taboo — those acts viewed as self-destructive and nihilistic — is put into 
sharp relief by Acker, who states that: “Masochism is only political rebellion” (58), and 
views the taboo act as the ultimate expression of valid alternative modes of subjectivity, 
which are in themselves overtly political acts. 
  Therefore for Acker, despite the failure of contemporary society to live up to its 
promise, and the oppression of more adequate modes of expression by the repressive 
discursive practices of language, there is still hope for the contemporary subject. That 
place is in the extreme expressions of subjectivity as seen in the taboo activities of 
various  counter-cultures  —  its  own  ‘heart  of  darkness’  —  and  in  the  fictional 
representations of being in her novels. Friedman explains this perspective arguing that: 
Acker deconstructs social grammar, syntax, and modes of meaning. She perceives 
Americans  as  having  become  so  thoroughly  roboticized  by  their  institutions  that 
hope for love, for authentic life and identity, can only be reimagined in some other 
space, outside of society, outside the law. Acker writes, ‘I’m trying to destroy all 
laws, tell you not to follow laws, restrictions.’ Pirates, murderers, Arabs, terrorists, 
slave traders and other Acker permutations of the extreme (sometimes a fantasy) 
outsider for whom society is a field for illicit and, above all, selfish harvests and 
who,  besotted  with  death,  theft,  hypocrisy,  paranoia,  and  ugly  sex,  give  back  a   230 
portrait  of  society  horrifyingly  consistent  with  their  values.  Just  as  appropriating 
male texts results in the subversive disclosure, crime and criminals propose sites 
where  the  bondage  of  self  to  the  culture’s  deadening  prescriptions  may  be 
demonstrated, and perhaps more important, where liberating strategies may be tested 
(1999:19-20).  
 
Finally then, it can be argued that — despite the extreme nature of her subject matter 
and the difficult plagiarist style of her intertextual novels — Acker is carrying out a 
politically optimistic act. She constantly blurs the arbitrary divisions between literature 
and  theory  and  removes  the  analysis  of  subjectivity  from  the  realm  of  the  purely 
theoretical in a similar, yet more extreme manner to the likes of Sartre, Camus, Ellis and 
Welsh. Having outlined the possibility of the diminished subject in Acker’s work, and 
the extent of its philosophical and political content, I shall expand on the notion of the 
contemporary subject partaking in extreme forms of self expression as a resistance to 
socially prescribed subjectivity. Therefore, what follows is a focus on certain taboo and 
extreme aspects of being, and a continued discussion of the predominant interest that 
many  writers  have  in  these  seemingly  unsavoury  aspects  of  counter-discursive 
contemporary subjectivity.  
 
5.3.a. Cocaine Nights — J.G. Ballard, Dystopia and the Diminished Subject 
 
Already thinking of a travel article, I noted the features of this silent world: the 
memory-erasing white architecture; the enforced leisure that fossilized the nervous 
system; the almost Africanized aspect, but a North Africa invented by someone who 
had  never  visited  the  Maghreb;  the  apparent  absence  of  any  social  structure; 
timelessness of a world beyond boredom, with no past, no future and diminishing 
present. Perhaps this was what a leisure-dominated future would resemble?  
— J.G. Ballard, in Cocaine Nights (1997:34-5). 
 
The relevance of J.G. Ballard’s work to this thesis stems from his fundamental interest 
in the human subject, and his continued relevance as a fiction writer for over fifty years, 
and  nearly  fifty  novels  and  short-story  collections  —  stretching  back  to  ‘The 
Overloaded Man’ in 1956. Although best known for two extremely contrasting novels 
— the controversial Crash and the hugely popular Empire of the Sun — it is his 1997 
novel Cocaine Nights that I shall be discussing. However, despite this focus I shall   231 
make  reference  to  the  controversies  associated  with  his  wider  oeuvre  in  order  to 
highlight  what  I  believe  is  Ballard’s  continued  investigation  into  the  aporia  of  the 
diminished subject through fictionalised examples of transgressive subjectivity.  
  Despite  beginning  his  career  as  a  science  fiction  writer,  Ballard  has  always 
maintained  a  focus  on  the  defamiliarised  subject  attempting  to  make  sense  of 
recognisable, yet dystopian worlds.
8 His work can be divided roughly into three periods, 
beginning with the ‘imaginary places’ of the disaster novels The Drowned World (1962) 
and  The  Drought  (1964)  —  wherein  with  impressive  prescience  Ballard  predicts  a 
future London submerged underwater as the polar ice-caps melt due to global warming 
and we see the main characters enter a neo-Triassic world of the unknown; and then 
explores  a  world  where  evaporation  ceases  from  over-polluted  oceans,  civilisation 
crumbles  due  to  a  lack  of  drinking  water,  and  cannibalism  takes  hold  when  food 
reserves runs out and fish stocks suffocate. In the second period, he focuses on the 
contemporary  violence  of  a  ‘landscape  of  technology  and  the  communications 
industry,’
9 as seen in the memorable The Atrocity Exhibition — which was famously 
pulped prior to publication in the US by Doubleday because of the chapter entitled 
‘Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan;’ followed by Crash, which featured graphic 
passages wherein the maimed survivors of crashes have sex in car wrecks, and stage 
recreations  of  famous  deaths  for  sexual  gratification;  then  in  High-Rise  we  witness 
civilization break down at a micro-level as the occupants of a luxury apartment block 
stratify themselves according to their ‘level’ and an internal civil war takes hold; while 
finally  in  Concrete  Island  we  find  the  central  character  —  like  a  contemporary 
Robinson  Crusoe  —  marooned  on  a  traffic  island  in  the  center  of  a  huge  freeway 
intersection, and forced to reassess his meaningless existence. And lastly to his third, 
most recent prophesies of contemporary subjectivity in the ‘gated’ suburbs of Cocaine 
Nights; in the elite high-tech business parks of Super-Cannes; of an English middle-  232 
class in revolt in Millennium People; and of the hyper-malls of Kingdom Come. 
  Despite the bleak and often violent nature of Ballard’s novels, his work cannot be 
associated with nihilistic ‘postmodernism,’ yet despite his clear interest a fragmented 
subject which in many cases predate this epoch, he has still been given this dubious 
epithet. In fact, upon closer investigation it appears that quite the opposite is true and 
that Ballard, much like Camus, has seemingly accepted the aporia of the meaningless of 
existence, and although we find him referred to as a ‘postmodern utopographer’ by the 
likes  of  W.  Warren  Wager,  it  appears  that  postmodernism  has  retrospectively 
appropriated Ballard’s theories, rather than vice versa: 
Despite his reputation as a cold-blooded anatomist of disaster and violence, he is in 
fact a visionary, a postmodern utopographer. His landscapes are heavens; or, rather, 
liminal  worlds  through  which  discerning  individuals  —  and  in  some  Ballardian 
scenarios, all humanity — must pass to earn salvation. In a moral cosmos, thanks to 
postmodern sensibility — where good and evil no longer exist, where life and death 
are the same, where the past and all its prescriptions are dust — the pilgrim cannot 
pick and choose. Everything becomes delightful, without exception. Pain is pleasure, 
and pleasure pain. Escaping to a higher consciousness demands immersion in all 
being. Hence, in Ballard’s transvaluation of the traditional Western wisdom, even 
dystopias are utopian. (1991:11) 
 
Despite referring to Ballard’s texts as postmodern, Wagar’s view of his writing as being 
other  than  simply  dystopian  is  important  —  although  I  would  urge  caution  before 
labelling  it  utopian  and  transcendental.  This  point  is  reiterated  by  John  Gray  in 
‘Modernity and its Discontents,’ wherein he argues that: “Much of his work concerns 
solitary, marooned individuals who see society not as a source of support but as an 
encumbering  irrelevance.  There  is  nothing  in  Ballard  of  the  moralising  humanist 
insistence that every disaster can somehow be transcended. Yet, if Ballard’s stories have 
a message, it is in no way tragic” (1999:76). That is, rather than positing a certified 
transcendental  utopia  leading  to  a  ‘higher  consciousness’  Ballard’s  fiction  instead 
explores a future for the subject in a world where the ‘encumbering irrelevance’ of 
hegemonic dictates are deconstructed, and the metaphysical constraints imposed on the 
subject are increasingly diminished.   233 
  Although Ballard does resist the tendency to determine possible future utopias, we 
find  within  his  work  a  repeated  theme  of  the  subject  escaping  the  aporia  of  the 
meaninglessness of existence through the exploration of extreme aspects of subjectivity 
beyond  the  dominant  cultural  dictates,  something  he  explains  in  an  interview  with 
Graeme Revell in the journal RE/Search: 
Either you accept/believe that the universe is totally random and meaningless, which 
is quite possible (a handy attitude to take if you are planning to take the way out, of 
madness — if you’re choosing that particular exit door from reality). The view that 
the universe is a meaningless structure is a very useful one — I don’t want to take 
that particular door. Quite the contrary, I feel (just as my heroes did in The Atrocity 
Exhibition, Crash and High Rise), that there is some sort of truth to be found …  
R/S: In the admission that you have some sort of moral idealistic strain, do you think 
that there is ‘a’ truth to be found, or do you just believe in the general idea of truth, 
faith, hope —  
JGB: No I don’t.  
R/S: You never exactly state the way out. What do you expect the reader to do? 
JGB:  This  is  where  the  open-ended  character  of  my  fiction  requires  the  reader 
himself to make a significant contribution (1984:45). 
 
That  is,  Ballard  remains  true  to  the  nature  of  his  medium,  recognizing  that  such 
explorations  are  simply  fictional  postulations,  open-ended  investigations,  and 
deconstructions of everyday aspects of subjectivity, wherein recognizable characters are 
placed  in  equally  recognizable  locations,  dealing  with  increasingly  unrecognizable 
situations. Yet despite the diverse focus of his fiction, it is the question of subjectivity 
that  remains  at  the  core  of  his  work,  something  explained  by  Andrzej  Gasiorek  in 
‘Refugees from Time:’ “A marked feature of Ballard’s exploration of identity is the 
extent to which he depicts characters as actors inhabiting prescribed personalities, as 
ciphers going through the motions of life […] Identity is always precarious in Ballard’s 
work, always one step away from being exposed as a complete sham. And its flimsiness 
is  systematically  related  to  the  simulated  nature  of  contemporary  social  existence” 
(2005:51). As seen in Ballard’s discussion of global warming in The Drowned World, 
and the increased impact of technology on contemporary subjectivity in Crash, quite 
often  his  novels  have  a  predictive  quality  that  cannot  be  ignored.  As  Will  Self  —   234 
himself a renowned author greatly influenced by Ballard — points out: “Why is J.G. 
Ballard rated by many (including myself) as the most significant English novelist of the 
second half of the 20th century? Sitting in his Shepperton semi, Ballard has issued a 
series of bulletins on the modern world of an almost unerring prescience. Other writers 
describe; Ballard anticipates. To paraphrase the title of one of his short story collections, 
he has provided us with our own myths of the near future” (Quoted in the Millennium 
People front piece). Perhaps with Ballard we have a case of life imitating art, and in the 
‘near future’ we may find more of his ‘myths’ becoming increasingly relevant. 
 
5.3.b. Transgressive Behaviour and Extreme Subjectivity 
 
Although  Ballard’s  career  spans  over  half-a-century,  a  wider  acceptance  of  the 
importance of this ‘significant English novelist’ has occurred only recently, and has 
seen him decline the offer of a  CBE — Commander of the British Empire — and 
receive his own entry in the Collins English Dictionary wherein ‘Ballardian’ is defined 
as a genre of writing: “Resembling or suggestive of the conditions described in J.G. 
Ballard’s  novels  and  stories,  especially  dystopian  modernity,  bleak  man-made 
landscapes  and  the  psychological  effects  of  technological,  social  or  environmental 
developments”  (Quoted  in  Morrison:2006:60).  However,  as  seen  with  the  initial 
controversy  regarding  both  the  1973  publication  of  Crash,
10  and  the  1997  David 
Cronenberg filmic adaptation, the transgressive elements of his work still cause outrage 
and led for calls for the film to be banned in the UK.
11 Despite the growing popularity 
and grudging acceptance of the importance, and quality, of Ballard’s writing the stigma 
associated with his oeuvre remains. This tendency can be seen in Murray Walden’s 
review of Kingdom Come in the September 9-10 Weekend Australian Review of 2006, 
wherein the counter-discursive adjectives fly freely:  
Think eccentric, disturbing, iconoclastic, searching, genre-busting, poetic, idealistic, 
humorous and bleak: all fit Ballard’s work. He’s someone whose every utterance is 
seized on by fans and analysed for significance. He’s both a cult figure and (now) a   235 
respected  man  of  letters.  Yet  the  man  who  welcomes  me  into  his  study  with 
grandfatherly gusto looks more like an absent minded university professor than a don 
of subversion (2006:8).  
 
And  the  fact  that  this  most  recent  publication  by  the  near  octogenarian
12  ‘don  of 
subversion’ can still engender such an ecstatic response indicates his importance to this 
thesis of the diminished subject. 
  Although  much  has  been  written  about  Crash,  it  marks  a  continuation  of  my 
teleology of counter-discursive literature and makes for an important entry point into 
Ballard’s  discussion  of  the  transgressive  subjectivity.
13  Despite  the  problematic 
inclusion of Ballard in his text Postmodern Literature, Ian Gregson does indicates the 
importance of the premise of the fragmented subject in his work, explaining that: “the 
crucial concerns of Crash, as of science fiction generally, are […] ontological. Where, 
ordinary attitudes to the self assume it to be unitary and organic, Crash depicts it as 
fragmented (sometimes all too literally) and mechanized” (2004:67). That is, rather than 
simply  viewing  the  subject  as  diminished  in  metaphysical  and  philosophical  terms, 
Ballard investigates the literal conjoining, and interdependence, of the corporeal human 
subject with technology, with often fatal results as seen when car crashes carry out the 
ultimate diminishing of subjectivity. Gregson goes on to explain that for Ballard: “The 
crucial image in Crash is of a car/human hybrid. Its characters, after their crashes, bear 
scars whose imprint can be read so that their bodies remain inscribed with the car parts 
with  which  they  have  collided.  More  than  this,  however,  they  are  metaphorically 
invaded by cars, so that their identity has been colonised by car technology” (2004:68). 
Thus, in Crash Ballard investigates the literal impact of the automobile on subjectivity, 
as  we  see  the  bodies  of  car  crash  victims  re-inscribed  with  scars  of  sutures,  and 
drastically reconstituted by amputations and stainless steel pins due to the collision of 
the  corporeal  and  the  technological,  as  the  subject  becomes  both  physically  and 
psychologically fragmented.    236 
  Not only does Ballard investigate the manner in which the subject is indelibly 
marked  by  its  increased  interaction  with  technology  —  something  also  explored  at 
length in the ‘cyberpunk’ novels of William Gibson — he also indicates the manner in 
which these transgressive events can stir the subject from the equivalent of ‘bad faith,’ 
whereby  this  new  form  of  subjectivity  literally  deconstructs  the  notion  of  the  self-
present subject. In his interview with Revell he explains that:  
There’s a sort of constant struggle on a minute-by-minute basis throughout our lives, 
throughout  every  day;  one  needs  to  dismantle  that  smothering  conventionalized 
reality that wraps itself around us. There’s a conspiracy, in which we play our willing 
part, just to stabilize the world we inhabit, or our small corner of it. One needs at the 
same time to dismantle that smothering set of conventions that we call everyday 
reality, and of course violent acts of various kinds, whether they’re car crashes or 
serious illnesses or any sort of trauma, do have a sort of liberating effect (1984:47).  
 
However, he is quick to point out that this supposed transcendence of the aporia of 
existence, and the desire for the metaphysics of comfort through extreme experience, 
does have its own problems when he counters that: “one cannot help one’s imagination 
being  touched  by  these  people  who,  if  at  enormous  price,  have  nonetheless  broken 
through the skin of reality and convention around us […] and who have in a sense 
achieved — become — mythological beings in a way that is only attainable through 
these  brutal  and  violent  acts.  One  can transcend  the  self,  sadly,  in  ways  which  are 
themselves rather to be avoided — say, extreme illness, car crashes, extreme states of 
being”  (47).  That  is,  for  Ballard,  the  type  of  transgressive  experience  necessary  to 
transcend  everyday  existence  is  either  difficult  to  obtain  or  mythical,  and  must  be 
avoided  at  all  cost,  for  it  either  entails  great  suffering,  or  the  attainment  of  the 
nonsensical self-presence of the mentally insane or schizophrenic, and it is on this note 
of caution that I shall now begin my discussion of Cocaine Nights. 
 
5.3.c. Cocaine Nights — A Cautionary Tale of the Transgressive 
 
In  Cocaine  Nights  we  find  Ballard  reassessing  the  possible  future  of  contemporary 
subjectivity by changing his focus to the possible endpoint of the growing popularity of   237 
securely self-contained ‘gated suburbs,’ and the self-regulation of acceptable behaviour 
therein. Yet rather than setting his investigation in the dreary outer-suburbs of English 
towns and cities, Ballard — like so many British retirees —follows the sun and locates 
Cocaine Nights in two seemingly idyllic resort towns on the Spanish coast. Yet behind 
the gloss of perfection we find Charles Prentice arrive in Estrella de Mar to the news 
that his brother Frank has confessed to murdering five residents in a horrific house fire. 
Filled with incredulity Charles begins his own investigation into the murders and the 
charismatic  Bobby  Crawford,  uncovering  a  world  of  appearances  with  a  seedy 
undercurrent of transgressive behaviour. Far from ideal, Charles discovers that beneath 
the thriving arts community and hugely popular sports environment, the residents are 
engaged  in  petty  theft,  burglary,  casual  sex,  prostitution,  Class  A  drug  use,  violent 
pornography and, as Charles himself witnesses, rape which he is later informed ‘keeps 
the  girls  on  their  toes!’  Ballard  explains  his  focus  on  transgressive  behaviour  in  a 
community designed to prevent just that, in an interview with Varona Bennett: 
I am fascinated by the psychology of gated communities and the England of the 
M25. Not Heritage England or Heritage London — rather, the business parks and 
executive housing, CCTV cameras, airports. A lot of the scenarios I’ve thought of 
have come true. When we look back over the last thirty years, meaningless violence 
has become very common […] It’s not certain if any of the people who carry out 
these atrocities have any justification, even in their own minds. It may be violence 
for violence’s sake. That’s dangerous because you can’t predict it. Maybe people are 
so bored and modern life is so empty that they want to drop a bomb or kill someone 
just to feel alive (2004:5). 
 
And it is this desire to feel alive in the boring perfection of a future life of leisure, free 
from violent crime, where ‘everything’ is available and the weather ideal that motivates 
both Cocaine Nights and Super-Cannes. As he explains: “if, as a science fiction writer, 
you asked me to make a prediction about the future, I would sum up my fear about the 
future  in  one  word:  boring.  And  that’s  my  one  fear:  that  everything  has  happened: 
nothing exciting or new or interesting is ever going to happen again … the future is just 
going to be a vast, conforming suburb of the soul … nothing new will happen, no   238 
breakouts  will  take  place”  (Juno:1984:8).  As  such,  Cocaine  Nights  acts  as  an 
investigation into the future outcome of a world of gated suburbs and bored retirees of 
an increasingly younger age, and the manner in which Crawford attempts to raise these 
increasingly  opaque  subjects  from  their  self-induced  torpor.
14  As  Crawford  warns 
Charles, when he witnesses the extent of this apathy first-hand: “It’s the fourth world, 
Charles. The one waiting to take over everything” (1997:215).
15 
  Soon  Charles  realises  that  tennis  coach  —  and  all-round  good-guy  —  Bobby 
Crawford is the instigator of this transgressive behaviour, and before long he too is 
under the spell of the messianic-like blond Adonis, and caught up in his plans to liberate 
the oppressed inhabitant of the nearby Residencia Costasol as he has those of Estrella de 
Mar.  Crawford  explains  the  manner  in  which  crime  can  defamiliarise  the  everyday 
leading to the subject to reassess the seemingly a priori: “‘The break-ins are like the 
devout Catholic’s wristlet that chafes the skin and sharpens the moral sensibility. The 
next burglary fills you with anger, even a self-righteous rage. The police are useless, 
fobbing you off with vague promises, and that generates a sense of injustice, a feeling 
that you’re surrounded by a world without shame. Everything around you, the paintings 
the silverware you take for granted, fit into this new moral framework. You’re more 
aware  of  yourself.  Dormant  areas  of  your  mind  that  you  haven’t  visited  for  years 
become important again. You begin to reassess yourself’” (244). Lance Olsen expands 
on this point in a review of Cocaine Nights suggesting that: 
Behind what turns out to be a bizarre social experiment stands a charismatic figure 
that believes such crimes are the only things that keeps us interesting, creative, and 
alive as a culture. The result, as one of the characters comments, ‘is Kafka re-shot in 
the  style  of  Psycho.’  Ballard  thereby  transforms  the  murder  mystery  into  a 
philosophical mode of inquiry that explores the conjunction of the imaginative act 
and the lawless postmodern zone where everything is possible, while suggesting that 
transgressive  behaviour  might  in  the  end  —  at  least  in  some  cases  —  actually 
motivate public good (1997:267). 
 
That is, by equating criminality with creativity, Crawford deterministically believes he 
has stumbled on the answer to the apathy and boredom that seems ready to engulf the   239 
contemporary subject, and sees it as his life’s work to both literally and figuratively 
‘inject’ the community with the transgressive, in order to defamiliarise the everyday a 
priori meaninglessness of existence.
16 This view is also held by Gasiorek who explains 
that: “Criminality, violence and psychopathology are defended not only as the paths 
along which a truth of self may be discovered, but also a sole means of resisting a 
streamlined and controlling polity. The rhetoric which draws on romantic-expressivist 
philosophies, equates psychological health with ‘deviant’ behaviour, and of course in an 
administered and seemingly meaningless world celebrations of the instinctual self are 
bound to carry a good deal of weight” (2005:50). However, in this exploration of the 
anything-goes  mentality  of  a  lawless  ‘postmodern  zone,’  and  the  apparent  freedom 
these transgressive acts give the individual, there is an undercurrent of caution. 
  The link between crime, mental illness, sexual deviancy and creativity is well-
known
17 — and famously articulated in the lives and writing of Jean Genet, Joe Orton, 
William Burroughs, Oscar Wilde, Thomas d’ Quincy, and recent Booker winner D.B.C 
Pierre  —  as  too  is  the  fear  of  the  future  of  creativity  without  these  transgressions. 
However, there lies within the content of such creative outpourings an inherent danger, 
for as Ballard indicates: “That’s the problem with this stuff — unless you’re using it in 
some sort of informed way, out of some sort of imaginative commitment … you are in 
danger of being numbed by the very powerful stimuli that attracted you in the first 
place. I mean you end up with the worst of both worlds!  You know — the ‘after we get 
bored with car crashes, what do we move onto next?’ sort of thing. You need a higher 
and  higher  charge  of  sensation  —  it’s  only  child  victims  of  psychotic  killers  who 
interest you. Then what’s next?” (Juno:1984:19). And it is the question of ‘what next’ 
that curbs Ballard’s delight at the possibilities of transgressive behaviour as a tool to 
free the subject from the dominant cultural and hegemonic dictates. Instead, he indicates 
the  inherent  problems  associated  with  a  society  free  to  carry  out  transgressive   240 
behaviour, for as we are informed: “Deviance in Estrella de Mar was a commodity 
under  jealous  guard”  (1997:135),  and  that  guard  is  an  increasingly  messianic  and 
dictatorial Bobby Crawford with the transgression of the taboo his drug of choice.
18  
  Very soon the residents of Estrella de Mar and Residencia Costasol are in need of 
greater doses of meaningless violence in order to maintain the euphoria peddled by 
Crawford, and take it upon themselves to carry on his ‘good work,’ which soon spreads 
like a virus and culminates in the five deaths. As Bennett indicates, in the aptly titled 
‘J.G. Ballard: Finding Meaning in Meaningless Times,’ the residents: “felt so privileged 
that they believed they had gone not only beyond the common run of men, but even 
beyond God. Yet the stultifyingly perfect environment in which they chose to live […] 
gradually persuaded them to drift into ever more bizarre games of violence, destruction 
and self-destruction. Light-hearted shoplifting, or on the spot spontaneous joyriding in 
someone  else’s  car,  gave  way  to  concerted  cruelty,  ritualized  rape  or  meaningless 
murder — anything to feel alive again” (2004:10-11). Dr Hamilton articulates this view 
to Charles as she witnesses her clientele reducing as the residents take on a new lease of 
life, abandoning sedatives and neuroses in favour of Crawford’s antidote to apathy: 
‘The place was filled with your patients. Not so many now, I dare say.’ 
‘Almost none at all.’ She placed her valise on my desk and sat beside it nodding to 
herself.  ‘A  few  leukaemias  I  send  back  to  London.  Shin-splints  from  all  this 
unnecessary exercise. Even a few cases of VD. But a little old-fashioned gonorrhoea 
wouldn’t surprise you.’ 
‘Not really.’ I shrugged tolerantly. ‘You’d expect it, given the bigger turnover of 
sexual partners. It’s a disease of social contact — like flu, or golf.’ 
‘There are other social diseases, some a lot more serious — like a taste for kiddie-
porn.’ 
‘Pretty rare in the Residencia.’ 
‘But surprisingly contagious.’ Paula treated me to her severest schoolmistressy gaze. 
‘People who think they’re immune suddenly catch a rogue cross-infection from all 
the other porn they’re looking at.’ (1997:292) 
 
Thus,  we  find  a  certain moralizing  in  Ballard’s  novel  as  he  questions  the  limits  of 
transgressive behaviour, for if one begins breaking down the supposedly oppressive 
discursive  constraints  placed  on  the  subject,  where  does  one  stop?  Charles   241 
acknowledges this fear in the opening passage of the book wherein he explains that, as a 
journalist: “Crossing frontiers is my profession. Those strips of no-man’s land between 
the checkpoints always seem such zones of promise, rich with the possibilities of new 
lives, new scents and affections. At the same time they set off a reflex of unease that I 
have never been able to repress” (9). Despite the possibilities the transgressive offers as 
a  site  of  contestation  enabling  the  ‘passage’  of  the  subject  into  future  ‘zones  of 
promise,’  Ballard  urges  an  awareness  of  the  necessity  of  certain  taboos,  feeling  an 
‘unease’ toward anarchy, especially given what this all too often entails for the innocent 
and vulnerable. He also indicates the dangers of Crawford’s deterministic approach to 
the future freedom of subjectivity — wherein we find any voice of dissent eliminated, 
hence  the  five  murders  —  and  after  failing  to  convince  Charles  of  the  danger  of 
Crawford’s darker side, Paula Hamilton takes it on herself to murder him in an attempt 
to halt the chaos and restore order. She does this primarily to save the life of psychiatrist 
Dr. Sanger — Crawford’s next victim and object of hate — who he sees as a figure of 
oppression sedating and stifling the freedom and creativity of the vulnerable Laurie — a 
drug dependent girl he sexually abuses while in his care. However, when Crawford 
‘liberates’  Laurie,  he turns  her into  a  mindless,  drug-fueled  prostitute  and  porn-star 
arguing that: “Laurie never wanted to be happy […] She’s one of those people who 
flinch from the very idea of happiness — in her mind nothing could be more boring or 
bourgeois” (302). In Ballard’s world neither the psychiatrist, nor the messiah of the 
transgressive, escape vilification, leaving us ambivalent as to the validity of either’s 
view of the future of contemporary subjectivity. 
 
5.3.e. In Summation — J.G. Ballard   
 
Finally then, although it appears that much of the criticism levelled against the ‘don of 
the subversive’ is problematic, and that while Ballard’s novels optimistically postulate, 
in a non-deterministic fashion, a future subjectivity free from certain hegemonic dictates   242 
through investigations of extreme and transgressive behaviour, they are quite clearly 
morally  driven  cautionary  tales.  Despite  the  continued  conservative  criticism  of  his 
work, there are those such as Rex Roberts who argue the opposite, suggesting that: “But 
for  all  the  superficial,  almost  parodic  intimations  of  pornography  in  his  prose,  and 
despite his undisguised admiration for his devilish villains, Ballard seems more moralist 
than nihilist. His book paints an alarming picture of the present, not to mention the 
future, suggesting that Western  society would do well to re-examine its values  and 
rethink its direction” (1998:75). This tendency to deconstruct the a priori roles mapped 
onto the contemporary subject — and posit a future beyond the current aporia — is best 
articulated by Ballard who humbly points out that: “I just write what I see happening. 
I’m a weatherman, just trying to forecast what’s ahead” (Quoted in Morrison:2006:60), 
and as we have seen, many of his predications have been unerringly accurate. Wagar 
further explains the importance of his explorations of subjectivity arguing that:  
The only serious question for critics on the left is whether his writings do and can 
make a positive contribution to social transformation. So far, from all the available 
hard evidence, they have not made much. His writings are not perceived, generally, 
as  tracts  for  world  revolution.  But  perhaps  they  deserve  to  be.  Perhaps,  like  the 
works of de Sade, Nietzsche, and Kafka, they will exert their greatest influence long 
after Ballard is no longer with us. I would like to think so (1991:18).  
 
And it is with this in mind that I urge for a continued interest in Ballard’s philosophical 
investigations into the transgressive, the defamiliarisation of the everyday aporia of 
diminished  subjectivity,  and  his  position  as  the  prophet  of  the  condition  of  the 
possibility of change. 
 
5.4.a. American Psycho — Bret Easton Ellis and the Diminished Subject 
 
Everything failed to subdue me. Soon everything seemed dull: another sunrise, the 
lives of heroes, falling in love, war, the discoveries people made with each other. The 
only thing that didn’t bore me, obviously enough, was how much money Tim Price 
made, yet in its obviousness it did. There wasn’t a clear, identifiable emotion within 
me, except for greed and, possibly, total disgust. I had all the characteristics of a 
human being — flesh, blood, skin, hair — but my depersonalization was so intense, 
had gone so deep, the normal ability to feel compassion had been eradicated, the 
victim  of  a  slow,  purposeful  erasure.  I  was  simple  imitating  reality,  a  rough   243 
resemblance of a human being, with only a dim corner of my mind functioning. 
Something horrible was happening and yet I couldn’t figure out why.  
— Bret Easton Ellis, in American Psycho (1991:282). 
 
Any discussion regarding controversial value judgments of contemporary literature in 
relation to the diminished  subject must necessarily include Bret Easton Ellis’ much 
loved, and loathed, American Psycho. Given that arguments regarding its depiction of 
explicit violence towards women of all social milieus, men of all colours and creeds, 
dogs of all breeds, and — breaking all taboos — small children are well known, rather 
than reiterating them I shall begin with an outline of the predominant outcry against this 
apparent ‘postmodern’ text and its author, before carrying out a re-reading of the novel 
in light of the proposition of the diminished subject. What follows then, is not a focus 
on  the  inherent  violence  in  this  novel,  but  rather  a  discussion  of  the  incessant 
questioning of subjectivity replete throughout this text. 
  Having already achieved widespread success with his first novel, Less Than Zero 
(1985) — quickly adapted to film in 1987 starring enfant terrible Robert Downy Jr. — 
by the time he came to write American Psycho in 1989, and despite the comparative 
failure of his second novel The Rules of Attraction (1987),
19 Ellis’ stock was definitely 
on the rise. However, while his publisher Simon & Shuster had advanced the then 25 
year-old an unheard of $300,000 (US) for this novel, controversy soon arose following 
the leak of sexually explicit and violent excerpts to the media, causing Ellis to part 
company with his publisher while — like a literary Sex Pistols — he walked away with 
the money.
20 The extent of this controversy, was explained later by Ellis: 
I knew there was a lot of pre-controversy and there were problems in-house and the 
guy who did my covers before backed away saying it was the most disgusting thing 
he had ever read, blahblahblah. […] I was totally shocked […] This was the last 
thing in the world I thought would happen. I thought maybe they would publish the 
book and maybe people would be upset by it, I guess, but I never thought they would 
not publish the book and I never thought that, for example, the National Organization 
for Women would call for a boycott of the book, or the book would cause this kind 
of fury. I just didn’t think this was going to happen. I didn’t think there was enough 
in the book to make it that shocking (Quoted in Tighe:2005:105). 
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A mere four weeks prior to publication, and despite Ellis’ protestations regarding the 
use of context free quotations used to condemn his novel, he found himself without a 
publisher and on the receiving end of vitriol of unheard of fury.
21 Despite these setbacks 
Random House agreed to publish the novel eventually releasing it in 1991, sparking yet 
more controversy, not least from the aforementioned National Organization for Women. 
As Elizabeth Young states in her article ‘The Beast in the Jungle, the Figure in the 
Carpet,’ the extreme response to its publication gave way to a predominantly negative 
‘psychodrama’  as  seen  when:  “Roger  Roseblatt  in  The  New  York  Times,  under  the 
headline ‘Snuff This Book,’ described it as ‘the most loathsome offering of the season.’ 
Time spoke of ‘the most appalling acts of torture, murder and dismemberment ever 
described in a book targeted for the Best-Seller lists.’ Tammy Bruce of NOW said it 
was ‘a how-to manual on the torture and dismemberment of women’ and called for a 
national boycott of the book. Gloria Steinem suggested that Ellis would have to take 
responsibility for any women tortured and killed in the same manner as described in the 
book” (1992:132).
22  
  Young goes on to argue that: “In all this media fall-out, these shrieks of ‘the 
literary equivalent of a snuff film’ and ‘pure trash’ there is a notable absence of any 
literary criticism” (133). Needless to say, this work of fiction was rarely treated as such, 
and  the  distinction  between  content  and  context,  and  author  and  character,  were 
continually confused. The tendency to conflate Ellis and Patrick Bateman, and for calls 
to make him responsible for any acts of violence that could be attributed to his text 
astounded him, for as Young continues: “He said what might be expected, that the book 
was a work of fiction and should speak for itself. He was quite clear about his position: 
‘The  acts  described  in  the  book  are  truly  indisputably  vile.  The  book  itself  is  not. 
Patrick Bateman is a monster. I am not. The outrage that has been expressed is totally 
disconnected from what the book is about’” (132). Furthermore, as James Gardener   245 
argues, if Ellis was attempting to write a culturally critical ‘transgressive text’ then this 
was in itself nothing new, and instead marks a continuation of a tradition in which 
literature of an extreme nature can be viewed as a direct response to a perceived cultural 
crisis: “The roots of transgressive literature that violently attacks the center of a culture, 
are ancient, reaching all the way back from Euripides’ Bacchae, through Marlowe and 
Webster and the Marquis de Sade, to Huysmans and Celine. This literature of self-
defined immorality, anguish, and degradation is constantly waxing and waning in our 
culture, as, for its part, is the humanistic strain” (1996:54). Despite this pre-postmodern 
perspective  of  transgressive  literature,  we  find  many  commentators  arguing  that 
American Psycho is a temporally specific critique of late capitalism, and among those is 
Carl Tighe who states that:  
Patrick Bateman is an example of what Hannah Arendt called ‘the banality of evil’. 
That’s basically what he is. He could have existed a hundred years ago (he probably 
existed five hundred years ago). He’ll probably exist five hundred years from now. 
He is just an example of the constantness of evil. He might be a creature of the 
eighties  with  all  the  trappings  that  implies,  but  I  think  he’s  really  a  creature  of 
eternity. Man doesn’t necessarily change for the better depending on the decade, or 
depending upon how ten years have passed. I think man is born and is corrupted and 
is always capable of badness. Capable of goodness, but badness gets more attention 
(2005:115). 
 
While  not  wishing  to  enter  into  a  debate  regarding  ‘good’  and  ‘evil’  here,  what  is 
important is Tighe’s perspective of Bateman as a fictional investigation into extreme 
aspects  of  subjectivity  that  predate  not  only  capitalism  but  also  the  ‘postmodern 
condition.’ However, despite this view, Ellis has been attacked for being the standard 
bearer  for  postmodern  writing  whose  texts  supporting  the  nihilistic  view  of  the 
schizophrenic postmodern subject. This perspective is supported by Carla Freccero in 
her  article  ‘Historical  Violence,  Censorship  and  the  Serial  Killer,’  who  argues  that: 
“The political loss for progressives, in denouncing American Psycho, has been a victory 
for  conservatives,  who  decry  modern  popular  culture  and  the  ‘twentysomething’ 
Generation X’s postmodern approach, which they interpret as a revitalization of values,   246 
a lack of a moral framework, and as producing a world without civilization, without 
decency”  (1997:160).  That  is,  for  Freccero,  criticisms  of  American  Psycho  by 
seemingly liberal sections of the literary and critical establishment have seen it closely 
aligned  with  those  predominantly  negative  perspectives  of  postmodernism  and 
contemporary  literature,  thus  giving  ammunition  to  the  conservatives  who  wish  to 
silence and censor these counter-discursive voices.  
 
5.4.b. Bret Easton Ellis and The Postmodern Condition 
 
LAUREN — Wake up. Saturday morning. Tutorial on the postmodern condition. 
Believe it or not. At ten. In Dickinson. It’s October already and we’ve only had one 
session. I doubt there is anyone else in the class. I was the only one at the first 
meeting a month ago and Conroy was so drunk he lost the rollsheet […] Walk up to 
Dickinson. And … guess what. Conroy’s asleep on the couch in his office. Office 
reeks of marijuana. Marijuana pipe on desk next to bottle of Scotch. Sit at the desk, 
not surprised, unfazed and smoke a cigarette, watch Conroy sleep. Getting up? No, 
he’s not. Put the cigarette out. Leave. Victor recommended this course to me.   
— Bret Easton Ellis, in The Rules of Attraction (1987:62). 
 
‘Believe it or not,’ given repeated protestations throughout this thesis, not only do I 
oppose  the  notion  of  a  temporally  specific  ‘condition’  afflicting  the  contemporary 
subject,  I  take  exception  to  Bret  Easton  Ellis  being  labelled  a  postmodern  writer. 
Although based in part on my own teleology of the diminished subject, we see within 
Ellis’ novels humorous asides that further undermine the predominant perspectives of 
postmodernism besides the aforementioned epigraph. In his second novel, The Rules of 
Attraction, we find him attacking the very form of literature he is accused of producing, 
when Sean Bateman — the younger brother of Patrick — attends a farewell party for 
Creative Writing tutor Vittorio at Camden College, who is being replaced by “some 
drunk who was fired from the Lit staff at Harvard” (190):  
‘Not only Joyce, but it reminded me a lot of Acker’s work,’ Trav is saying. ‘Has 
anyone read by the way, Crad Kilodney’s Lightning Struck My Dick? It’s amazing, 
amazing.’ He shakes his head […] I sit back, stifle a yawn, drink more of the beer. 
Trav  turns  to  Vittorio.  ‘But  Vittorio,  let  me  ask  you,  don’t  you  think  that  the 
admittedly Bohemian punk outlaw scribbling of these wasted post-Vietnam, post-
Watergate,  post-  …  hell,  post-everything minstrels,  is  the  product  of  the  literary 
establishment  bombasting  a  lost  generation  with  worthless  propaganda  exploiting   247 
greed, blasé sexual attitudes and mind-corrupting, numbing jejunosity and that’s why 
works  like  Just  Another  Asshole,  a  searing,  searing  collection  of  quote-unquote 
underground  writing,  become  potent  fixtures  on  the  minds  of  this  clan  of 
maladjusted, nihilistic, malcontent, self-serving … well, hell, miscarriages, or do you 
think it’s all …’ And now Trav stops, searches for the right word. ‘… bogus?’ […] 
‘Um … bogus?’ Vittorio mumbles. ‘What is this bogus … I have not read the book’ 
(197-8) 
 
Thus, we see in Vittorio — who has no idea what Trav is talking about — the old-guard 
showing its ignorance of the literary pretensions of the new generation while Ellis — 
echoing Mark Davis’ perspective in Gangland — asks whether this negative perspective 
of contemporary literature is a construct of the conservative establishment, positing that 
this  negative  reaction  to  so-called  postmodern  literature  is  in  fact  ‘bogus,’  just  as 
Lightning Struck My Dick and Just Another Asshole are humorous are pastiches of the 
titles one would expect of postmodern texts. 
  The question of the ‘post-’ in postmodernism is a repeated theme in American 
Psycho as Batman’s sole consumption of non-business information comes from gossip 
columns, such as the seemingly trashy Post magazine. At various times throughout the 
text we find Bateman being informed of the hyper-reality of contemporary New York 
life by reading Post, and find him entertainingly discussing “post-California cuisine” 
(1991:94) at a trendy new restaurant called Deck Chairs,
23 and becoming alarmed about 
the sighting of a new hybrid creature in Harlem: 
[M]y eye catches a story about recent sightings of these creatures that seem to be part 
bird, part rodent — essentially pigeons with the heads and tails of rats — found deep 
in the center of Harlem […] A grainy photograph of one of those things accompanies 
the article, but experts, the Post assures us, are fairly certain this new breed is a hoax. 
As usual this fails to soothe my fear, and it fills me with a nameless dread that 
someone  out  there  has  wasted  the  energy  and  time  to  think  this  up:  to  fake  a 
photograph […] and to send it to the Post, then for the Post to decide to run the story 
[…], to print the photograph, to have someone write about the photo and interview 
the experts, finally to run this story on page three of today’s edition and have it 
discussed over hundreds and thousands of lunches in the city this afternoon. I close 
the paper and lie back, exhausted (115). 
 
Thus  we  find  Bateman  literally  ‘exhausted’  by  the  info-tainment  of  contemporary 
society,  as  the  vague  simulacra  of  legitimate  information  reaches  its  nadir  in   248 
publications like Post, wherein we are made aware of the time, effort and resources 
invested in producing a story about a hyper-real ‘rat-bird’ which Post calmly assures us 
it is ‘fairly certain’ is a hoax.  
  While  all  texts  are  replete  with  multiple  interpretations  and  all  readings  are 
subjective in nature, I believe that Ellis has created in Bateman his own hyper-real 
simulacra of the subject of the ‘postmodern condition’ taken to its extreme limits, and 
undermines,  rather  than  supports,  this  temporally  specific  disorder.  This  occurs 
repeatedly as we find Patrick hilariously parodying ‘the death of history’ wherein time 
and experience become a blur of meaningless dinner engagements with unimportant 
people,  and  we  realise  that  the  consumption  of  nouvelle  cuisine  in  different  trendy 
restaurants has become his sole raison d’être: “I’m experiencing a major-league anxiety 
attack […] I’ve forgotten who I had lunch with earlier and, even more important, where. 
Was it Robert Ailes at Beats? Or was it Todd Hendricks at Ursula’s, the new Philip 
Duncan  Holmes  bistro  in  Tribeca?  Or  was  it  Ricky  Worrell  and  were  we  at 
December’s? Or would it have been Kevin Weber at Contro in NoHo? Did I order the 
partridge sandwich on brioche with green tomatoes, or a big plate of endive with clam 
sauce?  ‘Oh  god,  I  can’t  remember,’  I  moan”  (149).  We  find  him  articulating  the 
trivialities of contemporary culture as he suffers an existential crisis regarding his brand 
of styling mousse while at the latest bistro Vanities: “I stop tapping my foot and slowly 
scan the restaurant, the bistro, wondering how my hair really looks, and suddenly I wish 
I had switched mousses because since I last saw my hair, seconds ago, it feels different, 
as if its shape was somehow altered on the walk from the bar to the table. A pang of 
nausea that I am unable to stifle washes warmly over me” (231). And we finally find 
him  discussing  the  meaninglessness  of  existence  with  Detective  Kimball  who  is 
investigating the disappearance of Paul Owen, who Patrick may, or may not have killed: 
‘Do you suspect foul play?’ 
‘Can’t say,’ he says. ‘But like I told you, I wouldn’t be surprised if he’s just hiding   249 
out someplace.’ 
‘I mean no one’s dealing with the homicide squad yet or anything, right?’ I ask. 
‘No, not yet. As I said, we’re not sure. But …’ He stops, looks dejected. ‘Basically 
no one has seen or heard anything.’ 
‘That’s so typical, isn’t it?’ I ask. 
‘It’s  just  strange,’  he  agrees,  staring  out  the  window,  lost.  ‘One  day  someone’s 
walking around, going to work, alive, and then …’ Kimball stops, fails to complete 
the sentence. 
‘Nothing,’ I sigh, nodding. 
‘People just … disappear,’ he says. 
‘The earth just opens wide and swallows people,’ I say, somewhat sadly, checking 
my Rolex. 
‘Eerie,” Kimball yawns, stretching. ‘Really eerie.’ 
‘Ominous.’ I nod my agreement. 
‘It’s just’ — he sighs, exasperated — ‘futile.’ 
I pause, unsure of what to say, and come up with ‘Futility is hard to deal with’ (276). 
 
Ironically we see Patrick absent-mindedly discussing the meaninglessness of existence 
in one the novels’ few meaningful conversations, while checking his Rolex so as not to 
miss yet another ‘futile’ lunch engagement. While allegations of a lack of content and 
character  development  in  American  Psycho  abound,
24  it  is  my  contestation  that 
Bateman’s bizarre and questionable behaviour is born out of an acute awareness of the 
futile nature of being, and acts as an obvious progression of Clay’s ‘Disappear Here’ 
mantra from Less Than Zero. As such, I shall now turn my attention to what I consider 
to be the underlining theme of American Psycho, that is, the question of an a priori 
diminished contemporary subjectivity as distinct from the subject suffering the crisis of 
the postmodern condition. 
 
5.4.c. American Psycho and Ellis’ Oeuvre — Inter-textual character development 
 
Repeated  criticisms  of  American  Psycho  which  stem  from  Bateman’s  seemingly 
unmotivated acts of violence, unsatisfactory character development and the novel’s non-
linear narrative, supposedly justify this text’s undeserved postmodern epithet. However, 
as  Elizabeth  Young  explains,  it  appears  that  Ellis  brings  to  his  texts  an  acute 
understanding  of  post-structuralist  notions  of  the  arbitrary  nature  of  language  in  all 
forms of communication and any given narrative of the self:   250 
It seems as though Ellis is re-enforcing the fact that Patrick’s only ‘existence’ is 
within fiction. And we know from Roland Barthes just how bizarre is the fictional 
construct, how illogical, incongruous and contradictory is the contract between writer 
and  reader.  We  know  too  how  much  time  postmodern  fiction  has  spent  in 
deconstructing  and  disentangling  the  implicit  agreements  that  lie  behind  fictive 
‘realism.’ Ellis, in one of his interviews, has challenged the expectation: ‘That novels 
must have a traditional narrative structure … You would think that most writers in 
their  twenties  would  want  to  fool  around  a  little  bit  —  would  want  to  write 
something a little bit subversive.’ Any reading of American Psycho must take these 
intentions into account (1992:141).  
 
While I would argue against the specific focus on the ‘bizarre’ literary nature of the 
fictional  subject,  and  of  Young’s  conflation  of  Barthes,  Ellis  and  deconstruction  as 
postmodern, it is apparent that any reading of American Psycho must consider that Ellis 
is possibly engaging with multiple issues of subjectivity, language and culture. It is my 
proposal that he deliberately explores this loss of metaphysical certitude, and the impact 
of the supposed ‘postmodern condition,’ on a fictional subject in much the same way 
that Camus explored the ultimate extent of existential nihilism in The Outsider, and 
with much the same result. 
  Despite Bateman’s supposed lack of character development, I would argue that a 
more  complete  picture  is  available  if  one  considers  The  Rules  of  Attraction  and 
American  Psycho  as  mutually  dependent  narratives.  Ellis  explains  that  the 
characterization of Bateman was based on his own view of the superficial nature of 
contemporary culture stating that: “I was writing about a society in which the surfaces 
became the only thing. Everything was surface — food, clothes — that is what defined 
people. So I wrote a book that is all surface action; no narrative, no characters to latch 
onto, flat, endlessly repetitive” (Quoted in Freccero:1997:158). However, what he fails 
to explain is that American Psycho can in fact be viewed as a further development of 
Bateman’s character that rewards the loyalty of those who read the story of his brother 
Sean in The Rules of Attraction. In Writing and Responsibility, Carl Tighe emphasises 
this apparent lack of narrative content arguing that: “while we know almost nothing of 
Bateman’s life before the novel begins it is clear that his father was very wealthy, that   251 
Bateman was well educated, that Bateman need not work for a living and that he was 
probably  dangerously  disturbed  before  he  started  work  on  Wall  Street”  (2005:115). 
While this remains true if we view American Psycho in isolation, reading The Rules of 
Attraction not only gives us a greater insight into Patrick’s character, it tantalises us 
with a possible understanding of his apparent violent behaviour.  
  Although allusions to Bateman’s parents in The Rules of Attraction are scarce, 
they do help build up a picture of his familial background and give insight into their 
almost complete absence from American Psycho. Firstly, we find Sean discussing a 
birthday party held several years previously explaining that: “This was two months after 
he [his father] had mother committed to Sandstone and the thing I most remember about 
that birthday was the fact that no one mentioned it. No one ever mentioned it except for 
Patrick, who in confidence to me, whispered, ‘It was about time’” (1987:233). While 
not being privy to what kind of institution Sandstone is, this explains his  Mother’s 
absence and intrigues us as to her condition. In American Psycho, on the other hand we 
find Patrick discussing Sean with Nicholas — presumably a financial advisor standing 
in for absent parents — urging him to: “‘Tell him your mother is … worse.’ I mulled 
over this tactic, then said, ‘He might not care.’ ‘Tell him …’ Nicholas paused, then 
cleared  his  throat  and  rather  delicately  proposed,  ‘it  has  to  do  with  her  estate’” 
(1991:224).  Thus,  it  appears  that  Sean’s  sole  interest  in  his  Mother  involves  his 
inheritance  and  leaves  her  condition  intriguingly  unanswered.  Later  we  find  Patrick 
visiting her and we become aware of the awkward nature of their relationship: “My 
mother and I are sitting in her private room at Sandstone, where she is now a permanent 
resident. Heavily sedated, she has her sunglasses on and keeps touching her hair and I 
keep looking at my hands, pretty sure that they’re shaking. She tries to smile when she 
asks me what I want for Christmas. I’m not surprised how much effort it takes to raise 
my head and look at her” (365). While still unsure of her ailment we do find out that the   252 
sunglasses  are:  “black  Ray-Bans  I  bought  her  from  Bloomingdales  that  cost  two-
hundred dollars” (366), and that wearing them indoors may, or may not be a polite 
appreciation of this suitably inappropriate gift from her eldest son, or perhaps indicates 
another issue. Furthermore, when asked: “How was the party?” (366), we realise this 
must be Sean’s birthday and that the two texts share time line, and that we are viewing 
two separate, yet temporally interconnected, stories from different perspectives.   
  Unlike  his  mother,  Patrick’s  father  is  physically  absent  in  both  novels,  and 
although apparently alive in The Rules of Attraction, his state of health is questionable 
as we find out when Patrick and Sean discuss  the future of the latter at a hospital 
following his arrival in New York in their father’s personal Lear jet:  
‘What are you going to do?’ I ask. 
‘What do you mean?’ He almost looks surprised. 
‘I mean are you going to get a job?’ 
‘Not at Dad’s place,’ he says. 
‘Well, where then?’ I ask him. It’s a fair question. 
‘What do you think?’ he asks. ‘Suggestions?’ 
‘I’m asking you,’ I tell him. 
‘Because? …’ He lifts his hands up, leaves them suspended there for a moment. 
‘Because you’re not going to last another term at that place,’ I let him know. 
‘Well, what do you want? A lawyer? A priest? A neurosurgeon?’ He asks. ‘What you 
do?’ 
‘How about the son your father wanted?’ I ask. 
‘You think that thing in there even cares?’ he asks back, laughing, pointing a thumb 
back at the corridor, sniffing hard (1987:239). 
 
From this we gather that his father — referred to by Sean as ‘that thing’ — is seriously 
ill, and judging by Sean’s sarcastic choice of potential career moves, it is probably a 
neurological disorder. Furthermore, Sean’s outright rejection of work at his father’s firm 
supports the suggestion alluded to in American Psycho, that Patrick is working as a 
stockbroker at P & P despite the firm being owned by his father,
25 presumably to assert 
his own independence. Sean’s rejection of his family is not limited to his parents and we 
are left wondering, when he scoffs at Patrick’s probing with “What you do?” if this is 
simply a show of disgust at his profession, or alludes to something more sinister? Most 
importantly, we remain curious regarding his father’s hospitalization, for as we find out   253 
when Patrick visits his mother and describes a photograph of him as a younger man: 
“there’s something the matter with his eyes” (1991:366). 
 
5.4.d. Re-Reading American Psycho — A Question of Identity  
 
Despite  the  controversy  surrounding  American  Psycho,  those  few  positive  critical 
responses tend to view it as a postmodern critique of late consumer capitalism and the 
‘greed is good’ ethos of the corpulent corporate nineteen-eighties.
26 While I support this 
interpretation to an extent, it is my contestation that its primary theme is the question of 
fragmented subjectivity and the loss of certitude seen with the problematising of the 
metaphysics  of  presence  that  clearly  predate  the  ‘postmodern  condition.’  While 
prescribing this critique of capitalism Young indicates that Ellis’ use of consumer items 
to  describe  various  characters  throughout  the  novel,  not  only  indicates  the  vacuous 
nature of identity based merely on appearance, it articulates a lack of individuality, 
explaining that: “by his rigid adherence to adspeak dress-code for his characters, Ellis 
continues his emphasis upon deindividualization in contemporary society. Finally, and 
very ironically, Ellis’s [sic] use of detailed dress-code to obliterate rather than define 
character in the traditional sense ends up contributing to the mechanics of the plot in an 
entirely traditional sense — the ‘plot’ such as it, eventually turns upon the impossibility 
of anyone distinguishing one character from another” (1992:139). Thus, we see rampant 
consumerism failing to quell this latest crisis of subjectivity following the loss of the 
metaphysic of presence, indicating that this attempt to overcome the meaninglessness of 
existence is not specific to contemporary capitalist society but recurrent. 
  The question of identity, of misrecognition and the facile fixation on appearance 
becomes a kind of mantra to Bateman, and is clearly articulated when he explains that: 
“Even though I am more handsome than Craig, we both look pretty much the same” 
(1991:250). The extent of this obsession can be seen when he ‘thinks’ he catches a 
glimpse of a colleague in the street: “Someone who looks almost exactly like Jason   254 
Taylor — black slicked hair, navy double-breasted cashmere coat with a beaver collar, 
black leather boots, Morgan Stanley — passes beneath a street lamp and nods as I turn 
down the volume on the Walkman to hear him say ‘Hello Kevin’ and I catch a whiff of 
Grey Flannel” (162). The irony of this being that although Bateman cannot accurately 
identify the individual in the gloom of a street light, he manages to describe with detail 
not only his entire apparel, but also his scent. Furthermore, while being unsure if this is 
indeed Jason Taylor, Patrick is himself mistaken for someone called Kevin. As Young 
goes on to explain: “In a world in which the only relations are economic we remain 
alienated from any ‘authenticity’ of choice or desire. Patrick has been so fragmented 
and divided by his insane consumerism that he cannot ‘exist’ as a person” (1992:139). 
That this consumerism is fueled by lack of self-present subjectivity gives us an insight 
into the thematic of the fragmented and diminished subject as Bateman is repeatedly 
mistaken for a variety of different characters
27 — much like the identical blonde boys in 
Less Than Zero — leaving us to not only question the narrative validity of his character, 
but to also doubt his ‘true’ identity. 
  This lack of a definitive self-present subjectivity can be viewed as a humorous 
deconstruction of consumerism gone mad in an age free from metaphysical certitude, by 
those still clinging on to the vestiges of a belief in subjectivity beyond the aporia of 
existence. What is far from humorous — although no less important to this discussion 
of the diminished subject — is the manner in which Ellis completes the deconstruction 
of the subject by taking Bateman beyond the limits of acceptable moral behaviour — 
even  though  these  taboos  are  metaphysical  constructs  —  and  to  the  hypothetical 
outlands of the nihilistic postmodern subject: 
A Richard Marx CD plays on the stereo, a bag from Zabar’s loaded with sourdough 
onion bagels and spices sits on the kitchen table while I grind bone and fat and flesh 
into patties, and though it does sporadically penetrate just how unacceptable some of 
what I am doing actually is, I just remind myself that this thing, this girl, this meat, is 
nothing, is shit, and along with a Xanax […] this thought momentarily calms me 
down […] The smell of meat and blood clouds up the condo until I don’t notice it   255 
anymore. And later my macabre joy sours and I am weeping to myself, unable to 
find solace in any of this, crying out, sobbing ‘I just want to be loved,’ cursing the 
earth and everything I have been taught: principles, distinctions, choices, morals, 
compromises, knowledge, unity, prayer — all of it was wrong, without any final 
purpose. All it came down to was: die or adapt (1991:345). 
 
While not wishing to focus on the graphic violence in his text, I believe that this quote 
clearly articulates Ellis’ desire to carry out the ultimate deconstruction of subjectivity in 
a fictional form. While we can theoretically hypothesise the possible outcomes of the 
lack of certitude in contemporary subjectivity, in American Psycho we see Bateman 
literally deconstruct another subject, while crying out for the metaphysical comfort of 
love as he recognises the ultimate futility of existence, the meaninglessness of being, 
and  attempts  to  reconstitute  a  murdered  girl  as a  meal,  without  any  cooking  skills. 
Perhaps this is an indication of a moral position on Ellis’ part, and a critical parody of 
so-called postmodern theorists and doomsayers who, unwisely, bandy about theories of 
post-structuralism  and  deconstruction  while  proclaiming  the  death  of  the  subject, 
history and culture without the requisite critical skills to do so. 
  While the majority of interpretations of American Psycho view Bateman literally 
as a serial killer, it is my belief that many of the stylistic elements that have led to Ellis’ 
work being referred to as postmodern question this proposition. Not all commentators 
have read the novel as a literal expression of actual events, for as Carl Tighe explains: 
“Bateman’s admission that the deaths have not been reported in the press, throws the 
whole narrative into doubt. Has Bateman really been committing murders, or has he 
been imagining them? Is he a reliable narrator? We have only his word” (2005:113). 
This narrative doubt is also picked up on by Elizabeth Young, who states that: “He is a 
Yuppie, a Clone. He is also an extremely unreliable narrator” (1992:136) wherein, we 
find  her  justification  of  American  Psycho  as  a  postmodern  critique  of  consumer 
capitalism.  However,  what  is  not  discussed  here  is  the  possibility  that  Batmen’s 
‘unreliable’ narrative is a humorous pastiche of the schizophrenic postmodern subject,   256 
and  a  cautionary  exploration  of  a  theoretically  nihilistic  endgame.  Doubts  over 
Bateman’s identity and the presence of an inherited psychological disorder are replete in 
this text, as we see him constantly mistaken for others, find him refer to himself in the 
third person,
28 begin speaking a nonsensical internalised language, and given that his 
murderous missives and confessions are, by and large, ignored or misheard.
29 Although 
the surest sign of his insanity, to my mind, come in the most lucid passages of the text 
when Bateman describes the positive musical merits of Whitney Houston, Huey Lewis 
and the News — and most ridiculously — Phil Collins at the expense of Peter Gabriel! 
  Toward the end of the novel we find Bateman undergo an epiphany, with the 
realisation  that  the  superficial  nature  of  his  life  was  one  born  out  of  the  failure  of 
metaphysics to provide the certitude of subjectivity. In the following passage we find 
him  describing  his  existence  in  terms  of  a  phenomenological  approach  to  life  gone 
horribly wrong: 
[W]here there was nature and earth, life and water, I saw a desert landscape that was 
unending, resembling some sort of crater, so devoid of reason and light and spirit that 
the mind could not grasp it on any sort of conscious level and if you came close the 
mind would reel backward, unable to take it in. It was a vision so clear and real and 
vital to me that in its purity it was almost abstract. This is what I could understand, 
this was how I had lived my life, what I constructed my movement around, how I 
dealt with the tangible. This was the geography around which my reality revolved: it 
did not occur to me, ever, that people were good or that a man was capable of change 
or that the world could become a better place through one’s taking pleasure in a 
feeling  or  a  look  or  a  gesture,  of  receiving  another  person’s  love  or  kindness. 
Nothing was affirmative, the term ‘generosity of spirit’ applied to nothing, was a 
cliché, was some kind of bad joke. Sex is mathematics. Individuality no longer an 
issue.  What  does  intelligence  signify?  Define  reason.  Desire  —  meaningless. 
Intellect  is  not  a  cure.  Justice  is  dead.  Fear,  recrimination,  innocence,  sympathy, 
guilt, waste, failure, grief, were things, emotions, that no one really felt anymore. 
Reflection is useless, the world is useless. Evil is its only permanence. God is not 
alive. Love cannot be trusted. Surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found 
meaning in (1991:374-5).   
 
Thus, Bateman’s attempts at attaining a self-presence free of metaphysical certitude 
have  failed  and  his  mind  has  indeed  ‘reeled  back’  from  this  aporia,  replacing  this 
fundamental recognition with the rampant nihilism of consumer society. He has reached 
the theoretical limits of the pastiche of the schizophrenic postmodern subject and found   257 
that  this  ‘disappearance’  of  self-presence  has  not  been  alleviated  by  the  mere 
‘appearance’  of  consumer  commodities.  While  Patrick  may  be  certain  of  the 
phenomenology  of  contemporary  consumer  culture,  the  subject  lurking  beneath  the 
surface always already escapes closure, and the limitations of available commodities in 
turn restrict these surface expressions and further diminishing the subject. Despite his 
best efforts to exist in a world free of metaphysics, and to explore the ultimate self-
present moment of the schizophrenic postmodern subject, in the final passage we find 
him faced with the a priori aporia of the diminished subject, and the pointless nature of 
the choices he has made, when he recognises that: “THIS IS NOT AN EXIT” (399). 
 
5.4.e. In Summation — American Psycho and contemporary culture 
 
Ultimately, this reading proves it possible to interpret American Psycho as far more than 
a ‘how-to’ manual for violence against humans and dogs. Although the use of graphic 
sexual violence towards women sits uncomfortably with many commentators, the novel 
can be  seen as a defamiliarisation of subjectivity and taboo behaviour, in a  culture 
supposedly desensitised toward violence, and obsessed with the rampant consumption 
of not only capitalist commodities, but of the planet itself. As Ellis explains:  
Art  is  no  longer  the  great  love  who  is  wise,  witty,  strengthening,  tender, 
wholesomely passionate, secure, life-giving […] now we are far beyond that moral 
universe — art has now become our need to be terrified. We live in the fear that we 
are destroying the universe, even as we mine deeper into its secrets. So art may be 
needed  now  to  provide  us  with  just  those  fearful  insights  that  the  uneasy 
complacencies of our leaders do their best to avoid (Quoted in Freccero:1997:161).  
 
Ironically then, American Psycho can be seen as an extreme wake-up call for a society 
engrossed  with  what  now  appears  an  a  priori  modus  operandi,  with  Bateman  an 
exploration of the selfish schizophrenic consumer searching for self-presence in a world 
without the certitude of meaning, something that parallels Meursault’s self-destructive 
nihilism in The Outsider, and Bobby Crawford’s messianic activities in Cocaine Nights. 
  In much the same way that Camus’ exploration of existential nihilism led him to   258 
recognise the need for the metaphysics of comfort to assuage the meaninglessness of 
existence, we see in American Psycho a similar thematic, for as Young explains:  
Although Ellis is skilled at representing contemporary society it would seem that, 
unlike many postmodern theorists, he maintains a belief in a ‘reality’ or morality 
somewhere beyond the spectacular blandishment of the hyperreal consumer circus. 
As it seems unlikely that he inclines towards revolutionary politics, it is natural to 
think that […] he might have a vision of some more endemic oral universe, pre-
postmodern fragmentation and commodity fetishism (1992:146).
30  
 
While I continue to disagree with the view of Ellis’ work as postmodern, Young does 
express a perspective of American Psycho as a continuation of the exploration of a non-
temporally specific diminished subject, and despite calls to censor this novel, upholds 
the view that there is an underlying moral concern for the future of the contemporary 
subject without metaphysical certitude. This position becomes apparent with Bateman’s 
increasing, albeit confused, affection for: “Jean, my secretary who is in love with me” 
(1991:105), who, following a dinner date, is determined in the belief of her love for an 
ideal Patrick,
31 and despite his belief that she too will fall victim to the nihilism of the 
aporia  of  existence,  her  conviction  soothes  and  confuses  him  to  the  point  that  he 
realises for the first time — when observing a new born baby in a ‘return to innocence’ 
epiphany — that certain metaphysical ideals are necessary: “The baby stares at Jean and 
me. We stare back. It’s really weird and I’m experiencing a spontaneous kind of internal 
sensation, I feel I’m moving toward as well as away from something, and anything is 
possible” (380). Thus, we finally see within Patrick the recognition of the banality of 
the transparent self-presence he has attained through consumerism, as someone fixated 
with the superficiality of appearances appears, on the surface at least, to recognise the 
need for the metaphysics of comfort in a world without certitude, in order to ensure the 
continued well-being of the contemporary subject, despite terror of the meaninglessness 
of existence, and the inherent nature of condition of the possibility of change.
32   
                                                 
 
Notes: 
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1 Interestingly Will Self — well-known drug user and enfant terrible of the British literary establishment 
— not only took exception to the depiction of drug use, but carries out ‘a peculiar piece of potential libel,’ 
by arguing that: “I don’t believe on the basis of having read his book, and having watched the film (with 
his own imprimatur — to the extent of appearing himself as a dealer), that Irvine Welsh has ever had an 
injecting drug habit. If he had, I don’t se how he could have counseled the making of a film in which a 
human tragedy is turned into a source of rich belly laughs” (1996:12). While on the other hand, in his Mix 
Mag article ‘Irvine Welsh: The Don,’ David Davies argues that although the experiential history of the 
author is not important, he takes comfort knowing Welsh has used heroin: “Theoretically, it’s probably 
not really important whether Welsh has actually lived the life because he captures it so well but still I feel 
happier knowing that he has. Artistic license and all that but it is nonetheless reassuring to find that Welsh 
isn’t  just  some  superbrain  who’s  managed  to  dream  up  all  this  shit  about  drugs  and  clubbing.  His 
characters may not be based on real people but when you meet him it’s clear that it is Welsh’s own 
experiences that are feeding these stories” (1996:61). 
2 In Peter  Corliss’ review of  the filmic  adaptation of Trainspotting, we find Welsh  and John Hodge 
explaining  the  importance  of  the  metaphor:  “‘Trainspotting,’  Welsh  explains,  ‘is  the  compulsive 
collection of locomotive engine numbers from the British railway system. But you can’t do anything with 
the numbers once you’ve collected them.’ Says Hodge, who culled the brilliant screenplay from Welsh’s 
anecdotal novel. ‘It’s a nice metaphor for doing something that gives your life a bit of structure but it’s 
ultimately pointless.’ So is the intravenous injection of drugs — a palpable pleasure that wastes time, and 
often, life” (1996:85). 
3 A disparaging term used to refer to male prostitutes who have sex for money in order to pay the rent. 
4 Niall Lucy makes mention of Acker’s work in his Postmodern Literary Theory: An Introduction and the 
‘Introduction’  to  Postmodern  Literary  Theory:  An  Anthology,  as  does  Dina  Sherzer  in  her  paper 
‘Postmodernism  and  Feminism’  in  Postmodernism  and  Contemporary  Fiction,  Brian  McHale  in  his 
Constructing Postmodernism, and Scott Bukatman in Terminal Identity, to name but a few. 
5 Although it is argued that the subject suffering from mental disorders such as schizophrenia are closest 
to the notion of original self-present subjectivity, for Acker this is not a viable mode of expression. 
6 In Postmodern Literary Theory, Niall Lucy indicates  the manner in which Acker uses the counter-
discursive to defamiliarise the arbitrariness of language and the suppression of marginal discourse by the 
dominant culture, stating that: “Empire of the Senseless could be described as an attempt to set a record 
for the use of the words ‘fuck’ and ‘cunt,’ which appear on almost every page. By constant repetition, 
however, they become decreasingly shocking, turning into ‘senseless,’ empty signifiers. After a while 
they become no more noticeable than punctuation marks which seem to appear in the text only for the 
sake of some variety rather than according to a systematic set of rules for clarifying and communicating 
sense” (1997:50). 
7  There  is  a  predominant  notion  that  those  who  are  involved  in  self-harm,  such  as  drug  users,  self-
mutilators, and those with anorexia, are attempting to gain greater control of their lives by risking the 
very facticity of their being — that is their bodies.  
8 This position is supported by Stephen Potts who in Postmodern Fiction: A Bio-Bibliographical Guide 
argues that: “Throughout his career as a writer of novels and short stories, J.G. Ballard has tread [sic] the 
line between science fiction and the avant-garde. Veterans of the British New Wave regard him as a 
founder of their movement, which brought to the science fiction of the 1960s and 1970s a set of literary 
values the genre had not previously demonstrated, a turning away from pure-scientific speculation to the 
probing of the human soul.  Ballard’s fiction is dominated by tortured but  terrestrial settings  and the 
tormented people who inhabit them, characters confronting and in general yielding to their own atavistic 
compulsions” (1986:31). 
9 Ballard explains this himself when quoted in W. Warren Wagar’s ‘J.G. Ballard and the Transformation 
of Utopia:’ “In 1974 speaking to Robert Loiut, Ballard divided his work, down to that time, into two 
halves. In the first half through to The Crystal World (1966), he had offered descriptions of ‘imaginary 
places,’ under the dirtiest inspiration of the surrealist painters; in the second half, beginning with The 
Atrocity Exhibition (1970), his attention shifted to ‘the landscape of technology and the communications 
industry’” (1991:10-11). 
10 Ballard explains the joy he felt with one particularly vitriolic response to the initial publication to 
Crash to Graeme Revell: “Yes, that was from Reader’s Report, a piece by the wife of a psychiatrist: ‘The 
author  of  this  book  is  beyond  psychiatric  help’  —  which  for  me  meant  total  artistic  success!  For  a 
psychiatrist to say ‘you’re beyond psychiatric help’ — in a way, that’s the greatest compliment you can 
be paid! You’ve achieved freedom then — absolute freedom” (1984:49). With this statement, Ballard 
gleefully evokes the notion that the only true original representation of subjectivity can be found with the 
insane or schizophrenic, although he nevertheless makes certain sense himself! 
11 The controversy surrounding the release of the film version of Crash is explained by Carl Tighe in 
Writing and Responsibility: “In March 1997, after talks with the Home Secretary, the BBFC decided that 
there was little actual violence in the film, that an actress taking off her clothes inside a crashed vehicle in   260 
                                                                                                                                              
order to engage in sex did not pose a threat to public morals, and that while the film dealt with a form of 
sexual depravity it did not glorify or recommend that depravity […] Cronenberg described the UK press 
reaction as ‘completely insane,’ Ballard is reported to have been bemused and outraged by the press 
reaction: ‘Half of America used to be conceived in the back of cars. There’s nothing revolutionary in the 
idea that there is a sexual component to our idea of, or by our excitement by, car crashes’” (2005:89). 
12 J.G. Ballard was born to British parents in Shanghai in 1930 and, as is widely known, spent the war 
years in a Japanese internment camp, arriving in England for the first time in 1946. Much has been made 
of the impact of these events on his writing, and please refer to his semi-biographical novels The Empire 
of the Sun, and The Kindness of Women for further details, or the Steven Spielberg production of the 
former — if you must! 
13 Ballard’s contribution to a  literature of  the transgressive is  explained  in an interview with Jeremy 
Lewis: “You certainly trace this idea of exercising the perverse and deviant in the imagination in all your 
fiction. This leads to a Nietzschean sense of a new morality and a sense of freedom. These people you’ve 
cited as influences — Celine, Burroughs and Genet — were doing the same. Ballard — That’s true. There 
is a sense in which a ‘new morality’ (if you would like to call it that) has already started to emerge. 
People accept moral discontinuities in their lives in a way that older generations would not have done” 
(1991:7). Thus, for  Ballard an exploration of the transgressive remains important, for  as  culture  and 
subjectivity continue to evolve, so does morality.    
14 Evoking Foucault’s Discipline and Punish Crawford indicates the extent of the self-regulation of the 
contemporary subject, and intimates Ballard’s possible rationale for producing this text: “‘The Residencia 
Costasol is just a prison, just as much as Zarzuella jail. We’re building prisons all over the world and 
calling them luxury condos. The amazing thing is that the keys are on the inside. I can help people to snap 
the locks and step out into real air again. Think, Charles — if it works you can write a book about it, a 
warning to the rest of the world.’ ‘The kind of warning no one is keen to hear’” (1997:220).  
15 Crawford takes Charles to the  Residencia  Costasol on a reconnaissance mission to prepare for his 
transgressive invasion: “The residents, two middle-aged men and a woman in her thirties, sat in the silent 
room, their faces lit by the trembling glow of a television screen. No expression touched their eyes, as if 
the dim shadows on the hessian walls around them had long become a satisfactory substitute for thought. 
‘They’re watching TV with the sound turned down,’ I told Crawford as we strolled along the terrace, past 
similar groups isolated in their capsules. ‘What happened to them? They’re like a race from some dark 
planet who find the light there too strong to bear.’ 
‘They’re refugees from time, Charles. Look around you — there are no clocks anywhere and almost no 
one wears a wristwatch.’ 
‘Refugees? Yes … in some ways this place reminds me of the third world […]’ 
‘It’s the fourth world, Charles. The one waiting to take over everything’” (1997:215) 
16 In time-honoured tradition Crawford, the psychopath, takes great pleasure in articulating his vision of 
the future to Charles: 
“‘Leisure societies lie ahead at us, like those you see on the coast. People will still work — or, rather, 
some people will work, but only for a decade of their lives. They will retire in their late thirties, with fifty 
years of idleness in front of them.’  
‘A billion balconies facing the sun. Still it means a final goodbye to wars and ideologies.’ 
‘But how do you energize people, give them some sense of community? A world lying on its back is open 
to any cunning predator? Politics are a pastime for a professional caste and fail to excite the rest of us. 
Religious belief demands a vast effort of imagination and emotional commitment, difficult if you are still 
groggy from last night’s sleeping pill. One thing is left which can rouse people, threaten them directly and 
force them to act together.’  
‘Crime?’  
‘Crime and transgressive behaviour — by which I mean all activities that aren’t necessarily illegal, but 
provoke us and tap our need for strong emotion, quicken the nervous system and jump the synapses 
deadened by leisure and inaction’” (1997:180). And of course Crawford represents that cunning predator! 
17 Ballard humorously indicates the apparent disparity between the criminal act and creativity:  
“‘Does one follow the other? I don’t believe it. If someone burgles my house, shoots the dog and rapes 
the maid my reaction isn’t to open an art gallery.’  
‘Not your first reaction, perhaps. But later, as you question events and the world around you … the arts 
and criminality have always flourished side by side.’” (1997:181). 
18 The questionably limitless nature of his attack on the dominant social order is explained by Crawford:  
“‘The future has landed, Charles, the nightmare is already being dreamed. I believe in people, and know 
they deserve better.’ 
‘You’ll bring them back to life — with amateur porn-films, burglary and cocaine?’ 
‘They’re just the means. People are so hung up about sex and property and self-control. I am not talking 
about crime in the sense that Cabrera thinks of it. I mean anything that breaks the rules, sidesteps the 
social taboos’” (1997:245).   261 
                                                                                                                                              
19 Although The Rules of Attraction has been recently adapted as a movie. 
20 Elizabeth Young outlines these events in ‘The Beast in the Jungle, the Figure in the Carpet,’ explaining 
that: “Bret Easton Ellis started making notes for his third novel, which he intended to be the monologue 
of a serial killer, whilst still working on the proofs of The Rules of Attraction. The publishing house 
Simon  & Schuster offer  a $300,000 advance for the book only to withdraw from publication in the 
autumn  of  1990  after  some  exceptionally  violent,  gory  excerpts  appear  in  Spy  and  Time  magazine” 
(1992:132). 
21  Carl  Tighe  goes  on  to  explain  that  just  prior  to  publishing:  “At  this  stage  nobody  seems  to  have 
objected to the violence or misogyny. However in the autumn of 1990, just four weeks before it was due 
for distribution to bookshops, information was leaked to the press that the publisher had decided not to go 
ahead  with  publication.  The  rumour  was  that  in-house  editors  found  the  book  so  offensive  and 
misogynistic they simply refused to work on it. Ellis has always claimed that the book is about ‘a larger 
metaphor — alienation, pain, America, the overall tone of the culture’” (2005:104). 
22 The disparate reception of American Psycho was intense as seen with these reviews in ‘Volume 117’ of 
Contemporary Literary Criticism: “In a review of American Psycho, Alberto Manguel suggests that the 
book produces ‘a revulsion not of the senses but of the gut, like that produced by shoving a finger down 
one’s throat.’ Norman Mailer, a writer similarly known for vivid descriptions of brutality, finds it difficult 
to defend Ellis’s approach to writing, due to its apparent lack of moral purpose. Nevertheless, defenders 
of Ellis’s work abound. Gore Vidal feels American Psycho is ‘a wonderfully comic novel,’ and other 
positive  critical  commentary  centers  on  the  metaphorical  dimension  that  was  missed  by  those  who, 
compelled to act on the outrage the work provokes, are quick to ban and censor the book. American 
Psycho is seen by these defenders as an indictment of unprincipled materialistic consumerism” (Hunter 
(et al eds.):1999:105). 
23 “‘It’s called California classic cuisine,’ Anne tells me, leaning in close, after we ordered. The statement 
deserves a reaction, I suppose, and since Scott and Courtney are discussing the merits of the Post’s gossip 
column, it’s up to me to reply. 
‘You mean compared to say, California Cuisine?’ I ask carefully, measuring each word, then lamely add, 
‘Or post-California cuisine?’ 
‘I mean I know it sounds terribly trendy but there is a world of difference. It’s subtle,’ she says, ‘but it’s 
there.’ 
‘I’ve heard of post-California cuisine,’ I say, acutely aware of the design of the restaurant: the exposed 
pipe and the columns and the open pizza kitchen and the …  deck chairs. ‘In fact I’ve eaten it. No baby 
vegetables? Scallops in burritos? Wasabi crackers? Am I on the right track? […]’   
‘Exactly,’ Anne says. ‘Oh Courtney where did you find Patrick? He’s so knowledgeable about these 
things’” (1991:94-5). 
24 Young expands on this apparent lack of content: “The publication of Bret Easton Ellis’s American 
Psycho in 1991 was replete with ironies. It seemed as if the world had decided to add to the book all the 
old-fashioned fictional qualities that it so conspicuously lacked: melodrama, plot, characterization, irony, 
hubris.  The  story  of  the  book  —  its  publication  history,  its  author,  its  controversial  aspects,  its 
fashionability — had to stand in for the lack of story in the book which no one seemed to bother to read 
in any detail” (1992:132). 
25 This becomes apparent when Patrick has dinner with Bethany, an old girlfriend from his College days: 
“‘And you’re at … P & P?’ she asks. ‘Yes,’ I say.  
She nods, pauses, wants to say something, debates whether she should, then asks, all in a manner of 
seconds: ‘But doesn’t your family own —‘  
‘I don’t want to talk about this,’ I say, cutting her off. ‘But yes, Bethany. Yes.’ 
‘And you still work at P & P?’ she asks. Each syllable is spaced so that it bursts, booming sonically, into 
my head. 
‘Yes,’ I say, looking furtively around the room. ‘But—‘ She’s confused. ‘Didn’t your father—‘ 
‘Yes, of course,’ I say, interrupting. ‘Have you had the focaccia at Pooncakes?’” (1991:237). 
26 This is true for Young who explains that: “The all-prevailing kenosis of his previous work — the 
evacuation of content, the numbing-out of feeling and sense — together with his interest in social trends, 
and his expressed belief that only the most extreme and disruptive images of experience can penetrate the 
bland vacuity of his generation seem to make the combination of serial killer and the yuppie meritocracy 
of  eighties  New  York  and  obvious  choice  of  subject”  (1992:135).  And  also  by  Tighe:  “At  first  the 
gruesome nature of the killings […] dominate the way the book was received, […] We can now see the 
book very clearly as a satire on the coke-fuelled hedonistic money culture — on both sides of the Atlantic 
— of the Regan-Thatcher years” (2005:105). 
27  Apart  from  the  numerous  times  Patrick  is  mistaken  for  Marcus  Halberstam  by  Paul  Owen,  these 
misrecognitions are plentiful and reach a crescendo toward the end of the novel: “I’ve already bumped 
into Robert Ailes from First Boston in the Horror aisle, or at least I think it was Robert Ailes […] He 
mumbled ‘Hello MacDonald,’  as he passed me by holding a copy of Friday the 13th: Part 7 and a   262 
                                                                                                                                              
documentary about abortions” (1991:111-12): “Hey, Williams” (127): “‘So how were the Bahamas?’ I 
ask  after  we  order.  ‘You  just  got  back  right?’  ‘Well,  Taylor,’  Armstrong  begins,  staring  at  a  point 
somewhere behind me and lightly above my head” (137): “‘Hey Simpson’ and ‘See you at Fluties’” 
(141): “I trip out into the street bumping into Charles Murphy from Kidder Peabody or could it be Bruce 
Barker from Morgan Stanley, whoever, and he says ‘Hey, Kinsley’ and I belch into his face, my eyes 
rolling  back  into  my  head,  greenish  bile  dripping  in  strings  from  my  bared  fangs,  and  he  suggests, 
unfazed, ‘See you at Fluties, okay?’” (151): “Hey Davis” (179): “‘Hey McCloy,’ Petersen says” (182): 
“Someone else, Frederick Dibble, stops by and congratulates me on the Larson account and then has the 
nerve to say, ‘Talk to you later, Saul’” (262). 
28 The clearest narrative slip comes in the hyperreal car chase shoot-out between Bateman and the Police: 
“racing blindly down Greenwich I loose control entirely, the cab swerves into a Korean deli, next to a 
karaoke restaurant called the Lotus Blossom I’ve been to with Japanese clients, the cab rolling over fruit 
stands, smashing through a wall of glass, the body of the cashier thudding across the hood, Patrick tries to 
put the cab in reverse but nothing happens, he staggers out of the cab, leaning against it, a nerve-racking 
silence follows, “nice going Bateman,” he mutters, limping out of the store” (1991:349). 
29 Most humorously noted when Bateman is asked what he does for a living and replies ‘Murders and 
decapitations,’ which is interpreted correctly, we assume, as ‘Mergers and Acquisitions.’ 
30 Young expands on the inherent moralism in American Psycho explaining that: “Ellis might be very 
critical of his culture, his text may be an experimentation in many ways but he comes from deep within 
that culture and cannot be said to pose anything of an anarchic threat to it. The faults Ellis perceives in 
contemporary culture come from an old-fashioned, straightforwardly moralistic reading of it. His book 
presents terrible amoral deviations, which, if rectified, would restore to society all the moral values it has 
lost and would revive a more wholesome dominant culture” (1992:145). 
31 Please refer to the chapter entitled ‘End of the 1980s’ which is replete with the question of identity, and 
the narrative of subjectivity such as the following:  
“‘How many people in the world are like me?’ I ask again. ‘Do I really appear like that?’  
‘Patrick,’ she says. ‘I wouldn’t lie.’  
‘No of course you wouldn’t  … but I think that …’ My turn to sigh, contemplatively. ‘I think a lot of 
snowflakes are alike … and I think a lot of people are alike too.’ She nods, even though I can tell she’s 
very confused.  
‘Appearances can be deceiving,’ I admit carefully. 
‘No,’ she says, shaking her head, sure of herself for the first time. ‘I don’t think they are deceiving. 
They’re not.’ 
‘Sometimes, Jean,’ I explain, ‘the lines separating appearances — what you see — and reality — what 
you don’t — become, well, blurred.’  
‘That’s not true,’ she insists. ‘That’s simply not true.’ 
‘Really,’ I ask smiling. 
‘I didn’t used to think so,’ she says. ‘Maybe ten years ago I didn’t. But I do now.’  
‘What do you mean?’ I ask, interested. ‘You used to?’ 
… a flood of reality. I get an odd feeling that this is a crucial moment in my life and I am startled by the 
suddenness of what I guess passes for an epiphany. There is nothing of value I can offer her. For the first 
time I see Jean as uninhibited; she seems stronger, less controllable, wanting to take me into a new and 
unfamiliar land — the dreaded uncertainty of a totally different world. I sense that she wants to rearrange 
my life in a significant way — her eyes tell me this and though I see the truth in them, I also know that 
one day, someday very soon, she too will be locked in the rhythm of my insanity” (1991:378). 
32  However,  true  to  the  possible  sub-text  of  Bateman’s  schizophrenia,  the  atemporal  nature  of  the 
narrative, or perhaps even Ellis’ own revulsion toward happy endings, we soon find things returning to 
normal when Patrick explains that: “There’s no use denying it: this has been a bad week. I’ve started 
drinking my own urine. I laugh spontaneously at nothing. Sometimes I sleep under my futon” (1991:382). 
And  once  again  we  are  left  questioning  the  temporal  linearity  of  the  narrative,  Patrick  Bateman’s 
reliability as a narrator, or even if this event follows or pre-dates this hopeful epiphany. 
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Chapter 6 
 
On Not Concluding — 
The Diminished Subject, The Metaphysics of Comfort, 
The Narrative of Self and Michel Foucault 
 
 
6.1.a. An Ending By Way of A Re-Introduction  
 
[I]f indeed there really is no world (to speak of) apart from language, then there 
really isn’t much reason to become distraught over the alleged fact that we can never 
get it quite right. From this perspective, in other words, there is nothing to ‘get;’ 
there is only language itself, discourse, texts, ‘social constructions’ of the world, 
nothing more. The absence of the possibility of getting it right is thus understood not 
so  much  as  impossibility  —  a  failure,  a  stopping  short  —  as  non-possibility: 
language, rather than referring to the world ‘in itself,’ refers only to language […] 
Again, except for preverbal children and a few other unfortunates, has anyone ever 
beheld an ‘unlanguaged’ world, a pure and pristine presence, untouched by words, 
untouched by social institutions, issuing from the specific surrounds in which we 
live? The answer, many would say, is surely ‘No.’ So why be angst-ridden? Why 
mourn the absence of what isn’t there? Why not just speak and write and try to make 
things interesting? 
— Mark Freeman, in Rewriting the Self: History, Memory, Narrative (1993:10-11).  
 
They  cannot  bear  (and  one  cannot  but  sympathize)  to  hear  someone  saying: 
‘Discourse is not life: its time is not your time; in it, you will not be reconciled to 
death; you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but do 
not imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live 
longer than he.’  
— Michel Foucault, in The Uses of Pleasure (1983:211).  
 
Unlike  the  indeterminable  nature  of  the  condition  of  the  possibility  of  change  that 
continually  shapes  philosophy,  literature  and  subjectivity,  due  to  unavoidable  yet 
practical dictates, it is necessary that I end the continuation of this atemporal teleology 
of the a priori diminished subject, and dictate a finality of sorts. However, in keeping 
with the aporia of the meaninglessness of existence and the failure of philosophical 
discourse to deterministically posit a raison d’être for the subject, or to provide the 
metaphysical comfort of self-presence — in order to transcend the inevitable terminus 
that is our fundamental corporeality — I shall resist the time-honoured tradition, and 
arrogant  temptation,  to  carry  out  my  own  textual  metaphysics  in  the  form  of  a 
conclusion. In a thesis replete with the many pitfalls of metaphysics and the dangers of   264 
determinism, to map this nomenclature onto this discussion of the diminished subject 
would be remiss for, as I shall explain, rather than viewing contemporary subjectivity as 
simply suffering from a crisis of the loss of a  previous available transcendent  self-
presence, it is my contention that this is an ineluctable crisis — or as Nietzsche would 
put it an ‘eternal recurrence’ — of the recognition of the meaninglessness of being, and 
the repeated failure of religion and philosophy to provide the metaphysics of comfort 
which has traditionally assuaged the terror of existence. 
  Within this text, as with all discourses, there are inclusions and exclusions, there 
are necessary and more readily recognised subjective choices made when producing a 
text,  and  there  are  limits  in  scope  and  form  depending  on  the  type  of  work  one 
undertakes. In producing this particular text my choices have dictated the inclusion of a 
cross section of twentieth century continental philosophy, a precise selection of several 
contemporary Anglo-American works of fiction — all written in English — and which 
exemplify my proposal of an ineluctably diminished nature of subjectivity, and all in 
order  to  mount  an  opposition  to  the  proposition  of  a  temporally  specific,  nay, 
‘postmodern crisis’ of subjectivity. To many, certain absences may appear glaringly 
unforgivable: such as the omissions of Kant and Hegel and their patent importance 
those  theorist  who  did  gain  admission  to  this  text:  the  work  of  Saussure,  Barthes, 
Deleuze and Guattari, that could easily have found a comfortable niche in the body of 
this text, rather than being implied in the margins: likewise, the theory and fiction of 
Søren Kierkegaard and Simone de Beauvoir would not be out of place: and neither 
would the eagerly consumed and researched, yet absent, fiction of Martin Amis, Will 
Self, Paul Auster, David Foster-Wallace, and not least of all Dennis Cooper. However, 
one noticeable absence will now be redressed as I turn my attention to the notable 
French theoretician Michel Foucault and the manner in which his philosophical lifework   265 
makes for a fitting finale to this discussion of the diminished subject, contemporary 
literature, and the eternal recurrence of the crisis of philosophy. 
  What  follows,  therefore,  is  not  a  conclusion  in  the  strict  sense,  but  rather  an 
ending. Yet within it there is implied a need to continue exploring the key propositions 
rhythmically reiterated throughout this text. By introducing Michel Foucault somewhat 
belatedly in this text there is, as one would expect, a method, for I propose to carry out a 
reading of his life and texts in the form of a summary, and as an example par excellence 
of the key issues of this thesis. That is, in discussing Foucault I will argue that despite 
my seemingly negative atemporal teleology of the repeated failure of philosophy, it still 
remains an important locus for the discussion of contemporary culture, and that the 
continued exploration of counter-discursive expressions of subjectivity — as explored 
in both my philosophical and literary sections — must necessarily restrain temerity and 
exercise caution.  
 
6.2.a. Michel Foucault — A Narrative of a Philosophical Life   
 
As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. 
And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they 
appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the 
possibility — without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises — 
were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of 
the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a 
face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.  
— Michel Foucault, in The Order of Things (1966:387). 
 
If one writer of recent times best exemplifies a theoretical perspective of the human 
subject  as  always  already  diminished  and  lacking  metaphysical  comfort  due  to  an 
ineluctably unobtainable sense of self-presence, it is Michel Foucault. Although initially 
associated with the Structuralist movement and such luminaries as Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
Roland Barthes, Louis Althusser and Jacques Lacan, Foucault’s texts are difficult to 
categorise. Indeed, the keen student of his work will find themselves both mentally and 
physically challenged due to the disparate locations— and generic classifications — his   266 
texts occupy in any given library, finding them listed variously under Law, Philosophy, 
History, Psychiatry, Medicine and Gender Studies, among many — something that both 
frustrates and gives insight into this seemingly obtuse writer. Furthermore, despite his 
initial  impersonal  macro-level  investigations  into  the  arbitrary  nature  of  social 
discourses — while recognising the tangible effects on marginalised individuals such as 
the criminally insane — and by defamiliarising the seemingly a priori nature of power 
by implicating all subjects in the self-regulation of behaviour through the interpellation 
of systems of societal control — Foucault’s later work represented a more personal 
micro-level investigation into the sexual subject, which many have argued mirrored his 
political  and  philosophical  attempts  to  effect  tangible  personal  change  at  both  a 
conscious and corporeal level. As such, what follows is a re-reading of his key texts and 
various accounts of the controversial philosophical life of Michel Foucault. 
 
6.2.b. Michel Foucault, Discourse and The Diminished Subject 
 
One need not dig deep to unearth the diverse influences in Foucault’s numerous texts, 
including a fascination with Nietzsche’s Dionysian subject embracing the suffering of 
existence, and the ‘death of god:’ the Structural linguistic of Saussure and his concepts 
of ‘langue’ and ‘parole’ and the division of language into ‘sign, signifier and signified:’ 
the proto-poststructuralist musings of Barthes, and especially the ‘Death of the Author’ 
and ‘From Work to Text:’ an almost unacknowledged interest in the work of the then 
theoretical pariah Heidegger: and his rejection of the increasingly deterministic work of 
Sartre. However, like those before him, Foucault’s determination to avoid the trap of 
metaphysics,  and  highlight  the  manner  in  which  individual  behaviour  is  subject  to 
arbitrary discourses of power — coupled with the failure of traditional philosophy to 
effect any tangible alternatives — led him to carry out his own singular investigations 
into  various  hegemonic  restraints  placed  on  the  subject.  In  keeping  with  his 
determinedly anti-deterministic position, rather than affiliating himself with an existing   267 
philosophical  movement,  Foucault  set  about  establishing  a  unique  method  for 
defamiliarising the discursive rules and regulations which impact on our everyday lives, 
which varied between his earlier ‘archeological,’ and a later ‘genealogical’ approaches 
that  represent  more  than  a  passing  nod  to  Nietzsche.
1  He  explains  his  genealogical 
approach in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’ indicating that: “If genealogy in its own 
right gives rise to questions concerning our native land, native language, or the laws that 
govern us, its intention is to reveal the heterogeneous systems which, masked by the 
self,  inhibit  the  formation  of  any  form  of  identity”  (1986:95).  That  is,  rather  than 
viewing various institutions and discourses which guide, punish, educate and care for 
the individual as necessarily altruistic and a priori, Foucault set about investigating the 
historical  basis  of  these  controlling  discourses,  searching  for  discontinuities  and 
exclusions rather than origins, and implicated the individual in the legitimation and 
continuation of these arbitrary discourses, rather than positing a singular seat of power 
which — like the Bastille or the Winter Palace — could be stormed in a revolution to 
emancipate the oppressed subject.  
  With  his  proclamation  of  the  ‘death  of  man’  Foucault  not  only  drew  wide 
criticism for his supposedly anti-humanist position, he vividly exposed the lack of the 
metaphysics of presence by highlighting the a priori nature of the diminished subject, 
and  the  impossibility  of  the  subject  ever  achieving  transcendence  while  remaining 
engaged with those discourses that constrain it. In The Order of Things he argues that:  
From  within  language  experienced  and  traversed  as  language,  in  the  play  of  its 
possibilities extended to their furtherest point, what emerges is that man has ‘come to 
an end,’ and that, by reaching the summit of all possible speech, he arrives not at the 
very heart of himself but at the brink of that which limits him; in that region where 
death  prowls,  where  thought  is  extinguished,  where  the  promise  of  the  origin 
interminably recedes (1966:383).  
 
That is, the primacy of the self-present individual of the cogito has been undermined by 
the necessary relationship between subject and language. If, as Foucault argues, various 
unquestioned cultural, religious, political, judicial and medical discourses are brought   268 
into question by the discontinuities that pick at the seemingly seamless teleology of the 
history that legitimates them, then the concept of the self-present subject, or ‘man,’ is 
terminally undermined.  
  However, the subject is not simply diminished in relation to a tangible former 
sense  of  self,  it  is  always  already  diminished  in  relation  to  a  metaphysical  ideal, 
something supported by Foucault’s theoretical approach and seen further in ‘Nietzsche, 
Genealogy,  History,’  wherein  he  argues  that:  “The  purpose  of  history,  guided  by 
genealogy,  is  not  to  discover  the  roots  of  our  identity,  but  to  commit  itself  to  its 
dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland 
to  which  metaphysicians  promise  a  return;  it  seeks  to  make  visible  all  of  those 
discontinuities  that  cross  us”  (1986:95).  Thus,  we  can  read  Foucault’s  work  as  an 
example par excellence of the anti-metaphysician highlighting the a priori aporia of the 
meaninglessness of existence, for although he undermines the metaphysical comfort of 
the self-present subject, he optimistically proposes that by virtue of its discursive nature 
there is always already implied the condition of the possibility of change. 
 
6.2.c. The Failure of Philosophy — Sartre, Politics, Fascism and Terrorism 
 
Having  carried  out  my  own  subjective  ‘genealogy’  of  the  recurrent  failure  of 
philosophy, the trap of metaphysics, and the dangers of determinism, it is unsurprising 
that  Foucault  would  also  attempt  to  address  this  perceived  ‘crisis’  of  theory  and 
subjectivity.  He  expresses  his  hopes,  and  doubts,  for  the  future  of  philosophical 
discourse as a useful manner of defamiliarising subjectivity in The Uses of Pleasure — 
published just before his death — explaining that: “The ‘essay’ — which should be 
understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, 
and not the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication — is 
the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it 
was in past times, i.e., an ‘ascesis,’ […] an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought”   269 
(1987:9). Thus, it is possible to propose that even in his last days Foucault still believed 
in the positive potential of philosophical investigations into subjectivity — at both the 
macro  and  micro  levels  —  something  understandable  if  one  considers  his  lifelong 
dedication to this activity. Furthermore, it also indicates the recurrence of doubt as to 
the validity of any philosophical work,
2 the potential need for catharsis and comfort on 
the part of the theoretician, and a fundamental need for a belief in something positive. In 
his text Foucault, Gilles Deleuze supports this perspective of doubt and revisionism, 
discussing Foucault’s readiness to critically discuss his work in a variety of forums, 
indicating that: 
If Foucault’s interviews form an integral part of his work, it is because they extend 
the  historical  problematization  of  each  of  his  books  into  the  construction  of  the 
present problem, be it madness, punishment or sexuality. What are the new types of 
struggle,  which  are  transversal  and  immediate  rather  than  centralized  and 
mediatized?  What  are  the  ‘intellectual’s’  new  functions,  which  are  specific  or 
‘particular’ rather than universal? What are the new modes of subjectivation, which 
tend to have no identity? This is the present triple root of the questions: What can I 
do, What do I know, What am I? (1988:115).  
 
Thus, we clearly see the issue of subjectivity transgressing the purely theoretical and 
isolated world of academia, and entering — just as Foucault would have wanted — 
various  popular  discourses,  although  this  is  not  uncommon  in  Continental  Europe. 
Furthermore, in true anti-deterministic fashion, Foucault’s doubts led him to search for 
the discontinuities in his own works, to redevelop and modify his ideas according to 
societal changes, to postulate rather than dictate, but at all times to question the role of 
the philosopher and to strive to understand the controls and constraints placed on the 
individual, for the good of philosophy and — one could argue — for his own sense of 
well-being, and not without good reason.    
  Foucault’s ‘particular’ problem with the ‘universal’ role of the intellectual is a 
further example of a stringent anti-metaphysical position, and elucidates yet another of 
his major concerns. Having already discussed at length the vitriolic conflict that erupted 
between  Jean-Paul  Sartre  and  Albert  Camus,  it  should  come  as  no  surprise  that   270 
Foucault’s  perceived  failure  of  philosophy  should  be  influenced  by  the  intellectual 
determinism exhibited by the rampant left-wing Sartre during his ‘political turn.’ In his 
biography The Lives of Michel Foucault, David Macey explains how Foucault — as the 
predominant French intellectual of his day — had to be persuaded by Daniel Defert, his 
homosexual  partner,  to  attend  the  funeral  of  possibly  the  most  famous  French 
philosopher of all time: 
When Defert asked him if he would be going to the funeral, he replied: ‘Why should 
I? I don’t owe him anything,’ before capitulating in the face of the argument that 
Sartre  had,  in  political  an  international  terms,  been  the  prototypical  French 
intellectual of the post-war period. In the event, he found the experience moving. As 
they  moved  slowly  through  the  streets,  Foucault  spoke  to  Von  Bülow  [a  former 
student] of his youth and of the ‘intellectual terrorism’ then exercised by Sartre and 
those around him (1993:429). 
 
Thus, it appears that Foucault was of the opinion that Sartre had abused his extensive 
intellectual  capital  by  arguing  a  totalitarian  perspective  of  left-wing  politics  and 
philosophy in a deterministic fashion bordering on ‘terrorism,’ something seen with his 
— and those Le Temps Modernes — treatment of Camus’ metaphysically optimistic text 
The Rebel. James Miller’s biography The Passion of Michel Foucault, expands on this 
point stating that during the funeral Foucault explained to Von Bülow that: “‘it was 
him,  and  all  that  he  represented  …  that  I  wished  to  renounce.’  Sartre’s  impact  he 
summed up in a word: ‘terrorism’” (1994:38). Therefore, we can assume that while 
Foucault’s anti-metaphysical position was greatly influenced by Nietzsche, it had a lot 
to ‘thank’ Sartre’s totalitarian postulations for, and can be seen as a result of the failure 
of the latter to achieve the metaphysics of comfort, and certitude of subjectivity he was 
clearly obsessed with. 
  Having lived through the horrors of WWII, that Foucault should view Sartre’s 
metaphysical political posturing as a determinism that had much in common with — yet 
obviously fell short of — the terror of Nazi fascism is hardly surprising, and indicates 
his own determinedly anti-deterministic perspective. Furthermore, the repeated failure   271 
of Sartre’s many and varied attempts to posit a possible expression of subjectivity free 
from the nihilistic terror of existence, would have added to his own doubts over the 
validity,  and  usefulness,  of  philosophical  discourse  to  effect  any  useful  change. 
Foucault expresses this view in his article ‘Truth and Power,’ wherein he makes veiled 
reference to Sartre and his own hopes for a tangible outcome for philosophy: 
For a long period, the ‘left’ intellectual spoke and was acknowledged the right of 
speaking in the capacity of master of truth and justice. He was heard, or purported to 
make himself heard, as the spokesman of the universal. To be an intellectual meant 
something like being the consciousness/conscience of us all. I think we have here an 
idea transposed from Marxism, from a faded Marxism indeed […] Some years have 
now passed since the intellectual was called upon to play this role. A new mode of 
the ‘connection between theory and practice’ has been established. Intellectuals have 
got used to working, not in the modality of the ‘universal,’ the ‘exemplary,’ the ‘just-
and-true-for all,’ but within specific sectors, at the precise points where their own 
conditions  of  life  or  work  situate  them  (housing,  the  hospital,  the  asylum,  the 
laboratory, the university, family and sexual relations). This has undoubtedly given 
them a much more immediate and concrete awareness of struggles (1980:126). 
 
It takes little imagination to recognise this ‘left intellectual’ as Sartre, and to view his 
failings as Foucault’s impetus to strive for a philosophical position which — although 
always  constrained  by  discursive  practices  —  had  something  ‘concrete’  rather  than 
metaphysical,  to  say  about  the  ‘struggles’  of  the  subject  against  the  scourge  of 
totalitarianism, fascism and ‘terrorism’ — yet without recourse to its own reductive and 
potentially  oppressive  determinism.  This  optimistic  view  of  the  usefulness  of 
philosophy is best expressed in The Uses of Pleasure, and famously read as his eulogy 
by Gilles Deleuze: “But, then, what is philosophy today — philosophical activity, I 
mean — if it is not critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it 
consist, if not the endeavor to know and to what extent it might be possible to think 
differently, instead of legitimating what is already known? There is always something 
ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the outside, to dictate to others, 
to tell them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it works up a case against 
them in the language of naïve positivity” (1987:8-9). And on the particular ‘subject’ of 
Jean-Paul Sartre, enough said!   272 
 
6.2.d. Foucault and Plato — The Literary Turn 
 
In keeping with the rhythmical repetition of the themes of the crisis of philosophy and 
the usefulness of literature in the investigation of subjectivity throughout this thesis, it is 
understandable  that  given  his  own  increased  frustration  with  the  metaphysics  of 
philosophical  discourse,  that  Foucault’s  work  should  take  a  ‘literary  turn.’  As 
previously seen with the literary interests of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Camus before 
him,  Foucault  was  interested  in  fictional  explorations  of  the  lack  of  self-present 
certitude  afforded  the  metaphysical  subject  of  language,  in  a  defamiliarised  and 
deliberately metaphorical form, and the preeminence of value judgments that prioritise 
the  reason  and  rhetoric  of  philosophical  discourse,  over  the  unreason  of  the  poetic. 
Given  his  interest  in  defamiliarising  the  seemingly  a  priori  discourses  of  everyday 
subjectivity, the traditional division attributed to Plato’s ‘wrong turn’ — that which 
prioritised one arbitrary representation of subjectivity over another — was in need of 
questioning. He makes this apparent in ‘The Order of Discourse,’ explaining that: 
There is no doubt that this division is historically constituted. For the Greek poets of 
the sixth century BC, the true discourse […] which inspired respect and terror, and to 
which one had to submit because it ruled, was the one pronounced by men who 
spoke as of right and according to the required ritual; the discourse which dispensed 
justice and gave everyone his share; the discourse which in prophesying the future 
not  only  announced  what  was  going  to  happen  but  helped  to  make  it  happen, 
carrying men’s minds along with it and thus weaving itself into the fabric of destiny 
[…] Between Hesiod and Plato a certain division was established, separating true 
discourse from false discourse: a new division because henceforth the true discourse 
is no longer precious and desirable, since it is no longer the one linked to the exercise 
of power. The sophist is banished. This historical division probably gave our will to 
know its general form. However, it has never stopped shifting (1981:54). 
 
That is, the age-old predominance of the rhetorical over the poetical is revealed as 
nothing more than the valourising of one particular discursive practice over another, that 
at once condemns the metaphorical postulations of the poetic as fallacious, specious and 
dangerous, while legitimating an equally sophistic mode of control. Yet, despite the 
tradition of this arbitrary division of discourses, Foucault’s genealogical investigation   273 
into discursive practices, resists the hopeless nihilism of the terror of existence — as 
seen  with  Sartre’s  existentialism  —  and  implies  an  anti-deterministic  view  of  the 
immutability of these discourses, arguing for a lack of intransigence of the ‘will to 
know,’ and in turn the condition of the possibility of change. 
  An important aspect of Foucault’s genealogical investigation into the discourse of 
insanity — seen in Madness and Civilization and Discipline and Punish — stems from 
the  potential  subversive  possibilities  of  those  dangerous  individuals  exploring  the 
freedom of ‘ungrounded languages,’
3 as seen with the lunatic and the schizophrenic, 
and the actions of the criminally insane. However, given the severely limiting treatment 
of  these  individuals,  Foucault  began  to  view  the  transgressive  possibilities  of  these 
counter-discursive  activities  —  and  explorations  of  potential  alternative  forms  of 
fictional subjectivity — as best exemplified in the ‘new literature’ of such modernist 
writers as Artaud, Bataille and Kafka, arguing in The Order of Things that:  
It was inevitable that this new mode of being of literature should have been revealed 
in works like those of Artaud or Roussel — and by men like them; in Artaud’s work, 
language,  having  been  rejected  as  discourse  and  re-apprehended  in  the  plastic 
violence  of  the  shock,  is  referred  back  to  the  cry,  to  the  tortured  body,  to  the 
materiality of thought, to the flesh; in Roussel’s work, language having been reduced 
to powder by a systematically fabricated chance, recounts interminably the reception 
of death and the enigma of divided origins. And as if this experiencing of the forms 
of finitude in language were insupportable, or inadequate […] it is within madness 
that it manifested itself — the figure of finitude thus positing itself in language (as 
that which unveils itself within it), but also before it, preceding it, as that formless, 
mute, unsignifying region where language can find its freedom. And it is indeed in 
this space thus revealed that literature, first with surrealism (though still in a very 
much  disguised  form),  then,  more  and  more  purely,  with  Kafka,  Bataille,  and 
Blanchot, posited itself as experience: as experience of death (and in the element of 
death), of unthinkable thought (and in its inaccessible presence), of repetition […] as 
experience  of  finitude  (trapped  in  the  opening  and  the  tyranny  of  that  finitude) 
(1966:383-84). 
 
That is, for Foucault these works defamiliarised language and being, and in doing so the 
apparent  a  priori  and  restrictive  nature  of  all  discourses,  bringing  with  them  the 
possibility  of  alternative  ‘ungrounded’  forms  of  subjectivity.  Therefore,  these  texts 
attempt  to  express  the  language  of  those  individuals  marginalised,  oppressed  and   274 
considered dangerous by those hegemonic structures — enabling the legitimation and 
continuation of the metaphysical discourses which ply a hucksters tale of freedom and 
self-presence to those subjects who unwittingly interpellate them as a priori — yet with 
certain exceptions, such as American Psycho, most are ignored due to their lowly status 
as fallacious fiction.  
  However, Foucault soon became disenchanted with the transgressive possibilities 
of literature, as the rise of the Structuralist movement — and literary practices espoused 
by those at the journal Tel Quel — led to new a form of determinism whereby a narrow 
selection of ‘valid’ texts became the legitimate object for the philosophical investigation 
of subjectivity. As David Macey explains when discussing the posthumously published 
‘Foucault, passe-frontiéres de la philosophy’ — the sole result of a proposed series of 
interviews  between  Foucault  and  Roger-Pol  Droit  called  off  due  to  their  close 
approximation to an autobiography — Foucault was dismissive of: 
[T]he argument, elaborated by Tel Quel and other groups, that the act of writing itself 
was  subversive,  and  that  as  it  became  increasingly  self-reflexive,  it  became 
increasingly revolutionary. Speaking in the past tense, he once more described how 
Bataille, Blanchot and Klossowski had, like Nietzsche, represented an escape from 
the constricting discourse of philosophy, in an  area in which philosophy became 
permeable to other forms of thought and language. The tone is valedictory, almost 
rueful. For a moment, Foucault was more interested in the question of how academic 
and avante garde discourses effectively collude in defining some texts ‘literary,’ or 
promote them to ‘literary’ status. In the published fragment, he offers no solution 
(1993:340). 
 
Thus, we see again the scourge of deterministic discourses embracing, classifying and 
subsuming that, which for Foucault at least, was potentially counter-discursive, in much 
the  same  way  as  Sartre’s  value  judgments  of  ‘committed’  writing  did  in  What  is 
Literature? At the end of his ‘literary turn, therefore, we see Foucault reach an aporia 
and become ‘committed’ to a more immediate and personal micro-level approach to the 
investigation of alternative subjectivities. Therefore, the failure to adequately rectify the 
division between literature and philosophy — and with questionable subjective value 
judgments placed on the legitimacy of revolutionary texts based solely on predominant   275 
political and philosophical discourses that legitimate and perpetuate subjective positions 
— led to a deterministic perspective of literature fueling arguments, such as Fredric 
Jameson’s, that anything less than ‘committed’ contemporary writing was automatically 
postmodern and nihilistic. While such choices are inevitably subjective and political, for 
any ‘intellectual’ to argue ‘universally’ which texts fulfill their specific criteria was 
anathema to Foucault — who viewed such determinism as totalitarian and potentially 
fascistic — and thus undermined the potentially cathartic possibilities of literature to 
express possible future narratives of subjectivity. 
 
6.2.e. The Indeterminable Subject — A Counter-Discursive Narrative of Foucault 
 
Given Foucault’s anti-metaphysical perspective of the impossibility of attaining pure 
self-presence due to the discursively ‘authored’ nature of subjectivity, observations that 
his life and work appear deliberately indeterminable are many, and fit well with my own 
discussion of the a priori aporia of the diminished subject.
4 Because Foucault resisted 
all  efforts  to  write  his  biography  —  as  seen  with  his  rejection  Roger-Pol  Droit’s 
proposed book of interviews — all insights into his personal life are limited due to the 
posthumous  destruction  of  his  notebooks  and  letters  at  his  behest,  something 
understandable given his patent passion for Nietzsche’s work. The view that Foucault 
recognised the metaphysical nature of subjectivity and deliberately resisted any attempts 
to posit his life and texts in deterministic terms, is supported by Miller who — when 
attempting to do just that — indicates the ironic nature of his pursuit: 
Consider, for example, the dilemma of trying to write a narrative account of someone 
who  questioned,  repeatedly  and  systematically,  the  value  of  old-fashioned  ideas 
about the ‘author;’ someone who raised the gravest of doubts about the character of 
personal  identity  as  such;  someone  who,  as  a  matter  of  temperament,  distrusted 
prying questions and naked honesty; someone, finally, who was nevertheless inclined 
to see his own work as, on some level, autobiographical (1994:6). 
 
That is, we can posit that the lack of certitude regarding Michel Foucault the subject is 
an implicit aspect of his theoretical explorations that repeatedly resist the imposition of   276 
metaphysical  discourses.  However,  it  is  also  possible  —  given  the  failure  of  the 
possibility of a ‘committed’ literature — that Foucault’s work was in fact a cathartic 
exercise,  and  provides  greater  insights  into  his  response  to  the  terror  of  the 
meaninglessness of existence, for as he explains: “That’s the obscure desire of a person 
who writes. It is true that the first text one writes is neither written for others, nor for 
who one is … There is an attempt at modifying one’s way of being through the act of 
writing” (Quoted in Miller:33). Thus, it is possible to read Foucault’s work as a semi-
autobiographical attempt to ‘modify’ his subjectivity through the construction of texts 
that resist generic philosophical classifications,  and by promoting a fragmented and 
changing personal and public persona. 
  With this view Foucault’s work can be read as the personal odyssey of a subject 
resisting limiting discourses by exploring the optimistic possibilities of a philosophical 
life, for as he explains: “The key to the personal poetic attitude of a philosopher is not to 
be sought in his ideas, as if it could be deduced from them, but rather in his philosophy-
as-life,  in  his  philosophical  life,  his  ethos”  (Quoted  in  Miller:9).  In  other  words, 
Foucault’s  response  to  the  trap  of  metaphysics,  and  the  failure  of  philosophical 
discourses to explore positive and tangible alternatives of subjectivity, was to live out 
his  theoretical  ideas,  to  put  them  into  practice  and  test  their  validity,  and  that  the 
difficulties faced when attempting to make conclusions regarding either his philosophy 
or  life,  reflect  his  proposition  of  the  ‘death  of  man.’  David  Macey  supports  the 
perspective  that  Foucault  constructed  a  narrative  of  self  that  would  problematise 
perceived notions of subject, author and art, explaining that: 
The Sartrean theory of authenticity appeared to him to be a return of the idea of a 
true self. Prompted by his interviewers, Foucault agreed that his own view was much 
closer to Nietzsche’s contention that […] ‘One thing is needful — to ‘give style’ to 
one’s character — a great and rare art. It is practiced by those who survey all of the 
strengths and weakness of their nature and then fit them into an artistic plan until 
every one of them appears as art and even weakness delights the eye … through long 
practice and daily work at it.’ The relationship of the self should, that is, be one of 
creative activity and not one designed to reveal a ‘true’ self (1993:458).     277 
 
Thus, in Foucault we find a philosopher evoking Nietzsche by creating a narrative of 
self  in  order  to  undermine  the  primacy  of  the  cogito  and  the  possibility  of  the 
transcendence  of  self-presence.  Rather,  than  creating  a  neat  teleology  of  Michel 
Foucault the subject, both his life and work mimic the discontinuities of the condition of 
the possibility of change and the meaninglessness of everyday existence.
5 However, 
despite this recognition there remains at the core of Foucault’s work a determination 
that given the metaphysical nature of the discursive subject, alternative expressions of 
subjectivity are always already a possibility.  
  In  The  Archaeology  of  Knowledge  we  find  the  clearest  indication  that  this 
counter-discursive and fragmented narrative of self was a deliberate attempt by Foucault 
to avoid the oppressive discourses of subjectivity, wherein he argues that:  
What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much pleasure in 
writing, do you think that I would keep so persistently to my task, if I were not 
preparing — with a rather shaky hand — a labyrinth into which I can venture, in 
which I can move my discourse, opening up underground passages, forcing it to go 
far from itself, finding overhangs that reduce and deform its itinerary, in which I can 
lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am no 
doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask me who I am 
and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to 
see that our papers  are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write 
(1983:17).  
 
That is, Foucault can be viewed as a philosopher who embraced Nietzsche’s view of the 
labyrinth, the ‘death of man’ and the terror of the meaninglessness of existence, yet 
optimistically determined to use his life and philosophical discourses to defamiliarise 
the seemingly a priori in order to explore, and promote, alternative counter-discursive 
narratives of self, while holding on to the belief that through the act of writing the 
individual could transcended the oppressive ‘moralities’ afflicting subjectivity.
6 
 
6.2.f. A History of Sexuality — The Desexualised Subject and ‘Limit Experiences’ 
 
Having  recognised  that  the  discursive  nature  of  subjectivity  ipso  facto  implies  the 
condition of the possibility of change, and given his own homosexuality, it is hardly   278 
surprising  that  Foucault  turned  his  genealogical  attention  to  the  defamiliarisation  of 
sexual  discourses.  In  The  History  of  Sexuality  he  argued  that  rather  than  being 
repressed, “Our epoch has initiated sexual heterogeneities” (1987:37), whereby sexual 
diversity has been concertedly investigated leading to the establishment of such sexual 
discourses  as  ‘homosexuality’  and  ‘paedophilia,’  by  encouraging  the  individual  to 
‘confess’ to sexual ‘perversities’ and fantasies, explaining that: 
[S]ince the end of the sixteenth century, the ‘putting into discourse of sex,’ far from 
undergoing  a  process  of  restriction,  on  the  contrary  has  been  subjected  to  a 
mechanism of increased incitement; that the techniques of power exercised over sex 
have not obeyed a principle of rigorous selection, but rather one of dissemination and 
implantation of polymorphous sexualities; and that the will to knowledge has not 
come to a halt in the face of a taboo that must not be lifted, but has persisted in 
constituting  […] a science of sexuality (12-13). 
 
That is, the desire for the ‘will to knowledge’ has been extended to the micro-level 
control of the subject, whereby the very future of the human race is being determined, 
and  counter-discursive,  perverse,  dangerous  and  non-procreative  sexual  acts  are 
classified, determined and mapped by a variety of discourses to ensure the continuation 
of political power, medical discourses and the legal system.
7 Thus, human sexuality 
becomes a discourse of power and control over the most intimate aspects of subjectivity 
— rather than acting as the seat of rebellion — as the constant investigations by various 
hegemonic practices, such as religious, judicial, and even economic discourses — such 
as  the  pornography  industry  —  reveal  the  private  and  taboo  acts  of  the  sexual 
individual. As Foucault explains: “Sex was a means of access both to the life of the 
body and the life of the species. It was employed as a standard for the disciplines and as 
a basis for regulations. This is why in the nineteenth century sexuality was sought out in 
the smallest details of individual existences; it was tracked down in behaviour, pursued 
in dreams; it was suspected of underlying the least follies, it was traced back to the 
earliest years of childhood; it became the stamp of individuality — at the same time 
what enabled one to analyze the latter and what made it possible to master it” (146).   279 
Thus, while he argues that sexuality has not been repressed, and the plethora of diverse 
sexual  practices  appear  to  be  the  only  real  site  of  contestation  for  many  subjects, 
Foucault indicates that the willingness of the individual to appropriate a generic sexual 
classification is always already restrictive and metaphysical. 
  Foucault’s response to these discursively repressive expressions of sexuality was 
to propose a new form of ‘desexualised individual’ that would explore the pleasures of 
the  body  extraneous  to  traditionally  accepted  sexual  practices,  and  self-regulated 
behaviour, that legitimated and perpetuated hegemonic discourses. He elucidates this 
point further in The History of Sexuality arguing that:   
We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, 
one tracks along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality. It is the 
agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim — through a tactical reversal 
of the various mechanisms of sexuality — to counter the grips of power with the 
claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their possibility 
of  resistance.  The  rallying  point  for  the  counterattack  against  the  deployment  of 
sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasure (157). 
 
Knowingly, in an interview carried out shortly before his death, Foucault acknowledges 
that  he  fell  into  the  trap  of  determinism  indicating  that  his  ‘philosophy-as-life’  has 
become  predominated  by  his  personal  explorations  of  homosexual  practices  and 
subcultures, stating that: “I believe that … someone who is a writer is not simply doing 
his work in his books […] but that his major work is, in the end, himself in the process 
of writing his books. The private life of an individual, his sexual preference, and his 
work are interrelated, not because his work translates his sexual life, but because the 
work  includes  the  whole  life  as  well  as  the  text”  (Quoted  in  Miller:19).  While  this 
position expresses Foucault’s belief in the cathartic possibilities of writing — and a 
deep-seated desire for the metaphysics of comfort in the belief that the subject can 
manage  and  manipulate  their  own  narrative  of  self  —  the  manner  in  which  he 
transformed  this  philosophical  proposition  into  actual  experience  raises  various 
questions and concerns.    280 
  The locus for Foucault’s explorations of the ‘desexualised’ individual’s extreme 
‘limit  experience’  became  apparent  to  him  following  his  introduction  to  the  gay 
bathhouses of San Francisco during his first visit to the US in the mid-1970s. It was 
here that Foucault’s search for pleasure reached it peak, as he explains in one of many 
interviews given to gay publications at the time: “I think that it is politically important 
[…] that sexuality is able to function as it functions in the bathhouses. You meet men 
there  who  are  to  you  as  you  are  to  them:  nothing  more  than  a  body  with  which 
combinations and productions of pleasure are possible. You cease to be imprisoned in 
your own face, in your own past, in your own identity” (1994:264). Thus for Foucault 
the counter-discursive exploration of desexualised physical pleasure that transcended 
the repressive discourses controlling sexuality, could be found in the Sado-Masochist 
activities practiced in these environments and — defending this problematic position — 
argued in the journal Gai Pied that:  
The  idea  that  S&M  is  related  to  deep  violence,  that  S&M  practice  is  a  way  of 
liberating this violence, this aggression is stupid. We know very well that what all 
those  people  are  doing  is  not  aggressive;  they  are  inventing  new  possibilities  of 
pleasure with strange parts of their body — through the eroticism of the body. I think 
its a kind of creation, a creative enterprise, which has as one of its main features what 
I call the desexualisation of pleasure … The possibility of using our bodies as a 
possible  source  of  very  numerous  pleasures  is  something  that  is  important.  For 
instance, if you look at the traditional constructions of pleasure, you see that bodily 
pleasure, or pleasures of the flesh, are always drinking, eating and fucking. And that 
seems  to  be  the  limit  of  our  understanding  our  body,  our  pleasures  (Quoted  in 
Macey:1993:369). 
 
Thus we see Foucault attempt to transcend the discursively determining possibilities of 
sexuality by exploring the extent of bodily pleasure in the ‘ungrounded language’ of gay 
S&M practices, something that also including such deliberately asexual acts as ‘fist-
fucking.’ While he acknowledged the controversy surrounding the apparent violence 
associated with such practices, it appears that as a member of this subculture Foucault 
fulfilled his own metaphysical desire to explore the alternative avenues of pleasure, and 
micro-level  subjectivity,  that  he  postulated  in  his  texts.  Thus,  with  his  anonymous   281 
search for pleasure among strangers, we see the world-famous philosopher determinedly 
undertaking  an  extreme  exploration  of  subjectivity  by  becoming  the  faceless,  and 
nameless, corporeal subject of pleasure. 
 
6.2.g. Michel Foucault and The Condition of the Possibility of Change   
 
Although we have seen Foucault resisting the determinist trap of metaphysics, there 
appears little doubt that his philosophical life-work was, in many ways, caught up in its 
own metaphysics of comfort as he continually strove to defamiliarise the seemingly a 
priori hegemonic discourses which construct and constrain the subject, in favour of the 
possible freedom of a counter-discursive presence of self. Given the recurrent failure of 
traditional  philosophical  and  political  dogmas  to  achieve  alternative  expressions  of 
being, and the tendency for deterministic approaches to slip into totalitarianism and 
fascism, Foucault’s micro-level focus on the search for desexualised pleasure and his 
view of personal transcendence without the oppression of others appears — at least on 
the  surface  —  a  logical  conclusion.  This  perspective  of  Foucault  as  driven  with  a 
‘passion’  to  find  a  personal  outlet,  or  a  philosophical  outcome  for  subjectivity  that 
would transcend the a priori aporia of the meaninglessness of existence, is explored in 
Miller’s The Passion of Michel Foucault, wherein he dramatically exclaims that: 
Too much was at stake in Foucault’s ongoing exploration of ‘bodies and pleasure.’ 
Lured on by the most ‘insidious’ of lusts, curiosity — and convinced that the kind of 
curiosity that ‘enables one to get free of oneself’ even merited ‘the pain of being 
practised with a little obstinacy’ — Foucault remained desperately eager to unriddle 
the truth about himself. By discovering the truth, he might still be able to transfigure 
himself, and create ‘something that absolutely does not exist, about which we know 
nothing’ — a different kind of man with a different kind of soul, and a different kind 
of body, ‘utterly new, utterly beautiful.’ Of course there were dangers. One needed 
courage (1994:345).  
 
Although  Miller  seems  inordinately  interested  in  the  controversy  surrounding 
Foucault’s exploration of  ‘limit experiences’ in the S&M bathhouses of San Francisco, 
and his LSD experiences in Death Valley, there is a validity regarding the dangers 
associated with such physical explorations of alternative subjectivities. However, while   282 
Miller’s perspective is retrospectively influenced by the knowledge that Foucault was to 
contract  AIDS  as  a  result  of  his  philosophical  lifework,  my  own  view  is  that  this 
particular ‘danger’ faced by the subject, is merely an extreme example of the ineluctable 
condition of the possibility of change. Despite the optimism he held for his pursuit, 
Foucault was not obverse to the possibilities of danger — seen with his disgust at the 
sudden death of Roland Barthes
8 — as he explains in ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History:’ 
“Chance is not simply the drawing of lots, but raising the stakes in every attempt to 
master chance through the will to power, and giving rise to the risk of an even greater 
chance. The world we know is not this ultimately simple configuration where events are 
reduced to accentuate their essential traits, their final meaning, or their initial and final 
value. On the contrary, it is a profusion of entangled events” (1986:89). Thus, we see 
Foucault raise the stakes of his personal experience in order to effect change, and it is to 
the ‘profusion of tangled events’ both preceding and following his death that I shall turn 
my attention to next. 
  It is both ironic and unfortunate that Foucault’s new found locus for desexualised 
experience should be the first to be subject to the extreme condition of the possibility of 
change that is AIDS. That his investigations into ‘ungrounded languages’ and the purely 
corporeal nature of bodily pleasure, should become victim to a virulent and unforgiving 
virus that attacked the very corporeality of this potential new individual, can be viewed 
as the ultimate example of the impossibility of pure self-presence and of the a priori 
aporia of the diminished nature of subjectivity. However, what is most unfortunate is 
the controversial response to Foucault’s apparent reticence regarding his illness, and the 
possibility  that  he  continued  attending  S&M  bathhouses  despite  knowing  he  had 
contracted AIDS.
9 While having no wish to add to the weight of discourse regarding 
this aspect of Foucault’s life and death, I would instead argue that his response to his 
illness could be viewed as a continuation of his philosophical lifework. While it remains   283 
uncertain whether Foucault knew he had AIDS,
10 it does merit consideration that this 
controversy is the result of a deliberate reticence on his part to maintain a personal ethos 
by refusing to discuss either his illness or the ‘ungrounded language’ of desexualised 
experience,  for  fear  of  it  becoming  subsumed  by  the  oppressive  discourses  he  was 
attempting to undermine.  
  The  change  effected  by  the  spread  of  AIDS  throughout  San  Francisco’s  gay 
community  is  well  documented  by  Miller  who  explains  that:  “Under  these  morbid 
circumstances,  some  resolved  to  change  their  sexual  practices,  embracing  either  a 
terrified celibacy or a new moderation, cutting down on sexual contacts and avoiding 
the exchange of bodily fluids. But others, feeling confused or resigned — or both — 
expressed a defiant abandon, partying on, as one censorious eyewitness would later 
remark, ‘like the revellers in Edgar Allen Poe’s ‘Masque of the Red Death’” (1994:28). 
Although the image of horror and decay associated with Poe’s macabre story makes for 
riveting reading, I am more inclined to view Foucault’s position as one of continued 
resistance to the discourses of power he had spent both his academic and personal life 
attempting to overturn, a perspective supported by Macey who explains that in a private 
interview given to Michael Horovitz — a student of Foucault’s — not long before his 
death he: “began talking of AIDS, and of looking to the authorities for lessons: doctors, 
the church. He is incensed that a group (gays) who have risked so much, are looking to 
standard authorities for guidance in a time of crisis. It is absurd. Unbelievable. ‘How 
can I be scared of AIDS when I could die in a car?’” (1993:463). Thus, for Foucault, the 
medical discourses, and safe sex practices, forced upon those exploring the ‘ungrounded 
languages’  of  desexualised  S&M  pleasure,  were  ‘technologies  of  power’  that,  by 
undertaking a greater understanding of AIDS, its mode of transmission, and dictating 
the behaviour of those at risk of contracting it, were oppressing his counter-discursive 
experience. And while it may seem sensible with hindsight that many would adopt a   284 
low risk approach to their sexual behaviour — justified by the horrendous results of the 
spread of AIDS — it follows that Foucault would view this intrusion as anathema to his 
Dionysian embracement of the terror of existence. The extent of his reticence becomes 
apparent if we consider that if he was aware that he had contracted AIDS, and omitted 
to informed his lover, and political activist, Daniel Defert — and given the latter’s 
immediate  formation  of  an  internationally  recognised  AIDS  awareness  organisation 
upon his death — then it is possible that this lack of discourse was a somewhat justified 
final act of his philosophical life.
11  
 
6.3.a. On Not Concluding But Continuing 
 
The precept ‘to be concerned with oneself’ was, for the Greeks, one of the main 
principles of cities, one of the main rules for social and personal conduct and for the 
art of life. For us now this notion is rather obscure and faded. When one is asked 
‘What is the most important moral principle in ancient philosophy?’ the immediate 
answer is not ‘Take care of oneself’ but the Delphic principle […] ‘know yourself’ 
meant ‘Do not suppose yourself to be a god.’  
— Michel Foucault, in ‘Technologies of the Self’ (1988:19). 
 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a 
doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to 
be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of 
what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are 
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.   
— Michel Foucault, in ‘What is Enlightenment’ (1984:50). 
 
In summation then, despite the exigencies which dictate that I end this discussion of the 
diminished subject — those relating to the metaphysics of submission — this chapter in 
no  way  represents  a  conclusion.  And  while  feeling  a  certain  reluctance  to  end  this 
teleology I strongly urge, despite of the repeated failure of philosophical discourse to 
avoid  the  trap  of  metaphysics,  for  the  continuation  of  such  investigations  into  the 
discursive origins, and the repression of alternative expressions, of subjectivity. Given 
the widely accepted perspective of contemporary society as postmodern in nature, and 
of a temporally specific ‘crisis’ that has diminished the self-present individual of yester-
year, this investigation into the ‘eternal recurrence’ of the crises of both philosophy and   285 
subjectivity,  clearly  supports  one  major  criticism  of  contemporary  culture  —  and 
Fredric Jameson would be proud of me here — that we have lost our sense of history. 
However,  unlike  those  calling for the  return  of the  originality  of  art  in the  face  of 
pastiche,  and  the  purely  self-present  individual  as  opposed  to  the  fragmented 
postmodern subject, I would argue that the contemporary being is in no way diminished 
in relation to a bygone transcendental individual, but is simply the latest manifestation 
of the eternal recurrence of the a priori aporia of the diminished subject. Thus, this text 
can be seen as a type of Foucauldian genealogy into the history of a continued crisis of 
subjectivity  that,  rather  than  searching  for  origins  and  solutions  to  this  supposed 
problem, uncovers its precedents, and exposes the discontinuities in the journey that 
finds us arrive at our present ‘postmodern’ perspective. As Foucault explains, when 
discussing  his  reason  for  writing  Discipline  and  Punish:  “I  would like  to  write  the 
history of this prison, with all of the political investments of the body that it gathers 
together in its closed architecture. Why? Simply because I am interested in the past? 
No, if one means by that writing a history of the past in terms of the present. Yes, if one 
means  writing  the  history  of  the  present”  (1991:30-31).  With  this  in  mind,  this 
‘historical’ investigation into the crisis of philosophy and subjectivity is essential if we 
are  to  continue  defamiliarising  the  dominant  cultural  discourse  of  the  ‘crisis’  of 
postmodernism, and the metaphysical lie that urges for the return of a misplaced pre-
postmodern self-present individual. 
  It should be apparent by now that, despite the repeated failure of those attempting 
alleviate their own perceived crisis in theory and subjectivity as seen throughout this 
text,  in  no  way  do  I  prescribe  the  type  of  nihilism  associated  with  Sartre’s 
existentialism, the tragic personal and political aporia of Heidegger, nor the negative, 
anything-goes  attitude  of  much  contemporary  theory  stemming  from  the  misguided 
interpretation of Derridean deconstruction as ‘free-play.’ What would be closer to the   286 
truth is to say that I feel a far greater affiliation with the naïve utopianism of Camus and 
his  call  for  cautious  rebellion  in  the  face  of  determinism  and  totalitarianism,  while 
arguing that if we are to overcome the terror of existence it is through an innate belief in 
the certitude of the metaphysics of comfort that is human happiness and joy. With this 
in mind, Foucault appears to have more in common with Camus than it would seem, for 
he also strove for a future subject free of deterministic and repressive discourses, and 
expressed  his  own  need  for  metaphysical  comfort  through  the  exploration  of 
desexualised  pleasure.  And  in  this  respect  I  would  turn  to  Foucault’s  retrospective 
discussion of his philosophical life in The Uses of Pleasure wherein, and with great 
modesty, he states that:  
The irony in those efforts one makes to alter one’s way of looking at things, to 
change the boundaries of what one knows and to venture out a ways from there. Did 
mine actually result in a different way of thinking? Perhaps at the most they made it 
possible to go back through what I was already thinking, to think it differently, and 
to see what I had done from a new vantage point in a clearer light (1987:11).  
 
And while it may be presumptuous of me to suggest that I have achieved this in this 
text, perhaps all I can ask for at the micro-level is that this missive fulfills my own need 
for metaphysical comfort and a belief in the condition of the possibility of change — 
through my selective genealogy of these attempts to address the crises of subjectivity 
and philosophy — that inherently defamiliarises those hegemonic discourses that judge, 
and oppress, both personal and creative expressions of subjectivity.   
  That Michel Foucault’s philosophical lifework should be the focus of this final 
chapter is a deliberate attempt to highlight the need for caution when acting out one’s 
philosophical  premises  on  a  personal  level.  We  have  already  seen  the  mistakes  of 
Martin Heidegger, whose personal fears for the future of Germany following the First 
World War became confused with the misappropriation of Nietzsche’s work by the 
Nazi party, and of Sartre’s totalitarian perspective of Camus’ work from the position of 
the ‘universal intellectual.’ As such, without entering into a debate regarding Foucault’s   287 
ethical position due to a lack of privileged insight into his thoughts and actions — and 
as  seen  with  my  discussion  of  the  positive  possibilities  of  controversial  works  of 
literature, such as Cocaine Nights and American Psycho — it seems that certain ideas 
and actions are best left unexplored in ‘real’ terms, given the potential dangers posed for 
both the individual and the Other by certain extreme ‘limit experiences.’ Despite his 
own deliberately non-deterministic anti-metaphysical approach to his life and work, in 
death Foucault was accused of a micro-level fascism, and of deliberately infecting other 
subjects with AIDS, while continuing his own desexualised search for pleasure despite 
discursive attempts to restrict these experiences and the possibility of a transcendent 
presence  of  self.  However,  this  perspective  is  purely  speculative  and  one  needs  to 
remember his famous ‘Preface’ to Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, in which he argues that:  
[T]he major enemy, the strategic adversary is fascism […] And not only historical 
fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini — which was able to mobilize and use 
the desire of the masses so effectively — but also the fascism in us all, in our heads 
and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the 
very thing that dominates and exploits us (1996:xiii).  
 
Given this patent fascination, yet repeated dislike of determinism and fascism, it seems 
unlikely  that  Foucault  would  have  deliberately  involved  others  in  his  personal 
Dionysian desire to ‘live dangerously,’ and perhaps instead chose to chance his life, to 
raise the stakes, and run the risk of the potential outcome of his own passionate need for 
the ‘will to truth.’
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  And it is with this perspective that I urge for the continuation of philosophical 
research  despite  its  speculative  failings,  in  order  that  it  continue  to  monitor,  and 
defamiliarise, the seemingly a priori, to search for the discontinuities in the discourses 
of power, to posit alternatives, and to bring a certain cathartic contentment that comes 
with the knowledge that such a pursuit is an expression of the need for the metaphysics 
of comfort in the face of the meaninglessness of existence. If this thesis simply adds to   288 
the accumulation of knowledge, I hope that at the very least this investigation into the 
temporally  disparate,  yet  repeated  crises  of  subjectivity  and  philosophy,  and  the 
metaphysics of determinism, is understood as vehemently urging for a continued need 
to  ‘rebel’  against  the  unfortunate  tendency  of  totalitarian  views  to  veer  towards 
fundamentalism  and  fascism.  Something  that  can  manifest  itself  as  the  micro-level 
‘terrorism’ of which Foucault accused Sartre, or the macro-level ‘interdictions’ that we 
are currently witnessing on a global scale.  
  Given the lack of metaphysical or scientific certitude inherent with this type of 
philosophical work — something  clearly at odds with today’s career orientated and 
deterministic ‘outcome based’ education systems — and given the increasingly neo-
conservative attempts to censor controversial counter-discursive works of literature and 
cultural  expressions  in  general,  I  would  argue  that  both  philosophical  and  literary 
explorations of subjectivity effectively defamiliarise the taken-for-granted discourses of 
everyday life, and reassure us that, despite the apparent a priori nature of contemporary 
society  and  subjectivity,  these  narratives  are  always  already  arbitrary,  irrevocably 
diminished,  and  therefore,  when  at  their  most  oppressive,  remain  vulnerable  to  the 
condition of the possibility of change. 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
1  In  his  paper  ‘Michel  Foucault’  Paul  Patton  explains  the  development  of  his  ‘archaeological’  and 
‘genealogical’ approaches: “From a methodological point of view, Foucault’s work alternates between 
two  approaches,  sometimes  combining  both  in  a  single  study:  first,  an  ‘archaeological’  approach 
concerned to describe the historical presuppositions of a given system of thought, along with the forms of 
exclusion or limitation they establish in regard to what may be said and done […] Second, there is a 
genealogical approach, which Foucault brings to the fore in his latter books. This is concerned to trace the 
historical process by which a given system comes into being and is subsequently transformed. Genealogy 
is concerned with origins, but in the manner of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Its purpose is 
not  to  discover  the  stable  essence  at  the  beginning  of  things,  but  rather  to  display  their  plural  and 
discontinuous origins, their singularity as historical objects and their capacity for being reconverted to 
new ends by external forces” (1989:226-27). 
2 Paul Patton explains the diverse perspectives and recurrent doubts Foucault held regarding his own 
enterprise explaining that: “Foucault himself has offered a plethora of global characterisations of his work 
over the years. For example, he has suggested that his essential concern is to define the system of limits 
and exclusions which make up our cultural unconscious. Elsewhere, he has suggested that he has always 
been concerned with power, even if previously unaware of it. More recently, he has proposed that his 
overall objective has been to ‘create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human 
beings are made subjects.’ In part, these different presentations correspond to real shifts in the theoretical 
style and objects of his work. They also reflect a tendency to provide an elaborate theoretical framework   289 
                                                                                                                                              
for each particular historical study and then to reinterpret past work in terms of the current project. The 
effect is always to locate a given study within a broader historical and analytical perspective” (1989:227). 
3 In his ‘Introduction’ to the English translation of ‘The Order of Discourse,’ Robert Young explains that: 
“Foucault, therefore, himself attempted to produce a new form of discourse, an ‘ungrounded language,’ in 
which the inclusion/exclusion, inside/outside, opposition of reason and madness would be effaced. The 
attempt to hear the silence of madness led Foucault to turn to literature (to Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud) in 
search of its authentic voice. The difficulty, even impossibility, of finding its form of discourse elsewhere 
led to reflection on all those rules, systems and procedures which constitute, and are constituted by, our 
‘will to knowledge.’ These, Foucault argues, comprise a discrete realm of discursive practices — the 
‘order  of  discourse’  —  a  conceptual  terrain  in  which  knowledge  is  formed  and  produced.  What  is 
analysed not simply what was thought or said per se, but all the discursive rules and categories that were 
a priori, assumed as a constituent part of discourse and therefore of knowledge, and so fundamental that 
they remained unvoiced and unthought” (1981:48). 
4 In his ‘Preface’ to Gilles Deleuze’s text Foucault, Bové explains the confusion surrounding his texts, 
and  his  own  academic  self-interest  in  Foucault,  explaining  that:  “Many  of  Foucault’s  most  telling 
statements — often some of his weakest and most controversial — come in interviews and occasional 
essays. They often occur in an admonitory mode when he tries to correct the very self-interested images 
of him and his work that scholars create in line with their own intellectual, political, and professional 
care. Because there is commonly such a buzz of contradictory comment going on around him — as his 
friends  and  enemies  push  him  to  the  left,  right,  and  center  or  sometimes  off  the  political  spectrum 
altogether — Foucault could assert that it proves what he contends; conventional categories don’t fit him; 
he is posing an entirely new and different set of questions about a whole range of sometimes unthought of 
matters” (1988:vii-viii). 
5 Foucault humorously indicates the discontinuities in his own work in The Uses of Pleasure in a faux 
interview wherein he asks: “Aren’t you sure of what you’re saying? Are you going to change yet again, 
shift your position according to the questions that are put to you, and say that the objections are not really 
directed at the place from which you are speaking? Are you going to declare yet again that you have 
never been what you have been reproached with being? Are you already preparing the way out that will 
enable you in your next book to spring up somewhere else and declare as you’re now doing: no, no, I’m 
not where you are lying in wait for me, but over here laughing at you?” (1983:17). 
6 Foucault explains the positive possibilities of the ineluctably discursive nature of power arguing that: 
“Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences 
are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an 
instrument and an effect or power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a 
starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (1984:101). 
7 In Alan Sheridan’s text, Michel Foucault: Will to Truth, he explains that: “In the last hundred years, a 
whole mass of social controls has grown up, screening the sexuality of its citizens, of all ages, in every 
form  of  relationship,  warning,  protecting,  and  condemning,  calling  for  diagnoses,  piling  up  reports, 
organizing therapies. Sex has become an area fraught with innumerable dangers, known and unknown; 
everyone must be aware of it; everyone must speak of it. Sex was driven out of hiding and forced to live a 
discursive existence” (1980:172-73). 
8 Macey explains Foucault’s exasperation and recognition of the condition of the possibility of change at 
Roland Barthes death stating that: “For Foucault, the death of Barthes was a ‘scandal’ because he had 
died at the height of his creative powers. The circumstances were also an uncannily graphic reminder of 
the accident which had left him hospitalised for a week in 1978” (1993: 428). That is, of the time when 
Foucault himself was knocked down by an automobile. 
9  Worryingly  Miller’s  The  Passion  of  Michel  Foucault  —  a  fascinating  narrative  interpretation  of 
Foucault’s life — begins with this premise: “My research began with a rumour — one that I know believe 
to be essentially false. One evening in the spring of 1987, an old friend […] relayed a shocking piece of 
gossip: knowing he was dying of AIDS, Michel Foucault in 1983 had gone to gay bathhouses in America, 
and deliberately tried to infect other people with the disease” (1994:375). 
10 In his own study of Foucault’s life and work Macey indicates the confusion and doubt surrounding this 
possibility stating that: “According to his friend and translator Alan Sheridan, Foucault told him: ‘The 
doctors … did not know what was wrong with him. Among other possibilities, he talked about AIDS only 
to dismiss it.’ Paul Veyne was convinced that Foucault knew what was wrong, and Pierre Nora insists 
that he had told those around him that he knew” (1993:476). 
11 Miller argues that: “Foucault’s death put Daniel Defert in a difficult position. For nearly a quarter of a 
century, he had shared Foucault’s life; in those last days, he had shared as well the agony of his death. 
But now, he realized, no one — neither the doctor, nor Foucault, if he knew — had told him the truth. In 
private, one friend of his had confided, Defert was furious. After all, his longtime lover had perhaps 
deceived him. He was upset as well that Foucault had not turned his death from AIDS into a public   290 
                                                                                                                                              
political issue. Defert, a seasoned activist, must have known that a rare opportunity to educate the public 
had been squandered” (1994:23). 
12 Following his own reading of Foucault’s life and work Miller explains that during a brief interview 
with Defert he believed that he may have deliberately taken the choice to run the risk of contracting AIDS 
explaining that: “‘It is quite possible,’ Defert remarked, ‘that he had a real knowledge of his near death, 
without making it a drama, but constructing, really everyday a [new kind of] relationship with others … 
Even if he was not certain about his own situation,’ the menace of AIDS was constantly on his mind. ‘He 
took AIDS very seriously,’ Defert continued. ‘When he went to San Francisco for the last time, he took it 
as  a  ‘limit-experience.’’  I  was  stunned.  Our  conversation  continued  for  another  hour.  But  as  I  left 
Foucault’s old apartment that night, all I could think about was Defert’s deceptively simple statement: He 
took AIDS very seriously; he took it as a limit-experience” (1994:381). 
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